{"section":{"filename":"s2111.html","chapter":"2100","section_number":"2111","title":"Claim Interpretation; Broadest Reasonable Interpretation","revision_tag":"R-10.2019","bytes":162689,"sha256":"4361ab16d766f5a1383832d25f9cd28c174972b5fb38a32f3794fd3df7638d54","subsection_count":5,"max_depth":1,"subsections":[{"number":"2111.01","title":"Plain Meaning","revision_tag":"R-01.2024","depth":1},{"number":"2111.02","title":"Effect of Preamble","revision_tag":"R-07.2022","depth":1},{"number":"2111.03","title":"Transitional Phrases","revision_tag":"R-01.2024","depth":1},{"number":"2111.04","title":"“Adapted to,” “Adapted for,” “Wherein,” “Whereby,” and Contingent Clauses","revision_tag":"R-10.2019","depth":1},{"number":"2111.05","title":"Functional and Nonfunctional Descriptive Material","revision_tag":"R-07.2022","depth":1}]},"quality":"structured","cited_authorities":{"file_section":"2111","cases":[{"key":"case:415f.3d1303","slug":"phillips-v-awh-corp","short_name":"Phillips v. AWH Corp.","canonical_citation":"Phillips v. AWH Corp., 415 F.3d 1303, 75 USPQ2d 1321 (Fed. Cir. 2005)","decision_year":2005,"court":"Fed. Cir.","holding_summary":"Claim terms are construed in light of the specification as understood by one of ordinary skill in the art; the USPTO's broadest reasonable interpretation standard is expressly recognized, and judges may freely consult dictionaries and treatises so long as they do not contradict the patent documents.","holding_confidence":"high","mentions":6,"propositions":[]},{"key":"case:367f.3d1359","slug":"in-re-am-acad-of-sci-tech-ctr","short_name":"In re Am. Acad. of Sci. Tech. Ctr.","canonical_citation":"In re Am. Acad. of Sci. Tech. Ctr., 367 F.3d 1359, 70 USPQ2d 1827 (Fed. Cir. 2004)","decision_year":2004,"court":"Fed. Cir.","holding_summary":"The Office gives claims their broadest reasonable construction in light of the specification as it would be interpreted by one of ordinary skill in the art, while cautioning against reading limitations into a claim from the preferred embodiment absent clear disclaimer.","holding_confidence":"high","mentions":3,"propositions":[]},{"key":"case:603f.3d1255","slug":"in-re-suitco-surface-inc","short_name":"In re Suitco Surface, Inc.","canonical_citation":"In re Suitco Surface, Inc., 603 F.3d 1255, 94 USPQ2d 1640 (Fed. Cir. 2010)","decision_year":2010,"court":"Fed. Cir.","holding_summary":"During prosecution an examiner must give claim terms their broadest reasonable interpretation, but that interpretation must be consistent with the specification; claims must conform to the invention set forth in the remainder of the specification.","holding_confidence":"medium","mentions":3,"propositions":[]},{"key":"case:127f.3d1048","slug":"in-re-morris","short_name":"In re Morris","canonical_citation":"In re Morris, 127 F.3d 1048, 44 USPQ2d 1023 (Fed. Cir. 1997)","decision_year":1997,"court":"Fed. Cir.","holding_summary":"During examination, claims are given their broadest reasonable interpretation, a standard different from the claim construction courts apply in litigation; the burden of precise claim drafting rests on the applicant, who can amend during prosecution.","holding_confidence":"high","mentions":3,"propositions":[]},{"key":"case:893f.2d319","slug":"in-re-zletz","short_name":"In re Zletz","canonical_citation":"In re Zletz, 893 F.2d 319, 13 USPQ2d 1320 (Fed. Cir. 1989)","decision_year":1989,"court":"Fed. Cir.","holding_summary":"During examination, claims are given their broadest reasonable interpretation, and claim words their plain meaning unless inconsistent with the specification; because the applicant can amend, this practice reduces the risk that issued claims will be interpreted more broadly than justified, and indefinite claims are rejected under 35 U.S.C. 112.","holding_confidence":"high","mentions":3,"propositions":[]},{"key":"case:90f.3d1576","slug":"vitronics-corp-v-conceptronic-inc","short_name":"Vitronics Corp. v. Conceptronic Inc.","canonical_citation":"Vitronics Corp. v. Conceptronic Inc., 90 F.3d 1576 (Fed. Cir. 1996)","decision_year":1996,"court":"Fed. Cir.","holding_summary":"The specification is always highly relevant to claim construction and is usually dispositive; it is the single best guide to the meaning of a disputed claim term.","holding_confidence":"high","mentions":3,"propositions":[]},{"key":"case:696f.3d1142","slug":"in-re-abbott-diabetes-care-inc","short_name":"In re Abbott Diabetes Care Inc.","canonical_citation":"In re Abbott Diabetes Care Inc., 696 F.3d 1142, 104 USPQ2d 1337 (Fed. Cir. 2012)","decision_year":2012,"court":"Fed. Cir.","holding_summary":"The specification is the best source for determining a claim term's meaning; under the broadest reasonable interpretation, \"electrochemical sensor\" was construed as devoid of external connection cables or wires to be consistent with the claims and specification.","holding_confidence":"high","mentions":2,"propositions":[]},{"key":"case:182f.3d1298","slug":"pitney-bowes-inc-v-hewlett-packard-co","short_name":"Pitney Bowes, Inc. v. Hewlett-Packard Co.","canonical_citation":"Pitney Bowes, Inc. v. Hewlett-Packard Co., 182 F.3d 1298, 51 USPQ2d 1161 (Fed. Cir. 1999)","decision_year":1999,"court":"Fed. Cir.","holding_summary":"A claim preamble limits the claim when, read in the context of the entire claim, it recites claim limitations or is necessary to give life, meaning, and vitality to the claim; in that case it is construed as part of the claim.","holding_confidence":"high","mentions":2,"propositions":[]},{"key":"case:342f.3d1329","slug":"jansen-v-rexall-sundown-inc","short_name":"Jansen v. Rexall Sundown, Inc.","canonical_citation":"Jansen v. Rexall Sundown, Inc., 342 F.3d 1329, 68 USPQ2d 1154 (Fed. Cir. 2003)","decision_year":2003,"court":"Fed. Cir.","holding_summary":"In a claim to a method of treating or preventing pernicious anemia by administering a vitamin preparation to \"a human in need thereof,\" the recitation of a patient in need gives life and meaning to the preamble's statement of purpose, making the preamble limiting.","holding_confidence":"high","mentions":2,"propositions":[]},{"key":"case:80uspq448","slug":"ex-parte-davis-1948","short_name":"Ex parte Davis","canonical_citation":"Ex parte Davis, 80 USPQ 448 (BPAI 1948)","decision_year":1948,"court":"BPAI","holding_summary":"The transitional term \"comprising\" leaves a claim open for the inclusion of unspecified ingredients, even in major amounts.","holding_confidence":"high","mentions":2,"propositions":[]},{"key":"case:945f.3d1368","slug":"amgen-inc-v-amneal-pharmaceuticals-llc","short_name":"Amgen Inc. v. Amneal Pharmaceuticals LLC","canonical_citation":"Amgen Inc. v. Amneal Pharmaceuticals LLC, 945 F.3d 1368, 2020 USPQ2d 3197 (Fed. Cir. 2020)","decision_year":2020,"court":"Fed. Cir.","holding_summary":"There is a strong presumption that a claim element set off with \"consisting of,\" such as a Markush group, is closed to unrecited elements, even within a composition claim whose transition phrase is the open-ended \"comprising\".","holding_confidence":"high","mentions":2,"propositions":[]},{"key":"case:831f.3d1350","slug":"multilayer-stretch-cling-film-holdings-inc-v-berry-plastics-corp","short_name":"Multilayer Stretch Cling Film Holdings, Inc. v. Berry Plastics Corp.","canonical_citation":"Multilayer Stretch Cling Film Holdings, Inc. v. Berry Plastics Corp., 831 F.3d 1350, 119 USPQ2d 1773 (Fed. Cir. 2016)","decision_year":2016,"court":"Fed. Cir.","holding_summary":"Absent qualifying language, a Markush group is presumed closed to combinations or mixtures of the listed alternatives, though the presumption may be overcome by intrinsic evidence; Markush members must be alternatively usable for the purposes of the invention.","holding_confidence":"high","mentions":2,"propositions":[]},{"key":"case:317f.2d951","slug":"in-re-janakirama-rao","short_name":"In re Janakirama-Rao","canonical_citation":"In re Janakirama-Rao, 317 F.2d 951, 137 USPQ 893 (CCPA 1963)","decision_year":1963,"court":"CCPA","holding_summary":"The transitional phrase \"consisting essentially of\" occupies a middle ground between closed \"consisting of\" claims and open \"comprising\" claims, limiting the claim to the recited components plus those that do not materially affect the invention's basic and novel characteristics.","holding_confidence":"medium","mentions":2,"propositions":[]},{"key":"case:703f.2d1381","slug":"in-re-gulack","short_name":"In re Gulack","canonical_citation":"In re Gulack, 703 F.2d 1381, 217 USPQ 401 (Fed. Cir. 1983)","decision_year":1983,"court":"Fed. Cir.","holding_summary":"All claim limitations, including printed matter, must be considered when determining patentability over prior art; printed matter distinguishes the invention only where there is a new and unobvious functional relationship between the printed matter and the substrate.","holding_confidence":"high","mentions":2,"propositions":[]},{"key":"case:808f.3d845","slug":"in-re-distefano","short_name":"In re DiStefano","canonical_citation":"In re DiStefano, 808 F.3d 845, 117 USPQ2d 1265 (Fed. Cir. 2015)","decision_year":2015,"court":"Fed. Cir.","holding_summary":"The printed matter doctrine extends to method claims adding an instructional limitation to a known method; the relevant inquiry is whether a new and nonobvious functional relationship exists between the printed or instructional matter and the associated product or method.","holding_confidence":"high","mentions":2,"propositions":[]},{"key":"case:211f.3d1367","slug":"in-re-hyatt","short_name":"In re Hyatt","canonical_citation":"In re Hyatt, 211 F.3d 1367, 54 USPQ2d 1664 (Fed. Cir. 2000)","decision_year":2000,"court":"Fed. Cir.","holding_summary":"During prosecution, an examiner must give claims their broadest reasonable interpretation, and claim terms must find clear support or antecedent basis in the description so their meaning is ascertainable by reference to the specification.","holding_confidence":"high","mentions":1,"propositions":[]},{"key":"case:740f.2d1569","slug":"in-re-yamamoto","short_name":"In re Yamamoto","canonical_citation":"In re Yamamoto, 740 F.2d 1569 (Fed. Cir. 1984)","decision_year":1984,"court":"Fed. Cir.","holding_summary":"During examination, claims are given their broadest reasonable interpretation consistent with the specification because the applicant can amend them; this practice reduces the possibility that an issued claim will be interpreted more broadly than is justified.","holding_confidence":"high","mentions":1,"propositions":[]},{"key":"case:415f.2d1393","slug":"in-re-prater","short_name":"In re Prater","canonical_citation":"In re Prater, 415 F.2d 1393, 162 USPQ 541 (CCPA 1969)","decision_year":1969,"court":"CCPA","holding_summary":"During examination, pending claims must be given their broadest reasonable interpretation consistent with the specification, since the applicant may amend claims; admissions in an applicant's briefs or remarks can evidence that a claim's scope is inconsistent with what the inventor regards as the invention.","holding_confidence":"high","mentions":1,"propositions":[]},{"key":"case:165f.3d1353","slug":"in-re-cortright","short_name":"In re Cortright","canonical_citation":"In re Cortright, 165 F.3d 1353, 49 USPQ2d 1464 (Fed. Cir. 1999)","decision_year":1999,"court":"Fed. Cir.","holding_summary":"The broadest reasonable interpretation of a claim term must be consistent with the ordinary meaning of the term, the specification, and the understanding of those skilled in the art; construing \"restore hair growth\" to require return to the original state was therefore incorrect.","holding_confidence":"high","mentions":1,"propositions":[]},{"key":"case:504f.3d1364","slug":"in-re-buszard","short_name":"In re Buszard","canonical_citation":"In re Buszard, 504 F.3d 1364, 84 USPQ2d 1749 (Fed. Cir. 2007)","decision_year":2007,"court":"Fed. Cir.","holding_summary":"The broadest reasonable interpretation of claims during prosecution must be reasonable from the perspective of one of ordinary skill in the art; equating a claimed flexible foam with a crushed rigid foam was unreasonable, and BRI serves to facilitate sharpening and clarifying claims at the application stage.","holding_confidence":"high","mentions":1,"propositions":[]},{"key":"case:358f.3d1371","slug":"chef-america-inc-v-lamb-weston-inc","short_name":"Chef America, Inc. v. Lamb-Weston, Inc.","canonical_citation":"Chef America, Inc. v. Lamb-Weston, Inc., 358 F.3d 1371, 69 USPQ2d 1857 (Fed. Cir. 2004)","decision_year":2004,"court":"Fed. Cir.","holding_summary":"Ordinary, simple English claim words with clear meaning are construed to mean exactly what they say; 'heating the dough to a temperature in the range of about 400-850F' required heating the dough itself, not the oven air.","holding_confidence":"high","mentions":1,"propositions":[]},{"key":"case:64f.4th1311","slug":"salazar-v-at-t-mobility-llc","short_name":"Salazar v. AT&T Mobility LLC","canonical_citation":"Salazar v. AT&T Mobility LLC, 64 F.4th 1311, 2023 USPQ2d 412 (Fed. Cir. 2023)","decision_year":2023,"court":"Fed. Cir.","holding_summary":"Claim language reciting \"a microprocessor\" followed by multiple functions attributed to \"said microprocessor\" does not require only one microprocessor, but does require a single microprocessor capable of performing all of the recited functions.","holding_confidence":"high","mentions":1,"propositions":[]},{"key":"case:816f.3d1352","slug":"in-re-varma","short_name":"In re Varma","canonical_citation":"In re Varma, 816 F.3d 1352, 118 USPQ2d 1342 (Fed. Cir. 2016)","decision_year":2016,"court":"Fed. Cir.","holding_summary":"Claim limitations referring back to a singular recited element (\"said microprocessor\") require that single element to perform all the recited functions; multiple elements each performing only one function do not suffice, just as owning two dogs that each do one trick is not a dog that does both.","holding_confidence":"high","mentions":1,"propositions":[]},{"key":"case:358f.3d870","slug":"superguide-corp-v-directv-enterprises-inc","short_name":"Superguide Corp. v. DirecTV Enterprises, Inc.","canonical_citation":"Superguide Corp. v. DirecTV Enterprises, Inc., 358 F.3d 870, 69 USPQ2d 1865 (Fed. Cir. 2004)","decision_year":2004,"court":"Fed. Cir.","holding_summary":"It is improper to import limitations from the written description into a claim; a particular embodiment in the specification may not be read into a claim when the claim language is broader than the embodiment.","holding_confidence":"high","mentions":1,"propositions":[]},{"key":"case:358f.3d898","slug":"liebel-flarsheim-co-v-medrad-inc","short_name":"Liebel-Flarsheim Co. v. Medrad Inc.","canonical_citation":"Liebel-Flarsheim Co. v. Medrad Inc., 358 F.3d 898, 69 USPQ2d 1801 (Fed. Cir. 2004)","decision_year":2004,"court":"Fed. Cir.","holding_summary":"Even if a patent describes only a single embodiment, the claims are not necessarily construed as limited to that embodiment.","holding_confidence":"high","mentions":1,"propositions":[]},{"key":"case:343f.3d1364","slug":"e-pass-techs-inc-v-3com-corp","short_name":"E-Pass Techs., Inc. v. 3Com Corp.","canonical_citation":"E-Pass Techs., Inc. v. 3Com Corp., 343 F.3d 1364, 67 USPQ2d 1947 (Fed. Cir. 2003)","decision_year":2003,"court":"Fed. Cir.","holding_summary":"Claims must be interpreted in view of the specification without unnecessarily importing limitations from the specification into the claims; an inherent tension exists between reading a descriptive statement as a lexicographic definition versus a description of a preferred embodiment.","holding_confidence":"high","mentions":1,"propositions":[]},{"key":"case:318f.3d1363","slug":"altiris-inc-v-symantec-corp","short_name":"Altiris Inc. v. Symantec Corp.","canonical_citation":"Altiris Inc. v. Symantec Corp., 318 F.3d 1363, 65 USPQ2d 1865 (Fed. Cir. 2003)","decision_year":2003,"court":"Fed. Cir.","holding_summary":"A specific order of steps may not be read into method claims where neither the claim language, as a matter of logic or grammar, nor the specification requires a particular order, even if only a single embodiment is disclosed.","holding_confidence":"high","mentions":1,"propositions":[]},{"key":"case:16f.3d1189","slug":"in-re-donaldson-co","short_name":"In re Donaldson Co.","canonical_citation":"In re Donaldson Co., 16 F.3d 1189, 29 USPQ2d 1845 (Fed. Cir. 1994)","decision_year":1994,"court":"Fed. Cir.","holding_summary":"A means- or step-plus-function limitation must be construed, including during examination, as limited to the corresponding structure, materials, or acts described in the specification and their equivalents; failure to disclose sufficient corresponding structure renders the claim indefinite under 35 U.S.C. 112(b).","holding_confidence":"high","mentions":1,"propositions":[]},{"key":"case:710f.2d799","slug":"in-re-marosi","short_name":"In re Marosi","canonical_citation":"In re Marosi, 710 F.2d 799, 218 USPQ 289 (Fed. Cir. 1983)","decision_year":1983,"court":"Fed. Cir.","holding_summary":"Claims are interpreted in light of the specification under the broadest reasonable interpretation, and once the examiner shows a claimed product appears the same as or similar to a prior art product made by a different process, the burden shifts to the applicant to establish a nonobvious difference.","holding_confidence":"high","mentions":1,"propositions":[]},{"key":"case:537f.2d545","slug":"in-re-okuzawa","short_name":"In re Okuzawa","canonical_citation":"In re Okuzawa, 537 F.2d 545, 190 USPQ 464 (CCPA 1976)","decision_year":1976,"court":"CCPA","holding_summary":"Claims are not read in a vacuum; claim limitations are interpreted in light of the specification when giving the claims their broadest reasonable interpretation.","holding_confidence":"high","mentions":1,"propositions":[]},{"key":"case:81f.4th1231","slug":"sisvel-intl-s-a-v-sierra-wireless-inc","short_name":"Sisvel Int’l S.A. v. Sierra Wireless, Inc.","canonical_citation":"Sisvel Int’l S.A. v. Sierra Wireless, Inc., 81 F.4th 1231, 2023 USPQ2d 1030 (Fed. Cir. 2023)","decision_year":2023,"court":"Fed. Cir.","holding_summary":"Claim terms are given their plain and ordinary meaning and should not be construed to improperly limit the claims to specific disclosed embodiments where the intrinsic evidence provides no basis for such a limitation.","holding_confidence":"high","mentions":1,"propositions":[]},{"key":"case:336f.3d1298","slug":"sunrace-roots-enter-co-v-sram-corp","short_name":"Sunrace Roots Enter. Co. v. SRAM Corp.","canonical_citation":"Sunrace Roots Enter. Co. v. SRAM Corp., 336 F.3d 1298, 67 USPQ2d 1438 (Fed. Cir. 2003)","decision_year":2003,"court":"Fed. Cir.","holding_summary":"The ordinary and customary meaning of a claim term is the meaning the term would have to a person of ordinary skill in the art in question at the time of the invention.","holding_confidence":"high","mentions":1,"propositions":[]},{"key":"case:334f.3d1294","slug":"brookhill-wilk-1-llc-v-intuitive-surgical-inc","short_name":"Brookhill-Wilk 1, LLC v. Intuitive Surgical, Inc.","canonical_citation":"Brookhill-Wilk 1, LLC v. Intuitive Surgical, Inc., 334 F.3d 1294, 67 USPQ2d 1132 (Fed. Cir. 2003)","decision_year":2003,"court":"Fed. Cir.","holding_summary":"In the absence of an express intent to impart a novel meaning to claim terms, the words are presumed to take on the ordinary and customary meanings attributed to them by those of ordinary skill in the art.","holding_confidence":"high","mentions":1,"propositions":[]},{"key":"case:85f.4th1365","slug":"malvern-panalytical-inc-v-ta-instruments-waters-llc","short_name":"Malvern Panalytical Inc. v. TA Instruments-Waters LLC","canonical_citation":"Malvern Panalytical Inc. v. TA Instruments-Waters LLC, 85 F.4th 1365, 2023 USPQ2d 1297 (Fed. Cir. 2023)","decision_year":2023,"court":"Fed. Cir.","holding_summary":"The plain and ordinary meaning of a claim term is ascertained by examining the claim language, the specification, and the prosecution history; a pipette guiding mechanism was thus construed as a mechanism guiding the pipette assembly either manually or automatically.","holding_confidence":"high","mentions":1,"propositions":[]},{"key":"case:725f.3d1315","slug":"3m-innovative-props-co-v-tredegar-corp","short_name":"3M Innovative Props. Co. v. Tredegar Corp.","canonical_citation":"3M Innovative Props. Co. v. Tredegar Corp., 725 F.3d 1315, 107 USPQ2d 1717 (Fed. Cir. 2013)","decision_year":2013,"court":"Fed. Cir.","holding_summary":"When the specification clearly defines the scope and content of a claim term, there is no need to turn to extrinsic evidence for claim interpretation; any meaning taken from outside sources must be consistent with the term's use in the specification and drawings.","holding_confidence":"high","mentions":1,"propositions":[]},{"key":"case:8f.4th1285","slug":"seabed-geosolutions-us-inc-v-magseis-ff-llc","short_name":"Seabed Geosolutions (US) Inc. v. Magseis FF LLC","canonical_citation":"Seabed Geosolutions (US) Inc. v. Magseis FF LLC, 8 F.4th 1285, 2021 USPQ2d 848 (Fed. Cir. 2021)","decision_year":2021,"court":"Fed. Cir.","holding_summary":"Where the intrinsic evidence — the claims, written description, and prosecution history — clearly supports a claim interpretation, it is unnecessary to resort to extrinsic evidence for claim construction.","holding_confidence":"high","mentions":1,"propositions":[]},{"key":"case:85f.4th1167","slug":"actelion-pharmaceuticals-ltd-v-mylan-pharmaceuticals-inc","short_name":"Actelion Pharmaceuticals Ltd v. Mylan Pharmaceuticals Inc.","canonical_citation":"Actelion Pharmaceuticals Ltd v. Mylan Pharmaceuticals Inc., 85 F.4th 1167, 2023 USPQ2d 1314 (Fed. Cir. 2023)","decision_year":2023,"court":"Fed. Cir.","holding_summary":"When the claims, specification, and prosecution history do not resolve a claim term's meaning, such as whether a pH of 13 or higher includes values that round to 13, extrinsic evidence should be consulted to determine the term's meaning in the relevant art during the relevant period.","holding_confidence":"high","mentions":1,"propositions":[]},{"key":"case:574u.s.318","slug":"teva-pharmaceuticals-usa-inc-v-sandoz-inc","short_name":"Teva Pharmaceuticals USA, Inc v. Sandoz, Inc.","canonical_citation":"Teva Pharmaceuticals USA, Inc v. Sandoz, Inc., 574 U.S. 318, 135 S. Ct. 831, 113 USPQ2d 1269 (SCOTUS 2015)","decision_year":2015,"court":"SCOTUS","holding_summary":"When intrinsic evidence does not resolve a claim term's meaning, extrinsic evidence may be consulted to understand the meaning of the term in the relevant art during the relevant time period.","holding_confidence":"high","mentions":1,"propositions":[]},{"key":"case:288f.3d1359","slug":"ccs-fitness-inc-v-brunswick-corp","short_name":"CCS Fitness, Inc. v. Brunswick Corp.","canonical_citation":"CCS Fitness, Inc. v. Brunswick Corp., 288 F.3d 1359, 62 USPQ2d 1658 (Fed. Cir. 2002)","decision_year":2002,"court":"Fed. Cir.","holding_summary":"To act as their own lexicographer, an applicant must clearly set forth in the specification a special definition of a claim term differing from its plain and ordinary meaning. A claim limitation that does not use the term \"means\" carries a rebuttable presumption that means-plus-function treatment does not apply.","holding_confidence":"high","mentions":1,"propositions":[]},{"key":"case:743f.3d849","slug":"starhome-gmbh-v-at-t-mobility-llc","short_name":"Starhome GmbH v. AT&T Mobility LLC","canonical_citation":"Starhome GmbH v. AT&T Mobility LLC, 743 F.3d 849, 109 USPQ2d 1885 (Fed. Cir. 2014)","decision_year":2014,"court":"Fed. Cir.","holding_summary":"A claim term is given its ordinary and customary meaning absent a clear intent in the specification to depart from it; 'gateway' meant a connection between different networks because nothing in the specification indicated a disclaimer or redefinition.","holding_confidence":"high","mentions":1,"propositions":[]},{"key":"case:669f.3d1362","slug":"thorner-v-sony-computer-entmt-am-llc","short_name":"Thorner v. Sony Computer Entm’t Am. LLC","canonical_citation":"Thorner v. Sony Computer Entm’t Am. LLC, 669 F.3d 1362, 101 USPQ2d 1457 (Fed. Cir. 2012)","decision_year":2012,"court":"Fed. Cir.","holding_summary":"Claim terms carry their ordinary and customary meaning absent a clear intent to depart from it; claims reciting actuators \"attached to said pad\" were not limited to attachment to the external surface merely because the specification's embodiments used \"attached\" that way.","holding_confidence":"high","mentions":1,"propositions":[]},{"key":"case:30f.3d1475","slug":"in-re-paulsen","short_name":"In re Paulsen","canonical_citation":"In re Paulsen, 30 F.3d 1475, 31 USPQ2d 1671 (Fed. Cir. 1994)","decision_year":1994,"court":"Fed. Cir.","holding_summary":"An applicant may act as their own lexicographer but must define terms with reasonable clarity, deliberateness, and precision in the disclosure to displace ordinary meaning; broad terms like \"computer\" are not narrowed absent such definition, and commercial success of articles outside the claims is not probative of nonobviousness.","holding_confidence":"high","mentions":1,"propositions":[]},{"key":"case:952f.2d1384","slug":"intellicall-inc-v-phonometrics-inc","short_name":"Intellicall, Inc. v. Phonometrics, Inc.","canonical_citation":"Intellicall, Inc. v. Phonometrics, Inc., 952 F.2d 1384, 21 USPQ2d 1383 (Fed. Cir. 1992)","decision_year":1992,"court":"Fed. Cir.","holding_summary":"An inventor may define specific terms used to describe the invention, but must do so with reasonable clarity, deliberateness, and precision, setting out any uncommon definition within the patent disclosure so as to give skilled artisans notice of the changed meaning.","holding_confidence":"high","mentions":1,"propositions":[]},{"key":"case:199f.3d1295","slug":"toro-co-v-white-consolidated-industries-inc","short_name":"Toro Co. v. White Consolidated Industries Inc.","canonical_citation":"Toro Co. v. White Consolidated Industries Inc., 199 F.3d 1295, 53 USPQ2d 1065 (Fed. Cir. 1999)","decision_year":1999,"court":"Fed. Cir.","holding_summary":"An applicant's explicit definition of a claim term controls its interpretation; the meaning of words in a claim is construed not in a lexicographic vacuum but in the context of the specification and drawings.","holding_confidence":"high","mentions":1,"propositions":[]},{"key":"case:448f.3d1309","slug":"old-town-canoe-co-v-confluence-holdings-corp","short_name":"Old Town Canoe Co. v. Confluence Holdings Corp.","canonical_citation":"Old Town Canoe Co. v. Confluence Holdings Corp., 448 F.3d 1309, 78 USPQ2d 1705 (Fed. Cir. 2006)","decision_year":2006,"court":"Fed. Cir.","holding_summary":"If a claim term is used in its ordinary and customary meaning throughout the specification and the written description clearly indicates its meaning, the term in the claim carries that meaning.","holding_confidence":"high","mentions":1,"propositions":[]},{"key":"case:133f.3d1473","slug":"multiform-desiccants-inc-v-medzam-ltd","short_name":"Multiform Desiccants Inc. v. Medzam Ltd.","canonical_citation":"Multiform Desiccants Inc. v. Medzam Ltd., 133 F.3d 1473, 45 USPQ2d 1429 (Fed. Cir. 1998)","decision_year":1998,"court":"Fed. Cir.","holding_summary":"Any special meaning assigned to a claim term must be sufficiently clear in the specification that a person of experience in the field would understand the departure from the term's common usage.","holding_confidence":"high","mentions":1,"propositions":[]},{"key":"case:190f.3d1350","slug":"process-control-corp-v-hydreclaim-corp","short_name":"Process Control Corp. v. HydReclaim Corp.","canonical_citation":"Process Control Corp. v. HydReclaim Corp., 190 F.3d 1350, 52 USPQ2d 1029 (Fed. Cir. 1999)","decision_year":1999,"court":"Fed. Cir.","holding_summary":"Although a patentee may act as their own lexicographer and define a claim term contrary to its ordinary meaning, the written description must clearly redefine the term so as to put a reasonable competitor or skilled artisan on notice of the intended redefinition.","holding_confidence":"high","mentions":1,"propositions":[]},{"key":"case:81f.4th1353","slug":"apple-inc-v-corephotonics-ltd","short_name":"Apple Inc. v. Corephotonics, Ltd.","canonical_citation":"Apple Inc. v. Corephotonics, Ltd., 81 F.4th 1353, 2023 USPQ2d 1056 (Fed. Cir. 2023)","decision_year":2023,"court":"Fed. Cir.","holding_summary":"Broad claim language is construed in light of the specification; where the specification reasonably defined two types of Wide point of view, the claim phrase \"a point of view of the Wide camera\" required only a Wide perspective or Wide position point of view.","holding_confidence":"high","mentions":1,"propositions":[]},{"key":"case:395f.3d1364","slug":"merck-co-v-teva-pharms-usa-inc","short_name":"Merck & Co. v. Teva Pharms. USA, Inc.","canonical_citation":"Merck & Co. v. Teva Pharms. USA, Inc., 395 F.3d 1364, 73 USPQ2d 1641 (Fed. Cir. 2005)","decision_year":2005,"court":"Fed. Cir.","holding_summary":"Where the specification is ambiguous as to whether the inventor used a claim term inconsistently with its ordinary meaning, the ordinary meaning applies; a passage too ambiguous to clearly redefine \"about\" as \"exactly\" cannot displace the term's plain meaning.","holding_confidence":"high","mentions":1,"propositions":[]},{"key":"case:242f.3d1337","slug":"scimed-life-sys-inc-v-advanced-cardiovascular-sys-inc","short_name":"SciMed Life Sys., Inc. v. Advanced Cardiovascular Sys., Inc.","canonical_citation":"SciMed Life Sys., Inc. v. Advanced Cardiovascular Sys., Inc., 242 F.3d 1337, 58 USPQ2d 1059 (Fed. Cir. 2001)","decision_year":2001,"court":"Fed. Cir.","holding_summary":"A specification's clear and unmistakable disavowal of claim scope removes a feature from the claims even where the claim language, read alone, might otherwise be broad enough to encompass it.","holding_confidence":"high","mentions":1,"propositions":[]},{"key":"case:809fed.appx.787","slug":"in-re-clarke-2020","short_name":"In re Clarke","canonical_citation":"In re Clarke, 809 Fed. Appx. 787, 2020 USPQ2d 10253 (Fed. Cir. 2020)","decision_year":2020,"court":"Fed. Cir.","holding_summary":"The doctrine of prosecution history estoppel is inapplicable during prosecution; it applies only to issued patents.","holding_confidence":"high","mentions":1,"propositions":[]},{"key":"case:289f.3d801","slug":"catalina-mktg-intl-v-coolsavings-com-inc","short_name":"Catalina Mktg. Int’l v. Coolsavings.com, Inc.","canonical_citation":"Catalina Mktg. Int’l v. Coolsavings.com, Inc., 289 F.3d 801, 62 USPQ2d 1781 (Fed. Cir. 2002)","decision_year":2002,"court":"Fed. Cir.","holding_summary":"Whether a preamble limits a claim is determined case by case in light of the particular facts; there is no litmus test, and a preamble has the import that the claim as a whole suggests for it.","holding_confidence":"high","mentions":1,"propositions":[]},{"key":"case:55f.3d615","slug":"bell-communications-research-inc-v-vitalink-communications-corp","short_name":"Bell Communications Research, Inc. v. Vitalink Communications Corp.","canonical_citation":"Bell Communications Research, Inc. v. Vitalink Communications Corp., 55 F.3d 615, 34 USPQ2d 1816 (Fed. Cir. 1995)","decision_year":1995,"court":"Fed. Cir.","holding_summary":"A claim preamble has the import that the claim as a whole suggests for it, and its limiting weight must be evaluated in construing the claim's scope and meaning.","holding_confidence":"high","mentions":1,"propositions":[]},{"key":"case:187f.2d150","slug":"kropa-v-robie","short_name":"Kropa v. Robie","canonical_citation":"Kropa v. Robie, 187 F.2d 150, 88 USPQ 478 (CCPA 1951)","decision_year":1951,"court":"CCPA","holding_summary":"A preamble is limiting where it is essential to point out the invention; the preamble phrase 'an abrasive article' was deemed essential because only that phrase made known that the claimed grains-and-binder subject matter comprised an abrasive article.","holding_confidence":"high","mentions":1,"propositions":[]},{"key":"case:868f.2d1251","slug":"corning-glass-works-v-sumitomo-elec-u-s-a-inc","short_name":"Corning Glass Works v. Sumitomo Elec. U.S.A., Inc.","canonical_citation":"Corning Glass Works v. Sumitomo Elec. U.S.A., Inc., 868 F.2d 1251, 9 USPQ2d 1962 (Fed. Cir. 1989)","decision_year":1989,"court":"Fed. Cir.","holding_summary":"Preamble terminology that limits the structure of the claimed invention must be treated as a claim limitation; whether preamble recitations are structural limitations is resolved by reviewing the entire application to understand what the inventors actually invented and intended the claim to encompass, without importing extraneous limitations.","holding_confidence":"high","mentions":1,"propositions":[]},{"key":"case:903f.2d796","slug":"pac-tec-inc-v-amerace-corp","short_name":"Pac-Tec Inc. v. Amerace Corp.","canonical_citation":"Pac-Tec Inc. v. Amerace Corp., 903 F.2d 796, 14 USPQ2d 1871 (Fed. Cir. 1990)","decision_year":1990,"court":"Fed. Cir.","holding_summary":"Preamble language that constitutes a structural limitation is actually part of the claimed invention and must be treated as such.","holding_confidence":"high","mentions":1,"propositions":[]},{"key":"case:828f.2d751","slug":"in-re-stencel","short_name":"In re Stencel","canonical_citation":"In re Stencel, 828 F.2d 751, 4 USPQ2d 1071 (Fed. Cir. 1987)","decision_year":1987,"court":"Fed. Cir.","holding_summary":"Structure set forth in a claim preamble cannot be ignored where it gives meaning to the claimed invention; preamble language reciting the structure of the collar limited the claimed driver even though the collar was not directly claimed in the body.","holding_confidence":"high","mentions":1,"propositions":[]},{"key":"case:962f.3d1362","slug":"shoes-by-firebug-llc-v-stride-rite-childrens-grp-llc","short_name":"Shoes by Firebug LLC v. Stride Rite Children’s Grp., LLC","canonical_citation":"Shoes by Firebug LLC v. Stride Rite Children’s Grp., LLC, 962 F.3d 1362, 2020 USPQ2d 10701 (Fed. Cir. 2020)","decision_year":2020,"court":"Fed. Cir.","holding_summary":"When the claim body fully and intrinsically sets forth all limitations of the invention and the preamble merely states a purpose or intended use, the preamble is not limiting; a preamble may be limiting in one patent's claim yet not in a related patent's claim.","holding_confidence":"high","mentions":1,"propositions":[]},{"key":"case:112f.3d473","slug":"rowe-v-dror","short_name":"Rowe v. Dror","canonical_citation":"Rowe v. Dror, 112 F.3d 473, 42 USPQ2d 1550 (Fed. Cir. 1997)","decision_year":1997,"court":"Fed. Cir.","holding_summary":"Where a patentee defines a structurally complete invention in the claim body and uses the preamble only to state a purpose or intended use for the invention, the preamble is not a claim limitation.","holding_confidence":"high","mentions":1,"propositions":[]},{"key":"case:211f.3d588","slug":"stx-llc-v-brine","short_name":"STX LLC. v. Brine","canonical_citation":"STX LLC. v. Brine, 211 F.3d 588, 54 USPQ2d 1347 (Fed. Cir. 2000)","decision_year":2000,"court":"Fed. Cir.","holding_summary":"A preamble phrase reciting only improved characteristics, such as 'which provides improved playing and handling characteristics,' is not a claim limitation; subjective qualities inherent in a sold product cannot serve as an escape hatch to circumvent the on-sale bar.","holding_confidence":"high","mentions":1,"propositions":[]},{"key":"case:686fed.app'x864","slug":"nantkwest-inc-v-lee","short_name":"Nantkwest , Inc. v. Lee","canonical_citation":"Nantkwest , Inc. v. Lee, 686 Fed. App'x 864 (Fed. Cir. 2017)","decision_year":2017,"court":"Fed. Cir.","holding_summary":"A claim preamble stating the intentional purpose of a method limits the claim; the phrase \"treating a cancer\" requires lysis of many cells to accomplish the goal of treating cancer, not merely lysing one or a few cancer cells.","holding_confidence":"high","mentions":1,"propositions":[]},{"key":"case:301f.3d1343","slug":"in-re-cruciferous-sprout-litig","short_name":"In re Cruciferous Sprout Litig.","canonical_citation":"In re Cruciferous Sprout Litig., 301 F.3d 1343, 64 USPQ2d 1202 (Fed. Cir. 2002)","decision_year":2002,"court":"Fed. Cir.","holding_summary":"A preamble phrase is a claim limitation when it helps define the claimed invention, as evidenced by the specification and prosecution history; the phrase \"rich in glucosinolates\" thus limited a method of preparing food from cruciferous sprouts.","holding_confidence":"high","mentions":1,"propositions":[]},{"key":"case:312f.2d937","slug":"in-re-otto","short_name":"In re Otto","canonical_citation":"In re Otto, 312 F.2d 937, 136 USPQ 458 (CCPA 1963)","decision_year":1963,"court":"CCPA","holding_summary":"Inclusion of the material or article worked upon by a claimed structure does not impart patentability to apparatus claims; a recited intended use, such as hair curling, is of no significance to the structure or the process of making it.","holding_confidence":"high","mentions":1,"propositions":[]},{"key":"case:309f.2d488","slug":"in-re-sinex","short_name":"In re Sinex","canonical_citation":"In re Sinex, 309 F.2d 488, 135 USPQ 302 (CCPA 1962)","decision_year":1962,"court":"CCPA","holding_summary":"A statement of intended use in an apparatus claim does not distinguish the claim over a prior art apparatus capable of the same use.","holding_confidence":"high","mentions":1,"propositions":[]},{"key":"case:128f.3d1473","slug":"in-re-schreiber","short_name":"In re Schreiber","canonical_citation":"In re Schreiber, 128 F.3d 1473, 44 USPQ2d 1429 (Fed. Cir. 1997)","decision_year":1997,"court":"Fed. Cir.","holding_summary":"A prior art structure capable of performing a claimed intended use anticipates the claim; a spout disclosed for dispensing oil inherently performed the popcorn-dispensing function recited in the claim, given the structural similarity between the prior art spout and the claimed dispensing top.","holding_confidence":"high","mentions":1,"propositions":[]},{"key":"case:370f.3d1354","slug":"metabolite-labs-inc-v-corp-of-am-holdings","short_name":"Metabolite Labs., Inc. v. Corp. of Am. Holdings","canonical_citation":"Metabolite Labs., Inc. v. Corp. of Am. Holdings, 370 F.3d 1354, 71 USPQ2d 1081 (Fed. Cir. 2004)","decision_year":2004,"court":"Fed. Cir.","holding_summary":"A preamble may provide limiting context where its statement of intended use formed the basis for distinguishing prior art during prosecution; separately, a reference disclosing only a broad genus does not inherently disclose all species, as an invitation to investigate is not an inherent disclosure.","holding_confidence":"high","mentions":1,"propositions":[]},{"key":"case:383f.3d1303","slug":"poly-america-lp-v-gse-lining-tech-inc","short_name":"Poly-America LP v. GSE Lining Tech. Inc.","canonical_citation":"Poly-America LP v. GSE Lining Tech. Inc., 383 F.3d 1303, 72 USPQ2d 1685 (Fed. Cir. 2004)","decision_year":2004,"court":"Fed. Cir.","holding_summary":"Preamble language that discloses a fundamental characteristic of the claimed invention, rather than a mere purpose or intended use, is a claim limitation. Sale of a prior art device merely capable of performing a claimed method, but not used to practice it before the critical date, is not an on-sale bar to the process.","holding_confidence":"high","mentions":1,"propositions":[]},{"key":"case:369f.3d1289","slug":"intirtool-ltd-v-texar-corp","short_name":"Intirtool, Ltd. v. Texar Corp.","canonical_citation":"Intirtool, Ltd. v. Texar Corp., 369 F.3d 1289, 70 USPQ2d 1780 (Fed. Cir. 2004)","decision_year":2004,"court":"Fed. Cir.","holding_summary":"A claim preamble is not limiting where the claim body describes a structurally complete invention and prosecution history statements referring to the preamble's function do not rely on it to distinguish the prior art.","holding_confidence":"high","mentions":1,"propositions":[]},{"key":"case:377f.3d1369","slug":"mars-inc-v-h-j-heinz-co","short_name":"Mars Inc. v. H.J. Heinz Co.","canonical_citation":"Mars Inc. v. H.J. Heinz Co., 377 F.3d 1369, 71 USPQ2d 1837 (Fed. Cir. 2004)","decision_year":2004,"court":"Fed. Cir.","holding_summary":"Like the transitional term 'comprising', the terms 'containing' and 'mixture' are open-ended and do not exclude additional, unrecited elements or steps.","holding_confidence":"high","mentions":1,"propositions":[]},{"key":"case:327f.3d1364","slug":"invitrogen-corp-v-biocrest-manufacturing-l-p","short_name":"Invitrogen Corp. v. Biocrest Manufacturing, L.P.","canonical_citation":"Invitrogen Corp. v. Biocrest Manufacturing, L.P., 327 F.3d 1364, 66 USPQ2d 1631 (Fed. Cir. 2003)","decision_year":2003,"court":"Fed. Cir.","holding_summary":"The transition \"comprising\" in a method claim indicates that the claim is open-ended and allows for additional, unrecited steps.","holding_confidence":"high","mentions":1,"propositions":[]},{"key":"case:112f.3d495","slug":"genentech-inc-v-chiron-corp","short_name":"Genentech, Inc. v. Chiron Corp.","canonical_citation":"Genentech, Inc. v. Chiron Corp., 112 F.3d 495, 42 USPQ2d 1608 (Fed. Cir. 1997)","decision_year":1997,"court":"Fed. Cir.","holding_summary":"\"Comprising\" is an open-ended term of art in claim language meaning that the named elements are essential, but other elements may be added and still form a construct within the scope of the claim.","holding_confidence":"high","mentions":1,"propositions":[]},{"key":"case:793f.2d1261","slug":"moleculon-research-corp-v-cbs-inc","short_name":"Moleculon Research Corp. v. CBS, Inc.","canonical_citation":"Moleculon Research Corp. v. CBS, Inc., 793 F.2d 1261, 229 USPQ 805 (Fed. Cir. 1986)","decision_year":1986,"court":"Fed. Cir.","holding_summary":"An assignment or sale of the rights in an invention and potential patent rights is not a sale of the invention itself and will not by itself trigger the on-sale bar of pre-AIA 35 U.S.C. 102(b).","holding_confidence":"high","mentions":1,"propositions":[]},{"key":"case:656f.2d679","slug":"in-re-baxter","short_name":"In re Baxter","canonical_citation":"In re Baxter, 656 F.2d 679, 210 USPQ 795 (CCPA 1981)","decision_year":1981,"court":"CCPA","holding_summary":"The transitional term \"comprising\" is open-ended, leaving the claim open to the inclusion of unspecified elements or ingredients, even in major amounts.","holding_confidence":"high","mentions":1,"propositions":[]},{"key":"case:405f.3d1367","slug":"gillette-co-v-energizer-holdings-inc","short_name":"Gillette Co. v. Energizer Holdings Inc.","canonical_citation":"Gillette Co. v. Energizer Holdings Inc., 405 F.3d 1367, 74 USPQ2d 1586 (Fed. Cir. 2005)","decision_year":2005,"court":"Fed. Cir.","holding_summary":"The transitional term \"comprising\" and the phrase \"group of\" are presumptively open-ended, so a claim to a razor blade unit comprising a group of first, second, and third blades encompasses razors with more than three blades.","holding_confidence":"high","mentions":1,"propositions":[]},{"key":"case:53f.2d520","slug":"in-re-gray-1931","short_name":"In re Gray","canonical_citation":"In re Gray, 53 F.2d 520, 11 USPQ 255 (CCPA 1931)","decision_year":1931,"court":"CCPA","holding_summary":"The transitional phrase \"consisting of\" closes the claim, excluding any element, step, or ingredient not specified in the claim.","holding_confidence":"high","mentions":1,"propositions":[]},{"key":"case:363f.3d1321","slug":"norian-corp-v-stryker-corp","short_name":"Norian Corp. v. Stryker Corp.","canonical_citation":"Norian Corp. v. Stryker Corp., 363 F.3d 1321, 70 USPQ2d 1508 (Fed. Cir. 2004)","decision_year":2004,"court":"Fed. Cir.","holding_summary":"A 'consisting of' claim to a bone repair kit of specified chemicals was infringed by a kit that also included a spatula, because the added item was unrelated to the claimed invention.","holding_confidence":"high","mentions":1,"propositions":[]},{"key":"case:334f.3d1274","slug":"abbott-labs-v-baxter-pharmaceutical-products-inc","short_name":"Abbott Labs v. Baxter Pharmaceutical Products, Inc.","canonical_citation":"Abbott Labs v. Baxter Pharmaceutical Products, Inc., 334 F.3d 1274, 67 USPQ2d 1191 (Fed. Cir. 2003)","decision_year":2003,"court":"Fed. Cir.","holding_summary":"A Markush grouping requires selection from a closed group \"consisting of\" the listed alternatives; absent qualifying language such as \"at least one member\" or \"mixtures thereof,\" the claim element is presumed not to encompass combinations or mixtures of the alternatives.","holding_confidence":"high","mentions":1,"propositions":[]},{"key":"case:793f.2d1279","slug":"mannesmann-demag-corp-v-engineered-metal-products-co","short_name":"Mannesmann Demag Corp. v. Engineered Metal Products Co.","canonical_citation":"Mannesmann Demag Corp. v. Engineered Metal Products Co., 793 F.2d 1279, 230 USPQ 45 (Fed. Cir. 1986)","decision_year":1986,"court":"Fed. Cir.","holding_summary":"The transitional term \"having\" in a claim may be interpreted as open-ended, permitting additional unrecited elements, depending on how the term is used in light of the specification and context.","holding_confidence":"low","mentions":1,"propositions":[]},{"key":"case:393f.3d1253","slug":"in-re-crish","short_name":"In re Crish","canonical_citation":"In re Crish, 393 F.3d 1253, 73 USPQ2d 1364 (Fed. Cir. 2004)","decision_year":2004,"court":"Fed. Cir.","holding_summary":"The transitional phrase \"consisting of\" closes only the clause in which it appears, not the claim as a whole; and sequencing a known prior art plasmid does not make its inherent DNA sequence novel—the claimed sequence is anticipated by the plasmid that necessarily possessed it.","holding_confidence":"high","mentions":1,"propositions":[]},{"key":"case:537f.2d549","slug":"in-re-herz","short_name":"In re Herz","canonical_citation":"In re Herz, 537 F.2d 549, 190 USPQ 461 (CCPA 1976)","decision_year":1976,"court":"CCPA","holding_summary":"The transitional phrase \"consisting essentially of\" limits a claim's scope to the specified materials or steps and those that do not materially affect the basic and novel characteristics of the claimed invention.","holding_confidence":"high","mentions":1,"propositions":[]},{"key":"case:156f.3d1351","slug":"ppg-industries-v-guardian-industries","short_name":"PPG Industries v. Guardian Industries","canonical_citation":"PPG Industries v. Guardian Industries, 156 F.3d 1351, 48 USPQ2d 1351 (Fed. Cir. 1998)","decision_year":1998,"court":"Fed. Cir.","holding_summary":"A \"consisting essentially of\" claim occupies a middle ground between closed claims written in a \"consisting of\" format and fully open claims drafted in a \"comprising\" format.","holding_confidence":"high","mentions":1,"propositions":[]},{"key":"case:750f.2d1569","slug":"atlas-powder-v-e-i-dupont-de-nemours-co","short_name":"Atlas Powder v. E.I. duPont de Nemours & Co.","canonical_citation":"Atlas Powder v. E.I. duPont de Nemours & Co., 750 F.2d 1569, 224 USPQ 409 (Fed. Cir. 1984)","decision_year":1984,"court":"Fed. Cir.","holding_summary":"Prophetic examples do not by themselves make a disclosure nonenabling, and the presence of inoperative embodiments within a claim's scope does not render it nonenabled if a skilled person could identify operative embodiments without undue effort. A 'consisting essentially of' claim occupies a middle ground between closed and open claim formats.","holding_confidence":"high","mentions":1,"propositions":[]},{"key":"case:344f.3d1234","slug":"ak-steel-corp-v-sollac","short_name":"AK Steel Corp. v. Sollac","canonical_citation":"AK Steel Corp. v. Sollac, 344 F.3d 1234, 68 USPQ2d 1280 (Fed. Cir. 2003)","decision_year":2003,"court":"Fed. Cir.","holding_summary":"A specification's statements defining what materially alters the invention—such as an upper limit on silicon content with discussion of its deleterious effects—control the scope of \"consisting essentially of\"; broad functional claims and claimed ranges must be enabled across their full scope.","holding_confidence":"high","mentions":1,"propositions":[]},{"key":"case:337f.2d870","slug":"in-re-de-lajarte","short_name":"In re De Lajarte","canonical_citation":"In re De Lajarte, 337 F.2d 870, 143 USPQ 256 (CCPA 1964)","decision_year":1964,"court":"CCPA","holding_summary":"An applicant contending that additional steps or materials in the prior art are excluded by the transitional phrase \"consisting essentially of\" bears the burden of showing that introducing those additional steps or components would materially change the characteristics of the claimed invention.","holding_confidence":"high","mentions":1,"propositions":[]},{"key":"case:12uspq2d1061","slug":"ex-parte-hoffman","short_name":"Ex parte Hoffman","canonical_citation":"Ex parte Hoffman, 12 USPQ2d 1061 (BPAI 1989)","decision_year":1989,"court":"BPAI","holding_summary":"The transitional phrase \"consisting essentially of\" may properly modify method steps, rendering the claim open only to additional steps that do not materially affect the basic and novel characteristics of the claimed method.","holding_confidence":"high","mentions":1,"propositions":[]},{"key":"case:228f.3d1365","slug":"lampi-corp-v-american-power-products-inc","short_name":"Lampi Corp. v. American Power Products Inc.","canonical_citation":"Lampi Corp. v. American Power Products Inc., 228 F.3d 1365, 56 USPQ2d 1445 (Fed. Cir. 2000)","decision_year":2000,"court":"Fed. Cir.","holding_summary":"The transitional phrase \"having\" must be interpreted in light of the specification and may be construed as open terminology permitting inclusion of components beyond those recited.","holding_confidence":"high","mentions":1,"propositions":[]},{"key":"case:246f.3d1336","slug":"crystal-semiconductor-corp-v-tritech-microelectronics-intl-inc","short_name":"Crystal Semiconductor Corp. v. TriTech Microelectronics Int’l Inc.","canonical_citation":"Crystal Semiconductor Corp. v. TriTech Microelectronics Int’l Inc., 246 F.3d 1336, 57 USPQ2d 1953 (Fed. Cir. 2001)","decision_year":2001,"court":"Fed. Cir.","holding_summary":"The transitional term \"having\" does not create a presumption that the body of the claim is open; whether it is open or closed depends on the specification.","holding_confidence":"high","mentions":1,"propositions":[]},{"key":"case:119f.3d1559","slug":"regents-of-the-univ-of-cal-v-eli-lilly-co","short_name":"Regents of the Univ. of Cal. v. Eli Lilly & Co.","canonical_citation":"Regents of the Univ. of Cal. v. Eli Lilly & Co., 119 F.3d 1559, 43 USPQ2d 1398 (Fed. Cir. 1997)","decision_year":1997,"court":"Fed. Cir.","holding_summary":"The written description requirement demands a description of the invention itself—such as the structure of a claimed genus—not merely an indication of a result one might achieve; generic or functional claim language often fails this requirement.","holding_confidence":"high","mentions":1,"propositions":[]},{"key":"case:239f.3d1239","slug":"afg-industries-inc-v-cardinal-ig-company","short_name":"AFG Industries, Inc. v. Cardinal IG Company","canonical_citation":"AFG Industries, Inc. v. Cardinal IG Company, 239 F.3d 1239, 57 USPQ2d 1776 (Fed. Cir. 2001)","decision_year":2001,"court":"Fed. Cir.","holding_summary":"The transitional phrase \"composed of\" may be interpreted, depending on the specification and facts, in the same manner as either \"consisting of\" or \"consisting essentially of.\"","holding_confidence":"high","mentions":1,"propositions":[]},{"key":"case:132f.2d1014","slug":"in-re-bertsch","short_name":"In re Bertsch","canonical_citation":"In re Bertsch, 132 F.2d 1014, 56 USPQ 379 (CCPA 1942)","decision_year":1942,"court":"CCPA","holding_summary":"The transitional phrase \"composed of\" is interpreted in the same manner as \"consisting of,\" although under certain circumstances it may be given a broader meaning in patent law.","holding_confidence":"high","mentions":1,"propositions":[]},{"key":"case:285f.3d1029","slug":"griffin-v-bertina","short_name":"Griffin v. Bertina","canonical_citation":"Griffin v. Bertina, 285 F.3d 1029, 62 USPQ2d 1431 (Fed. Cir. 2002)","decision_year":2002,"court":"Fed. Cir.","holding_summary":"A \"wherein\" clause limits a process claim when the clause gives meaning and purpose to the manipulative steps; whether such language is limiting depends on the specific facts of the case.","holding_confidence":"high","mentions":1,"propositions":[]},{"key":"case:739f.3d1375","slug":"in-re-giannelli","short_name":"In re Giannelli","canonical_citation":"In re Giannelli, 739 F.3d 1375, 109 USPQ2d 1333 (Fed. Cir. 2014)","decision_year":2014,"court":"Fed. Cir.","holding_summary":"An 'adapted to' clause can limit a machine claim where the written description gives it the narrower meaning of designed or constructed for a particular use, such as a machine designed to be used as a rowing machine with a pulling force on the handles.","holding_confidence":"high","mentions":1,"propositions":[]},{"key":"case:405f.3d1326","slug":"hoffer-v-microsoft-corp","short_name":"Hoffer v. Microsoft Corp.","canonical_citation":"Hoffer v. Microsoft Corp., 405 F.3d 1326, 74 USPQ2d 1481 (Fed. Cir. 2005)","decision_year":2005,"court":"Fed. Cir.","holding_summary":"A \"whereby\" clause that states a condition material to patentability cannot be ignored in order to change the substance of the invention, but a whereby clause in a method claim is given no weight when it simply expresses the intended result of a positively recited process step.","holding_confidence":"high","mentions":1,"propositions":[]},{"key":"case:336f.3d1373","slug":"minton-v-natl-assn-of-securities-dealers","short_name":"Minton v. Natl. Ass’n. of Securities Dealers","canonical_citation":"Minton v. Natl. Ass’n. of Securities Dealers, 336 F.3d 1373, 1378, 67 USPQ2d 1614, 1681 (Fed. Cir. 2003)","decision_year":2003,"court":"Fed. Cir.","holding_summary":"A process is a series of acts. A whereby clause in a method claim is given no weight when it simply expresses the intended result of a positively recited step, and the sale of a device embodying a claimed method triggers the on-sale bar.","holding_confidence":"high","mentions":1,"propositions":[]},{"key":"case:450u.s.175","slug":"diamond-v-diehr","short_name":"Diamond v. Diehr","canonical_citation":"Diamond v. Diehr, 450 U.S. 175, 209 USPQ 1 (1981)","decision_year":1981,"court":"SCOTUS","holding_summary":"In the eligibility analysis, claims must be considered as a whole rather than dissected into old and new elements; an invention is not ineligible merely because it involves a mathematical formula or other judicial exception applied in a practical process.","holding_confidence":"high","mentions":1,"propositions":[]},{"key":"case:32f.3d1579","slug":"in-re-lowry","short_name":"In re Lowry","canonical_citation":"In re Lowry, 32 F.3d 1579, 32 USPQ2d 1031 (Fed. Cir. 1994)","decision_year":1994,"court":"Fed. Cir.","holding_summary":"Printed matter must be given patentable weight when a new and nonobvious functional relationship exists between the printed matter and its associated physical substrate.","holding_confidence":"high","mentions":1,"propositions":[]},{"key":"case:367f.3d1336","slug":"in-re-ngai","short_name":"In re Ngai","canonical_citation":"In re Ngai, 367 F.3d 1336, 70 USPQ2d 1862 (Fed. Cir. 2004)","decision_year":2004,"court":"Fed. Cir.","holding_summary":"Nonfunctional printed matter does not distinguish a claimed product from an otherwise identical prior art product; a kit of instructions plus a buffer agent was anticipated even though the content of the instructions differed.","holding_confidence":"high","mentions":1,"propositions":[]},{"key":"case:639f.3d1057","slug":"in-re-kao","short_name":"In re Kao","canonical_citation":"In re Kao, 639 F.3d 1057, 98 USPQ2d 1799 (Fed. Cir. 2011)","decision_year":2011,"court":"Fed. Cir.","holding_summary":"When secondary considerations are present, though not always dispositive, it is error not to consider them; but where the offered evidence results from something other than what is both claimed and novel, there is no nexus. Instructional limitations added to known methods require a new and nonobvious functional relationship.","holding_confidence":"high","mentions":1,"propositions":[]},{"key":"case:616f.3d1267","slug":"king-pharmaceuticals-inc-v-eon-labs-inc","short_name":"King Pharmaceuticals Inc. v. Eon Labs Inc.","canonical_citation":"King Pharmaceuticals Inc. v. Eon Labs Inc., 616 F.3d 1267, 95 USPQ2d 1833 (Fed. Cir. 2010)","decision_year":2010,"court":"Fed. Cir.","holding_summary":"The printed matter doctrine extends to method claims in which an instructional limitation is added to a method known in the art; such a limitation receives patentable weight only if it has a new and nonobvious functional relationship with the known method.","holding_confidence":"high","mentions":1,"propositions":[]},{"key":"case:418f.2d1392","slug":"in-re-miller","short_name":"In re Miller","canonical_citation":"In re Miller, 418 F.2d 1392, 164 USPQ 46 (CCPA 1969)","decision_year":1969,"court":"CCPA","holding_summary":"Printed matter can be given patentable weight when it bears a new and nonobvious functional relationship to its substrate, as where volume indicia on a measuring cup perform the function of indicating volume for halving a recipe.","holding_confidence":"high","mentions":1,"propositions":[]},{"key":"case:323fed.app'x898","slug":"in-re-bryan","short_name":"In re Bryan","canonical_citation":"In re Bryan, 323 Fed. App'x 898 (Fed. Cir. 2009)","decision_year":2009,"court":"Fed. Cir.","holding_summary":"Printed matter on game cards that merely enables the cards to be collected, traded, and drawn bears no new and nonobvious functional relationship to the substrate; such functions pertain to the method of playing a game, not the structure of the article.","holding_confidence":"high","mentions":1,"propositions":[]},{"key":"case:112uspq439","slug":"ex-parte-gwinn","short_name":"Ex parte Gwinn","canonical_citation":"Ex parte Gwinn, 112 USPQ 439 (BPAI 1955)","decision_year":1955,"court":"BPAI","holding_summary":"Claims to a set of dice differing from the prior art solely in printed matter were properly rejected because there was no new feature of physical structure and no new relation of the printed matter to the physical structure.","holding_confidence":"high","mentions":1,"propositions":[]}],"statutes":[{"key":"us_usc:35:102","slug":"35-usc-102","canonical_citation":"35 U.S.C. 102","mentions":6},{"key":"us_usc:35:112","slug":"35-usc-112","canonical_citation":"35 U.S.C. 112","mentions":5},{"key":"us_usc:35:101","slug":"35-usc-101","canonical_citation":"35 U.S.C. 101","mentions":2},{"key":"us_cfr:37:1.75","slug":"37-cfr-1-75","canonical_citation":"37 CFR 1.75","mentions":1},{"key":"us_usc:35:103","slug":"35-usc-103","canonical_citation":"35 U.S.C. 103","mentions":1}],"cross_references":[{"key":"mpep:2106","section_number":"2106","title":"Patent Subject Matter Eligibility","exists":true,"mentions":1},{"key":"mpep:2112","section_number":"2112","title":"Requirements of Rejection Based on Inherency; Burden of Proof","exists":true,"mentions":1},{"key":"mpep:2117","section_number":"2117","title":"Markush Claims","exists":true,"mentions":2},{"key":"mpep:2143","section_number":"2143","title":"Examples of Basic Requirements of a Prima Facie Case of Obviousness","exists":true,"mentions":1},{"key":"mpep:2150","section_number":"2150","title":"Examination Guidelines for 35 U.S.C. 102 and 103 as Amended by the First Inventor To File Provisions of the Leahy-Smith America Invents Act","exists":true,"mentions":1},{"key":"mpep:2173","section_number":"2173","title":"Claims Must Particularly Point Out and Distinctly Claim the Invention","exists":true,"mentions":3},{"key":"mpep:2181","section_number":"2181","title":"Identifying and Interpreting a 35 U.S.C. 112(f) or Pre-AIA 35 U.S.C. 112, Sixth Paragraph Limitation","exists":true,"mentions":1},{"key":"mpep:2186","section_number":"2186","title":"Relationship to the Doctrine of Equivalents","exists":true,"mentions":1}],"form_paragraphs":[]},"structured_data":{"nodes":[{"id":"se_3v44fuac","corpus_id":"mpep-e9r01-2024-html","opaque_url":"https://mpep.io/n/se_3v44fuac","effective_range":{"start_revision":"R-10.2019","end_revision":null},"rendered_text_html":"","rendered_text_plain":"","provenance":{"source_file":"s2111.html","source_anchor":"d0e200352","source_sha256":"4361ab16d766f5a1383832d25f9cd28c174972b5fb38a32f3794fd3df7638d54"},"node_type":"section","akn_urn":"/akn/us/statement/manual/uspto/2024/mpep/eng@2024-02-29!sec_2111","canonical_url":"https://mpep.io/akn/us/statement/manual/uspto/2024/mpep/eng@2024-02-29!sec_2111","section_number":"2111","chapter":"2100","depth":0,"title":"Claim Interpretation; Broadest Reasonable Interpretation","children_ids":["pb_f4h5wswc","pb_posq5j4m","nq_zexvaesg","pb_yegdafdd","pb_g2d5vx63","pb_lb5taciq","pb_kqbdm5ej","pb_cwt3wj6n","se_cfmo5i5k","se_kirs6hlb","se_3qvuqrak","se_vz6csedi","se_qdlieef7"],"revision_tag":"R-10.2019"},{"id":"pb_f4h5wswc","corpus_id":"mpep-e9r01-2024-html","opaque_url":"https://mpep.io/n/pb_f4h5wswc","effective_range":{"start_revision":"R-10.2019","end_revision":null},"rendered_text_html":"<b id=\"\">CLAIMS MUST BE GIVEN THEIR BROADEST REASONABLE INTERPRETATION IN LIGHT OF THE\n                        SPECIFICATION</b>","rendered_text_plain":"CLAIMS MUST BE GIVEN THEIR BROADEST REASONABLE INTERPRETATION IN LIGHT OF THE SPECIFICATION","provenance":{"source_file":"s2111.html","source_anchor":"d0e200352/b.0","source_sha256":"4361ab16d766f5a1383832d25f9cd28c174972b5fb38a32f3794fd3df7638d54"},"node_type":"prose_block","kind":"informal_heading","host_section_id":"se_3v44fuac","heading_level":2,"heading_text":"CLAIMS MUST BE GIVEN THEIR BROADEST REASONABLE INTERPRETATION IN LIGHT OF THE SPECIFICATION"},{"id":"pb_posq5j4m","corpus_id":"mpep-e9r01-2024-html","opaque_url":"https://mpep.io/n/pb_posq5j4m","effective_range":{"start_revision":"R-10.2019","end_revision":null},"rendered_text_html":"During patent examination, the pending claims must be “given their\n                        broadest reasonable interpretation consistent with the specification.” The Federal\n                        Circuit’s <i>en banc</i> decision in <i>Phillips v. AWH\n                           Corp.,</i> 415 F.3d 1303, 1316, 75 USPQ2d 1321, 1329 (Fed. Cir. 2005) expressly\n                        recognized that the USPTO employs the “broadest reasonable interpretation” standard:\n                     ","rendered_text_plain":"During patent examination, the pending claims must be “given their broadest reasonable interpretation consistent with the specification.” The Federal Circuit’s en banc decision in Phillips v. AWH Corp., 415 F.3d 1303, 1316, 75 USPQ2d 1321, 1329 (Fed. Cir. 2005) expressly recognized that the USPTO employs the “broadest reasonable interpretation” standard:","provenance":{"source_file":"s2111.html","source_anchor":"d0e200360","source_sha256":"4361ab16d766f5a1383832d25f9cd28c174972b5fb38a32f3794fd3df7638d54"},"node_type":"prose_block","kind":"narrative","host_section_id":"se_3v44fuac"},{"id":"cs_a3teryyl","corpus_id":"mpep-e9r01-2024-html","opaque_url":"https://mpep.io/n/cs_a3teryyl","effective_range":{"start_revision":"R-10.2019","end_revision":null},"rendered_text_html":"","rendered_text_plain":"Phillips v. AWH Corp., 415 F.3d 1303, 75 USPQ2d 1321 (Fed. Cir. 2005)","provenance":{"source_file":"s2111.html","source_anchor":"","source_sha256":"4361ab16d766f5a1383832d25f9cd28c174972b5fb38a32f3794fd3df7638d54"},"node_type":"case","short_name":"Phillips v. AWH Corp.","all_citations":["415 F.3d 1303","75 USPQ2d 1321"],"canonical_citation":"Phillips v. AWH Corp., 415 F.3d 1303, 75 USPQ2d 1321 (Fed. Cir. 2005)","decision_year":2005,"court":"Fed. Cir."},{"id":"nq_zexvaesg","corpus_id":"mpep-e9r01-2024-html","opaque_url":"https://mpep.io/n/nq_zexvaesg","effective_range":{"start_revision":"R-10.2019","end_revision":null},"rendered_text_html":"\n<p id=\"ch2100_p_29ba0_f115_1bd\"> The Patent and Trademark Office (“PTO”) determines\n                           the scope of claims in patent applications not solely on the basis of the claim\n                           language, but upon giving claims their broadest reasonable construction “in light of\n                           the specification as it would be interpreted by one of ordinary skill in the art.”\n                           <i>In re Am. Acad. of Sci. Tech. Ctr.,</i> 367 F.3d 1359, 1364[, 70\n                           USPQ2d 1827, 1830] (Fed. Cir. 2004). Indeed, the rules of the PTO require that\n                           application claims must “conform to the invention as set forth in the remainder of\n                           the specification and the terms and phrases used in the claims must find clear\n                           support or antecedent basis in the description so that the meaning of the terms in\n                           the claims may be ascertainable by reference to the description.” <b><a href=\"mpep-9020-appx-r.html#d0e320269\">37 CFR\n                                 1.75(d)(1)</a></b>.\n                        </p>\n","rendered_text_plain":"The Patent and Trademark Office (“PTO”) determines the scope of claims in patent applications not solely on the basis of the claim language, but upon giving claims their broadest reasonable construction “in light of the specification as it would be interpreted by one of ordinary skill in the art.” In re Am. Acad. of Sci. Tech. Ctr., 367 F.3d 1359, 1364[, 70 USPQ2d 1827, 1830] (Fed. Cir. 2004). Indeed, the rules of the PTO require that application claims must “conform to the invention as set forth in the remainder of the specification and the terms and phrases used in the claims must find clear support or antecedent basis in the description so that the meaning of the terms in the claims may be ascertainable by reference to the description.” 37 CFR 1.75(d)(1).","provenance":{"source_file":"s2111.html","source_anchor":"d0e200371","source_sha256":"4361ab16d766f5a1383832d25f9cd28c174972b5fb38a32f3794fd3df7638d54"},"node_type":"narrative_quote","source_anchor":"d0e200371","host_section_id":"se_3v44fuac","source_case_id":"cs_awc42adi"},{"id":"cs_awc42adi","corpus_id":"mpep-e9r01-2024-html","opaque_url":"https://mpep.io/n/cs_awc42adi","effective_range":{"start_revision":"R-10.2019","end_revision":null},"rendered_text_html":"","rendered_text_plain":"In re Am. Acad. of Sci. Tech. Ctr., 367 F.3d 1359, 70 USPQ2d 1827 (Fed. Cir. 2004)","provenance":{"source_file":"s2111.html","source_anchor":"","source_sha256":"4361ab16d766f5a1383832d25f9cd28c174972b5fb38a32f3794fd3df7638d54"},"node_type":"case","short_name":"In re Am. Acad. of Sci. Tech. Ctr.","all_citations":["367 F.3d 1359","70 USPQ2d 1827"],"canonical_citation":"In re Am. Acad. of Sci. Tech. Ctr., 367 F.3d 1359, 70 USPQ2d 1827 (Fed. Cir. 2004)","decision_year":2004,"court":"Fed. Cir."},{"id":"pb_yegdafdd","corpus_id":"mpep-e9r01-2024-html","opaque_url":"https://mpep.io/n/pb_yegdafdd","effective_range":{"start_revision":"R-10.2019","end_revision":null},"rendered_text_html":"See also <i>In re Suitco Surface, Inc.,</i> 603 F.3d 1255,\n                        1259, 94 USPQ2d 1640, 1643 (Fed. Cir. 2010); <i>In re Hyatt,</i> 211 F.3d\n                        1367, 1372, 54 USPQ2d 1664, 1667 (Fed. Cir. 2000). \n                     ","rendered_text_plain":"See also In re Suitco Surface, Inc., 603 F.3d 1255, 1259, 94 USPQ2d 1640, 1643 (Fed. Cir. 2010); In re Hyatt, 211 F.3d 1367, 1372, 54 USPQ2d 1664, 1667 (Fed. Cir. 2000).","provenance":{"source_file":"s2111.html","source_anchor":"d0e200380","source_sha256":"4361ab16d766f5a1383832d25f9cd28c174972b5fb38a32f3794fd3df7638d54"},"node_type":"prose_block","kind":"narrative","host_section_id":"se_3v44fuac"},{"id":"cs_j7s2ghee","corpus_id":"mpep-e9r01-2024-html","opaque_url":"https://mpep.io/n/cs_j7s2ghee","effective_range":{"start_revision":"R-10.2019","end_revision":null},"rendered_text_html":"","rendered_text_plain":"In re Suitco Surface, Inc., 603 F.3d 1255, 94 USPQ2d 1640 (Fed. Cir. 2010)","provenance":{"source_file":"s2111.html","source_anchor":"","source_sha256":"4361ab16d766f5a1383832d25f9cd28c174972b5fb38a32f3794fd3df7638d54"},"node_type":"case","short_name":"In re Suitco Surface, Inc.","all_citations":["603 F.3d 1255","94 USPQ2d 1640"],"canonical_citation":"In re Suitco Surface, Inc., 603 F.3d 1255, 94 USPQ2d 1640 (Fed. Cir. 2010)","decision_year":2010,"court":"Fed. Cir."},{"id":"cs_qfvhtwpy","corpus_id":"mpep-e9r01-2024-html","opaque_url":"https://mpep.io/n/cs_qfvhtwpy","effective_range":{"start_revision":"R-10.2019","end_revision":null},"rendered_text_html":"","rendered_text_plain":"In re Hyatt, 211 F.3d 1367, 54 USPQ2d 1664 (Fed. Cir. 2000)","provenance":{"source_file":"s2111.html","source_anchor":"","source_sha256":"4361ab16d766f5a1383832d25f9cd28c174972b5fb38a32f3794fd3df7638d54"},"node_type":"case","short_name":"In re Hyatt","all_citations":["211 F.3d 1367","54 USPQ2d 1664"],"canonical_citation":"In re Hyatt, 211 F.3d 1367, 54 USPQ2d 1664 (Fed. Cir. 2000)","decision_year":2000,"court":"Fed. Cir."},{"id":"pb_g2d5vx63","corpus_id":"mpep-e9r01-2024-html","opaque_url":"https://mpep.io/n/pb_g2d5vx63","effective_range":{"start_revision":"R-10.2019","end_revision":null},"rendered_text_html":"Patented claims are not given the broadest reasonable\n                        interpretation during court proceedings involving infringement and validity, and can be\n                        interpreted based on a fully developed prosecution record. In contrast, an examiner must\n                        construe claim terms in the broadest reasonable manner during prosecution as is\n                        reasonably allowed in an effort to establish a clear record of what applicant intends to\n                        claim. Thus, the Office does not interpret claims when examining patent applications in\n                        the same manner as the courts. <i>In re Morris,</i> 127 F.3d 1048, 1054, 44\n                        USPQ2d 1023, 1028 (Fed. Cir. 1997); <i>In re Zletz,</i> 893 F.2d 319,\n                        321-22, 13 USPQ2d 1320, 1321-22 (Fed. Cir. 1989). \n                     ","rendered_text_plain":"Patented claims are not given the broadest reasonable interpretation during court proceedings involving infringement and validity, and can be interpreted based on a fully developed prosecution record. In contrast, an examiner must construe claim terms in the broadest reasonable manner during prosecution as is reasonably allowed in an effort to establish a clear record of what applicant intends to claim. Thus, the Office does not interpret claims when examining patent applications in the same manner as the courts. In re Morris, 127 F.3d 1048, 1054, 44 USPQ2d 1023, 1028 (Fed. Cir. 1997); In re Zletz, 893 F.2d 319, 321-22, 13 USPQ2d 1320, 1321-22 (Fed. Cir. 1989).","provenance":{"source_file":"s2111.html","source_anchor":"ch2100_d24d26_258ff_1cb","source_sha256":"4361ab16d766f5a1383832d25f9cd28c174972b5fb38a32f3794fd3df7638d54"},"node_type":"prose_block","kind":"narrative","host_section_id":"se_3v44fuac"},{"id":"cs_2neg23rl","corpus_id":"mpep-e9r01-2024-html","opaque_url":"https://mpep.io/n/cs_2neg23rl","effective_range":{"start_revision":"R-10.2019","end_revision":null},"rendered_text_html":"","rendered_text_plain":"In re Morris, 127 F.3d 1048, 44 USPQ2d 1023 (Fed. Cir. 1997)","provenance":{"source_file":"s2111.html","source_anchor":"","source_sha256":"4361ab16d766f5a1383832d25f9cd28c174972b5fb38a32f3794fd3df7638d54"},"node_type":"case","short_name":"In re Morris","all_citations":["127 F.3d 1048","44 USPQ2d 1023"],"canonical_citation":"In re Morris, 127 F.3d 1048, 44 USPQ2d 1023 (Fed. Cir. 1997)","decision_year":1997,"court":"Fed. Cir."},{"id":"cs_huec6nfd","corpus_id":"mpep-e9r01-2024-html","opaque_url":"https://mpep.io/n/cs_huec6nfd","effective_range":{"start_revision":"R-10.2019","end_revision":null},"rendered_text_html":"","rendered_text_plain":"In re Zletz, 893 F.2d 319, 13 USPQ2d 1320 (Fed. Cir. 1989)","provenance":{"source_file":"s2111.html","source_anchor":"","source_sha256":"4361ab16d766f5a1383832d25f9cd28c174972b5fb38a32f3794fd3df7638d54"},"node_type":"case","short_name":"In re Zletz","all_citations":["893 F.2d 319","13 USPQ2d 1320"],"canonical_citation":"In re Zletz, 893 F.2d 319, 13 USPQ2d 1320 (Fed. Cir. 1989)","decision_year":1989,"court":"Fed. Cir."},{"id":"pb_lb5taciq","corpus_id":"mpep-e9r01-2024-html","opaque_url":"https://mpep.io/n/pb_lb5taciq","effective_range":{"start_revision":"R-10.2019","end_revision":null},"rendered_text_html":"Because applicant has the opportunity to amend the claims\n                        during prosecution, giving a claim its broadest reasonable interpretation will reduce\n                        the possibility that the claim, once issued, will be interpreted more broadly than is\n                        justified. <i> In re Yamamoto,</i> 740 F.2d 1569, 1571 (Fed. Cir. 1984);\n                        <i>In re Zletz,</i> 893 F.2d 319, 321, 13 USPQ2d 1320, 1322 (Fed. Cir.\n                        1989) (“During patent examination the pending claims must be interpreted as broadly as\n                        their terms reasonably allow.”); <i>In re Prater,</i> 415 F.2d 1393,\n                        1404-05, 162 USPQ 541, 550-51 (CCPA 1969) (Claim 9 was directed to a process of\n                        analyzing data generated by mass spectrographic analysis of a gas. The process comprised\n                        selecting the data to be analyzed by subjecting the data to a mathematical manipulation.\n                        The examiner made rejections under <b><a href=\"mpep-9015-appx-l.html#d0e302376\">35 U.S.C. 101</a></b> and <b><a href=\"mpep-9015-appx-l.html#d0e302383\">35 U.S.C. 102</a></b>. In\n                        the <b><a href=\"mpep-9015-appx-l.html#d0e302383\">35 U.S.C.\n                              102</a></b> rejection, the examiner explained that the claim was\n                        anticipated by a mental process augmented by pencil and paper markings. The court agreed\n                        that the claim was not limited to using a machine to carry out the process since the\n                        claim did not explicitly set forth the machine. The court explained that “reading a\n                        claim in light of the specification, to thereby interpret limitations explicitly recited\n                        in the claim, is a quite different thing from ‘reading limitations of the specification\n                        into a claim,’ to thereby narrow the scope of the claim by implicitly adding disclosed\n                        limitations which have no express basis in the claim.” The court found that applicant\n                        was advocating the latter, i.e., the impermissible importation of subject matter from\n                        the specification into the claim.). See also <i>In re Morris,</i> 127 F.3d\n                        1048, 1054-55, 44 USPQ2d 1023, 1027-28 (Fed. Cir. 1997) (The court held that the USPTO\n                        is not required, in the course of prosecution, to interpret claims in applications in\n                        the same manner as a court would interpret claims in an infringement suit. Rather, the\n                        “PTO applies to verbiage of the proposed claims the broadest reasonable meaning of the\n                        words in their ordinary usage as they would be understood by one of ordinary skill in\n                        the art, taking into account whatever enlightenment by way of definitions or otherwise\n                        that may be afforded by the written description contained in applicant’s\n                        specification.”). \n                     ","rendered_text_plain":"Because applicant has the opportunity to amend the claims during prosecution, giving a claim its broadest reasonable interpretation will reduce the possibility that the claim, once issued, will be interpreted more broadly than is justified. In re Yamamoto, 740 F.2d 1569, 1571 (Fed. Cir. 1984); In re Zletz, 893 F.2d 319, 321, 13 USPQ2d 1320, 1322 (Fed. Cir. 1989) (“During patent examination the pending claims must be interpreted as broadly as their terms reasonably allow.”); In re Prater, 415 F.2d 1393, 1404-05, 162 USPQ 541, 550-51 (CCPA 1969) (Claim 9 was directed to a process of analyzing data generated by mass spectrographic analysis of a gas. The process comprised selecting the data to be analyzed by subjecting the data to a mathematical manipulation. The examiner made rejections under 35 U.S.C. 101 and 35 U.S.C. 102. In the 35 U.S.C. 102 rejection, the examiner explained that the claim was anticipated by a mental process augmented by pencil and paper markings. The court agreed that the claim was not limited to using a machine to carry out the process since the claim did not explicitly set forth the machine. The court explained that “reading a claim in light of the specification, to thereby interpret limitations explicitly recited in the claim, is a quite different thing from ‘reading limitations of the specification into a claim,’ to thereby narrow the scope of the claim by implicitly adding disclosed limitations which have no express basis in the claim.” The court found that applicant was advocating the latter, i.e., the impermissible importation of subject matter from the specification into the claim.). See also In re Morris, 127 F.3d 1048, 1054-55, 44 USPQ2d 1023, 1027-28 (Fed. Cir. 1997) (The court held that the USPTO is not required, in the course of prosecution, to interpret claims in applications in the same manner as a court would interpret claims in an infringement suit. Rather, the “PTO applies to verbiage of the proposed claims the broadest reasonable meaning of the words in their ordinary usage as they would be understood by one of ordinary skill in the art, taking into account whatever enlightenment by way of definitions or otherwise that may be afforded by the written description contained in applicant’s specification.”).","provenance":{"source_file":"s2111.html","source_anchor":"ch2100_d24d26_258f6_1c6","source_sha256":"4361ab16d766f5a1383832d25f9cd28c174972b5fb38a32f3794fd3df7638d54"},"node_type":"prose_block","kind":"narrative","host_section_id":"se_3v44fuac"},{"id":"cs_c4tjhpgc","corpus_id":"mpep-e9r01-2024-html","opaque_url":"https://mpep.io/n/cs_c4tjhpgc","effective_range":{"start_revision":"R-10.2019","end_revision":null},"rendered_text_html":"","rendered_text_plain":"In re Yamamoto, 740 F.2d 1569 (Fed. Cir. 1984)","provenance":{"source_file":"s2111.html","source_anchor":"","source_sha256":"4361ab16d766f5a1383832d25f9cd28c174972b5fb38a32f3794fd3df7638d54"},"node_type":"case","short_name":"In re Yamamoto","all_citations":["740 F.2d 1569"],"canonical_citation":"In re Yamamoto, 740 F.2d 1569 (Fed. Cir. 1984)","decision_year":1984,"court":"Fed. Cir."},{"id":"cs_nskzo2yq","corpus_id":"mpep-e9r01-2024-html","opaque_url":"https://mpep.io/n/cs_nskzo2yq","effective_range":{"start_revision":"R-10.2019","end_revision":null},"rendered_text_html":"","rendered_text_plain":"In re Prater, 415 F.2d 1393, 162 USPQ 541 (CCPA 1969)","provenance":{"source_file":"s2111.html","source_anchor":"","source_sha256":"4361ab16d766f5a1383832d25f9cd28c174972b5fb38a32f3794fd3df7638d54"},"node_type":"case","short_name":"In re Prater","all_citations":["415 F.2d 1393","162 USPQ 541"],"canonical_citation":"In re Prater, 415 F.2d 1393, 162 USPQ 541 (CCPA 1969)","decision_year":1969,"court":"CCPA"},{"id":"st_3o7kwqdn","corpus_id":"mpep-e9r01-2024-html","opaque_url":"https://mpep.io/n/st_3o7kwqdn","effective_range":{"start_revision":"R-10.2019","end_revision":null},"rendered_text_html":"","rendered_text_plain":"","provenance":{"source_file":"s2111.html","source_anchor":"","source_sha256":"4361ab16d766f5a1383832d25f9cd28c174972b5fb38a32f3794fd3df7638d54"},"node_type":"statute","authority":"us_usc","authority_title_num":"35","authority_section_num":"101","canonical_citation":"35 U.S.C. 101","subsection_path":[]},{"id":"st_qhm4rtwl","corpus_id":"mpep-e9r01-2024-html","opaque_url":"https://mpep.io/n/st_qhm4rtwl","effective_range":{"start_revision":"R-10.2019","end_revision":null},"rendered_text_html":"","rendered_text_plain":"","provenance":{"source_file":"s2111.html","source_anchor":"","source_sha256":"4361ab16d766f5a1383832d25f9cd28c174972b5fb38a32f3794fd3df7638d54"},"node_type":"statute","authority":"us_usc","authority_title_num":"35","authority_section_num":"102","canonical_citation":"35 U.S.C. 102","subsection_path":[]},{"id":"pb_kqbdm5ej","corpus_id":"mpep-e9r01-2024-html","opaque_url":"https://mpep.io/n/pb_kqbdm5ej","effective_range":{"start_revision":"R-10.2019","end_revision":null},"rendered_text_html":"The broadest reasonable interpretation does not mean the broadest\n                        possible interpretation. Rather, the meaning given to a claim term must be consistent\n                        with the ordinary and customary meaning of the term (unless the term has been given a\n                        special definition in the specification), and must be consistent with the use of the\n                        claim term in the specification and drawings. Further, the broadest reasonable\n                        interpretation of the claims must be consistent with the interpretation that those\n                        skilled in the art would reach. <i>In re Cortright,</i> 165 F.3d 1353, 1359,\n                        49 USPQ2d 1464, 1468 (Fed. Cir. 1999) (The Board’s construction of the claim limitation\n                        “restore hair growth” as requiring the hair to be returned to its original state was\n                        held to be an incorrect interpretation of the limitation. The court held that,\n                        consistent with applicant’s disclosure and the disclosure of three patents from\n                        analogous arts using the same phrase to require only some increase in hair growth, one\n                        of ordinary skill would construe “restore hair growth” to mean that the claimed method\n                        increases the amount of hair grown on the scalp, but does not necessarily produce a full\n                        head of hair.). Thus the focus of the inquiry regarding the meaning of a claim should be\n                        what would be reasonable from the perspective of one of ordinary skill in the\n                        art.<i> In re Suitco Surface, Inc.,</i> 603 F.3d 1255, 1260, 94 USPQ2d\n                        1640, 1644 (Fed. Cir. 2010); <i>In re Buszard,</i> 504 F.3d 1364, 84 USPQ2d\n                        1749 (Fed. Cir. 2007). In <i>Buszard,</i> the claim was directed to a flame\n                        retardant composition comprising a flexible polyurethane foam reaction mixture. 504 F.3d\n                        at 1365, 84 USPQ2d at 1750. The Federal Circuit found that the Board’s interpretation\n                        that equated a “flexible” foam with a crushed “rigid” foam was not reasonable.\n                        <i>Id.</i> at 1367, 84 USPQ2d at 1751. Persuasive argument was presented\n                        that persons experienced in the field of polyurethane foams know that a flexible mixture\n                        is different than a rigid foam mixture. <i>Id.</i> at 1366, 84 USPQ2d at\n                        1751. \n                     ","rendered_text_plain":"The broadest reasonable interpretation does not mean the broadest possible interpretation. Rather, the meaning given to a claim term must be consistent with the ordinary and customary meaning of the term (unless the term has been given a special definition in the specification), and must be consistent with the use of the claim term in the specification and drawings. Further, the broadest reasonable interpretation of the claims must be consistent with the interpretation that those skilled in the art would reach. In re Cortright, 165 F.3d 1353, 1359, 49 USPQ2d 1464, 1468 (Fed. Cir. 1999) (The Board’s construction of the claim limitation “restore hair growth” as requiring the hair to be returned to its original state was held to be an incorrect interpretation of the limitation. The court held that, consistent with applicant’s disclosure and the disclosure of three patents from analogous arts using the same phrase to require only some increase in hair growth, one of ordinary skill would construe “restore hair growth” to mean that the claimed method increases the amount of hair grown on the scalp, but does not necessarily produce a full head of hair.). Thus the focus of the inquiry regarding the meaning of a claim should be what would be reasonable from the perspective of one of ordinary skill in the art. In re Suitco Surface, Inc., 603 F.3d 1255, 1260, 94 USPQ2d 1640, 1644 (Fed. Cir. 2010); In re Buszard, 504 F.3d 1364, 84 USPQ2d 1749 (Fed. Cir. 2007). In Buszard, the claim was directed to a flame retardant composition comprising a flexible polyurethane foam reaction mixture. 504 F.3d at 1365, 84 USPQ2d at 1750. The Federal Circuit found that the Board’s interpretation that equated a “flexible” foam with a crushed “rigid” foam was not reasonable. Id. at 1367, 84 USPQ2d at 1751. Persuasive argument was presented that persons experienced in the field of polyurethane foams know that a flexible mixture is different than a rigid foam mixture. Id. at 1366, 84 USPQ2d at 1751.","provenance":{"source_file":"s2111.html","source_anchor":"d0e200403","source_sha256":"4361ab16d766f5a1383832d25f9cd28c174972b5fb38a32f3794fd3df7638d54"},"node_type":"prose_block","kind":"narrative","host_section_id":"se_3v44fuac"},{"id":"cs_4lixctbe","corpus_id":"mpep-e9r01-2024-html","opaque_url":"https://mpep.io/n/cs_4lixctbe","effective_range":{"start_revision":"R-10.2019","end_revision":null},"rendered_text_html":"","rendered_text_plain":"In re Cortright, 165 F.3d 1353, 49 USPQ2d 1464 (Fed. Cir. 1999)","provenance":{"source_file":"s2111.html","source_anchor":"","source_sha256":"4361ab16d766f5a1383832d25f9cd28c174972b5fb38a32f3794fd3df7638d54"},"node_type":"case","short_name":"In re Cortright","all_citations":["165 F.3d 1353","49 USPQ2d 1464"],"canonical_citation":"In re Cortright, 165 F.3d 1353, 49 USPQ2d 1464 (Fed. Cir. 1999)","decision_year":1999,"court":"Fed. Cir."},{"id":"cs_5du2wmco","corpus_id":"mpep-e9r01-2024-html","opaque_url":"https://mpep.io/n/cs_5du2wmco","effective_range":{"start_revision":"R-10.2019","end_revision":null},"rendered_text_html":"","rendered_text_plain":"In re Buszard, 504 F.3d 1364, 84 USPQ2d 1749 (Fed. Cir. 2007)","provenance":{"source_file":"s2111.html","source_anchor":"","source_sha256":"4361ab16d766f5a1383832d25f9cd28c174972b5fb38a32f3794fd3df7638d54"},"node_type":"case","short_name":"In re Buszard","all_citations":["504 F.3d 1364","84 USPQ2d 1749"],"canonical_citation":"In re Buszard, 504 F.3d 1364, 84 USPQ2d 1749 (Fed. Cir. 2007)","decision_year":2007,"court":"Fed. Cir."},{"id":"pb_cwt3wj6n","corpus_id":"mpep-e9r01-2024-html","opaque_url":"https://mpep.io/n/pb_cwt3wj6n","effective_range":{"start_revision":"R-10.2019","end_revision":null},"rendered_text_html":"See <b><a href=\"s2173.html#d0e217598\">MPEP § 2173.02</a></b> for further discussion\n                        of claim interpretation in the context of analyzing claims for compliance with\n                        <b><a href=\"mpep-9015-appx-l.html#al_d1d85b_2ae65_215\">35 U.S.C.\n                              112(b)</a></b> or <b><a href=\"mpep-9015-appx-l.html#d0e302824\">pre-AIA 35 U.S.C. 112</a></b>, second\n                        paragraph. \n                     ","rendered_text_plain":"See MPEP § 2173.02 for further discussion of claim interpretation in the context of analyzing claims for compliance with 35 U.S.C. 112(b) or pre-AIA 35 U.S.C. 112, second paragraph.","provenance":{"source_file":"s2111.html","source_anchor":"ch2100_d1b0d7_249f8_1a7","source_sha256":"4361ab16d766f5a1383832d25f9cd28c174972b5fb38a32f3794fd3df7638d54"},"node_type":"prose_block","kind":"narrative","host_section_id":"se_3v44fuac"},{"id":"se_2a3enqtn","corpus_id":"mpep-e9r01-2024-html","opaque_url":"https://mpep.io/n/se_2a3enqtn","effective_range":{"start_revision":"R-10.2019","end_revision":null},"rendered_text_html":"","rendered_text_plain":"","provenance":{"source_file":"s2111.html","source_anchor":"stub-2173","source_sha256":"4361ab16d766f5a1383832d25f9cd28c174972b5fb38a32f3794fd3df7638d54"},"node_type":"section","akn_urn":"/akn/us/statement/manual/uspto/2024/mpep/eng@2024-02-29!sec_2173","canonical_url":"https://mpep.io/akn/us/statement/manual/uspto/2024/mpep/eng@2024-02-29!sec_2173","section_number":"2173","chapter":"2100","depth":0,"title":"Section 2173","children_ids":[]},{"id":"st_unl2pn3b","corpus_id":"mpep-e9r01-2024-html","opaque_url":"https://mpep.io/n/st_unl2pn3b","effective_range":{"start_revision":"R-10.2019","end_revision":null},"rendered_text_html":"","rendered_text_plain":"","provenance":{"source_file":"s2111.html","source_anchor":"","source_sha256":"4361ab16d766f5a1383832d25f9cd28c174972b5fb38a32f3794fd3df7638d54"},"node_type":"statute","authority":"us_usc","authority_title_num":"35","authority_section_num":"112","canonical_citation":"35 U.S.C. 112(b)","subsection_path":["b"]},{"id":"st_qls46uzt","corpus_id":"mpep-e9r01-2024-html","opaque_url":"https://mpep.io/n/st_qls46uzt","effective_range":{"start_revision":"R-10.2019","end_revision":null},"rendered_text_html":"","rendered_text_plain":"","provenance":{"source_file":"s2111.html","source_anchor":"","source_sha256":"4361ab16d766f5a1383832d25f9cd28c174972b5fb38a32f3794fd3df7638d54"},"node_type":"statute","authority":"us_usc","authority_title_num":"35","authority_section_num":"112","canonical_citation":"35 U.S.C. 112","subsection_path":[]},{"id":"se_cfmo5i5k","corpus_id":"mpep-e9r01-2024-html","opaque_url":"https://mpep.io/n/se_cfmo5i5k","effective_range":{"start_revision":"R-10.2019","end_revision":null},"rendered_text_html":"","rendered_text_plain":"","provenance":{"source_file":"s2111.html","source_anchor":"d0e200409","source_sha256":"4361ab16d766f5a1383832d25f9cd28c174972b5fb38a32f3794fd3df7638d54"},"node_type":"section","akn_urn":"/akn/us/statement/manual/uspto/2024/mpep/eng@2024-02-29!sec_2111_01","canonical_url":"https://mpep.io/akn/us/statement/manual/uspto/2024/mpep/eng@2024-02-29!sec_2111_01","section_number":"2111.01","chapter":"2100","depth":1,"title":"Plain Meaning","children_ids":["pb_khrr46xh","pb_x47ofbqf","pb_rljdt26i","pb_4xta4cyw","pb_x44i6qvv","pb_5qkpikok","pb_3nn6cpt4","pb_fzsmzuuc","pb_bzapbaq2","pb_wzwk2zad","pb_ye4zyjda","pb_pa4un562","pb_mv4os74s","pb_n3nlnjrs","pb_q5ptv2qk","pb_yjdqwrbo","pb_4eo5uhy2","pb_ury77tog","pb_qv67bbg7","pb_zvcrhkel","pb_6tlsrvos","pb_jrfqortp","pb_xqcssy77","pb_bapkn2bp","pb_r46pqqyf","pb_spylifyv","pb_cdcovthm","pb_7ivc6loj","pb_qwyle7o5","fg_eeh3xvew"],"revision_tag":"R-01.2024","parent_section_id":"se_3v44fuac"},{"id":"pb_khrr46xh","corpus_id":"mpep-e9r01-2024-html","opaque_url":"https://mpep.io/n/pb_khrr46xh","effective_range":{"start_revision":"R-10.2019","end_revision":null},"rendered_text_html":"<i>[Editor Note: This MPEP section is applicable regardless of whether an\n                              application is examined under the AIA or under pre-AIA law. For applications subject\n                              to the first inventor to file (FITF) provisions of the AIA, the relevant time is\n                              \"before the effective filing date of the claimed invention\". For applications subject\n                              to <b><a href=\"mpep-9015-appx-l.html#d0e302383\">pre-AIA 35\n                                    U.S.C. 102</a></b>, the relevant time is \"at the time of the\n                              invention\". See <b><a href=\"s2150.html#ch2100_d2002f_22805_16e\">MPEP § 2150</a></b> et seq. Many of the\n                              court decisions discussed in this section involved applications or patents subject to\n                              <b><a href=\"mpep-9015-appx-l.html#d0e302383\">pre-AIA 35\n                                    U.S.C. 102</a></b>. These court decisions may be applicable to\n                              applications and patents subject to <b><a href=\"mpep-9015-appx-l.html#al_d1fbe1_234ed_52\">AIA 35 U.S.C. 102</a></b> but the\n                              relevant time is before the effective filing date of the claimed invention and not at\n                              the time of the invention.]</i>","rendered_text_plain":"[Editor Note: This MPEP section is applicable regardless of whether an application is examined under the AIA or under pre-AIA law. For applications subject to the first inventor to file (FITF) provisions of the AIA, the relevant time is \"before the effective filing date of the claimed invention\". For applications subject to pre-AIA 35 U.S.C. 102, the relevant time is \"at the time of the invention\". See MPEP § 2150 et seq. Many of the court decisions discussed in this section involved applications or patents subject to pre-AIA 35 U.S.C. 102. These court decisions may be applicable to applications and patents subject to AIA 35 U.S.C. 102 but the relevant time is before the effective filing date of the claimed invention and not at the time of the invention.]","provenance":{"source_file":"s2111.html","source_anchor":"ch2100_d223b3_2324b_3e5","source_sha256":"4361ab16d766f5a1383832d25f9cd28c174972b5fb38a32f3794fd3df7638d54"},"node_type":"prose_block","kind":"narrative","host_section_id":"se_cfmo5i5k","tags":["editorial_note"]},{"id":"se_ecxtga5x","corpus_id":"mpep-e9r01-2024-html","opaque_url":"https://mpep.io/n/se_ecxtga5x","effective_range":{"start_revision":"R-10.2019","end_revision":null},"rendered_text_html":"","rendered_text_plain":"","provenance":{"source_file":"s2111.html","source_anchor":"stub-2150","source_sha256":"4361ab16d766f5a1383832d25f9cd28c174972b5fb38a32f3794fd3df7638d54"},"node_type":"section","akn_urn":"/akn/us/statement/manual/uspto/2024/mpep/eng@2024-02-29!sec_2150","canonical_url":"https://mpep.io/akn/us/statement/manual/uspto/2024/mpep/eng@2024-02-29!sec_2150","section_number":"2150","chapter":"2100","depth":0,"title":"Section 2150","children_ids":[]},{"id":"pb_x47ofbqf","corpus_id":"mpep-e9r01-2024-html","opaque_url":"https://mpep.io/n/pb_x47ofbqf","effective_range":{"start_revision":"R-10.2019","end_revision":null},"rendered_text_html":"<b id=\"\">I.</b><b id=\"\"> THE WORDS OF A CLAIM MUST BE GIVEN THEIR “PLAIN MEANING” UNLESS SUCH MEANING\n                           IS INCONSISTENT WITH THE SPECIFICATION</b>","rendered_text_plain":"I. THE WORDS OF A CLAIM MUST BE GIVEN THEIR “PLAIN MEANING” UNLESS SUCH MEANING IS INCONSISTENT WITH THE SPECIFICATION","provenance":{"source_file":"s2111.html","source_anchor":"d0e200409/b.0","source_sha256":"4361ab16d766f5a1383832d25f9cd28c174972b5fb38a32f3794fd3df7638d54"},"node_type":"prose_block","kind":"informal_heading","host_section_id":"se_cfmo5i5k","heading_level":2,"heading_text":"I. THE WORDS OF A CLAIM MUST BE GIVEN THEIR “PLAIN MEANING” UNLESS SUCH MEANING IS INCONSISTENT WITH THE SPECIFICATION"},{"id":"pb_rljdt26i","corpus_id":"mpep-e9r01-2024-html","opaque_url":"https://mpep.io/n/pb_rljdt26i","effective_range":{"start_revision":"R-10.2019","end_revision":null},"rendered_text_html":"Under a broadest reasonable interpretation (BRI),\n                           words of the claim must be given their plain meaning, unless such meaning is\n                           inconsistent with the specification. The plain meaning of a term means the ordinary\n                           and customary meaning given to the term by those of ordinary skill in the art at the\n                           relevant time. The ordinary and customary meaning of a term may be evidenced by a\n                           variety of sources, including the words of the claims themselves, the specification,\n                           drawings, and prior art. However, the best source for determining the meaning of a\n                           claim term is the specification - the greatest clarity is obtained when the\n                           specification serves as a glossary for the claim terms. <i>Phillips v. AWH\n                              Corp.,</i> 415 F.3d 1303, 1315, 75 USPQ2d 1321, 1327 (Fed. Cir. 2005)\n                           (<i>en banc</i>) (“[T]he specification ‘is always highly relevant to\n                           the claim construction analysis. Usually, it is dispositive; it is the single best\n                           guide to the meaning of a disputed term.’” (quoting <i>Vitronics Corp. v.\n                              Conceptronic Inc.,</i> 90 F.3d 1576, 1582 (Fed. Cir. 1996)). The words of\n                           the claim must be given their plain meaning unless the plain meaning is inconsistent\n                           with the specification. <i>In re Zletz,</i> 893 F.2d 319, 321, 13 USPQ2d\n                           1320, 1322 (Fed. Cir. 1989) (discussed below); <i>Chef America, Inc. v.\n                              Lamb-Weston, Inc.,</i> 358 F.3d 1371, 1372, 69 USPQ2d 1857 (Fed. Cir. 2004)\n                           (Ordinary, simple English words whose meaning is clear and unquestionable, absent any\n                           indication that their use in a particular context changes their meaning, are\n                           construed to mean exactly what they say. Thus, “heating the resulting batter-coated\n                           dough to a temperature in the range of about 400<sup>o</sup>F to\n                           850<sup>o</sup>F” required heating the dough, rather than the air\n                           inside an oven, to the specified temperature.). See also <i>Salazar v. AT&amp;T\n                              Mobility LLC,</i> 64 F.4th 1311, 1317-1318, 2023 USPQ2d 412 (Fed. Cir. 2023)\n                           (While the claim language, “a microprocessor for generating . . . , said\n                           microprocessor creating . . . , a plurality of parameter sets retrieved by said\n                           microprocessor . . . , said microprocessor generating . . . ,” does not require there\n                           be only one microprocessor, the limitations to \"said microprocessor\" require a\n                           singular element—“a microprocessor”—to be capable of performing all of the recited\n                           “generating,” “creating,” and “retrieving” functions. Similarly, “[f]or a dog owner\n                           to have ‘a dog that rolls over and fetches sticks,’ it does not suffice that he have\n                           two dogs, each able to perform just one of the tasks.” (quoting <i>In re\n                              Varma,</i> 816 F.3d 1352, 1363, 118 USPQ2d 1342, 1350 (Fed. Cir.\n                           2016))).\n                        ","rendered_text_plain":"Under a broadest reasonable interpretation (BRI), words of the claim must be given their plain meaning, unless such meaning is inconsistent with the specification. The plain meaning of a term means the ordinary and customary meaning given to the term by those of ordinary skill in the art at the relevant time. The ordinary and customary meaning of a term may be evidenced by a variety of sources, including the words of the claims themselves, the specification, drawings, and prior art. However, the best source for determining the meaning of a claim term is the specification - the greatest clarity is obtained when the specification serves as a glossary for the claim terms. Phillips v. AWH Corp., 415 F.3d 1303, 1315, 75 USPQ2d 1321, 1327 (Fed. Cir. 2005) (en banc) (“[T]he specification ‘is always highly relevant to the claim construction analysis. Usually, it is dispositive; it is the single best guide to the meaning of a disputed term.’” (quoting Vitronics Corp. v. Conceptronic Inc., 90 F.3d 1576, 1582 (Fed. Cir. 1996)). The words of the claim must be given their plain meaning unless the plain meaning is inconsistent with the specification. In re Zletz, 893 F.2d 319, 321, 13 USPQ2d 1320, 1322 (Fed. Cir. 1989) (discussed below); Chef America, Inc. v. Lamb-Weston, Inc., 358 F.3d 1371, 1372, 69 USPQ2d 1857 (Fed. Cir. 2004) (Ordinary, simple English words whose meaning is clear and unquestionable, absent any indication that their use in a particular context changes their meaning, are construed to mean exactly what they say. Thus, “heating the resulting batter-coated dough to a temperature in the range of about 400oF to 850oF” required heating the dough, rather than the air inside an oven, to the specified temperature.). See also Salazar v. AT&T Mobility LLC, 64 F.4th 1311, 1317-1318, 2023 USPQ2d 412 (Fed. Cir. 2023) (While the claim language, “a microprocessor for generating . . . , said microprocessor creating . . . , a plurality of parameter sets retrieved by said microprocessor . . . , said microprocessor generating . . . ,” does not require there be only one microprocessor, the limitations to \"said microprocessor\" require a singular element—“a microprocessor”—to be capable of performing all of the recited “generating,” “creating,” and “retrieving” functions. Similarly, “[f]or a dog owner to have ‘a dog that rolls over and fetches sticks,’ it does not suffice that he have two dogs, each able to perform just one of the tasks.” (quoting In re Varma, 816 F.3d 1352, 1363, 118 USPQ2d 1342, 1350 (Fed. Cir. 2016))).","provenance":{"source_file":"s2111.html","source_anchor":"ch2100_d1b0d7_253bb_371","source_sha256":"4361ab16d766f5a1383832d25f9cd28c174972b5fb38a32f3794fd3df7638d54"},"node_type":"prose_block","kind":"narrative","host_section_id":"se_cfmo5i5k"},{"id":"cs_6r7ekb2s","corpus_id":"mpep-e9r01-2024-html","opaque_url":"https://mpep.io/n/cs_6r7ekb2s","effective_range":{"start_revision":"R-10.2019","end_revision":null},"rendered_text_html":"","rendered_text_plain":"Vitronics Corp. v. Conceptronic Inc., 90 F.3d 1576 (Fed. Cir. 1996)","provenance":{"source_file":"s2111.html","source_anchor":"","source_sha256":"4361ab16d766f5a1383832d25f9cd28c174972b5fb38a32f3794fd3df7638d54"},"node_type":"case","short_name":"Vitronics Corp. v. Conceptronic Inc.","all_citations":["90 F.3d 1576"],"canonical_citation":"Vitronics Corp. v. Conceptronic Inc., 90 F.3d 1576 (Fed. Cir. 1996)","decision_year":1996,"court":"Fed. Cir."},{"id":"cs_4qypt76e","corpus_id":"mpep-e9r01-2024-html","opaque_url":"https://mpep.io/n/cs_4qypt76e","effective_range":{"start_revision":"R-10.2019","end_revision":null},"rendered_text_html":"","rendered_text_plain":"Chef America, Inc. v. Lamb-Weston, Inc., 358 F.3d 1371, 69 USPQ2d 1857 (Fed. Cir. 2004)","provenance":{"source_file":"s2111.html","source_anchor":"","source_sha256":"4361ab16d766f5a1383832d25f9cd28c174972b5fb38a32f3794fd3df7638d54"},"node_type":"case","short_name":"Chef America, Inc. v. Lamb-Weston, Inc.","all_citations":["358 F.3d 1371","69 USPQ2d 1857"],"canonical_citation":"Chef America, Inc. v. Lamb-Weston, Inc., 358 F.3d 1371, 69 USPQ2d 1857 (Fed. Cir. 2004)","decision_year":2004,"court":"Fed. Cir."},{"id":"cs_47ngocmk","corpus_id":"mpep-e9r01-2024-html","opaque_url":"https://mpep.io/n/cs_47ngocmk","effective_range":{"start_revision":"R-10.2019","end_revision":null},"rendered_text_html":"","rendered_text_plain":"Salazar v. AT&T Mobility LLC, 64 F.4th 1311, 2023 USPQ2d 412 (Fed. Cir. 2023)","provenance":{"source_file":"s2111.html","source_anchor":"","source_sha256":"4361ab16d766f5a1383832d25f9cd28c174972b5fb38a32f3794fd3df7638d54"},"node_type":"case","short_name":"Salazar v. AT&T Mobility LLC","all_citations":["64 F.4th 1311","2023 USPQ2d 412"],"canonical_citation":"Salazar v. AT&T Mobility LLC, 64 F.4th 1311, 2023 USPQ2d 412 (Fed. Cir. 2023)","decision_year":2023,"court":"Fed. Cir."},{"id":"cs_pmd3b4u6","corpus_id":"mpep-e9r01-2024-html","opaque_url":"https://mpep.io/n/cs_pmd3b4u6","effective_range":{"start_revision":"R-10.2019","end_revision":null},"rendered_text_html":"","rendered_text_plain":"In re Varma, 816 F.3d 1352, 118 USPQ2d 1342 (Fed. Cir. 2016)","provenance":{"source_file":"s2111.html","source_anchor":"","source_sha256":"4361ab16d766f5a1383832d25f9cd28c174972b5fb38a32f3794fd3df7638d54"},"node_type":"case","short_name":"In re Varma","all_citations":["816 F.3d 1352","118 USPQ2d 1342"],"canonical_citation":"In re Varma, 816 F.3d 1352, 118 USPQ2d 1342 (Fed. Cir. 2016)","decision_year":2016,"court":"Fed. Cir."},{"id":"pb_4xta4cyw","corpus_id":"mpep-e9r01-2024-html","opaque_url":"https://mpep.io/n/pb_4xta4cyw","effective_range":{"start_revision":"R-10.2019","end_revision":null},"rendered_text_html":"The presumption that a term is given its ordinary and\n                           customary meaning may be rebutted by the applicant by clearly setting forth a\n                           different definition of the term in the specification. <i>In re\n                              Morris,</i> 127 F.3d 1048, 1054, 44 USPQ2d 1023, 1028 (Fed. Cir. 1997) (the\n                           USPTO looks to the ordinary use of the claim terms taking into account definitions or\n                           other “enlightenment” contained in the written description); <i>But c.f. In re\n                              Am. Acad. of Sci. Tech. Ctr.,</i> 367 F.3d 1359, 1369, 70 USPQ2d 1827, 1834\n                           (Fed. Cir. 2004) (“We have cautioned against reading limitations into a claim from\n                           the preferred embodiment described in the specification, even if it is the only\n                           embodiment described, absent clear disclaimer in the specification.”). When the\n                           specification sets a clear path to the claim language, the scope of the claims is\n                           more easily determined and the public notice function of the claims is best served. \n                        ","rendered_text_plain":"The presumption that a term is given its ordinary and customary meaning may be rebutted by the applicant by clearly setting forth a different definition of the term in the specification. In re Morris, 127 F.3d 1048, 1054, 44 USPQ2d 1023, 1028 (Fed. Cir. 1997) (the USPTO looks to the ordinary use of the claim terms taking into account definitions or other “enlightenment” contained in the written description); But c.f. In re Am. Acad. of Sci. Tech. Ctr., 367 F.3d 1359, 1369, 70 USPQ2d 1827, 1834 (Fed. Cir. 2004) (“We have cautioned against reading limitations into a claim from the preferred embodiment described in the specification, even if it is the only embodiment described, absent clear disclaimer in the specification.”). When the specification sets a clear path to the claim language, the scope of the claims is more easily determined and the public notice function of the claims is best served.","provenance":{"source_file":"s2111.html","source_anchor":"ch2100_d24d26_25acb_3e0","source_sha256":"4361ab16d766f5a1383832d25f9cd28c174972b5fb38a32f3794fd3df7638d54"},"node_type":"prose_block","kind":"narrative","host_section_id":"se_cfmo5i5k"},{"id":"pb_x44i6qvv","corpus_id":"mpep-e9r01-2024-html","opaque_url":"https://mpep.io/n/pb_x44i6qvv","effective_range":{"start_revision":"R-10.2019","end_revision":null},"rendered_text_html":"","rendered_text_plain":"","provenance":{"source_file":"s2111.html","source_anchor":"d0e200422","source_sha256":"4361ab16d766f5a1383832d25f9cd28c174972b5fb38a32f3794fd3df7638d54"},"node_type":"prose_block","kind":"decorative","host_section_id":"se_cfmo5i5k","tags":["validation:decorative_empty"]},{"id":"pb_5qkpikok","corpus_id":"mpep-e9r01-2024-html","opaque_url":"https://mpep.io/n/pb_5qkpikok","effective_range":{"start_revision":"R-10.2019","end_revision":null},"rendered_text_html":"<b id=\"\">II.</b><b id=\"\"> IT IS IMPROPER TO IMPORT CLAIM LIMITATIONS FROM THE SPECIFICATION</b>","rendered_text_plain":"II. IT IS IMPROPER TO IMPORT CLAIM LIMITATIONS FROM THE SPECIFICATION","provenance":{"source_file":"s2111.html","source_anchor":"d0e200409/b.2","source_sha256":"4361ab16d766f5a1383832d25f9cd28c174972b5fb38a32f3794fd3df7638d54"},"node_type":"prose_block","kind":"informal_heading","host_section_id":"se_cfmo5i5k","heading_level":2,"heading_text":"II. IT IS IMPROPER TO IMPORT CLAIM LIMITATIONS FROM THE SPECIFICATION"},{"id":"pb_3nn6cpt4","corpus_id":"mpep-e9r01-2024-html","opaque_url":"https://mpep.io/n/pb_3nn6cpt4","effective_range":{"start_revision":"R-10.2019","end_revision":null},"rendered_text_html":"“Though understanding the claim language may be aided by\n                           explanations contained in the written description, it is important not to import into\n                           a claim limitations that are not part of the claim. For example, a particular\n                           embodiment appearing in the written description may not be read into a claim when the\n                           claim language is broader than the embodiment.” <i>Superguide Corp. v. DirecTV\n                              Enterprises, Inc.,</i> 358 F.3d 870, 875, 69 USPQ2d 1865, 1868 (Fed. Cir.\n                           2004). See also <i>Liebel-Flarsheim Co. v. Medrad Inc.,</i> 358 F.3d 898,\n                           906, 69 USPQ2d 1801, 1807 (Fed. Cir. 2004) (discussing recent cases wherein the court\n                           expressly rejected the contention that if a patent describes only a single\n                           embodiment, the claims of the patent must be construed as being limited to that\n                           embodiment); <i>E-Pass Techs., Inc. v. 3Com Corp.,</i> 343 F.3d 1364,\n                           1369, 67 USPQ2d 1947, 1950 (Fed. Cir. 2003) (“Interpretation of descriptive\n                           statements in a patent’s written description is a difficult task, as an inherent\n                           tension exists as to whether a statement is a clear lexicographic definition or a\n                           description of a preferred embodiment. The problem is to interpret claims ‘in view of\n                           the specification’ without unnecessarily importing limitations from the specification\n                           into the claims.”); <i>Altiris Inc. v. Symantec Corp.,</i> 318 F.3d 1363,\n                           1371, 65 USPQ2d 1865, 1869-70 (Fed. Cir. 2003) (Although the specification discussed\n                           only a single embodiment, the court held that it was improper to read a specific\n                           order of steps into method claims where, as a matter of logic or grammar, the\n                           language of the method claims did not impose a specific order on the performance of\n                           the method steps, and the specification did not directly or implicitly require a\n                           particular order). See also subsection IV, below. When an element is claimed using\n                           language falling under the scope of <b><a href=\"mpep-9015-appx-l.html#al_d1d85b_2ae60_3d5\">35 U.S.C. 112(f)</a></b> or\n                           <b><a href=\"mpep-9015-appx-l.html#d0e302824\">pre-AIA\n                                 35 U.S.C. 112</a></b>, 6<sup>th</sup> paragraph (often\n                           broadly referred to as means- (or step-) plus- function language), the specification\n                           must be consulted to determine the structure, material, or acts corresponding to the\n                           function recited in the claim, and the claimed element is construed as limited to the\n                           corresponding structure, material, or acts described in the specification and\n                           equivalents thereof. <i>In re Donaldson,</i> 16 F.3d 1189, 29 USPQ2d 1845\n                           (Fed. Cir. 1994) (see <b><a href=\"s2181.html#d0e219279\">MPEP § 2181</a></b>- <b><a href=\"s2186.html#d0e220631\">MPEP § 2186</a></b>).\n                        ","rendered_text_plain":"“Though understanding the claim language may be aided by explanations contained in the written description, it is important not to import into a claim limitations that are not part of the claim. For example, a particular embodiment appearing in the written description may not be read into a claim when the claim language is broader than the embodiment.” Superguide Corp. v. DirecTV Enterprises, Inc., 358 F.3d 870, 875, 69 USPQ2d 1865, 1868 (Fed. Cir. 2004). See also Liebel-Flarsheim Co. v. Medrad Inc., 358 F.3d 898, 906, 69 USPQ2d 1801, 1807 (Fed. Cir. 2004) (discussing recent cases wherein the court expressly rejected the contention that if a patent describes only a single embodiment, the claims of the patent must be construed as being limited to that embodiment); E-Pass Techs., Inc. v. 3Com Corp., 343 F.3d 1364, 1369, 67 USPQ2d 1947, 1950 (Fed. Cir. 2003) (“Interpretation of descriptive statements in a patent’s written description is a difficult task, as an inherent tension exists as to whether a statement is a clear lexicographic definition or a description of a preferred embodiment. The problem is to interpret claims ‘in view of the specification’ without unnecessarily importing limitations from the specification into the claims.”); Altiris Inc. v. Symantec Corp., 318 F.3d 1363, 1371, 65 USPQ2d 1865, 1869-70 (Fed. Cir. 2003) (Although the specification discussed only a single embodiment, the court held that it was improper to read a specific order of steps into method claims where, as a matter of logic or grammar, the language of the method claims did not impose a specific order on the performance of the method steps, and the specification did not directly or implicitly require a particular order). See also subsection IV, below. When an element is claimed using language falling under the scope of 35 U.S.C. 112(f) or pre-AIA 35 U.S.C. 112, 6th paragraph (often broadly referred to as means- (or step-) plus- function language), the specification must be consulted to determine the structure, material, or acts corresponding to the function recited in the claim, and the claimed element is construed as limited to the corresponding structure, material, or acts described in the specification and equivalents thereof. In re Donaldson, 16 F.3d 1189, 29 USPQ2d 1845 (Fed. Cir. 1994) (see MPEP § 2181- MPEP § 2186).","provenance":{"source_file":"s2111.html","source_anchor":"d0e200464","source_sha256":"4361ab16d766f5a1383832d25f9cd28c174972b5fb38a32f3794fd3df7638d54"},"node_type":"prose_block","kind":"narrative","host_section_id":"se_cfmo5i5k"},{"id":"cs_x4icn2bu","corpus_id":"mpep-e9r01-2024-html","opaque_url":"https://mpep.io/n/cs_x4icn2bu","effective_range":{"start_revision":"R-10.2019","end_revision":null},"rendered_text_html":"","rendered_text_plain":"Superguide Corp. v. DirecTV Enterprises, Inc., 358 F.3d 870, 69 USPQ2d 1865 (Fed. Cir. 2004)","provenance":{"source_file":"s2111.html","source_anchor":"","source_sha256":"4361ab16d766f5a1383832d25f9cd28c174972b5fb38a32f3794fd3df7638d54"},"node_type":"case","short_name":"Superguide Corp. v. DirecTV Enterprises, Inc.","all_citations":["358 F.3d 870","69 USPQ2d 1865"],"canonical_citation":"Superguide Corp. v. DirecTV Enterprises, Inc., 358 F.3d 870, 69 USPQ2d 1865 (Fed. Cir. 2004)","decision_year":2004,"court":"Fed. Cir."},{"id":"cs_fkwwjyyv","corpus_id":"mpep-e9r01-2024-html","opaque_url":"https://mpep.io/n/cs_fkwwjyyv","effective_range":{"start_revision":"R-10.2019","end_revision":null},"rendered_text_html":"","rendered_text_plain":"Liebel-Flarsheim Co. v. Medrad Inc., 358 F.3d 898, 69 USPQ2d 1801 (Fed. Cir. 2004)","provenance":{"source_file":"s2111.html","source_anchor":"","source_sha256":"4361ab16d766f5a1383832d25f9cd28c174972b5fb38a32f3794fd3df7638d54"},"node_type":"case","short_name":"Liebel-Flarsheim Co. v. Medrad Inc.","all_citations":["358 F.3d 898","69 USPQ2d 1801"],"canonical_citation":"Liebel-Flarsheim Co. v. Medrad Inc., 358 F.3d 898, 69 USPQ2d 1801 (Fed. Cir. 2004)","decision_year":2004,"court":"Fed. Cir."},{"id":"cs_2knbqsnr","corpus_id":"mpep-e9r01-2024-html","opaque_url":"https://mpep.io/n/cs_2knbqsnr","effective_range":{"start_revision":"R-10.2019","end_revision":null},"rendered_text_html":"","rendered_text_plain":"E-Pass Techs., Inc. v. 3Com Corp., 343 F.3d 1364, 67 USPQ2d 1947 (Fed. Cir. 2003)","provenance":{"source_file":"s2111.html","source_anchor":"","source_sha256":"4361ab16d766f5a1383832d25f9cd28c174972b5fb38a32f3794fd3df7638d54"},"node_type":"case","short_name":"E-Pass Techs., Inc. v. 3Com Corp.","all_citations":["343 F.3d 1364","67 USPQ2d 1947"],"canonical_citation":"E-Pass Techs., Inc. v. 3Com Corp., 343 F.3d 1364, 67 USPQ2d 1947 (Fed. Cir. 2003)","decision_year":2003,"court":"Fed. Cir."},{"id":"cs_5vynrqi7","corpus_id":"mpep-e9r01-2024-html","opaque_url":"https://mpep.io/n/cs_5vynrqi7","effective_range":{"start_revision":"R-10.2019","end_revision":null},"rendered_text_html":"","rendered_text_plain":"Altiris Inc. v. Symantec Corp., 318 F.3d 1363, 65 USPQ2d 1865 (Fed. Cir. 2003)","provenance":{"source_file":"s2111.html","source_anchor":"","source_sha256":"4361ab16d766f5a1383832d25f9cd28c174972b5fb38a32f3794fd3df7638d54"},"node_type":"case","short_name":"Altiris Inc. v. Symantec Corp.","all_citations":["318 F.3d 1363","65 USPQ2d 1865"],"canonical_citation":"Altiris Inc. v. Symantec Corp., 318 F.3d 1363, 65 USPQ2d 1865 (Fed. Cir. 2003)","decision_year":2003,"court":"Fed. Cir."},{"id":"cs_4b42pxv5","corpus_id":"mpep-e9r01-2024-html","opaque_url":"https://mpep.io/n/cs_4b42pxv5","effective_range":{"start_revision":"R-10.2019","end_revision":null},"rendered_text_html":"","rendered_text_plain":"In re Donaldson, 16 F.3d 1189, 29 USPQ2d 1845 (Fed. Cir. 1994)","provenance":{"source_file":"s2111.html","source_anchor":"","source_sha256":"4361ab16d766f5a1383832d25f9cd28c174972b5fb38a32f3794fd3df7638d54"},"node_type":"case","short_name":"In re Donaldson","all_citations":["16 F.3d 1189","29 USPQ2d 1845"],"canonical_citation":"In re Donaldson, 16 F.3d 1189, 29 USPQ2d 1845 (Fed. Cir. 1994)","decision_year":1994,"court":"Fed. Cir."},{"id":"st_66k6soq2","corpus_id":"mpep-e9r01-2024-html","opaque_url":"https://mpep.io/n/st_66k6soq2","effective_range":{"start_revision":"R-10.2019","end_revision":null},"rendered_text_html":"","rendered_text_plain":"","provenance":{"source_file":"s2111.html","source_anchor":"","source_sha256":"4361ab16d766f5a1383832d25f9cd28c174972b5fb38a32f3794fd3df7638d54"},"node_type":"statute","authority":"us_usc","authority_title_num":"35","authority_section_num":"112","canonical_citation":"35 U.S.C. 112(f)","subsection_path":["f"]},{"id":"se_5pqlzyv5","corpus_id":"mpep-e9r01-2024-html","opaque_url":"https://mpep.io/n/se_5pqlzyv5","effective_range":{"start_revision":"R-10.2019","end_revision":null},"rendered_text_html":"","rendered_text_plain":"","provenance":{"source_file":"s2111.html","source_anchor":"stub-2181","source_sha256":"4361ab16d766f5a1383832d25f9cd28c174972b5fb38a32f3794fd3df7638d54"},"node_type":"section","akn_urn":"/akn/us/statement/manual/uspto/2024/mpep/eng@2024-02-29!sec_2181","canonical_url":"https://mpep.io/akn/us/statement/manual/uspto/2024/mpep/eng@2024-02-29!sec_2181","section_number":"2181","chapter":"2100","depth":0,"title":"Section 2181","children_ids":[]},{"id":"se_sqqrbptp","corpus_id":"mpep-e9r01-2024-html","opaque_url":"https://mpep.io/n/se_sqqrbptp","effective_range":{"start_revision":"R-10.2019","end_revision":null},"rendered_text_html":"","rendered_text_plain":"","provenance":{"source_file":"s2111.html","source_anchor":"stub-2186","source_sha256":"4361ab16d766f5a1383832d25f9cd28c174972b5fb38a32f3794fd3df7638d54"},"node_type":"section","akn_urn":"/akn/us/statement/manual/uspto/2024/mpep/eng@2024-02-29!sec_2186","canonical_url":"https://mpep.io/akn/us/statement/manual/uspto/2024/mpep/eng@2024-02-29!sec_2186","section_number":"2186","chapter":"2100","depth":0,"title":"Section 2186","children_ids":[]},{"id":"pb_fzsmzuuc","corpus_id":"mpep-e9r01-2024-html","opaque_url":"https://mpep.io/n/pb_fzsmzuuc","effective_range":{"start_revision":"R-10.2019","end_revision":null},"rendered_text_html":"In <i>Zletz,</i><i>supra,</i> the examiner and the Board had interpreted claims reading\n                           “normally solid polypropylene” and “normally solid polypropylene having a crystalline\n                           polypropylene content” as being limited to “normally solid linear high homopolymers\n                           of propylene which have a crystalline polypropylene content.” The court ruled that\n                           limitations, not present in the claims, were improperly imported from the\n                           specification. See also<i> In re Marosi, </i>710 F.2d 799, 802, 218 USPQ\n                           289, 292 (Fed. Cir. 1983) (“'[C]laims are not to be read in a vacuum, and limitations\n                           therein are to be interpreted in light of the specification in giving them their\n                           ‘broadest <span class=\"Underline\">reasonable</span> interpretation.'” (quoting <i>In re\n                              Okuzawa,</i> 537 F.2d 545, 548, 190 USPQ 464, 466 (CCPA 1976)). The court\n                           looked to the specification to construe “essentially free of alkali metal” as\n                           including unavoidable levels of impurities but no more.). \n                        ","rendered_text_plain":"In Zletz,supra, the examiner and the Board had interpreted claims reading “normally solid polypropylene” and “normally solid polypropylene having a crystalline polypropylene content” as being limited to “normally solid linear high homopolymers of propylene which have a crystalline polypropylene content.” The court ruled that limitations, not present in the claims, were improperly imported from the specification. See also In re Marosi, 710 F.2d 799, 802, 218 USPQ 289, 292 (Fed. Cir. 1983) (“'[C]laims are not to be read in a vacuum, and limitations therein are to be interpreted in light of the specification in giving them their ‘broadest reasonable interpretation.'” (quoting In re Okuzawa, 537 F.2d 545, 548, 190 USPQ 464, 466 (CCPA 1976)). The court looked to the specification to construe “essentially free of alkali metal” as including unavoidable levels of impurities but no more.).","provenance":{"source_file":"s2111.html","source_anchor":"d0e200505","source_sha256":"4361ab16d766f5a1383832d25f9cd28c174972b5fb38a32f3794fd3df7638d54"},"node_type":"prose_block","kind":"narrative","host_section_id":"se_cfmo5i5k"},{"id":"cs_zfjneiu7","corpus_id":"mpep-e9r01-2024-html","opaque_url":"https://mpep.io/n/cs_zfjneiu7","effective_range":{"start_revision":"R-10.2019","end_revision":null},"rendered_text_html":"","rendered_text_plain":"In re Marosi, 710 F.2d 799, 218 USPQ 289 (Fed. Cir. 1983)","provenance":{"source_file":"s2111.html","source_anchor":"","source_sha256":"4361ab16d766f5a1383832d25f9cd28c174972b5fb38a32f3794fd3df7638d54"},"node_type":"case","short_name":"In re Marosi","all_citations":["710 F.2d 799","218 USPQ 289"],"canonical_citation":"In re Marosi, 710 F.2d 799, 218 USPQ 289 (Fed. Cir. 1983)","decision_year":1983,"court":"Fed. Cir."},{"id":"cs_gvlydq4e","corpus_id":"mpep-e9r01-2024-html","opaque_url":"https://mpep.io/n/cs_gvlydq4e","effective_range":{"start_revision":"R-10.2019","end_revision":null},"rendered_text_html":"","rendered_text_plain":"In re Okuzawa, 537 F.2d 545, 190 USPQ 464 (CCPA 1976)","provenance":{"source_file":"s2111.html","source_anchor":"","source_sha256":"4361ab16d766f5a1383832d25f9cd28c174972b5fb38a32f3794fd3df7638d54"},"node_type":"case","short_name":"In re Okuzawa","all_citations":["537 F.2d 545","190 USPQ 464"],"canonical_citation":"In re Okuzawa, 537 F.2d 545, 190 USPQ 464 (CCPA 1976)","decision_year":1976,"court":"CCPA"},{"id":"pb_bzapbaq2","corpus_id":"mpep-e9r01-2024-html","opaque_url":"https://mpep.io/n/pb_bzapbaq2","effective_range":{"start_revision":"R-10.2019","end_revision":null},"rendered_text_html":"In <i>Sisvel Int’l S.A. v. Sierra Wireless,\n                              Inc.,</i> 81 F.4th 1231, 1236-37, 2023 USPQ2d 1030 (Fed. Cir. 2023), the\n                           court found that construing “connection rejection message” should be given its plain\n                           and ordinary meaning, and should not be construed in such a way as to improperly\n                           limit the claims to specific disclosed embodiments. The intrinsic evidence provided\n                           no basis to limit the claims to the preferred embodiments and a person of ordinary\n                           skill in the art would broadly interpret the claim language consistent with the broad\n                           statements in the specification. \n                        ","rendered_text_plain":"In Sisvel Int’l S.A. v. Sierra Wireless, Inc., 81 F.4th 1231, 1236-37, 2023 USPQ2d 1030 (Fed. Cir. 2023), the court found that construing “connection rejection message” should be given its plain and ordinary meaning, and should not be construed in such a way as to improperly limit the claims to specific disclosed embodiments. The intrinsic evidence provided no basis to limit the claims to the preferred embodiments and a person of ordinary skill in the art would broadly interpret the claim language consistent with the broad statements in the specification.","provenance":{"source_file":"s2111.html","source_anchor":"ch2100_p_3ab81_1bf64_286","source_sha256":"4361ab16d766f5a1383832d25f9cd28c174972b5fb38a32f3794fd3df7638d54"},"node_type":"prose_block","kind":"narrative","host_section_id":"se_cfmo5i5k"},{"id":"cs_s2wg262z","corpus_id":"mpep-e9r01-2024-html","opaque_url":"https://mpep.io/n/cs_s2wg262z","effective_range":{"start_revision":"R-10.2019","end_revision":null},"rendered_text_html":"","rendered_text_plain":"Sisvel Int’l S.A. v. Sierra Wireless, Inc., 81 F.4th 1231, 2023 USPQ2d 1030 (Fed. Cir. 2023)","provenance":{"source_file":"s2111.html","source_anchor":"","source_sha256":"4361ab16d766f5a1383832d25f9cd28c174972b5fb38a32f3794fd3df7638d54"},"node_type":"case","short_name":"Sisvel Int’l S.A. v. Sierra Wireless, Inc.","all_citations":["81 F.4th 1231","2023 USPQ2d 1030"],"canonical_citation":"Sisvel Int’l S.A. v. Sierra Wireless, Inc., 81 F.4th 1231, 2023 USPQ2d 1030 (Fed. Cir. 2023)","decision_year":2023,"court":"Fed. Cir."},{"id":"pb_wzwk2zad","corpus_id":"mpep-e9r01-2024-html","opaque_url":"https://mpep.io/n/pb_wzwk2zad","effective_range":{"start_revision":"R-10.2019","end_revision":null},"rendered_text_html":"<b id=\"\">III.</b><b id=\"\"> “PLAIN MEANING” REFERS TO THE ORDINARY AND CUSTOMARY MEANING GIVEN TO THE TERM\n                           BY THOSE OF ORDINARY SKILL IN THE ART</b>","rendered_text_plain":"III. “PLAIN MEANING” REFERS TO THE ORDINARY AND CUSTOMARY MEANING GIVEN TO THE TERM BY THOSE OF ORDINARY SKILL IN THE ART","provenance":{"source_file":"s2111.html","source_anchor":"d0e200409/b.4","source_sha256":"4361ab16d766f5a1383832d25f9cd28c174972b5fb38a32f3794fd3df7638d54"},"node_type":"prose_block","kind":"informal_heading","host_section_id":"se_cfmo5i5k","heading_level":2,"heading_text":"III. “PLAIN MEANING” REFERS TO THE ORDINARY AND CUSTOMARY MEANING GIVEN TO THE TERM BY THOSE OF ORDINARY SKILL IN THE ART"},{"id":"pb_ye4zyjda","corpus_id":"mpep-e9r01-2024-html","opaque_url":"https://mpep.io/n/pb_ye4zyjda","effective_range":{"start_revision":"R-10.2019","end_revision":null},"rendered_text_html":"“[T]he ordinary and customary meaning of a claim term is the meaning\n                           that the term would have to a person of ordinary skill in the art in question at the\n                           time of the invention, <i>i.e</i>., as of the effective filing date of\n                           the patent application.” <i>Phillips v. AWH Corp.,</i>415 F.3d 1303,\n                           1313, 75 USPQ2d 1321, 1326 (Fed. Cir. 2005) <i>(en banc)</i>;\n                           <i>Sunrace Roots Enter. Co. v. SRAM Corp.,</i> 336 F.3d 1298, 1302, 67\n                           USPQ2d 1438, 1441 (Fed. Cir. 2003); <i>Brookhill-Wilk 1, LLC v. Intuitive\n                              Surgical, Inc.,</i> 334 F.3d 1294, 1298, 67 USPQ2d 1132, 1136 (Fed. Cir.\n                           2003) (“In the absence of an express intent to impart a novel meaning to the claim\n                           terms, the words are presumed to take on the ordinary and customary meanings\n                           attributed to them by those of ordinary skill in the art.”). \n                        ","rendered_text_plain":"“[T]he ordinary and customary meaning of a claim term is the meaning that the term would have to a person of ordinary skill in the art in question at the time of the invention, i.e., as of the effective filing date of the patent application.” Phillips v. AWH Corp.,415 F.3d 1303, 1313, 75 USPQ2d 1321, 1326 (Fed. Cir. 2005) (en banc); Sunrace Roots Enter. Co. v. SRAM Corp., 336 F.3d 1298, 1302, 67 USPQ2d 1438, 1441 (Fed. Cir. 2003); Brookhill-Wilk 1, LLC v. Intuitive Surgical, Inc., 334 F.3d 1294, 1298, 67 USPQ2d 1132, 1136 (Fed. Cir. 2003) (“In the absence of an express intent to impart a novel meaning to the claim terms, the words are presumed to take on the ordinary and customary meanings attributed to them by those of ordinary skill in the art.”).","provenance":{"source_file":"s2111.html","source_anchor":"d0e200542","source_sha256":"4361ab16d766f5a1383832d25f9cd28c174972b5fb38a32f3794fd3df7638d54"},"node_type":"prose_block","kind":"narrative","host_section_id":"se_cfmo5i5k"},{"id":"cs_b5g27hzv","corpus_id":"mpep-e9r01-2024-html","opaque_url":"https://mpep.io/n/cs_b5g27hzv","effective_range":{"start_revision":"R-10.2019","end_revision":null},"rendered_text_html":"","rendered_text_plain":"Sunrace Roots Enter. Co. v. SRAM Corp., 336 F.3d 1298, 67 USPQ2d 1438 (Fed. Cir. 2003)","provenance":{"source_file":"s2111.html","source_anchor":"","source_sha256":"4361ab16d766f5a1383832d25f9cd28c174972b5fb38a32f3794fd3df7638d54"},"node_type":"case","short_name":"Sunrace Roots Enter. Co. v. SRAM Corp.","all_citations":["336 F.3d 1298","67 USPQ2d 1438"],"canonical_citation":"Sunrace Roots Enter. Co. v. SRAM Corp., 336 F.3d 1298, 67 USPQ2d 1438 (Fed. Cir. 2003)","decision_year":2003,"court":"Fed. Cir."},{"id":"cs_5cnmeia7","corpus_id":"mpep-e9r01-2024-html","opaque_url":"https://mpep.io/n/cs_5cnmeia7","effective_range":{"start_revision":"R-10.2019","end_revision":null},"rendered_text_html":"","rendered_text_plain":"Brookhill-Wilk 1, LLC v. Intuitive Surgical, Inc., 334 F.3d 1294, 67 USPQ2d 1132 (Fed. Cir. 2003)","provenance":{"source_file":"s2111.html","source_anchor":"","source_sha256":"4361ab16d766f5a1383832d25f9cd28c174972b5fb38a32f3794fd3df7638d54"},"node_type":"case","short_name":"Brookhill-Wilk 1, LLC v. Intuitive Surgical, Inc.","all_citations":["334 F.3d 1294","67 USPQ2d 1132"],"canonical_citation":"Brookhill-Wilk 1, LLC v. Intuitive Surgical, Inc., 334 F.3d 1294, 67 USPQ2d 1132 (Fed. Cir. 2003)","decision_year":2003,"court":"Fed. Cir."},{"id":"pb_pa4un562","corpus_id":"mpep-e9r01-2024-html","opaque_url":"https://mpep.io/n/pb_pa4un562","effective_range":{"start_revision":"R-10.2019","end_revision":null},"rendered_text_html":"The ordinary and customary meaning of a term may be evidenced by a\n                           variety of sources, including the words of the claims themselves, the specification,\n                           drawings, and prior art. However, the best source for determining the meaning of a\n                           claim term is the specification – the greatest clarity is obtained when the\n                           specification serves as a glossary for the claim terms. See, e.g., <i>In re\n                              Abbott Diabetes Care Inc.,</i> 696 F.3d 1142, 1149-50, 104 USPQ2d 1337,\n                           1342-43 (Fed. Cir. 2012) (construing the term “electrochemical sensor” as “devoid of\n                           external connection cables or wires to connect to a sensor control unit” to be\n                           consistent with “the language of the claims and the specification”); <i>In re\n                              Suitco Surface, Inc.,</i> 603 F.3d 1255, 1260-61, 94 USPQ2d 1640, 1644 (Fed.\n                           Cir. 2010) (construing the term “material for finishing the top surface of the floor”\n                           to mean “a clear, uniform layer on the top surface of a floor that is the final\n                           treatment or coating of a surface” to be consistent with “the express language of the\n                           claim and the specification”); <i>Vitronics Corp. v. Conceptronic\n                              Inc.,</i> 90 F.3d 1576, 1583, 39 USPQ2d 1573, 1577 (Fed. Cir. 1996)\n                           (construing the term “solder reflow temperature” to mean “peak reflow temperature” of\n                           solder rather than the “liquidus temperature” of solder in order to remain consistent\n                           with the specification); <i>Malvern Panalytical Inc. v. TA Instruments-Waters\n                              LLC,</i> 85 F.4th 1365, 1374-75, 2023 USPQ2d 1297 (Fed. Cir. 2023) (the\n                           court construed “pipette guiding mechanism” as a mechanism that guides the pipette\n                           assembly either manually or automatically, and stated that the plain and ordinary\n                           meaning can be ascertained by examining the claim language, specification, and the\n                           prosecution history). \n                        ","rendered_text_plain":"The ordinary and customary meaning of a term may be evidenced by a variety of sources, including the words of the claims themselves, the specification, drawings, and prior art. However, the best source for determining the meaning of a claim term is the specification – the greatest clarity is obtained when the specification serves as a glossary for the claim terms. See, e.g., In re Abbott Diabetes Care Inc., 696 F.3d 1142, 1149-50, 104 USPQ2d 1337, 1342-43 (Fed. Cir. 2012) (construing the term “electrochemical sensor” as “devoid of external connection cables or wires to connect to a sensor control unit” to be consistent with “the language of the claims and the specification”); In re Suitco Surface, Inc., 603 F.3d 1255, 1260-61, 94 USPQ2d 1640, 1644 (Fed. Cir. 2010) (construing the term “material for finishing the top surface of the floor” to mean “a clear, uniform layer on the top surface of a floor that is the final treatment or coating of a surface” to be consistent with “the express language of the claim and the specification”); Vitronics Corp. v. Conceptronic Inc., 90 F.3d 1576, 1583, 39 USPQ2d 1573, 1577 (Fed. Cir. 1996) (construing the term “solder reflow temperature” to mean “peak reflow temperature” of solder rather than the “liquidus temperature” of solder in order to remain consistent with the specification); Malvern Panalytical Inc. v. TA Instruments-Waters LLC, 85 F.4th 1365, 1374-75, 2023 USPQ2d 1297 (Fed. Cir. 2023) (the court construed “pipette guiding mechanism” as a mechanism that guides the pipette assembly either manually or automatically, and stated that the plain and ordinary meaning can be ascertained by examining the claim language, specification, and the prosecution history).","provenance":{"source_file":"s2111.html","source_anchor":"d0e200586","source_sha256":"4361ab16d766f5a1383832d25f9cd28c174972b5fb38a32f3794fd3df7638d54"},"node_type":"prose_block","kind":"narrative","host_section_id":"se_cfmo5i5k"},{"id":"cs_zop2tmtk","corpus_id":"mpep-e9r01-2024-html","opaque_url":"https://mpep.io/n/cs_zop2tmtk","effective_range":{"start_revision":"R-10.2019","end_revision":null},"rendered_text_html":"","rendered_text_plain":"In re Abbott Diabetes Care Inc., 696 F.3d 1142, 104 USPQ2d 1337 (Fed. Cir. 2012)","provenance":{"source_file":"s2111.html","source_anchor":"","source_sha256":"4361ab16d766f5a1383832d25f9cd28c174972b5fb38a32f3794fd3df7638d54"},"node_type":"case","short_name":"In re Abbott Diabetes Care Inc.","all_citations":["696 F.3d 1142","104 USPQ2d 1337"],"canonical_citation":"In re Abbott Diabetes Care Inc., 696 F.3d 1142, 104 USPQ2d 1337 (Fed. Cir. 2012)","decision_year":2012,"court":"Fed. Cir."},{"id":"cs_zdlqhuxp","corpus_id":"mpep-e9r01-2024-html","opaque_url":"https://mpep.io/n/cs_zdlqhuxp","effective_range":{"start_revision":"R-10.2019","end_revision":null},"rendered_text_html":"","rendered_text_plain":"Vitronics Corp. v. Conceptronic Inc., 90 F.3d 1576, 39 USPQ2d 1573 (Fed. Cir. 1996)","provenance":{"source_file":"s2111.html","source_anchor":"","source_sha256":"4361ab16d766f5a1383832d25f9cd28c174972b5fb38a32f3794fd3df7638d54"},"node_type":"case","short_name":"Vitronics Corp. v. Conceptronic Inc.","all_citations":["90 F.3d 1576","39 USPQ2d 1573"],"canonical_citation":"Vitronics Corp. v. Conceptronic Inc., 90 F.3d 1576, 39 USPQ2d 1573 (Fed. Cir. 1996)","decision_year":1996,"court":"Fed. Cir."},{"id":"cs_ieaywvg4","corpus_id":"mpep-e9r01-2024-html","opaque_url":"https://mpep.io/n/cs_ieaywvg4","effective_range":{"start_revision":"R-10.2019","end_revision":null},"rendered_text_html":"","rendered_text_plain":"Malvern Panalytical Inc. v. TA Instruments-Waters LLC, 85 F.4th 1365, 2023 USPQ2d 1297 (Fed. Cir. 2023)","provenance":{"source_file":"s2111.html","source_anchor":"","source_sha256":"4361ab16d766f5a1383832d25f9cd28c174972b5fb38a32f3794fd3df7638d54"},"node_type":"case","short_name":"Malvern Panalytical Inc. v. TA Instruments-Waters LLC","all_citations":["85 F.4th 1365","2023 USPQ2d 1297"],"canonical_citation":"Malvern Panalytical Inc. v. TA Instruments-Waters LLC, 85 F.4th 1365, 2023 USPQ2d 1297 (Fed. Cir. 2023)","decision_year":2023,"court":"Fed. Cir."},{"id":"pb_mv4os74s","corpus_id":"mpep-e9r01-2024-html","opaque_url":"https://mpep.io/n/pb_mv4os74s","effective_range":{"start_revision":"R-10.2019","end_revision":null},"rendered_text_html":"In some cases it is also appropriate to look to how the\n                           claim term is used in the prior art, which includes prior art patents, published\n                           applications, trade publications, and dictionaries. <i>Phillips v. AWH\n                              Corp.,</i> 415 F.3d 1303, 1317, 75 USPQ2d 1321, 1329 (Fed. Cir. 2005)\n                           (“Although we have emphasized the importance of intrinsic evidence in claim\n                           construction, we have also authorized district courts to rely on extrinsic evidence,\n                           which “consists of all evidence external to the patent and prosecution history,\n                           including expert and inventor testimony, dictionaries, and learned treatises.”) \n                        ","rendered_text_plain":"In some cases it is also appropriate to look to how the claim term is used in the prior art, which includes prior art patents, published applications, trade publications, and dictionaries. Phillips v. AWH Corp., 415 F.3d 1303, 1317, 75 USPQ2d 1321, 1329 (Fed. Cir. 2005) (“Although we have emphasized the importance of intrinsic evidence in claim construction, we have also authorized district courts to rely on extrinsic evidence, which “consists of all evidence external to the patent and prosecution history, including expert and inventor testimony, dictionaries, and learned treatises.”)","provenance":{"source_file":"s2111.html","source_anchor":"ch2100_d24d7a_fd94_1f0","source_sha256":"4361ab16d766f5a1383832d25f9cd28c174972b5fb38a32f3794fd3df7638d54"},"node_type":"prose_block","kind":"narrative","host_section_id":"se_cfmo5i5k"},{"id":"pb_n3nlnjrs","corpus_id":"mpep-e9r01-2024-html","opaque_url":"https://mpep.io/n/pb_n3nlnjrs","effective_range":{"start_revision":"R-10.2019","end_revision":null},"rendered_text_html":"Any meaning of a claim term taken from the prior art\n                           must be consistent with the use of the claim term in the specification and drawings.\n                           Moreover, when the specification is clear about the scope and content of a claim\n                           term, there is no need to turn to extrinsic evidence for claim interpretation.\n                           <i>3M Innovative Props. Co. v. Tredegar Corp.,</i> 725 F.3d 1315,\n                           1326-28, 107 USPQ2d 1717, 1726-27 (Fed. Cir. 2013) (holding that “continuous\n                           microtextured skin layer over substantially the entire laminate” was clearly defined\n                           in the written description, and therefore, there was no need to turn to extrinsic\n                           evidence to construe the claim). See also <i>Seabed Geosolutions (US) Inc. v.\n                              Magseis FF LLC,</i> 8 F.4th 1285, 1290, 2021 USPQ2d 848 (Fed. Cir. 2021)\n                           (finding that where the intrinsic evidence (i.e., the claims, written description and\n                           prosecution history) clearly supports a claim interpretation, it is unnecessary to\n                           resort to extrinsic evidence.). However, in some instances where neither the claims,\n                           nor the specification, nor the prosecution history offer sufficient clarity on claim\n                           scope, extrinsic evidence may become a necessary part of claim interpretation. In\n                           <i>Actelion,</i> the claim language of “a pH of 13 or higher” was\n                           unclear after analysis of the intrinsic evidence. The court looked to the\n                           specification, which inconsistently described the level of specificity for a pH of\n                           13. Finally, the court turned to the prosecution history, which also did not provide\n                           any clarity as to whether a pH of 13 includes values that round to 13, such as 12.5.\n                           The court found that in this case extrinsic evidence should be consulted to\n                           understand “the meaning of a term in the relevant art during the relevant time\n                           period”. <i>Actelion Pharmaceuticals Ltd v. Mylan Pharmaceuticals\n                              Inc.,</i> 85 F.4th 1167, 1172-74, 2023 USPQ2d 1314 (Fed. Cir. 2023) (quoting\n                           <i>Teva Pharmaceuticals USA, Inc v. Sandoz, Inc.,</i> 574 U.S. 318,\n                           331, 135 S. Ct. 831, 841, 113 USPQ2d 1269, 1276 (2015)).\n                        ","rendered_text_plain":"Any meaning of a claim term taken from the prior art must be consistent with the use of the claim term in the specification and drawings. Moreover, when the specification is clear about the scope and content of a claim term, there is no need to turn to extrinsic evidence for claim interpretation. 3M Innovative Props. Co. v. Tredegar Corp., 725 F.3d 1315, 1326-28, 107 USPQ2d 1717, 1726-27 (Fed. Cir. 2013) (holding that “continuous microtextured skin layer over substantially the entire laminate” was clearly defined in the written description, and therefore, there was no need to turn to extrinsic evidence to construe the claim). See also Seabed Geosolutions (US) Inc. v. Magseis FF LLC, 8 F.4th 1285, 1290, 2021 USPQ2d 848 (Fed. Cir. 2021) (finding that where the intrinsic evidence (i.e., the claims, written description and prosecution history) clearly supports a claim interpretation, it is unnecessary to resort to extrinsic evidence.). However, in some instances where neither the claims, nor the specification, nor the prosecution history offer sufficient clarity on claim scope, extrinsic evidence may become a necessary part of claim interpretation. In Actelion, the claim language of “a pH of 13 or higher” was unclear after analysis of the intrinsic evidence. The court looked to the specification, which inconsistently described the level of specificity for a pH of 13. Finally, the court turned to the prosecution history, which also did not provide any clarity as to whether a pH of 13 includes values that round to 13, such as 12.5. The court found that in this case extrinsic evidence should be consulted to understand “the meaning of a term in the relevant art during the relevant time period”. Actelion Pharmaceuticals Ltd v. Mylan Pharmaceuticals Inc., 85 F.4th 1167, 1172-74, 2023 USPQ2d 1314 (Fed. Cir. 2023) (quoting Teva Pharmaceuticals USA, Inc v. Sandoz, Inc., 574 U.S. 318, 331, 135 S. Ct. 831, 841, 113 USPQ2d 1269, 1276 (2015)).","provenance":{"source_file":"s2111.html","source_anchor":"ch2100_p_3ac4e_18f52_0","source_sha256":"4361ab16d766f5a1383832d25f9cd28c174972b5fb38a32f3794fd3df7638d54"},"node_type":"prose_block","kind":"narrative","host_section_id":"se_cfmo5i5k"},{"id":"cs_sktixj26","corpus_id":"mpep-e9r01-2024-html","opaque_url":"https://mpep.io/n/cs_sktixj26","effective_range":{"start_revision":"R-10.2019","end_revision":null},"rendered_text_html":"","rendered_text_plain":"3M Innovative Props. Co. v. Tredegar Corp., 725 F.3d 1315, 107 USPQ2d 1717 (Fed. Cir. 2013)","provenance":{"source_file":"s2111.html","source_anchor":"","source_sha256":"4361ab16d766f5a1383832d25f9cd28c174972b5fb38a32f3794fd3df7638d54"},"node_type":"case","short_name":"3M Innovative Props. Co. v. Tredegar Corp.","all_citations":["725 F.3d 1315","107 USPQ2d 1717"],"canonical_citation":"3M Innovative Props. Co. v. Tredegar Corp., 725 F.3d 1315, 107 USPQ2d 1717 (Fed. Cir. 2013)","decision_year":2013,"court":"Fed. Cir."},{"id":"cs_6sl6bo4c","corpus_id":"mpep-e9r01-2024-html","opaque_url":"https://mpep.io/n/cs_6sl6bo4c","effective_range":{"start_revision":"R-10.2019","end_revision":null},"rendered_text_html":"","rendered_text_plain":"Seabed Geosolutions (US) Inc. v. Magseis FF LLC, 8 F.4th 1285, 2021 USPQ2d 848 (Fed. Cir. 2021)","provenance":{"source_file":"s2111.html","source_anchor":"","source_sha256":"4361ab16d766f5a1383832d25f9cd28c174972b5fb38a32f3794fd3df7638d54"},"node_type":"case","short_name":"Seabed Geosolutions (US) Inc. v. Magseis FF LLC","all_citations":["8 F.4th 1285","2021 USPQ2d 848"],"canonical_citation":"Seabed Geosolutions (US) Inc. v. Magseis FF LLC, 8 F.4th 1285, 2021 USPQ2d 848 (Fed. Cir. 2021)","decision_year":2021,"court":"Fed. Cir."},{"id":"cs_xly66t3k","corpus_id":"mpep-e9r01-2024-html","opaque_url":"https://mpep.io/n/cs_xly66t3k","effective_range":{"start_revision":"R-10.2019","end_revision":null},"rendered_text_html":"","rendered_text_plain":"Actelion Pharmaceuticals Ltd v. Mylan Pharmaceuticals Inc., 85 F.4th 1167, 2023 USPQ2d 1314 (Fed. Cir. 2023)","provenance":{"source_file":"s2111.html","source_anchor":"","source_sha256":"4361ab16d766f5a1383832d25f9cd28c174972b5fb38a32f3794fd3df7638d54"},"node_type":"case","short_name":"Actelion Pharmaceuticals Ltd v. Mylan Pharmaceuticals Inc.","all_citations":["85 F.4th 1167","2023 USPQ2d 1314"],"canonical_citation":"Actelion Pharmaceuticals Ltd v. Mylan Pharmaceuticals Inc., 85 F.4th 1167, 2023 USPQ2d 1314 (Fed. Cir. 2023)","decision_year":2023,"court":"Fed. Cir."},{"id":"cs_wgxfwx6k","corpus_id":"mpep-e9r01-2024-html","opaque_url":"https://mpep.io/n/cs_wgxfwx6k","effective_range":{"start_revision":"R-10.2019","end_revision":null},"rendered_text_html":"","rendered_text_plain":"Teva Pharmaceuticals USA, Inc v. Sandoz, Inc., 574 U.S. 318, 135 S. Ct. 831, 113 USPQ2d 1269 (SCOTUS 2015)","provenance":{"source_file":"s2111.html","source_anchor":"","source_sha256":"4361ab16d766f5a1383832d25f9cd28c174972b5fb38a32f3794fd3df7638d54"},"node_type":"case","short_name":"Teva Pharmaceuticals USA, Inc v. Sandoz, Inc.","all_citations":["574 U.S. 318","135 S. Ct. 831","113 USPQ2d 1269"],"canonical_citation":"Teva Pharmaceuticals USA, Inc v. Sandoz, Inc., 574 U.S. 318, 135 S. Ct. 831, 113 USPQ2d 1269 (SCOTUS 2015)","decision_year":2015,"court":"SCOTUS"},{"id":"pb_q5ptv2qk","corpus_id":"mpep-e9r01-2024-html","opaque_url":"https://mpep.io/n/pb_q5ptv2qk","effective_range":{"start_revision":"R-10.2019","end_revision":null},"rendered_text_html":"<b id=\"\">IV.</b><b id=\"\"> APPLICANT MAY BE OWN LEXICOGRAPHER AND/OR MAY DISAVOW CLAIM SCOPE</b>","rendered_text_plain":"IV. APPLICANT MAY BE OWN LEXICOGRAPHER AND/OR MAY DISAVOW CLAIM SCOPE","provenance":{"source_file":"s2111.html","source_anchor":"d0e200409/b.6","source_sha256":"4361ab16d766f5a1383832d25f9cd28c174972b5fb38a32f3794fd3df7638d54"},"node_type":"prose_block","kind":"informal_heading","host_section_id":"se_cfmo5i5k","heading_level":2,"heading_text":"IV. APPLICANT MAY BE OWN LEXICOGRAPHER AND/OR MAY DISAVOW CLAIM SCOPE"},{"id":"pb_yjdqwrbo","corpus_id":"mpep-e9r01-2024-html","opaque_url":"https://mpep.io/n/pb_yjdqwrbo","effective_range":{"start_revision":"R-10.2019","end_revision":null},"rendered_text_html":"The only exceptions to giving the words in a claim\n                           their ordinary and customary meaning in the art are (1) when the applicant acts as\n                           their own lexicographer; and (2) when the applicant disavows or disclaims the full\n                           scope of a claim term in the specification. To act as their own lexicographer, the\n                           applicant must clearly set forth a special definition of a claim term in the\n                           specification that differs from the plain and ordinary meaning it would otherwise\n                           possess. <i>CCS Fitness, Inc. v. Brunswick Corp.,</i> 288 F.3d 1359,\n                           1366, 62 USPQ2d 1658, 1662 (Fed. Cir. 2002). The specification may also include an\n                           intentional disclaimer, or disavowal, of claim scope. In both of these cases, “the\n                           inventor’s intention, as expressed in the specification, is regarded as dispositive.”\n                           <i>Phillips v. AWH Corp.,</i> 415 F.3d 1303, 1316 (Fed. Cir. 2005)\n                           (<i>en banc</i>). See also <i>Starhome GmbH v. AT&amp;T Mobility\n                              LLC,</i> 743 F.3d 849, 857, 109 USPQ2d 1885, 1890-91 (Fed. Cir. 2014)\n                           (holding that the term “gateway” should be given its ordinary and customary meaning\n                           of “a connection between different networks” because nothing in the specification\n                           indicated a clear intent to depart from that ordinary meaning); <i>Thorner v.\n                              Sony Computer Entm’t Am. LLC,</i> 669 F.3d 1362, 1367-68, 101 USPQ2d 1457,\n                           1460 (Fed. Cir. 2012) (The asserted claims of the patent were directed to a tactile\n                           feedback system for video game controllers comprising a flexible pad with a plurality\n                           of actuators “attached to said pad.” The court held that the claims were not limited\n                           to actuators attached to the external surface of the pad, even though the\n                           specification used the word “attached” when describing embodiments affixed to the\n                           external surface of the pad but the word “embedded” when describing embodiments\n                           affixed to the internal surface of the pad. The court explained that the plain and\n                           ordinary meaning of “attached” includes both external and internal attachments.\n                           Further, there is no clear and explicit statement in the specification to redefine\n                           “attached” or disavow the full scope of the term.). \n                        ","rendered_text_plain":"The only exceptions to giving the words in a claim their ordinary and customary meaning in the art are (1) when the applicant acts as their own lexicographer; and (2) when the applicant disavows or disclaims the full scope of a claim term in the specification. To act as their own lexicographer, the applicant must clearly set forth a special definition of a claim term in the specification that differs from the plain and ordinary meaning it would otherwise possess. CCS Fitness, Inc. v. Brunswick Corp., 288 F.3d 1359, 1366, 62 USPQ2d 1658, 1662 (Fed. Cir. 2002). The specification may also include an intentional disclaimer, or disavowal, of claim scope. In both of these cases, “the inventor’s intention, as expressed in the specification, is regarded as dispositive.” Phillips v. AWH Corp., 415 F.3d 1303, 1316 (Fed. Cir. 2005) (en banc). See also Starhome GmbH v. AT&T Mobility LLC, 743 F.3d 849, 857, 109 USPQ2d 1885, 1890-91 (Fed. Cir. 2014) (holding that the term “gateway” should be given its ordinary and customary meaning of “a connection between different networks” because nothing in the specification indicated a clear intent to depart from that ordinary meaning); Thorner v. Sony Computer Entm’t Am. LLC, 669 F.3d 1362, 1367-68, 101 USPQ2d 1457, 1460 (Fed. Cir. 2012) (The asserted claims of the patent were directed to a tactile feedback system for video game controllers comprising a flexible pad with a plurality of actuators “attached to said pad.” The court held that the claims were not limited to actuators attached to the external surface of the pad, even though the specification used the word “attached” when describing embodiments affixed to the external surface of the pad but the word “embedded” when describing embodiments affixed to the internal surface of the pad. The court explained that the plain and ordinary meaning of “attached” includes both external and internal attachments. Further, there is no clear and explicit statement in the specification to redefine “attached” or disavow the full scope of the term.).","provenance":{"source_file":"s2111.html","source_anchor":"ch2100_d24d7a_12457_1e2","source_sha256":"4361ab16d766f5a1383832d25f9cd28c174972b5fb38a32f3794fd3df7638d54"},"node_type":"prose_block","kind":"narrative","host_section_id":"se_cfmo5i5k"},{"id":"cs_rv5eh33o","corpus_id":"mpep-e9r01-2024-html","opaque_url":"https://mpep.io/n/cs_rv5eh33o","effective_range":{"start_revision":"R-10.2019","end_revision":null},"rendered_text_html":"","rendered_text_plain":"CCS Fitness, Inc. v. Brunswick Corp., 288 F.3d 1359, 62 USPQ2d 1658 (Fed. Cir. 2002)","provenance":{"source_file":"s2111.html","source_anchor":"","source_sha256":"4361ab16d766f5a1383832d25f9cd28c174972b5fb38a32f3794fd3df7638d54"},"node_type":"case","short_name":"CCS Fitness, Inc. v. Brunswick Corp.","all_citations":["288 F.3d 1359","62 USPQ2d 1658"],"canonical_citation":"CCS Fitness, Inc. v. Brunswick Corp., 288 F.3d 1359, 62 USPQ2d 1658 (Fed. Cir. 2002)","decision_year":2002,"court":"Fed. Cir."},{"id":"cs_k4x4cdpi","corpus_id":"mpep-e9r01-2024-html","opaque_url":"https://mpep.io/n/cs_k4x4cdpi","effective_range":{"start_revision":"R-10.2019","end_revision":null},"rendered_text_html":"","rendered_text_plain":"Phillips v. AWH Corp., 415 F.3d 1303 (Fed. Cir. 2005)","provenance":{"source_file":"s2111.html","source_anchor":"","source_sha256":"4361ab16d766f5a1383832d25f9cd28c174972b5fb38a32f3794fd3df7638d54"},"node_type":"case","short_name":"Phillips v. AWH Corp.","all_citations":["415 F.3d 1303"],"canonical_citation":"Phillips v. AWH Corp., 415 F.3d 1303 (Fed. Cir. 2005)","decision_year":2005,"court":"Fed. Cir."},{"id":"cs_iyjsh3yf","corpus_id":"mpep-e9r01-2024-html","opaque_url":"https://mpep.io/n/cs_iyjsh3yf","effective_range":{"start_revision":"R-10.2019","end_revision":null},"rendered_text_html":"","rendered_text_plain":"Starhome GmbH v. AT&T Mobility LLC, 743 F.3d 849, 109 USPQ2d 1885 (Fed. Cir. 2014)","provenance":{"source_file":"s2111.html","source_anchor":"","source_sha256":"4361ab16d766f5a1383832d25f9cd28c174972b5fb38a32f3794fd3df7638d54"},"node_type":"case","short_name":"Starhome GmbH v. AT&T Mobility LLC","all_citations":["743 F.3d 849","109 USPQ2d 1885"],"canonical_citation":"Starhome GmbH v. AT&T Mobility LLC, 743 F.3d 849, 109 USPQ2d 1885 (Fed. Cir. 2014)","decision_year":2014,"court":"Fed. Cir."},{"id":"cs_zp7bimgx","corpus_id":"mpep-e9r01-2024-html","opaque_url":"https://mpep.io/n/cs_zp7bimgx","effective_range":{"start_revision":"R-10.2019","end_revision":null},"rendered_text_html":"","rendered_text_plain":"Thorner v. Sony Computer Entm’t Am. LLC, 669 F.3d 1362, 101 USPQ2d 1457 (Fed. Cir. 2012)","provenance":{"source_file":"s2111.html","source_anchor":"","source_sha256":"4361ab16d766f5a1383832d25f9cd28c174972b5fb38a32f3794fd3df7638d54"},"node_type":"case","short_name":"Thorner v. Sony Computer Entm’t Am. LLC","all_citations":["669 F.3d 1362","101 USPQ2d 1457"],"canonical_citation":"Thorner v. Sony Computer Entm’t Am. LLC, 669 F.3d 1362, 101 USPQ2d 1457 (Fed. Cir. 2012)","decision_year":2012,"court":"Fed. Cir."},{"id":"pb_4eo5uhy2","corpus_id":"mpep-e9r01-2024-html","opaque_url":"https://mpep.io/n/pb_4eo5uhy2","effective_range":{"start_revision":"R-10.2019","end_revision":null},"rendered_text_html":"<i><b id=\"\">A.</b></i><i><b id=\"\">Lexicography</b></i>","rendered_text_plain":"A. Lexicography","provenance":{"source_file":"s2111.html","source_anchor":"d0e200409/i.0","source_sha256":"4361ab16d766f5a1383832d25f9cd28c174972b5fb38a32f3794fd3df7638d54"},"node_type":"prose_block","kind":"informal_heading","host_section_id":"se_cfmo5i5k","heading_level":2,"heading_text":"A. Lexicography"},{"id":"pb_ury77tog","corpus_id":"mpep-e9r01-2024-html","opaque_url":"https://mpep.io/n/pb_ury77tog","effective_range":{"start_revision":"R-10.2019","end_revision":null},"rendered_text_html":"An applicant is entitled to be their own lexicographer and may\n                           rebut the presumption that claim terms are to be given their ordinary and\n                           customary meaning by clearly setting forth a definition of the term that is\n                           different from its ordinary and customary meaning(s) in the specification at the\n                           relevant time. See<i> In re Paulsen,</i> 30 F.3d 1475, 1480, 31 USPQ2d\n                           1671, 1674 (Fed. Cir. 1994) (holding that an inventor may define specific terms\n                           used to describe invention, but must do so “with reasonable clarity,\n                           deliberateness, and precision” and, if done, must “‘set out his uncommon\n                           definition in some manner within the patent disclosure’ so as to give one of\n                           ordinary skill in the art notice of the change” in meaning) (quoting\n                           <i>Intellicall, Inc. v. Phonometrics, Inc.,</i> 952 F.2d 1384,\n                           1387-88, 21 USPQ2d 1383, 1386 (Fed. Cir. 1992)). \n                        ","rendered_text_plain":"An applicant is entitled to be their own lexicographer and may rebut the presumption that claim terms are to be given their ordinary and customary meaning by clearly setting forth a definition of the term that is different from its ordinary and customary meaning(s) in the specification at the relevant time. See In re Paulsen, 30 F.3d 1475, 1480, 31 USPQ2d 1671, 1674 (Fed. Cir. 1994) (holding that an inventor may define specific terms used to describe invention, but must do so “with reasonable clarity, deliberateness, and precision” and, if done, must “‘set out his uncommon definition in some manner within the patent disclosure’ so as to give one of ordinary skill in the art notice of the change” in meaning) (quoting Intellicall, Inc. v. Phonometrics, Inc., 952 F.2d 1384, 1387-88, 21 USPQ2d 1383, 1386 (Fed. Cir. 1992)).","provenance":{"source_file":"s2111.html","source_anchor":"d0e200641","source_sha256":"4361ab16d766f5a1383832d25f9cd28c174972b5fb38a32f3794fd3df7638d54"},"node_type":"prose_block","kind":"narrative","host_section_id":"se_cfmo5i5k"},{"id":"cs_mhpjxnaj","corpus_id":"mpep-e9r01-2024-html","opaque_url":"https://mpep.io/n/cs_mhpjxnaj","effective_range":{"start_revision":"R-10.2019","end_revision":null},"rendered_text_html":"","rendered_text_plain":"In re Paulsen, 30 F.3d 1475, 31 USPQ2d 1671 (Fed. Cir. 1994)","provenance":{"source_file":"s2111.html","source_anchor":"","source_sha256":"4361ab16d766f5a1383832d25f9cd28c174972b5fb38a32f3794fd3df7638d54"},"node_type":"case","short_name":"In re Paulsen","all_citations":["30 F.3d 1475","31 USPQ2d 1671"],"canonical_citation":"In re Paulsen, 30 F.3d 1475, 31 USPQ2d 1671 (Fed. Cir. 1994)","decision_year":1994,"court":"Fed. Cir."},{"id":"cs_5jlisyux","corpus_id":"mpep-e9r01-2024-html","opaque_url":"https://mpep.io/n/cs_5jlisyux","effective_range":{"start_revision":"R-10.2019","end_revision":null},"rendered_text_html":"","rendered_text_plain":"Intellicall, Inc. v. Phonometrics, Inc., 952 F.2d 1384, 21 USPQ2d 1383 (Fed. Cir. 1992)","provenance":{"source_file":"s2111.html","source_anchor":"","source_sha256":"4361ab16d766f5a1383832d25f9cd28c174972b5fb38a32f3794fd3df7638d54"},"node_type":"case","short_name":"Intellicall, Inc. v. Phonometrics, Inc.","all_citations":["952 F.2d 1384","21 USPQ2d 1383"],"canonical_citation":"Intellicall, Inc. v. Phonometrics, Inc., 952 F.2d 1384, 21 USPQ2d 1383 (Fed. Cir. 1992)","decision_year":1992,"court":"Fed. Cir."},{"id":"pb_qv67bbg7","corpus_id":"mpep-e9r01-2024-html","opaque_url":"https://mpep.io/n/pb_qv67bbg7","effective_range":{"start_revision":"R-10.2019","end_revision":null},"rendered_text_html":"Where an explicit definition is provided by the\n                           applicant for a term, that definition will control interpretation of the term as\n                           it is used in the claim. <i>Toro Co. v. White Consolidated Industries\n                              Inc.,</i> 199 F.3d 1295, 1301, 53 USPQ2d 1065, 1069 (Fed. Cir. 1999)\n                           (meaning of words used in a claim is not construed in a “lexicographic vacuum, but\n                           in the context of the specification and drawings”). Thus, if a claim term is used\n                           in its ordinary and customary meaning throughout the specification, and the\n                           written description clearly indicates its meaning, then the term in the claim has\n                           that meaning. <i>Old Town Canoe Co. v. Confluence Holdings Corp.,</i>\n                           448 F.3d 1309, 1317, 78 USPQ2d 1705, 1711 (Fed. Cir. 2006) (The court held that\n                           “completion of coalescence” must be given its ordinary and customary meaning of\n                           reaching the end of coalescence. The court explained that even though coalescence\n                           could theoretically be “completed” by halting the molding process earlier, the\n                           specification clearly intended that completion of coalescence occurs only after\n                           the molding process reaches its optimum stage.).\n                        ","rendered_text_plain":"Where an explicit definition is provided by the applicant for a term, that definition will control interpretation of the term as it is used in the claim. Toro Co. v. White Consolidated Industries Inc., 199 F.3d 1295, 1301, 53 USPQ2d 1065, 1069 (Fed. Cir. 1999) (meaning of words used in a claim is not construed in a “lexicographic vacuum, but in the context of the specification and drawings”). Thus, if a claim term is used in its ordinary and customary meaning throughout the specification, and the written description clearly indicates its meaning, then the term in the claim has that meaning. Old Town Canoe Co. v. Confluence Holdings Corp., 448 F.3d 1309, 1317, 78 USPQ2d 1705, 1711 (Fed. Cir. 2006) (The court held that “completion of coalescence” must be given its ordinary and customary meaning of reaching the end of coalescence. The court explained that even though coalescence could theoretically be “completed” by halting the molding process earlier, the specification clearly intended that completion of coalescence occurs only after the molding process reaches its optimum stage.).","provenance":{"source_file":"s2111.html","source_anchor":"ch2100_d24d26_25edf_d5","source_sha256":"4361ab16d766f5a1383832d25f9cd28c174972b5fb38a32f3794fd3df7638d54"},"node_type":"prose_block","kind":"narrative","host_section_id":"se_cfmo5i5k"},{"id":"cs_2cgpy3ic","corpus_id":"mpep-e9r01-2024-html","opaque_url":"https://mpep.io/n/cs_2cgpy3ic","effective_range":{"start_revision":"R-10.2019","end_revision":null},"rendered_text_html":"","rendered_text_plain":"Toro Co. v. White Consolidated Industries Inc., 199 F.3d 1295, 53 USPQ2d 1065 (Fed. Cir. 1999)","provenance":{"source_file":"s2111.html","source_anchor":"","source_sha256":"4361ab16d766f5a1383832d25f9cd28c174972b5fb38a32f3794fd3df7638d54"},"node_type":"case","short_name":"Toro Co. v. White Consolidated Industries Inc.","all_citations":["199 F.3d 1295","53 USPQ2d 1065"],"canonical_citation":"Toro Co. v. White Consolidated Industries Inc., 199 F.3d 1295, 53 USPQ2d 1065 (Fed. Cir. 1999)","decision_year":1999,"court":"Fed. Cir."},{"id":"cs_2ycg3sjb","corpus_id":"mpep-e9r01-2024-html","opaque_url":"https://mpep.io/n/cs_2ycg3sjb","effective_range":{"start_revision":"R-10.2019","end_revision":null},"rendered_text_html":"","rendered_text_plain":"Old Town Canoe Co. v. Confluence Holdings Corp., 448 F.3d 1309, 78 USPQ2d 1705 (Fed. Cir. 2006)","provenance":{"source_file":"s2111.html","source_anchor":"","source_sha256":"4361ab16d766f5a1383832d25f9cd28c174972b5fb38a32f3794fd3df7638d54"},"node_type":"case","short_name":"Old Town Canoe Co. v. Confluence Holdings Corp.","all_citations":["448 F.3d 1309","78 USPQ2d 1705"],"canonical_citation":"Old Town Canoe Co. v. Confluence Holdings Corp., 448 F.3d 1309, 78 USPQ2d 1705 (Fed. Cir. 2006)","decision_year":2006,"court":"Fed. Cir."},{"id":"pb_zvcrhkel","corpus_id":"mpep-e9r01-2024-html","opaque_url":"https://mpep.io/n/pb_zvcrhkel","effective_range":{"start_revision":"R-10.2019","end_revision":null},"rendered_text_html":"However, it is important to note that any special\n                           meaning assigned to a term “must be sufficiently clear in the specification that\n                           any departure from common usage would be so understood by a person of experience\n                           in the field of the invention.” <i>Multiform Desiccants Inc. v. Medzam\n                              Ltd.,</i> 133 F.3d 1473, 1477, 45 USPQ2d 1429, 1432 (Fed. Cir. 1998). See\n                           also <i>Process Control Corp. v. HydReclaim Corp.,</i> 190 F.3d 1350,\n                           1357, 52 USPQ2d 1029, 1033 (Fed. Cir. 1999) and <b><a href=\"s2173.html#d0e217839\">MPEP\n                                 § 2173.05(a)</a></b>. In <i>Apple Inc. v. Corephotonics,\n                              Ltd.,</i> 81 F.4th 1353, 1358-60, 2023 USPQ2d 1056 (Fed. Cir. 2023), the\n                           claim phrase “a point of view of the Wide camera” was held to only require a “Wide\n                           perspective point of view or Wide position point of view” after reviewing the\n                           specification. In particular, the court found that a reasonable reading of the\n                           specification defined two different types of Wide point of view – perspective and\n                           position, whereas the claim language was broad as to the point of view. The court\n                           also explained that claims should not be interpreted in a way that would omit a\n                           disclosed embodiment, absent evidence to the contrary. Thus, given the review of\n                           the intrinsic evidence, the court held that the claim language only required Wide\n                           perspective or Wide position point of view, but not both.\n                        ","rendered_text_plain":"However, it is important to note that any special meaning assigned to a term “must be sufficiently clear in the specification that any departure from common usage would be so understood by a person of experience in the field of the invention.” Multiform Desiccants Inc. v. Medzam Ltd., 133 F.3d 1473, 1477, 45 USPQ2d 1429, 1432 (Fed. Cir. 1998). See also Process Control Corp. v. HydReclaim Corp., 190 F.3d 1350, 1357, 52 USPQ2d 1029, 1033 (Fed. Cir. 1999) and MPEP § 2173.05(a). In Apple Inc. v. Corephotonics, Ltd., 81 F.4th 1353, 1358-60, 2023 USPQ2d 1056 (Fed. Cir. 2023), the claim phrase “a point of view of the Wide camera” was held to only require a “Wide perspective point of view or Wide position point of view” after reviewing the specification. In particular, the court found that a reasonable reading of the specification defined two different types of Wide point of view – perspective and position, whereas the claim language was broad as to the point of view. The court also explained that claims should not be interpreted in a way that would omit a disclosed embodiment, absent evidence to the contrary. Thus, given the review of the intrinsic evidence, the court held that the claim language only required Wide perspective or Wide position point of view, but not both.","provenance":{"source_file":"s2111.html","source_anchor":"ch2100_d24d26_25fee_28b","source_sha256":"4361ab16d766f5a1383832d25f9cd28c174972b5fb38a32f3794fd3df7638d54"},"node_type":"prose_block","kind":"narrative","host_section_id":"se_cfmo5i5k"},{"id":"cs_jywbmx3d","corpus_id":"mpep-e9r01-2024-html","opaque_url":"https://mpep.io/n/cs_jywbmx3d","effective_range":{"start_revision":"R-10.2019","end_revision":null},"rendered_text_html":"","rendered_text_plain":"Multiform Desiccants Inc. v. Medzam Ltd., 133 F.3d 1473, 45 USPQ2d 1429 (Fed. Cir. 1998)","provenance":{"source_file":"s2111.html","source_anchor":"","source_sha256":"4361ab16d766f5a1383832d25f9cd28c174972b5fb38a32f3794fd3df7638d54"},"node_type":"case","short_name":"Multiform Desiccants Inc. v. Medzam Ltd.","all_citations":["133 F.3d 1473","45 USPQ2d 1429"],"canonical_citation":"Multiform Desiccants Inc. v. Medzam Ltd., 133 F.3d 1473, 45 USPQ2d 1429 (Fed. Cir. 1998)","decision_year":1998,"court":"Fed. Cir."},{"id":"cs_a2kmikm4","corpus_id":"mpep-e9r01-2024-html","opaque_url":"https://mpep.io/n/cs_a2kmikm4","effective_range":{"start_revision":"R-10.2019","end_revision":null},"rendered_text_html":"","rendered_text_plain":"Process Control Corp. v. HydReclaim Corp., 190 F.3d 1350, 52 USPQ2d 1029 (Fed. Cir. 1999)","provenance":{"source_file":"s2111.html","source_anchor":"","source_sha256":"4361ab16d766f5a1383832d25f9cd28c174972b5fb38a32f3794fd3df7638d54"},"node_type":"case","short_name":"Process Control Corp. v. HydReclaim Corp.","all_citations":["190 F.3d 1350","52 USPQ2d 1029"],"canonical_citation":"Process Control Corp. v. HydReclaim Corp., 190 F.3d 1350, 52 USPQ2d 1029 (Fed. Cir. 1999)","decision_year":1999,"court":"Fed. Cir."},{"id":"cs_p2y5nr2r","corpus_id":"mpep-e9r01-2024-html","opaque_url":"https://mpep.io/n/cs_p2y5nr2r","effective_range":{"start_revision":"R-10.2019","end_revision":null},"rendered_text_html":"","rendered_text_plain":"Apple Inc. v. Corephotonics, Ltd., 81 F.4th 1353, 2023 USPQ2d 1056 (Fed. Cir. 2023)","provenance":{"source_file":"s2111.html","source_anchor":"","source_sha256":"4361ab16d766f5a1383832d25f9cd28c174972b5fb38a32f3794fd3df7638d54"},"node_type":"case","short_name":"Apple Inc. v. Corephotonics, Ltd.","all_citations":["81 F.4th 1353","2023 USPQ2d 1056"],"canonical_citation":"Apple Inc. v. Corephotonics, Ltd., 81 F.4th 1353, 2023 USPQ2d 1056 (Fed. Cir. 2023)","decision_year":2023,"court":"Fed. Cir."},{"id":"pb_6tlsrvos","corpus_id":"mpep-e9r01-2024-html","opaque_url":"https://mpep.io/n/pb_6tlsrvos","effective_range":{"start_revision":"R-10.2019","end_revision":null},"rendered_text_html":"In some cases, the meaning of a particular claim\n                           term may be defined by implication, that is, according to the usage of the term in\n                           the context in the specification. See <i>Phillips v. AWH Corp.,</i>\n                           415 F.3d 1303, 1320-21, 75 USPQ2d 1321, 1332 (Fed. Cir. 2005) <i>(en\n                              banc)</i>; <i>Vitronics Corp. v. Conceptronic Inc.,</i> 90\n                           F.3d 1576, 1583, 39 USPQ2d 1573, 1577 (Fed. Cir. 1996). But where the\n                           specification is ambiguous as to whether the inventor used claim terms\n                           inconsistent with their ordinary meaning, the ordinary meaning will apply.\n                           <i>Merck &amp; Co. v. Teva Pharms. USA, Inc.,</i> 395 F.3d 1364,\n                           1370, 73 USPQ2d 1641, 1646 (Fed. Cir. 2005) (The Federal Circuit reversed the\n                           district court’s construction of the claim term “about” as “exactly.” The\n                           appellate court explained that a passage in the specification the district court\n                           relied upon for the definition of “about” was too ambiguous to redefine “about” to\n                           mean “exactly” in clear enough terms. The appellate court held that “about” should\n                           instead be given its plain and ordinary meaning of “approximately.”).\n                        ","rendered_text_plain":"In some cases, the meaning of a particular claim term may be defined by implication, that is, according to the usage of the term in the context in the specification. See Phillips v. AWH Corp., 415 F.3d 1303, 1320-21, 75 USPQ2d 1321, 1332 (Fed. Cir. 2005) (en banc); Vitronics Corp. v. Conceptronic Inc., 90 F.3d 1576, 1583, 39 USPQ2d 1573, 1577 (Fed. Cir. 1996). But where the specification is ambiguous as to whether the inventor used claim terms inconsistent with their ordinary meaning, the ordinary meaning will apply. Merck & Co. v. Teva Pharms. USA, Inc., 395 F.3d 1364, 1370, 73 USPQ2d 1641, 1646 (Fed. Cir. 2005) (The Federal Circuit reversed the district court’s construction of the claim term “about” as “exactly.” The appellate court explained that a passage in the specification the district court relied upon for the definition of “about” was too ambiguous to redefine “about” to mean “exactly” in clear enough terms. The appellate court held that “about” should instead be given its plain and ordinary meaning of “approximately.”).","provenance":{"source_file":"s2111.html","source_anchor":"ch2100_d24d7a_13a7c_68","source_sha256":"4361ab16d766f5a1383832d25f9cd28c174972b5fb38a32f3794fd3df7638d54"},"node_type":"prose_block","kind":"narrative","host_section_id":"se_cfmo5i5k"},{"id":"cs_j4urhrr3","corpus_id":"mpep-e9r01-2024-html","opaque_url":"https://mpep.io/n/cs_j4urhrr3","effective_range":{"start_revision":"R-10.2019","end_revision":null},"rendered_text_html":"","rendered_text_plain":"Merck & Co. v. Teva Pharms. USA, Inc., 395 F.3d 1364, 73 USPQ2d 1641 (Fed. Cir. 2005)","provenance":{"source_file":"s2111.html","source_anchor":"","source_sha256":"4361ab16d766f5a1383832d25f9cd28c174972b5fb38a32f3794fd3df7638d54"},"node_type":"case","short_name":"Merck & Co. v. Teva Pharms. USA, Inc.","all_citations":["395 F.3d 1364","73 USPQ2d 1641"],"canonical_citation":"Merck & Co. v. Teva Pharms. USA, Inc., 395 F.3d 1364, 73 USPQ2d 1641 (Fed. Cir. 2005)","decision_year":2005,"court":"Fed. Cir."},{"id":"pb_jrfqortp","corpus_id":"mpep-e9r01-2024-html","opaque_url":"https://mpep.io/n/pb_jrfqortp","effective_range":{"start_revision":"R-10.2019","end_revision":null},"rendered_text_html":"<i><b id=\"\">B.</b></i><i><b id=\"\">Disavowal</b></i>","rendered_text_plain":"B. Disavowal","provenance":{"source_file":"s2111.html","source_anchor":"d0e200409/i.2","source_sha256":"4361ab16d766f5a1383832d25f9cd28c174972b5fb38a32f3794fd3df7638d54"},"node_type":"prose_block","kind":"informal_heading","host_section_id":"se_cfmo5i5k","heading_level":2,"heading_text":"B. Disavowal"},{"id":"pb_xqcssy77","corpus_id":"mpep-e9r01-2024-html","opaque_url":"https://mpep.io/n/pb_xqcssy77","effective_range":{"start_revision":"R-10.2019","end_revision":null},"rendered_text_html":"Applicant may also rebut the presumption of plain\n                           meaning by clearly disavowing the full scope of the claim term in the\n                           specification. Disavowal, or disclaimer of claim scope, is only considered when it\n                           is clear and unmistakable. See <i>SciMed Life Sys., Inc. v. Advanced\n                              Cardiovascular Sys., Inc.,</i> 242 F.3d 1337, 1341, 58 USPQ2d 1059, 1063\n                           (Fed. Cir. 2001) (“Where the specification makes clear that the invention does not\n                           include a particular feature, that feature is deemed to be outside the reach of\n                           the claims of the patent, even though the language of the claims, read without\n                           reference to the specification, might be considered broad enough to encompass the\n                           feature in question.”); see also <i>In re Am. Acad. Of Sci. Tech\n                              Ctr.,</i> 367 F.3d 1359, 1365-67, 70 USPQ2d 1827, 1831-33 (Fed. Cir.\n                           2004) (refusing to limit claim term “user computer” to only “single-user\n                           computers” even though “some of the language of the specification, when viewed in\n                           isolation, might lead a reader to conclude that the term . . . is meant to refer\n                           to a computer that serves only a single user, the specification as a whole\n                           suggests a construction that is not so narrow”). But, in some cases, disavowal of\n                           a broader claim scope may be made by implication, such as where the specification\n                           contains only disparaging remarks with respect to a feature and every embodiment\n                           in the specification excludes that feature.<i> In re Abbott Diabetes Care\n                              Inc.,</i> 696 F.3d 1142, 1149-50, 104 USPQ2d 1337, 1342-43 (Fed. Cir.\n                           2012) (holding that the broadest reasonable interpretation of the claim term\n                           “electrochemical sensor” does not include a sensor having “external connection\n                           cables or wires” because the specification “repeatedly, consistently, and\n                           exclusively depict[s] an electrochemical sensor without external cables or wires\n                           while simultaneously disparaging sensors with external cables or wires”). But see\n                           <i>In re Clarke,</i> 809 Fed. Appx. 787, 794, 2020 USPQ2d 10253\n                           (Fed. Cir. 2020) (“The doctrine of prosecution history estoppel is\n                           <i>inapplicable</i> during prosecution. Instead the doctrine is\n                           applicable only to <i>issued</i> patents.”) (emphasis in the\n                           original). If the examiner believes that the broadest reasonable interpretation of\n                           a claim is narrower than what the words of the claim otherwise suggest as the\n                           result of implicit disavowal in the specification, then the examiner should make\n                           the interpretation clear on the record.\n                        ","rendered_text_plain":"Applicant may also rebut the presumption of plain meaning by clearly disavowing the full scope of the claim term in the specification. Disavowal, or disclaimer of claim scope, is only considered when it is clear and unmistakable. See SciMed Life Sys., Inc. v. Advanced Cardiovascular Sys., Inc., 242 F.3d 1337, 1341, 58 USPQ2d 1059, 1063 (Fed. Cir. 2001) (“Where the specification makes clear that the invention does not include a particular feature, that feature is deemed to be outside the reach of the claims of the patent, even though the language of the claims, read without reference to the specification, might be considered broad enough to encompass the feature in question.”); see also In re Am. Acad. Of Sci. Tech Ctr., 367 F.3d 1359, 1365-67, 70 USPQ2d 1827, 1831-33 (Fed. Cir. 2004) (refusing to limit claim term “user computer” to only “single-user computers” even though “some of the language of the specification, when viewed in isolation, might lead a reader to conclude that the term . . . is meant to refer to a computer that serves only a single user, the specification as a whole suggests a construction that is not so narrow”). But, in some cases, disavowal of a broader claim scope may be made by implication, such as where the specification contains only disparaging remarks with respect to a feature and every embodiment in the specification excludes that feature. In re Abbott Diabetes Care Inc., 696 F.3d 1142, 1149-50, 104 USPQ2d 1337, 1342-43 (Fed. Cir. 2012) (holding that the broadest reasonable interpretation of the claim term “electrochemical sensor” does not include a sensor having “external connection cables or wires” because the specification “repeatedly, consistently, and exclusively depict[s] an electrochemical sensor without external cables or wires while simultaneously disparaging sensors with external cables or wires”). But see In re Clarke, 809 Fed. Appx. 787, 794, 2020 USPQ2d 10253 (Fed. Cir. 2020) (“The doctrine of prosecution history estoppel is inapplicable during prosecution. Instead the doctrine is applicable only to issued patents.”) (emphasis in the original). If the examiner believes that the broadest reasonable interpretation of a claim is narrower than what the words of the claim otherwise suggest as the result of implicit disavowal in the specification, then the examiner should make the interpretation clear on the record.","provenance":{"source_file":"s2111.html","source_anchor":"ch2100_d24d26_2609c_2e","source_sha256":"4361ab16d766f5a1383832d25f9cd28c174972b5fb38a32f3794fd3df7638d54"},"node_type":"prose_block","kind":"narrative","host_section_id":"se_cfmo5i5k"},{"id":"cs_zkizbdp4","corpus_id":"mpep-e9r01-2024-html","opaque_url":"https://mpep.io/n/cs_zkizbdp4","effective_range":{"start_revision":"R-10.2019","end_revision":null},"rendered_text_html":"","rendered_text_plain":"SciMed Life Sys., Inc. v. Advanced Cardiovascular Sys., Inc., 242 F.3d 1337, 58 USPQ2d 1059 (Fed. Cir. 2001)","provenance":{"source_file":"s2111.html","source_anchor":"","source_sha256":"4361ab16d766f5a1383832d25f9cd28c174972b5fb38a32f3794fd3df7638d54"},"node_type":"case","short_name":"SciMed Life Sys., Inc. v. Advanced Cardiovascular Sys., Inc.","all_citations":["242 F.3d 1337","58 USPQ2d 1059"],"canonical_citation":"SciMed Life Sys., Inc. v. Advanced Cardiovascular Sys., Inc., 242 F.3d 1337, 58 USPQ2d 1059 (Fed. Cir. 2001)","decision_year":2001,"court":"Fed. Cir."},{"id":"cs_n6hns2wy","corpus_id":"mpep-e9r01-2024-html","opaque_url":"https://mpep.io/n/cs_n6hns2wy","effective_range":{"start_revision":"R-10.2019","end_revision":null},"rendered_text_html":"","rendered_text_plain":"In re Am. Acad. Of Sci. Tech Ctr., 367 F.3d 1359, 70 USPQ2d 1827 (Fed. Cir. 2004)","provenance":{"source_file":"s2111.html","source_anchor":"","source_sha256":"4361ab16d766f5a1383832d25f9cd28c174972b5fb38a32f3794fd3df7638d54"},"node_type":"case","short_name":"In re Am. Acad. Of Sci. Tech Ctr.","all_citations":["367 F.3d 1359","70 USPQ2d 1827"],"canonical_citation":"In re Am. Acad. Of Sci. Tech Ctr., 367 F.3d 1359, 70 USPQ2d 1827 (Fed. Cir. 2004)","decision_year":2004,"court":"Fed. Cir."},{"id":"cs_q3tydziq","corpus_id":"mpep-e9r01-2024-html","opaque_url":"https://mpep.io/n/cs_q3tydziq","effective_range":{"start_revision":"R-10.2019","end_revision":null},"rendered_text_html":"","rendered_text_plain":"In re Clarke, 809 Fed. Appx. 787, 2020 USPQ2d 10253 (Fed. Cir. 2020)","provenance":{"source_file":"s2111.html","source_anchor":"","source_sha256":"4361ab16d766f5a1383832d25f9cd28c174972b5fb38a32f3794fd3df7638d54"},"node_type":"case","short_name":"In re Clarke","all_citations":["809 Fed. Appx. 787","2020 USPQ2d 10253"],"canonical_citation":"In re Clarke, 809 Fed. Appx. 787, 2020 USPQ2d 10253 (Fed. Cir. 2020)","decision_year":2020,"court":"Fed. Cir."},{"id":"pb_bapkn2bp","corpus_id":"mpep-e9r01-2024-html","opaque_url":"https://mpep.io/n/pb_bapkn2bp","effective_range":{"start_revision":"R-10.2019","end_revision":null},"rendered_text_html":"See also <b><a href=\"s2173.html#d0e217839\">MPEP § 2173.05(a)</a></b>.\n                        ","rendered_text_plain":"See also MPEP § 2173.05(a).","provenance":{"source_file":"s2111.html","source_anchor":"d0e200683","source_sha256":"4361ab16d766f5a1383832d25f9cd28c174972b5fb38a32f3794fd3df7638d54"},"node_type":"prose_block","kind":"narrative","host_section_id":"se_cfmo5i5k"},{"id":"pb_r46pqqyf","corpus_id":"mpep-e9r01-2024-html","opaque_url":"https://mpep.io/n/pb_r46pqqyf","effective_range":{"start_revision":"R-10.2019","end_revision":null},"rendered_text_html":"<b id=\"\">V.</b><b id=\"\"> SUMMARY OF DETERMINING THE MEANING OF A CLAIM TERM THAT DOES NOT INVOKE 35\n                           U.S.C. 112(f)</b>","rendered_text_plain":"V. SUMMARY OF DETERMINING THE MEANING OF A CLAIM TERM THAT DOES NOT INVOKE 35 U.S.C. 112(f)","provenance":{"source_file":"s2111.html","source_anchor":"d0e200409/b.8","source_sha256":"4361ab16d766f5a1383832d25f9cd28c174972b5fb38a32f3794fd3df7638d54"},"node_type":"prose_block","kind":"informal_heading","host_section_id":"se_cfmo5i5k","heading_level":2,"heading_text":"V. SUMMARY OF DETERMINING THE MEANING OF A CLAIM TERM THAT DOES NOT INVOKE 35 U.S.C. 112(f)"},{"id":"pb_spylifyv","corpus_id":"mpep-e9r01-2024-html","opaque_url":"https://mpep.io/n/pb_spylifyv","effective_range":{"start_revision":"R-10.2019","end_revision":null},"rendered_text_html":"This flow chart indicates the decisions an examiner\n                           would follow in order to ascertain the proper claim interpretation based on the plain\n                           meaning definition of BRI. With each decision in the flow chart, a different path may\n                           need to be taken to conclude whether plain meaning applies or a special definition\n                           applies.\n                        ","rendered_text_plain":"This flow chart indicates the decisions an examiner would follow in order to ascertain the proper claim interpretation based on the plain meaning definition of BRI. With each decision in the flow chart, a different path may need to be taken to conclude whether plain meaning applies or a special definition applies.","provenance":{"source_file":"s2111.html","source_anchor":"ch2100_p_29ba0_f122_325","source_sha256":"4361ab16d766f5a1383832d25f9cd28c174972b5fb38a32f3794fd3df7638d54"},"node_type":"prose_block","kind":"narrative","host_section_id":"se_cfmo5i5k"},{"id":"pb_cdcovthm","corpus_id":"mpep-e9r01-2024-html","opaque_url":"https://mpep.io/n/pb_cdcovthm","effective_range":{"start_revision":"R-10.2019","end_revision":null},"rendered_text_html":"The first question is to determine whether a claim\n                           term has an ordinary and customary meaning to those of ordinary skill in the art. If\n                           so, then the examiner should check the specification to determine whether it provides\n                           a special definition for the claim term. If the specification does not provide a\n                           special definition for the claim term, the examiner should apply the ordinary and\n                           customary meaning to the claim term. If the specification provides a special\n                           definition for the claim term, the examiner should use the special definition.\n                           However, because there is a presumption that claim terms have their ordinary and\n                           customary meaning and the specification must provide a clear and intentional use of a\n                           special definition for the claim term to be treated as having a special definition,\n                           an Office action should acknowledge and identify the special definition in this\n                           situation.\n                        ","rendered_text_plain":"The first question is to determine whether a claim term has an ordinary and customary meaning to those of ordinary skill in the art. If so, then the examiner should check the specification to determine whether it provides a special definition for the claim term. If the specification does not provide a special definition for the claim term, the examiner should apply the ordinary and customary meaning to the claim term. If the specification provides a special definition for the claim term, the examiner should use the special definition. However, because there is a presumption that claim terms have their ordinary and customary meaning and the specification must provide a clear and intentional use of a special definition for the claim term to be treated as having a special definition, an Office action should acknowledge and identify the special definition in this situation.","provenance":{"source_file":"s2111.html","source_anchor":"ch2100_p_29ba0_f127_3a5","source_sha256":"4361ab16d766f5a1383832d25f9cd28c174972b5fb38a32f3794fd3df7638d54"},"node_type":"prose_block","kind":"narrative","host_section_id":"se_cfmo5i5k"},{"id":"pb_7ivc6loj","corpus_id":"mpep-e9r01-2024-html","opaque_url":"https://mpep.io/n/pb_7ivc6loj","effective_range":{"start_revision":"R-10.2019","end_revision":null},"rendered_text_html":"Moving back to the first question, if a claim term\n                           does not have an ordinary and customary meaning, the examiner should check the\n                           specification to determine whether it provides a meaning to the claim term. If no\n                           reasonably clear meaning can be ascribed to the claim term after considering the\n                           specification and prior art, the examiner should apply the broadest reasonable\n                           interpretation to the claim term as it can be best understood. Also, the claim should\n                           be rejected under <b><a href=\"mpep-9015-appx-l.html#al_d1d85b_2ae65_215\">35 U.S.C. 112(b)</a></b> and the\n                           specification objected to under <b><a href=\"mpep-9020-appx-r.html#d0e320295\">37 CFR 1.75(d)</a></b>.\n                        ","rendered_text_plain":"Moving back to the first question, if a claim term does not have an ordinary and customary meaning, the examiner should check the specification to determine whether it provides a meaning to the claim term. If no reasonably clear meaning can be ascribed to the claim term after considering the specification and prior art, the examiner should apply the broadest reasonable interpretation to the claim term as it can be best understood. Also, the claim should be rejected under 35 U.S.C. 112(b) and the specification objected to under 37 CFR 1.75(d).","provenance":{"source_file":"s2111.html","source_anchor":"ch2100_d24d26_27316_1ad","source_sha256":"4361ab16d766f5a1383832d25f9cd28c174972b5fb38a32f3794fd3df7638d54"},"node_type":"prose_block","kind":"narrative","host_section_id":"se_cfmo5i5k"},{"id":"st_ymtxetyr","corpus_id":"mpep-e9r01-2024-html","opaque_url":"https://mpep.io/n/st_ymtxetyr","effective_range":{"start_revision":"R-10.2019","end_revision":null},"rendered_text_html":"","rendered_text_plain":"","provenance":{"source_file":"s2111.html","source_anchor":"","source_sha256":"4361ab16d766f5a1383832d25f9cd28c174972b5fb38a32f3794fd3df7638d54"},"node_type":"statute","authority":"us_cfr","authority_title_num":"37","authority_section_num":"1.75","canonical_citation":"37 CFR 1.75(d)","subsection_path":["d"]},{"id":"pb_qwyle7o5","corpus_id":"mpep-e9r01-2024-html","opaque_url":"https://mpep.io/n/pb_qwyle7o5","effective_range":{"start_revision":"R-10.2019","end_revision":null},"rendered_text_html":"If the specification provides a meaning for the claim\n                           term, the examiner should use the meaning provided by the specification. It may be\n                           appropriate for an Office action to acknowledge and identify the meaning provided by\n                           the specification in this situation.\n                        ","rendered_text_plain":"If the specification provides a meaning for the claim term, the examiner should use the meaning provided by the specification. It may be appropriate for an Office action to acknowledge and identify the meaning provided by the specification in this situation.","provenance":{"source_file":"s2111.html","source_anchor":"ch2100_d24d26_27323_30f","source_sha256":"4361ab16d766f5a1383832d25f9cd28c174972b5fb38a32f3794fd3df7638d54"},"node_type":"prose_block","kind":"narrative","host_section_id":"se_cfmo5i5k"},{"id":"fg_eeh3xvew","corpus_id":"mpep-e9r01-2024-html","opaque_url":"https://mpep.io/n/fg_eeh3xvew","effective_range":{"start_revision":"R-10.2019","end_revision":null},"rendered_text_html":"","rendered_text_plain":"","provenance":{"source_file":"s2111.html","source_anchor":"ch2100_fig_24d7a_2f0f3_82","source_sha256":"4361ab16d766f5a1383832d25f9cd28c174972b5fb38a32f3794fd3df7638d54"},"node_type":"figure","graphic_uri":"graphics/2111_01-1.png","alt_text":"How to Determine the Meaning of a Claim Term That Does Not Invoke 112(f)","width":762,"height":714,"host_section_id":"se_cfmo5i5k"},{"id":"se_kirs6hlb","corpus_id":"mpep-e9r01-2024-html","opaque_url":"https://mpep.io/n/se_kirs6hlb","effective_range":{"start_revision":"R-10.2019","end_revision":null},"rendered_text_html":"","rendered_text_plain":"","provenance":{"source_file":"s2111.html","source_anchor":"d0e200689","source_sha256":"4361ab16d766f5a1383832d25f9cd28c174972b5fb38a32f3794fd3df7638d54"},"node_type":"section","akn_urn":"/akn/us/statement/manual/uspto/2024/mpep/eng@2024-02-29!sec_2111_02","canonical_url":"https://mpep.io/akn/us/statement/manual/uspto/2024/mpep/eng@2024-02-29!sec_2111_02","section_number":"2111.02","chapter":"2100","depth":1,"title":"Effect of Preamble","children_ids":["pb_33jkqirl","pb_bngkdhin","pb_xwwid2nn","pb_4g2hms56","pb_4bil4aym","pb_jtd4sdrw","pb_75janm5u","pb_lp7yjncu","pb_nmrfdh6i"],"revision_tag":"R-07.2022","parent_section_id":"se_3v44fuac"},{"id":"pb_33jkqirl","corpus_id":"mpep-e9r01-2024-html","opaque_url":"https://mpep.io/n/pb_33jkqirl","effective_range":{"start_revision":"R-10.2019","end_revision":null},"rendered_text_html":"The determination of whether a preamble limits a claim is made on a\n                           case-by-case basis in light of the facts in each case; there is no litmus test defining\n                           when a preamble limits the scope of a claim. <i>Catalina Mktg. Int’l v.\n                              Coolsavings.com, Inc.,</i> 289 F.3d 801, 808, 62 USPQ2d 1781, 1785 (Fed. Cir.\n                           2002). See <i>id.</i> at 808-10, 62 USPQ2d at 1784-86 for a discussion of\n                           guideposts that have emerged from various decisions exploring the preamble’s effect on\n                           claim scope, as well as a hypothetical example illustrating these principles. \n                        ","rendered_text_plain":"The determination of whether a preamble limits a claim is made on a case-by-case basis in light of the facts in each case; there is no litmus test defining when a preamble limits the scope of a claim. Catalina Mktg. Int’l v. Coolsavings.com, Inc., 289 F.3d 801, 808, 62 USPQ2d 1781, 1785 (Fed. Cir. 2002). See id. at 808-10, 62 USPQ2d at 1784-86 for a discussion of guideposts that have emerged from various decisions exploring the preamble’s effect on claim scope, as well as a hypothetical example illustrating these principles.","provenance":{"source_file":"s2111.html","source_anchor":"d0e200693","source_sha256":"4361ab16d766f5a1383832d25f9cd28c174972b5fb38a32f3794fd3df7638d54"},"node_type":"prose_block","kind":"narrative","host_section_id":"se_kirs6hlb"},{"id":"cs_m4dvsy53","corpus_id":"mpep-e9r01-2024-html","opaque_url":"https://mpep.io/n/cs_m4dvsy53","effective_range":{"start_revision":"R-10.2019","end_revision":null},"rendered_text_html":"","rendered_text_plain":"Catalina Mktg. Int’l v. Coolsavings.com, Inc., 289 F.3d 801, 62 USPQ2d 1781 (Fed. Cir. 2002)","provenance":{"source_file":"s2111.html","source_anchor":"","source_sha256":"4361ab16d766f5a1383832d25f9cd28c174972b5fb38a32f3794fd3df7638d54"},"node_type":"case","short_name":"Catalina Mktg. Int’l v. Coolsavings.com, Inc.","all_citations":["289 F.3d 801","62 USPQ2d 1781"],"canonical_citation":"Catalina Mktg. Int’l v. Coolsavings.com, Inc., 289 F.3d 801, 62 USPQ2d 1781 (Fed. Cir. 2002)","decision_year":2002,"court":"Fed. Cir."},{"id":"pb_bngkdhin","corpus_id":"mpep-e9r01-2024-html","opaque_url":"https://mpep.io/n/pb_bngkdhin","effective_range":{"start_revision":"R-10.2019","end_revision":null},"rendered_text_html":" “[A] claim preamble has the import that the claim as a whole suggests\n                           for it.” <i>Bell Communications Research, Inc. v. Vitalink Communications\n                              Corp.,</i> 55 F.3d 615, 620, 34 USPQ2d 1816, 1820 (Fed. Cir. 1995). “If the\n                           claim preamble, when read in the context of the entire claim, recites limitations of the\n                           claim, or, if the claim preamble is ‘necessary to give life, meaning, and vitality’ to\n                           the claim, then the claim preamble should be construed as if in the balance of the\n                           claim.” <i>Pitney Bowes, Inc. v. Hewlett-Packard Co.,</i> 182 F.3d 1298,\n                           1305, 51 USPQ2d 1161, 1165-66 (Fed. Cir. 1999). See also <i>Jansen v. Rexall\n                              Sundown, Inc.,</i> 342 F.3d 1329, 1333, 68 USPQ2d 1154, 1158 (Fed. Cir. 2003)\n                           (In considering the effect of the preamble in a claim directed to a method of treating\n                           or preventing pernicious anemia in humans by administering a certain vitamin preparation\n                           to “a human in need thereof,” the court held that the claims’ recitation of a patient or\n                           a human “in need” gives life and meaning to the preamble’s statement of\n                           purpose.).<i> Kropa v. Robie,</i> 187 F.2d 150, 152, 88 USPQ 478, 481\n                           (CCPA 1951) (A preamble reciting “[a]n abrasive article” was deemed essential to point\n                           out the invention defined by claims to an article comprising abrasive grains and a\n                           hardened binder and the process of making it. The court stated “it is only by that\n                           phrase that it can be known that the subject matter defined by the claims is comprised\n                           as an abrasive article. Every union of substances capable <i>inter alia</i>\n                           of use as abrasive grains and a binder is not an ‘abrasive article.’” Therefore, the\n                           preamble served to further define the structure of the article produced.). \n                        ","rendered_text_plain":"“[A] claim preamble has the import that the claim as a whole suggests for it.” Bell Communications Research, Inc. v. Vitalink Communications Corp., 55 F.3d 615, 620, 34 USPQ2d 1816, 1820 (Fed. Cir. 1995). “If the claim preamble, when read in the context of the entire claim, recites limitations of the claim, or, if the claim preamble is ‘necessary to give life, meaning, and vitality’ to the claim, then the claim preamble should be construed as if in the balance of the claim.” Pitney Bowes, Inc. v. Hewlett-Packard Co., 182 F.3d 1298, 1305, 51 USPQ2d 1161, 1165-66 (Fed. Cir. 1999). See also Jansen v. Rexall Sundown, Inc., 342 F.3d 1329, 1333, 68 USPQ2d 1154, 1158 (Fed. Cir. 2003) (In considering the effect of the preamble in a claim directed to a method of treating or preventing pernicious anemia in humans by administering a certain vitamin preparation to “a human in need thereof,” the court held that the claims’ recitation of a patient or a human “in need” gives life and meaning to the preamble’s statement of purpose.). Kropa v. Robie, 187 F.2d 150, 152, 88 USPQ 478, 481 (CCPA 1951) (A preamble reciting “[a]n abrasive article” was deemed essential to point out the invention defined by claims to an article comprising abrasive grains and a hardened binder and the process of making it. The court stated “it is only by that phrase that it can be known that the subject matter defined by the claims is comprised as an abrasive article. Every union of substances capable inter alia of use as abrasive grains and a binder is not an ‘abrasive article.’” Therefore, the preamble served to further define the structure of the article produced.).","provenance":{"source_file":"s2111.html","source_anchor":"d0e200702","source_sha256":"4361ab16d766f5a1383832d25f9cd28c174972b5fb38a32f3794fd3df7638d54"},"node_type":"prose_block","kind":"narrative","host_section_id":"se_kirs6hlb"},{"id":"cs_wgdgieop","corpus_id":"mpep-e9r01-2024-html","opaque_url":"https://mpep.io/n/cs_wgdgieop","effective_range":{"start_revision":"R-10.2019","end_revision":null},"rendered_text_html":"","rendered_text_plain":"Bell Communications Research, Inc. v. Vitalink Communications Corp., 55 F.3d 615, 34 USPQ2d 1816 (Fed. Cir. 1995)","provenance":{"source_file":"s2111.html","source_anchor":"","source_sha256":"4361ab16d766f5a1383832d25f9cd28c174972b5fb38a32f3794fd3df7638d54"},"node_type":"case","short_name":"Bell Communications Research, Inc. v. Vitalink Communications Corp.","all_citations":["55 F.3d 615","34 USPQ2d 1816"],"canonical_citation":"Bell Communications Research, Inc. v. Vitalink Communications Corp., 55 F.3d 615, 34 USPQ2d 1816 (Fed. Cir. 1995)","decision_year":1995,"court":"Fed. Cir."},{"id":"cs_gbzdkpsj","corpus_id":"mpep-e9r01-2024-html","opaque_url":"https://mpep.io/n/cs_gbzdkpsj","effective_range":{"start_revision":"R-10.2019","end_revision":null},"rendered_text_html":"","rendered_text_plain":"Pitney Bowes, Inc. v. Hewlett-Packard Co., 182 F.3d 1298, 51 USPQ2d 1161 (Fed. Cir. 1999)","provenance":{"source_file":"s2111.html","source_anchor":"","source_sha256":"4361ab16d766f5a1383832d25f9cd28c174972b5fb38a32f3794fd3df7638d54"},"node_type":"case","short_name":"Pitney Bowes, Inc. v. Hewlett-Packard Co.","all_citations":["182 F.3d 1298","51 USPQ2d 1161"],"canonical_citation":"Pitney Bowes, Inc. v. Hewlett-Packard Co., 182 F.3d 1298, 51 USPQ2d 1161 (Fed. Cir. 1999)","decision_year":1999,"court":"Fed. Cir."},{"id":"cs_kcxxkgjr","corpus_id":"mpep-e9r01-2024-html","opaque_url":"https://mpep.io/n/cs_kcxxkgjr","effective_range":{"start_revision":"R-10.2019","end_revision":null},"rendered_text_html":"","rendered_text_plain":"Jansen v. Rexall Sundown, Inc., 342 F.3d 1329, 68 USPQ2d 1154 (Fed. Cir. 2003)","provenance":{"source_file":"s2111.html","source_anchor":"","source_sha256":"4361ab16d766f5a1383832d25f9cd28c174972b5fb38a32f3794fd3df7638d54"},"node_type":"case","short_name":"Jansen v. Rexall Sundown, Inc.","all_citations":["342 F.3d 1329","68 USPQ2d 1154"],"canonical_citation":"Jansen v. Rexall Sundown, Inc., 342 F.3d 1329, 68 USPQ2d 1154 (Fed. Cir. 2003)","decision_year":2003,"court":"Fed. Cir."},{"id":"cs_vqayyzqa","corpus_id":"mpep-e9r01-2024-html","opaque_url":"https://mpep.io/n/cs_vqayyzqa","effective_range":{"start_revision":"R-10.2019","end_revision":null},"rendered_text_html":"","rendered_text_plain":"Kropa v. Robie, 187 F.2d 150, 88 USPQ 478 (CCPA 1951)","provenance":{"source_file":"s2111.html","source_anchor":"","source_sha256":"4361ab16d766f5a1383832d25f9cd28c174972b5fb38a32f3794fd3df7638d54"},"node_type":"case","short_name":"Kropa v. Robie","all_citations":["187 F.2d 150","88 USPQ 478"],"canonical_citation":"Kropa v. Robie, 187 F.2d 150, 88 USPQ 478 (CCPA 1951)","decision_year":1951,"court":"CCPA"},{"id":"pb_xwwid2nn","corpus_id":"mpep-e9r01-2024-html","opaque_url":"https://mpep.io/n/pb_xwwid2nn","effective_range":{"start_revision":"R-10.2019","end_revision":null},"rendered_text_html":"<b id=\"\">I.</b><b id=\"\"> PREAMBLE STATEMENTS LIMITING STRUCTURE</b>","rendered_text_plain":"I. PREAMBLE STATEMENTS LIMITING STRUCTURE","provenance":{"source_file":"s2111.html","source_anchor":"d0e200689/b.0","source_sha256":"4361ab16d766f5a1383832d25f9cd28c174972b5fb38a32f3794fd3df7638d54"},"node_type":"prose_block","kind":"informal_heading","host_section_id":"se_kirs6hlb","heading_level":2,"heading_text":"I. PREAMBLE STATEMENTS LIMITING STRUCTURE"},{"id":"pb_4g2hms56","corpus_id":"mpep-e9r01-2024-html","opaque_url":"https://mpep.io/n/pb_4g2hms56","effective_range":{"start_revision":"R-10.2019","end_revision":null},"rendered_text_html":" Any terminology in the preamble that limits the structure of the\n                           claimed invention must be treated as a claim limitation. See, e.g., <i>Corning\n                              Glass Works v. Sumitomo Elec. U.S.A., Inc.,</i> 868 F.2d 1251, 1257,\n                           9 USPQ2d 1962, 1966 (Fed. Cir. 1989) (The determination of whether preamble\n                           recitations are structural limitations can be resolved only on review of the entirety\n                           of the application “to gain an understanding of what the inventors actually invented\n                           and intended to encompass by the claim” as drafted without importing “‘extraneous’\n                           limitations from the specification.”); <i>Pac-Tec Inc. v. Amerace\n                              Corp.,</i> 903 F.2d 796, 801, 14 USPQ2d 1871, 1876 (Fed. Cir. 1990)\n                           (determining that preamble language that constitutes a structural limitation is\n                           actually part of the claimed invention). See also <i>In re Stencel,</i>\n                           828 F.2d 751, 4 USPQ2d 1071 (Fed. Cir. 1987) (The claim at issue was directed to a\n                           driver for setting a joint of a threaded collar; however, the body of the claim did\n                           not directly include the structure of the collar as part of the claimed article. The\n                           examiner did not consider the preamble, which did set forth the structure of the\n                           collar, as limiting the claim. The court found that the collar structure could not be\n                           ignored. While the claim was not directly limited to the collar, the collar structure\n                           recited in the preamble did limit the structure of the driver. “[T]he framework - the\n                           teachings of the prior art - against which patentability is measured is not all\n                           drivers broadly, but drivers suitable for use in combination with this collar, for\n                           the claims are so limited.” <i>Id.</i> at 1073, 828 F.2d at 754.).\n                        ","rendered_text_plain":"Any terminology in the preamble that limits the structure of the claimed invention must be treated as a claim limitation. See, e.g., Corning Glass Works v. Sumitomo Elec. U.S.A., Inc., 868 F.2d 1251, 1257, 9 USPQ2d 1962, 1966 (Fed. Cir. 1989) (The determination of whether preamble recitations are structural limitations can be resolved only on review of the entirety of the application “to gain an understanding of what the inventors actually invented and intended to encompass by the claim” as drafted without importing “‘extraneous’ limitations from the specification.”); Pac-Tec Inc. v. Amerace Corp., 903 F.2d 796, 801, 14 USPQ2d 1871, 1876 (Fed. Cir. 1990) (determining that preamble language that constitutes a structural limitation is actually part of the claimed invention). See also In re Stencel, 828 F.2d 751, 4 USPQ2d 1071 (Fed. Cir. 1987) (The claim at issue was directed to a driver for setting a joint of a threaded collar; however, the body of the claim did not directly include the structure of the collar as part of the claimed article. The examiner did not consider the preamble, which did set forth the structure of the collar, as limiting the claim. The court found that the collar structure could not be ignored. While the claim was not directly limited to the collar, the collar structure recited in the preamble did limit the structure of the driver. “[T]he framework - the teachings of the prior art - against which patentability is measured is not all drivers broadly, but drivers suitable for use in combination with this collar, for the claims are so limited.” Id. at 1073, 828 F.2d at 754.).","provenance":{"source_file":"s2111.html","source_anchor":"d0e200727","source_sha256":"4361ab16d766f5a1383832d25f9cd28c174972b5fb38a32f3794fd3df7638d54"},"node_type":"prose_block","kind":"narrative","host_section_id":"se_kirs6hlb"},{"id":"cs_6abiepva","corpus_id":"mpep-e9r01-2024-html","opaque_url":"https://mpep.io/n/cs_6abiepva","effective_range":{"start_revision":"R-10.2019","end_revision":null},"rendered_text_html":"","rendered_text_plain":"Corning Glass Works v. Sumitomo Elec. U.S.A., Inc., 868 F.2d 1251, 9 USPQ2d 1962 (Fed. Cir. 1989)","provenance":{"source_file":"s2111.html","source_anchor":"","source_sha256":"4361ab16d766f5a1383832d25f9cd28c174972b5fb38a32f3794fd3df7638d54"},"node_type":"case","short_name":"Corning Glass Works v. Sumitomo Elec. U.S.A., Inc.","all_citations":["868 F.2d 1251","9 USPQ2d 1962"],"canonical_citation":"Corning Glass Works v. Sumitomo Elec. U.S.A., Inc., 868 F.2d 1251, 9 USPQ2d 1962 (Fed. Cir. 1989)","decision_year":1989,"court":"Fed. Cir."},{"id":"cs_ybyt76qg","corpus_id":"mpep-e9r01-2024-html","opaque_url":"https://mpep.io/n/cs_ybyt76qg","effective_range":{"start_revision":"R-10.2019","end_revision":null},"rendered_text_html":"","rendered_text_plain":"Pac-Tec Inc. v. Amerace Corp., 903 F.2d 796, 14 USPQ2d 1871 (Fed. Cir. 1990)","provenance":{"source_file":"s2111.html","source_anchor":"","source_sha256":"4361ab16d766f5a1383832d25f9cd28c174972b5fb38a32f3794fd3df7638d54"},"node_type":"case","short_name":"Pac-Tec Inc. v. Amerace Corp.","all_citations":["903 F.2d 796","14 USPQ2d 1871"],"canonical_citation":"Pac-Tec Inc. v. Amerace Corp., 903 F.2d 796, 14 USPQ2d 1871 (Fed. Cir. 1990)","decision_year":1990,"court":"Fed. Cir."},{"id":"cs_z35um645","corpus_id":"mpep-e9r01-2024-html","opaque_url":"https://mpep.io/n/cs_z35um645","effective_range":{"start_revision":"R-10.2019","end_revision":null},"rendered_text_html":"","rendered_text_plain":"In re Stencel, 828 F.2d 751, 4 USPQ2d 1071 (Fed. Cir. 1987)","provenance":{"source_file":"s2111.html","source_anchor":"","source_sha256":"4361ab16d766f5a1383832d25f9cd28c174972b5fb38a32f3794fd3df7638d54"},"node_type":"case","short_name":"In re Stencel","all_citations":["828 F.2d 751","4 USPQ2d 1071"],"canonical_citation":"In re Stencel, 828 F.2d 751, 4 USPQ2d 1071 (Fed. Cir. 1987)","decision_year":1987,"court":"Fed. Cir."},{"id":"pb_4bil4aym","corpus_id":"mpep-e9r01-2024-html","opaque_url":"https://mpep.io/n/pb_4bil4aym","effective_range":{"start_revision":"R-10.2019","end_revision":null},"rendered_text_html":"<b id=\"\">II.</b><b id=\"\"> PREAMBLE STATEMENTS RECITING PURPOSE OR INTENDED USE</b>","rendered_text_plain":"II. PREAMBLE STATEMENTS RECITING PURPOSE OR INTENDED USE","provenance":{"source_file":"s2111.html","source_anchor":"d0e200689/b.2","source_sha256":"4361ab16d766f5a1383832d25f9cd28c174972b5fb38a32f3794fd3df7638d54"},"node_type":"prose_block","kind":"informal_heading","host_section_id":"se_kirs6hlb","heading_level":2,"heading_text":"II. PREAMBLE STATEMENTS RECITING PURPOSE OR INTENDED USE"},{"id":"pb_jtd4sdrw","corpus_id":"mpep-e9r01-2024-html","opaque_url":"https://mpep.io/n/pb_jtd4sdrw","effective_range":{"start_revision":"R-10.2019","end_revision":null},"rendered_text_html":"The claim preamble must be read in the context of the entire claim.\n                           The determination of whether preamble recitations are structural limitations or mere\n                           statements of purpose or use “can be resolved only on review of the entirety of the\n                           [record] to gain an understanding of what the inventors actually invented and\n                           intended to encompass by the claim” as drafted without importing “‘extraneous’\n                           limitations from the specification.” <i>Corning Glass Works, </i>868 F.2d\n                           at 1257, 9 USPQ2d at 1966. If the body of a claim fully and intrinsically sets forth\n                           all of the limitations of the claimed invention, and the preamble merely states, for\n                           example, the purpose or intended use of the invention, rather than any distinct\n                           definition of any of the claimed invention’s limitations, then the preamble is not\n                           considered a limitation and is of no significance to claim construction.\n                           <i>Shoes by Firebug LLC v. Stride Rite Children’s Grp., LLC,</i> 962\n                           F.3d 1362, 2020 USPQ2d 10701 (Fed. Cir. 2020) (The court found that the preamble in\n                           one patent’s claim is limiting but is not in a related patent); <i>Pitney\n                              Bowes, Inc. v. Hewlett-Packard Co.,</i> 182 F.3d 1298, 1305, 51 USPQ2d 1161,\n                           1165 (Fed. Cir. 1999). See also <i>Rowe v. Dror,</i> 112 F.3d 473, 478,\n                           42 USPQ2d 1550, 1553 (Fed. Cir. 1997) (“where a patentee defines a structurally\n                           complete invention in the claim body and uses the preamble only to state a purpose or\n                           intended use for the invention, the preamble is not a claim limitation”);\n                           <i>Kropa v. Robie,</i> 187 F.2d at 152, 88 USPQ2d at 480-81 (preamble\n                           is not a limitation where claim is directed to a product and the preamble merely\n                           recites a property inherent in an old product defined by the remainder of the claim);\n                           <i>STX LLC. v. Brine,</i> 211 F.3d 588, 591, 54 USPQ2d 1347, 1350\n                           (Fed. Cir. 2000) (holding that the preamble phrase “which provides improved playing\n                           and handling characteristics” in a claim drawn to a head for a lacrosse stick was not\n                           a claim limitation). Compare <i>Jansen v. Rexall Sundown, Inc.,</i> 342\n                           F.3d 1329, 1333-34, 68 USPQ2d 1154, 1158 (Fed. Cir. 2003) (In a claim directed to a\n                           method of treating or preventing pernicious anemia in humans by administering a\n                           certain vitamin preparation to “a human in need thereof,” the court held that the\n                           preamble is not merely a statement of effect that may or may not be desired or\n                           appreciated, but rather is a statement of the intentional purpose for which the\n                           method must be performed. Thus the claim is properly interpreted to mean that the\n                           vitamin preparation must be administered to a human with a recognized need to treat\n                           or prevent pernicious anemia.); <i>Nantkwest , Inc. v. Lee,</i> 686 Fed.\n                           App'x 864, 867 (Fed. Cir. 2017) (nonprecedential) (The court found that the preamble\n                           phrase “treating a cancer” “’require[s] lysis of many cells, in order to accomplish\n                           the goal of treating cancer’ and not merely lysing one or a few cancer cells.”);\n                           <i> In re Cruciferous Sprout Litig.,</i> 301 F.3d 1343, 1346-48, 64\n                           USPQ2d 1202, 1204-05 (Fed. Cir. 2002) (A claim at issue was directed to a method of\n                           preparing a food rich in glucosinolates wherein cruciferous sprouts are harvested\n                           prior to the 2-leaf stage. The court held that the preamble phrase “rich in\n                           glucosinolates” helps define the claimed invention, as evidenced by the specification\n                           and prosecution history, and thus is a limitation of the claim (although the claim\n                           was anticipated by prior art that produced sprouts inherently “rich in\n                           glucosinolates”)).\n                        ","rendered_text_plain":"The claim preamble must be read in the context of the entire claim. The determination of whether preamble recitations are structural limitations or mere statements of purpose or use “can be resolved only on review of the entirety of the [record] to gain an understanding of what the inventors actually invented and intended to encompass by the claim” as drafted without importing “‘extraneous’ limitations from the specification.” Corning Glass Works, 868 F.2d at 1257, 9 USPQ2d at 1966. If the body of a claim fully and intrinsically sets forth all of the limitations of the claimed invention, and the preamble merely states, for example, the purpose or intended use of the invention, rather than any distinct definition of any of the claimed invention’s limitations, then the preamble is not considered a limitation and is of no significance to claim construction. Shoes by Firebug LLC v. Stride Rite Children’s Grp., LLC, 962 F.3d 1362, 2020 USPQ2d 10701 (Fed. Cir. 2020) (The court found that the preamble in one patent’s claim is limiting but is not in a related patent); Pitney Bowes, Inc. v. Hewlett-Packard Co., 182 F.3d 1298, 1305, 51 USPQ2d 1161, 1165 (Fed. Cir. 1999). See also Rowe v. Dror, 112 F.3d 473, 478, 42 USPQ2d 1550, 1553 (Fed. Cir. 1997) (“where a patentee defines a structurally complete invention in the claim body and uses the preamble only to state a purpose or intended use for the invention, the preamble is not a claim limitation”); Kropa v. Robie, 187 F.2d at 152, 88 USPQ2d at 480-81 (preamble is not a limitation where claim is directed to a product and the preamble merely recites a property inherent in an old product defined by the remainder of the claim); STX LLC. v. Brine, 211 F.3d 588, 591, 54 USPQ2d 1347, 1350 (Fed. Cir. 2000) (holding that the preamble phrase “which provides improved playing and handling characteristics” in a claim drawn to a head for a lacrosse stick was not a claim limitation). Compare Jansen v. Rexall Sundown, Inc., 342 F.3d 1329, 1333-34, 68 USPQ2d 1154, 1158 (Fed. Cir. 2003) (In a claim directed to a method of treating or preventing pernicious anemia in humans by administering a certain vitamin preparation to “a human in need thereof,” the court held that the preamble is not merely a statement of effect that may or may not be desired or appreciated, but rather is a statement of the intentional purpose for which the method must be performed. Thus the claim is properly interpreted to mean that the vitamin preparation must be administered to a human with a recognized need to treat or prevent pernicious anemia.); Nantkwest , Inc. v. Lee, 686 Fed. App'x 864, 867 (Fed. Cir. 2017) (nonprecedential) (The court found that the preamble phrase “treating a cancer” “’require[s] lysis of many cells, in order to accomplish the goal of treating cancer’ and not merely lysing one or a few cancer cells.”); In re Cruciferous Sprout Litig., 301 F.3d 1343, 1346-48, 64 USPQ2d 1202, 1204-05 (Fed. Cir. 2002) (A claim at issue was directed to a method of preparing a food rich in glucosinolates wherein cruciferous sprouts are harvested prior to the 2-leaf stage. The court held that the preamble phrase “rich in glucosinolates” helps define the claimed invention, as evidenced by the specification and prosecution history, and thus is a limitation of the claim (although the claim was anticipated by prior art that produced sprouts inherently “rich in glucosinolates”)).","provenance":{"source_file":"s2111.html","source_anchor":"d0e200755","source_sha256":"4361ab16d766f5a1383832d25f9cd28c174972b5fb38a32f3794fd3df7638d54"},"node_type":"prose_block","kind":"narrative","host_section_id":"se_kirs6hlb"},{"id":"cs_wd3lkbns","corpus_id":"mpep-e9r01-2024-html","opaque_url":"https://mpep.io/n/cs_wd3lkbns","effective_range":{"start_revision":"R-10.2019","end_revision":null},"rendered_text_html":"","rendered_text_plain":"Shoes by Firebug LLC v. Stride Rite Children’s Grp., LLC, 962 F.3d 1362, 2020 USPQ2d 10701 (Fed. Cir. 2020)","provenance":{"source_file":"s2111.html","source_anchor":"","source_sha256":"4361ab16d766f5a1383832d25f9cd28c174972b5fb38a32f3794fd3df7638d54"},"node_type":"case","short_name":"Shoes by Firebug LLC v. Stride Rite Children’s Grp., LLC","all_citations":["962 F.3d 1362","2020 USPQ2d 10701"],"canonical_citation":"Shoes by Firebug LLC v. Stride Rite Children’s Grp., LLC, 962 F.3d 1362, 2020 USPQ2d 10701 (Fed. Cir. 2020)","decision_year":2020,"court":"Fed. Cir."},{"id":"cs_op4qurml","corpus_id":"mpep-e9r01-2024-html","opaque_url":"https://mpep.io/n/cs_op4qurml","effective_range":{"start_revision":"R-10.2019","end_revision":null},"rendered_text_html":"","rendered_text_plain":"Rowe v. Dror, 112 F.3d 473, 42 USPQ2d 1550 (Fed. Cir. 1997)","provenance":{"source_file":"s2111.html","source_anchor":"","source_sha256":"4361ab16d766f5a1383832d25f9cd28c174972b5fb38a32f3794fd3df7638d54"},"node_type":"case","short_name":"Rowe v. Dror","all_citations":["112 F.3d 473","42 USPQ2d 1550"],"canonical_citation":"Rowe v. Dror, 112 F.3d 473, 42 USPQ2d 1550 (Fed. Cir. 1997)","decision_year":1997,"court":"Fed. Cir."},{"id":"cs_hmbq3nhc","corpus_id":"mpep-e9r01-2024-html","opaque_url":"https://mpep.io/n/cs_hmbq3nhc","effective_range":{"start_revision":"R-10.2019","end_revision":null},"rendered_text_html":"","rendered_text_plain":"STX LLC. v. Brine, 211 F.3d 588, 54 USPQ2d 1347 (Fed. Cir. 2000)","provenance":{"source_file":"s2111.html","source_anchor":"","source_sha256":"4361ab16d766f5a1383832d25f9cd28c174972b5fb38a32f3794fd3df7638d54"},"node_type":"case","short_name":"STX LLC. v. Brine","all_citations":["211 F.3d 588","54 USPQ2d 1347"],"canonical_citation":"STX LLC. v. Brine, 211 F.3d 588, 54 USPQ2d 1347 (Fed. Cir. 2000)","decision_year":2000,"court":"Fed. Cir."},{"id":"cs_vupz2ut3","corpus_id":"mpep-e9r01-2024-html","opaque_url":"https://mpep.io/n/cs_vupz2ut3","effective_range":{"start_revision":"R-10.2019","end_revision":null},"rendered_text_html":"","rendered_text_plain":"Nantkwest , Inc. v. Lee, 686 Fed. App'x 864 (Fed. Cir. 2017)","provenance":{"source_file":"s2111.html","source_anchor":"","source_sha256":"4361ab16d766f5a1383832d25f9cd28c174972b5fb38a32f3794fd3df7638d54"},"node_type":"case","short_name":"Nantkwest , Inc. v. Lee","all_citations":["686 Fed. App'x 864"],"canonical_citation":"Nantkwest , Inc. v. Lee, 686 Fed. App'x 864 (Fed. Cir. 2017)","decision_year":2017,"court":"Fed. Cir."},{"id":"cs_g742swtn","corpus_id":"mpep-e9r01-2024-html","opaque_url":"https://mpep.io/n/cs_g742swtn","effective_range":{"start_revision":"R-10.2019","end_revision":null},"rendered_text_html":"","rendered_text_plain":"In re Cruciferous Sprout Litig., 301 F.3d 1343, 64 USPQ2d 1202 (Fed. Cir. 2002)","provenance":{"source_file":"s2111.html","source_anchor":"","source_sha256":"4361ab16d766f5a1383832d25f9cd28c174972b5fb38a32f3794fd3df7638d54"},"node_type":"case","short_name":"In re Cruciferous Sprout Litig.","all_citations":["301 F.3d 1343","64 USPQ2d 1202"],"canonical_citation":"In re Cruciferous Sprout Litig., 301 F.3d 1343, 64 USPQ2d 1202 (Fed. Cir. 2002)","decision_year":2002,"court":"Fed. Cir."},{"id":"pb_75janm5u","corpus_id":"mpep-e9r01-2024-html","opaque_url":"https://mpep.io/n/pb_75janm5u","effective_range":{"start_revision":"R-10.2019","end_revision":null},"rendered_text_html":"During examination, statements in the preamble reciting the purpose\n                           or intended use of the claimed invention must be evaluated to determine whether or\n                           not the recited purpose or intended use results in a structural difference (or, in\n                           the case of process claims, manipulative difference) between the claimed invention\n                           and the prior art. If so, the recitation serves to limit the claim. See, e.g.,\n                           <i>In re Otto,</i> 312 F.2d 937, 938, 136 USPQ 458, 459 (CCPA 1963)\n                           (The claims were directed to a core member for hair curlers and a process of making a\n                           core member for hair curlers. The court held that the intended use of hair curling\n                           was of no significance to the structure and process of making.); <i>In re\n                              Sinex,</i> 309 F.2d 488, 492, 135 USPQ 302, 305 (CCPA 1962) (statement of\n                           intended use in an apparatus claim did not distinguish over the prior art apparatus).\n                           To satisfy an intended use limitation which is limiting, a prior art structure which\n                           is capable of performing the intended use as recited in the preamble meets the claim.\n                           See, e.g., <i>In re Schreiber,</i> 128 F.3d 1473, 1477, 44 USPQ2d 1429,\n                           1431 (Fed. Cir. 1997) (anticipation rejection affirmed based on Board’s factual\n                           finding that the reference dispenser (a spout disclosed as useful for purposes such\n                           as dispensing oil from an oil can) would be capable of dispensing popcorn in the\n                           manner set forth in appellant’s claim 1 (a dispensing top for dispensing popcorn in a\n                           specified manner)) and cases cited therein. See also <b><a href=\"s2112.html#d0e201036\">MPEP § 2112</a></b> -\n                           <b><a href=\"s2112.html#d0e201360\">MPEP §\n                                 2112.02</a></b>. \n                        ","rendered_text_plain":"During examination, statements in the preamble reciting the purpose or intended use of the claimed invention must be evaluated to determine whether or not the recited purpose or intended use results in a structural difference (or, in the case of process claims, manipulative difference) between the claimed invention and the prior art. If so, the recitation serves to limit the claim. See, e.g., In re Otto, 312 F.2d 937, 938, 136 USPQ 458, 459 (CCPA 1963) (The claims were directed to a core member for hair curlers and a process of making a core member for hair curlers. The court held that the intended use of hair curling was of no significance to the structure and process of making.); In re Sinex, 309 F.2d 488, 492, 135 USPQ 302, 305 (CCPA 1962) (statement of intended use in an apparatus claim did not distinguish over the prior art apparatus). To satisfy an intended use limitation which is limiting, a prior art structure which is capable of performing the intended use as recited in the preamble meets the claim. See, e.g., In re Schreiber, 128 F.3d 1473, 1477, 44 USPQ2d 1429, 1431 (Fed. Cir. 1997) (anticipation rejection affirmed based on Board’s factual finding that the reference dispenser (a spout disclosed as useful for purposes such as dispensing oil from an oil can) would be capable of dispensing popcorn in the manner set forth in appellant’s claim 1 (a dispensing top for dispensing popcorn in a specified manner)) and cases cited therein. See also MPEP § 2112 - MPEP § 2112.02.","provenance":{"source_file":"s2111.html","source_anchor":"d0e200779","source_sha256":"4361ab16d766f5a1383832d25f9cd28c174972b5fb38a32f3794fd3df7638d54"},"node_type":"prose_block","kind":"narrative","host_section_id":"se_kirs6hlb"},{"id":"cs_ar4iilar","corpus_id":"mpep-e9r01-2024-html","opaque_url":"https://mpep.io/n/cs_ar4iilar","effective_range":{"start_revision":"R-10.2019","end_revision":null},"rendered_text_html":"","rendered_text_plain":"In re Otto, 312 F.2d 937, 136 USPQ 458 (CCPA 1963)","provenance":{"source_file":"s2111.html","source_anchor":"","source_sha256":"4361ab16d766f5a1383832d25f9cd28c174972b5fb38a32f3794fd3df7638d54"},"node_type":"case","short_name":"In re Otto","all_citations":["312 F.2d 937","136 USPQ 458"],"canonical_citation":"In re Otto, 312 F.2d 937, 136 USPQ 458 (CCPA 1963)","decision_year":1963,"court":"CCPA"},{"id":"cs_6bcoigi2","corpus_id":"mpep-e9r01-2024-html","opaque_url":"https://mpep.io/n/cs_6bcoigi2","effective_range":{"start_revision":"R-10.2019","end_revision":null},"rendered_text_html":"","rendered_text_plain":"In re Sinex, 309 F.2d 488, 135 USPQ 302 (CCPA 1962)","provenance":{"source_file":"s2111.html","source_anchor":"","source_sha256":"4361ab16d766f5a1383832d25f9cd28c174972b5fb38a32f3794fd3df7638d54"},"node_type":"case","short_name":"In re Sinex","all_citations":["309 F.2d 488","135 USPQ 302"],"canonical_citation":"In re Sinex, 309 F.2d 488, 135 USPQ 302 (CCPA 1962)","decision_year":1962,"court":"CCPA"},{"id":"cs_c7c3pdhu","corpus_id":"mpep-e9r01-2024-html","opaque_url":"https://mpep.io/n/cs_c7c3pdhu","effective_range":{"start_revision":"R-10.2019","end_revision":null},"rendered_text_html":"","rendered_text_plain":"In re Schreiber, 128 F.3d 1473, 44 USPQ2d 1429 (Fed. Cir. 1997)","provenance":{"source_file":"s2111.html","source_anchor":"","source_sha256":"4361ab16d766f5a1383832d25f9cd28c174972b5fb38a32f3794fd3df7638d54"},"node_type":"case","short_name":"In re Schreiber","all_citations":["128 F.3d 1473","44 USPQ2d 1429"],"canonical_citation":"In re Schreiber, 128 F.3d 1473, 44 USPQ2d 1429 (Fed. Cir. 1997)","decision_year":1997,"court":"Fed. Cir."},{"id":"se_47uv733r","corpus_id":"mpep-e9r01-2024-html","opaque_url":"https://mpep.io/n/se_47uv733r","effective_range":{"start_revision":"R-10.2019","end_revision":null},"rendered_text_html":"","rendered_text_plain":"","provenance":{"source_file":"s2111.html","source_anchor":"stub-2112","source_sha256":"4361ab16d766f5a1383832d25f9cd28c174972b5fb38a32f3794fd3df7638d54"},"node_type":"section","akn_urn":"/akn/us/statement/manual/uspto/2024/mpep/eng@2024-02-29!sec_2112","canonical_url":"https://mpep.io/akn/us/statement/manual/uspto/2024/mpep/eng@2024-02-29!sec_2112","section_number":"2112","chapter":"2100","depth":0,"title":"Section 2112","children_ids":[]},{"id":"pb_lp7yjncu","corpus_id":"mpep-e9r01-2024-html","opaque_url":"https://mpep.io/n/pb_lp7yjncu","effective_range":{"start_revision":"R-10.2019","end_revision":null},"rendered_text_html":"However, a “preamble may provide context for claim construction,\n                           particularly, where … that preamble’s statement of intended use forms the basis for\n                           distinguishing the prior art in the patent’s prosecution history.”\n                           <i>Metabolite Labs., Inc. v. Corp. of Am. Holdings,</i> 370 F.3d 1354,\n                           1358-62, 71 USPQ2d 1081, 1084-87 (Fed. Cir. 2004). The patent claim at issue was\n                           directed to a two-step method for detecting a deficiency of vitamin\n                           B<sub>12</sub> or folic acid, involving (i) assaying a body fluid for\n                           an “elevated level” of homocysteine, and (ii) “correlating” an “elevated” level with\n                           a vitamin deficiency. <i>Id.</i> at 1358-59, 71 USPQ2d at 1084. The court\n                           stated that the disputed claim term “correlating” can include comparing with either\n                           an unelevated level or elevated level, as opposed to only an elevated level because\n                           adding the “correlating” step in the claim during prosecution to overcome prior art\n                           tied the preamble directly to the “correlating” step. <i>Id.</i> at 1362,\n                           71 USPQ2d at 1087. The recitation of the intended use of “detecting” a vitamin\n                           deficiency in the preamble rendered the claimed invention a method for “detecting,”\n                           and, thus, was not limited to detecting “elevated” levels. <i>Id.</i>","rendered_text_plain":"However, a “preamble may provide context for claim construction, particularly, where … that preamble’s statement of intended use forms the basis for distinguishing the prior art in the patent’s prosecution history.” Metabolite Labs., Inc. v. Corp. of Am. Holdings, 370 F.3d 1354, 1358-62, 71 USPQ2d 1081, 1084-87 (Fed. Cir. 2004). The patent claim at issue was directed to a two-step method for detecting a deficiency of vitamin B12 or folic acid, involving (i) assaying a body fluid for an “elevated level” of homocysteine, and (ii) “correlating” an “elevated” level with a vitamin deficiency. Id. at 1358-59, 71 USPQ2d at 1084. The court stated that the disputed claim term “correlating” can include comparing with either an unelevated level or elevated level, as opposed to only an elevated level because adding the “correlating” step in the claim during prosecution to overcome prior art tied the preamble directly to the “correlating” step. Id. at 1362, 71 USPQ2d at 1087. The recitation of the intended use of “detecting” a vitamin deficiency in the preamble rendered the claimed invention a method for “detecting,” and, thus, was not limited to detecting “elevated” levels. Id.","provenance":{"source_file":"s2111.html","source_anchor":"d0e200797","source_sha256":"4361ab16d766f5a1383832d25f9cd28c174972b5fb38a32f3794fd3df7638d54"},"node_type":"prose_block","kind":"narrative","host_section_id":"se_kirs6hlb"},{"id":"cs_2a4i5i76","corpus_id":"mpep-e9r01-2024-html","opaque_url":"https://mpep.io/n/cs_2a4i5i76","effective_range":{"start_revision":"R-10.2019","end_revision":null},"rendered_text_html":"","rendered_text_plain":"Metabolite Labs., Inc. v. Corp. of Am. Holdings, 370 F.3d 1354, 71 USPQ2d 1081 (Fed. Cir. 2004)","provenance":{"source_file":"s2111.html","source_anchor":"","source_sha256":"4361ab16d766f5a1383832d25f9cd28c174972b5fb38a32f3794fd3df7638d54"},"node_type":"case","short_name":"Metabolite Labs., Inc. v. Corp. of Am. Holdings","all_citations":["370 F.3d 1354","71 USPQ2d 1081"],"canonical_citation":"Metabolite Labs., Inc. v. Corp. of Am. Holdings, 370 F.3d 1354, 71 USPQ2d 1081 (Fed. Cir. 2004)","decision_year":2004,"court":"Fed. Cir."},{"id":"pb_nmrfdh6i","corpus_id":"mpep-e9r01-2024-html","opaque_url":"https://mpep.io/n/pb_nmrfdh6i","effective_range":{"start_revision":"R-10.2019","end_revision":null},"rendered_text_html":"See also <i>Catalina Mktg. Int’l,</i> 289 F.3d at\n                           808-09, 62 USPQ2d at 1785 (“[C]lear reliance on the preamble during prosecution to\n                           distinguish the claimed invention from the prior art transforms the preamble into a\n                           claim limitation because such reliance indicates use of the preamble to define, in\n                           part, the claimed invention.…Without such reliance, however, a preamble generally is\n                           not limiting when the claim body describes a structurally complete invention such\n                           that deletion of the preamble phrase does not affect the structure or steps of the\n                           claimed invention.” Consequently, “preamble language merely extolling benefits or\n                           features of the claimed invention does not limit the claim scope without clear\n                           reliance on those benefits or features as patentably significant.”). In\n                           <i>Poly-America LP v. GSE Lining Tech. Inc.,</i> 383 F.3d 1303, 1310,\n                           72 USPQ2d 1685, 1689 (Fed. Cir. 2004), the court stated that “a ‘[r]eview of the\n                           entirety of the ’047 patent reveals that the preamble language relating to\n                           ‘blown-film’ does not state a purpose or an intended use of the invention, but rather\n                           discloses a fundamental characteristic of the claimed invention that is properly\n                           construed as a limitation of the claim.’” Compare <i>Intirtool, Ltd. v. Texar\n                              Corp.,</i> 369 F.3d 1289, 1294-96, 70 USPQ2d 1780, 1783-84 (Fed. Cir. 2004)\n                           (holding that the preamble of a patent claim directed to a “hand-held punch pliers\n                           for simultaneously punching and connecting overlapping sheet metal” was not a\n                           limitation of the claim because (i) the body of the claim described a “structurally\n                           complete invention” without the preamble, and (ii) statements in prosecution history\n                           referring to “punching and connecting” function of invention did not constitute\n                           “clear reliance” on the preamble needed to make the preamble a limitation).\n                        ","rendered_text_plain":"See also Catalina Mktg. Int’l, 289 F.3d at 808-09, 62 USPQ2d at 1785 (“[C]lear reliance on the preamble during prosecution to distinguish the claimed invention from the prior art transforms the preamble into a claim limitation because such reliance indicates use of the preamble to define, in part, the claimed invention.…Without such reliance, however, a preamble generally is not limiting when the claim body describes a structurally complete invention such that deletion of the preamble phrase does not affect the structure or steps of the claimed invention.” Consequently, “preamble language merely extolling benefits or features of the claimed invention does not limit the claim scope without clear reliance on those benefits or features as patentably significant.”). In Poly-America LP v. GSE Lining Tech. Inc., 383 F.3d 1303, 1310, 72 USPQ2d 1685, 1689 (Fed. Cir. 2004), the court stated that “a ‘[r]eview of the entirety of the ’047 patent reveals that the preamble language relating to ‘blown-film’ does not state a purpose or an intended use of the invention, but rather discloses a fundamental characteristic of the claimed invention that is properly construed as a limitation of the claim.’” Compare Intirtool, Ltd. v. Texar Corp., 369 F.3d 1289, 1294-96, 70 USPQ2d 1780, 1783-84 (Fed. Cir. 2004) (holding that the preamble of a patent claim directed to a “hand-held punch pliers for simultaneously punching and connecting overlapping sheet metal” was not a limitation of the claim because (i) the body of the claim described a “structurally complete invention” without the preamble, and (ii) statements in prosecution history referring to “punching and connecting” function of invention did not constitute “clear reliance” on the preamble needed to make the preamble a limitation).","provenance":{"source_file":"s2111.html","source_anchor":"d0e200811","source_sha256":"4361ab16d766f5a1383832d25f9cd28c174972b5fb38a32f3794fd3df7638d54"},"node_type":"prose_block","kind":"narrative","host_section_id":"se_kirs6hlb"},{"id":"cs_gy2tf45o","corpus_id":"mpep-e9r01-2024-html","opaque_url":"https://mpep.io/n/cs_gy2tf45o","effective_range":{"start_revision":"R-10.2019","end_revision":null},"rendered_text_html":"","rendered_text_plain":"Poly-America LP v. GSE Lining Tech. Inc., 383 F.3d 1303, 72 USPQ2d 1685 (Fed. Cir. 2004)","provenance":{"source_file":"s2111.html","source_anchor":"","source_sha256":"4361ab16d766f5a1383832d25f9cd28c174972b5fb38a32f3794fd3df7638d54"},"node_type":"case","short_name":"Poly-America LP v. GSE Lining Tech. Inc.","all_citations":["383 F.3d 1303","72 USPQ2d 1685"],"canonical_citation":"Poly-America LP v. GSE Lining Tech. Inc., 383 F.3d 1303, 72 USPQ2d 1685 (Fed. Cir. 2004)","decision_year":2004,"court":"Fed. Cir."},{"id":"cs_klmlpef4","corpus_id":"mpep-e9r01-2024-html","opaque_url":"https://mpep.io/n/cs_klmlpef4","effective_range":{"start_revision":"R-10.2019","end_revision":null},"rendered_text_html":"","rendered_text_plain":"Intirtool, Ltd. v. Texar Corp., 369 F.3d 1289, 70 USPQ2d 1780 (Fed. Cir. 2004)","provenance":{"source_file":"s2111.html","source_anchor":"","source_sha256":"4361ab16d766f5a1383832d25f9cd28c174972b5fb38a32f3794fd3df7638d54"},"node_type":"case","short_name":"Intirtool, Ltd. v. Texar Corp.","all_citations":["369 F.3d 1289","70 USPQ2d 1780"],"canonical_citation":"Intirtool, Ltd. v. Texar Corp., 369 F.3d 1289, 70 USPQ2d 1780 (Fed. Cir. 2004)","decision_year":2004,"court":"Fed. Cir."},{"id":"se_3qvuqrak","corpus_id":"mpep-e9r01-2024-html","opaque_url":"https://mpep.io/n/se_3qvuqrak","effective_range":{"start_revision":"R-10.2019","end_revision":null},"rendered_text_html":"","rendered_text_plain":"","provenance":{"source_file":"s2111.html","source_anchor":"d0e200824","source_sha256":"4361ab16d766f5a1383832d25f9cd28c174972b5fb38a32f3794fd3df7638d54"},"node_type":"section","akn_urn":"/akn/us/statement/manual/uspto/2024/mpep/eng@2024-02-29!sec_2111_03","canonical_url":"https://mpep.io/akn/us/statement/manual/uspto/2024/mpep/eng@2024-02-29!sec_2111_03","section_number":"2111.03","chapter":"2100","depth":1,"title":"Transitional Phrases","children_ids":["pb_2m66veuo","pb_xled5zix","pb_uu37zxop","pb_fd6h4j4s","pb_ddlqv2lf","pb_oyy3brff","pb_zawwcr6h","pb_jtrwtl7e","pb_l7sw7j5s","pb_66luavi7","pb_fm5wtodn","pb_qnbtbufd"],"revision_tag":"R-01.2024","parent_section_id":"se_3v44fuac"},{"id":"pb_2m66veuo","corpus_id":"mpep-e9r01-2024-html","opaque_url":"https://mpep.io/n/pb_2m66veuo","effective_range":{"start_revision":"R-10.2019","end_revision":null},"rendered_text_html":"The transitional phrases “comprising”, “consisting essentially of” and\n                           “consisting of” define the scope of a claim with respect to what unrecited additional\n                           components or steps, if any, are excluded from the scope of the claim. The determination\n                           of what is or is not excluded by a transitional phrase must be made on a case-by-case\n                           basis in light of the facts of each case. \n                        ","rendered_text_plain":"The transitional phrases “comprising”, “consisting essentially of” and “consisting of” define the scope of a claim with respect to what unrecited additional components or steps, if any, are excluded from the scope of the claim. The determination of what is or is not excluded by a transitional phrase must be made on a case-by-case basis in light of the facts of each case.","provenance":{"source_file":"s2111.html","source_anchor":"d0e200828","source_sha256":"4361ab16d766f5a1383832d25f9cd28c174972b5fb38a32f3794fd3df7638d54"},"node_type":"prose_block","kind":"narrative","host_section_id":"se_3qvuqrak"},{"id":"pb_xled5zix","corpus_id":"mpep-e9r01-2024-html","opaque_url":"https://mpep.io/n/pb_xled5zix","effective_range":{"start_revision":"R-10.2019","end_revision":null},"rendered_text_html":"<b id=\"\">I.</b><b id=\"\"> COMPRISING</b>","rendered_text_plain":"I. COMPRISING","provenance":{"source_file":"s2111.html","source_anchor":"d0e200824/b.0","source_sha256":"4361ab16d766f5a1383832d25f9cd28c174972b5fb38a32f3794fd3df7638d54"},"node_type":"prose_block","kind":"informal_heading","host_section_id":"se_3qvuqrak","heading_level":2,"heading_text":"I. COMPRISING"},{"id":"pb_uu37zxop","corpus_id":"mpep-e9r01-2024-html","opaque_url":"https://mpep.io/n/pb_uu37zxop","effective_range":{"start_revision":"R-10.2019","end_revision":null},"rendered_text_html":"The transitional term “comprising”, which is synonymous with\n                           “including,” “containing,” or “characterized by,” is inclusive or open-ended and does\n                           not exclude additional, unrecited elements or method steps. See, e.g., <i>Mars\n                              Inc. v. H.J. Heinz Co.,</i> 377 F.3d 1369, 1376, 71 USPQ2d 1837, 1843 (Fed.\n                           Cir. 2004) (“[L]ike the term ‘comprising,’ the terms ‘containing’ and ‘mixture’ are\n                           open-ended.”). <i>Invitrogen Corp. v. Biocrest Manufacturing, L.P.,</i>\n                           327 F.3d 1364, 1368, 66 USPQ2d 1631, 1634 (Fed. Cir. 2003) (“The transition\n                           ‘comprising’ in a method claim indicates that the claim is open-ended and allows for\n                           additional steps.”); <i>Genentech, Inc. v. Chiron Corp.,</i> 112 F.3d\n                           495, 501, 42 USPQ2d 1608, 1613 (Fed. Cir. 1997) (“Comprising” is a term of art used\n                           in claim language which means that the named elements are essential, but other\n                           elements may be added and still form a construct within the scope of the claim.);\n                           <i>Moleculon Research Corp.</i><i>v.</i><i>CBS, Inc.,</i> 793 F.2d 1261, 229 USPQ 805 (Fed. Cir. 1986);\n                           <i>In re Baxter,</i> 656 F.2d 679, 686, 210 USPQ 795, 803 (CCPA 1981);\n                           <i>Ex parte Davis,</i> 80 USPQ 448, 450 (Bd. App. 1948) (“comprising”\n                           leaves “the claim open for the inclusion of unspecified ingredients even in major\n                           amounts”). In <i>Gillette Co. v. Energizer Holdings Inc.,</i> 405 F.3d\n                           1367, 1371-73, 74 USPQ2d 1586, 1589-91 (Fed. Cir. 2005), the court held that a claim\n                           to “a safety razor blade unit comprising a guard, a cap, and a group of first,\n                           second, and third blades” encompasses razors with more than three blades because the\n                           transitional phrase “comprising” in the preamble and the phrase “group of” are\n                           presumptively open-ended. “The word ‘comprising’ transitioning from the preamble to\n                           the body signals that the entire claim is presumptively open-ended.”\n                           <i>Id.</i> In contrast, the court noted the phrase “group consisting\n                           of” is a closed term, which is often used in claim drafting to signal a “Markush\n                           group” that is by its nature closed. <i>Id.</i> The court also emphasized\n                           that reference to “first,” “second,” and “third” blades in the claim was not used to\n                           show a serial or numerical limitation but instead was used to distinguish or identify\n                           the various members of the group. <i>Id.</i>","rendered_text_plain":"The transitional term “comprising”, which is synonymous with “including,” “containing,” or “characterized by,” is inclusive or open-ended and does not exclude additional, unrecited elements or method steps. See, e.g., Mars Inc. v. H.J. Heinz Co., 377 F.3d 1369, 1376, 71 USPQ2d 1837, 1843 (Fed. Cir. 2004) (“[L]ike the term ‘comprising,’ the terms ‘containing’ and ‘mixture’ are open-ended.”). Invitrogen Corp. v. Biocrest Manufacturing, L.P., 327 F.3d 1364, 1368, 66 USPQ2d 1631, 1634 (Fed. Cir. 2003) (“The transition ‘comprising’ in a method claim indicates that the claim is open-ended and allows for additional steps.”); Genentech, Inc. v. Chiron Corp., 112 F.3d 495, 501, 42 USPQ2d 1608, 1613 (Fed. Cir. 1997) (“Comprising” is a term of art used in claim language which means that the named elements are essential, but other elements may be added and still form a construct within the scope of the claim.); Moleculon Research Corp.v.CBS, Inc., 793 F.2d 1261, 229 USPQ 805 (Fed. Cir. 1986); In re Baxter, 656 F.2d 679, 686, 210 USPQ 795, 803 (CCPA 1981); Ex parte Davis, 80 USPQ 448, 450 (Bd. App. 1948) (“comprising” leaves “the claim open for the inclusion of unspecified ingredients even in major amounts”). In Gillette Co. v. Energizer Holdings Inc., 405 F.3d 1367, 1371-73, 74 USPQ2d 1586, 1589-91 (Fed. Cir. 2005), the court held that a claim to “a safety razor blade unit comprising a guard, a cap, and a group of first, second, and third blades” encompasses razors with more than three blades because the transitional phrase “comprising” in the preamble and the phrase “group of” are presumptively open-ended. “The word ‘comprising’ transitioning from the preamble to the body signals that the entire claim is presumptively open-ended.” Id. In contrast, the court noted the phrase “group consisting of” is a closed term, which is often used in claim drafting to signal a “Markush group” that is by its nature closed. Id. The court also emphasized that reference to “first,” “second,” and “third” blades in the claim was not used to show a serial or numerical limitation but instead was used to distinguish or identify the various members of the group. Id.","provenance":{"source_file":"s2111.html","source_anchor":"d0e200831","source_sha256":"4361ab16d766f5a1383832d25f9cd28c174972b5fb38a32f3794fd3df7638d54"},"node_type":"prose_block","kind":"narrative","host_section_id":"se_3qvuqrak"},{"id":"cs_gddw3nwp","corpus_id":"mpep-e9r01-2024-html","opaque_url":"https://mpep.io/n/cs_gddw3nwp","effective_range":{"start_revision":"R-10.2019","end_revision":null},"rendered_text_html":"","rendered_text_plain":"Mars Inc. v. H.J. Heinz Co., 377 F.3d 1369, 71 USPQ2d 1837 (Fed. Cir. 2004)","provenance":{"source_file":"s2111.html","source_anchor":"","source_sha256":"4361ab16d766f5a1383832d25f9cd28c174972b5fb38a32f3794fd3df7638d54"},"node_type":"case","short_name":"Mars Inc. v. H.J. Heinz Co.","all_citations":["377 F.3d 1369","71 USPQ2d 1837"],"canonical_citation":"Mars Inc. v. H.J. Heinz Co., 377 F.3d 1369, 71 USPQ2d 1837 (Fed. Cir. 2004)","decision_year":2004,"court":"Fed. Cir."},{"id":"cs_kgm6jve3","corpus_id":"mpep-e9r01-2024-html","opaque_url":"https://mpep.io/n/cs_kgm6jve3","effective_range":{"start_revision":"R-10.2019","end_revision":null},"rendered_text_html":"","rendered_text_plain":"Invitrogen Corp. v. Biocrest Manufacturing, L.P., 327 F.3d 1364, 66 USPQ2d 1631 (Fed. Cir. 2003)","provenance":{"source_file":"s2111.html","source_anchor":"","source_sha256":"4361ab16d766f5a1383832d25f9cd28c174972b5fb38a32f3794fd3df7638d54"},"node_type":"case","short_name":"Invitrogen Corp. v. Biocrest Manufacturing, L.P.","all_citations":["327 F.3d 1364","66 USPQ2d 1631"],"canonical_citation":"Invitrogen Corp. v. Biocrest Manufacturing, L.P., 327 F.3d 1364, 66 USPQ2d 1631 (Fed. Cir. 2003)","decision_year":2003,"court":"Fed. Cir."},{"id":"cs_h3u7hxa5","corpus_id":"mpep-e9r01-2024-html","opaque_url":"https://mpep.io/n/cs_h3u7hxa5","effective_range":{"start_revision":"R-10.2019","end_revision":null},"rendered_text_html":"","rendered_text_plain":"Genentech, Inc. v. Chiron Corp., 112 F.3d 495, 42 USPQ2d 1608 (Fed. Cir. 1997)","provenance":{"source_file":"s2111.html","source_anchor":"","source_sha256":"4361ab16d766f5a1383832d25f9cd28c174972b5fb38a32f3794fd3df7638d54"},"node_type":"case","short_name":"Genentech, Inc. v. Chiron Corp.","all_citations":["112 F.3d 495","42 USPQ2d 1608"],"canonical_citation":"Genentech, Inc. v. Chiron Corp., 112 F.3d 495, 42 USPQ2d 1608 (Fed. Cir. 1997)","decision_year":1997,"court":"Fed. Cir."},{"id":"cs_xauko4df","corpus_id":"mpep-e9r01-2024-html","opaque_url":"https://mpep.io/n/cs_xauko4df","effective_range":{"start_revision":"R-10.2019","end_revision":null},"rendered_text_html":"","rendered_text_plain":"Moleculon Research Corp. v. CBS, Inc., 793 F.2d 1261, 229 USPQ 805 (Fed. Cir. 1986)","provenance":{"source_file":"s2111.html","source_anchor":"","source_sha256":"4361ab16d766f5a1383832d25f9cd28c174972b5fb38a32f3794fd3df7638d54"},"node_type":"case","short_name":"Moleculon Research Corp. v. CBS, Inc.","all_citations":["793 F.2d 1261","229 USPQ 805"],"canonical_citation":"Moleculon Research Corp. v. CBS, Inc., 793 F.2d 1261, 229 USPQ 805 (Fed. Cir. 1986)","decision_year":1986,"court":"Fed. Cir."},{"id":"cs_m2v53jz3","corpus_id":"mpep-e9r01-2024-html","opaque_url":"https://mpep.io/n/cs_m2v53jz3","effective_range":{"start_revision":"R-10.2019","end_revision":null},"rendered_text_html":"","rendered_text_plain":"In re Baxter, 656 F.2d 679, 210 USPQ 795 (CCPA 1981)","provenance":{"source_file":"s2111.html","source_anchor":"","source_sha256":"4361ab16d766f5a1383832d25f9cd28c174972b5fb38a32f3794fd3df7638d54"},"node_type":"case","short_name":"In re Baxter","all_citations":["656 F.2d 679","210 USPQ 795"],"canonical_citation":"In re Baxter, 656 F.2d 679, 210 USPQ 795 (CCPA 1981)","decision_year":1981,"court":"CCPA"},{"id":"cs_taqsjtm5","corpus_id":"mpep-e9r01-2024-html","opaque_url":"https://mpep.io/n/cs_taqsjtm5","effective_range":{"start_revision":"R-10.2019","end_revision":null},"rendered_text_html":"","rendered_text_plain":"Ex parte Davis, 80 USPQ 448 (BPAI 1948)","provenance":{"source_file":"s2111.html","source_anchor":"","source_sha256":"4361ab16d766f5a1383832d25f9cd28c174972b5fb38a32f3794fd3df7638d54"},"node_type":"case","short_name":"Ex parte Davis","all_citations":["80 USPQ 448"],"canonical_citation":"Ex parte Davis, 80 USPQ 448 (BPAI 1948)","decision_year":1948,"court":"BPAI"},{"id":"cs_zlmsn2by","corpus_id":"mpep-e9r01-2024-html","opaque_url":"https://mpep.io/n/cs_zlmsn2by","effective_range":{"start_revision":"R-10.2019","end_revision":null},"rendered_text_html":"","rendered_text_plain":"Gillette Co. v. Energizer Holdings Inc., 405 F.3d 1367, 74 USPQ2d 1586 (Fed. Cir. 2005)","provenance":{"source_file":"s2111.html","source_anchor":"","source_sha256":"4361ab16d766f5a1383832d25f9cd28c174972b5fb38a32f3794fd3df7638d54"},"node_type":"case","short_name":"Gillette Co. v. Energizer Holdings Inc.","all_citations":["405 F.3d 1367","74 USPQ2d 1586"],"canonical_citation":"Gillette Co. v. Energizer Holdings Inc., 405 F.3d 1367, 74 USPQ2d 1586 (Fed. Cir. 2005)","decision_year":2005,"court":"Fed. Cir."},{"id":"pb_fd6h4j4s","corpus_id":"mpep-e9r01-2024-html","opaque_url":"https://mpep.io/n/pb_fd6h4j4s","effective_range":{"start_revision":"R-10.2019","end_revision":null},"rendered_text_html":"In <i>Amgen Inc. v. Amneal Pharmaceuticals\n                              LLC,</i> 945 F.3d 1368, 1379, 2020 USPQ2d 3197 (Fed. Cir. 2020), in an\n                           infringement suit, the court interpreted a claim for a pharmaceutical composition\n                           having a “comprising” transition phrase and following limitations, including\n                           limitations requiring “at least one” binder and “at least one” disintegrant, each\n                           “consisting of” items listed in a Markush group. The court found that the Markush\n                           grouping recited particular binders or disintegrants, but while the components of the\n                           Markush grouping are closed as to the components therein, the claim transition\n                           “comprising” allowed for additional component(s) that were functionally similar to\n                           the members of the Markush grouping. Thus, the plain language of the claim requires\n                           “at least one” of the Markush members and does not further limit the claim to only\n                           binders and disintegrants listed in the Markush grouping. See also\n                           <b><a href=\"s2117.html#ch2100_d299b6_1ae8e_380\">MPEP\n                                 § 2117</a></b> for further discussion of a Markush group. \n                        ","rendered_text_plain":"In Amgen Inc. v. Amneal Pharmaceuticals LLC, 945 F.3d 1368, 1379, 2020 USPQ2d 3197 (Fed. Cir. 2020), in an infringement suit, the court interpreted a claim for a pharmaceutical composition having a “comprising” transition phrase and following limitations, including limitations requiring “at least one” binder and “at least one” disintegrant, each “consisting of” items listed in a Markush group. The court found that the Markush grouping recited particular binders or disintegrants, but while the components of the Markush grouping are closed as to the components therein, the claim transition “comprising” allowed for additional component(s) that were functionally similar to the members of the Markush grouping. Thus, the plain language of the claim requires “at least one” of the Markush members and does not further limit the claim to only binders and disintegrants listed in the Markush grouping. See also MPEP § 2117 for further discussion of a Markush group.","provenance":{"source_file":"s2111.html","source_anchor":"ch2100_p_3ab81_1c012_384","source_sha256":"4361ab16d766f5a1383832d25f9cd28c174972b5fb38a32f3794fd3df7638d54"},"node_type":"prose_block","kind":"narrative","host_section_id":"se_3qvuqrak"},{"id":"cs_hjrn2xh2","corpus_id":"mpep-e9r01-2024-html","opaque_url":"https://mpep.io/n/cs_hjrn2xh2","effective_range":{"start_revision":"R-10.2019","end_revision":null},"rendered_text_html":"","rendered_text_plain":"Amgen Inc. v. Amneal Pharmaceuticals LLC, 945 F.3d 1368, 2020 USPQ2d 3197 (Fed. Cir. 2020)","provenance":{"source_file":"s2111.html","source_anchor":"","source_sha256":"4361ab16d766f5a1383832d25f9cd28c174972b5fb38a32f3794fd3df7638d54"},"node_type":"case","short_name":"Amgen Inc. v. Amneal Pharmaceuticals LLC","all_citations":["945 F.3d 1368","2020 USPQ2d 3197"],"canonical_citation":"Amgen Inc. v. Amneal Pharmaceuticals LLC, 945 F.3d 1368, 2020 USPQ2d 3197 (Fed. Cir. 2020)","decision_year":2020,"court":"Fed. Cir."},{"id":"se_b562ojoh","corpus_id":"mpep-e9r01-2024-html","opaque_url":"https://mpep.io/n/se_b562ojoh","effective_range":{"start_revision":"R-10.2019","end_revision":null},"rendered_text_html":"","rendered_text_plain":"","provenance":{"source_file":"s2111.html","source_anchor":"stub-2117","source_sha256":"4361ab16d766f5a1383832d25f9cd28c174972b5fb38a32f3794fd3df7638d54"},"node_type":"section","akn_urn":"/akn/us/statement/manual/uspto/2024/mpep/eng@2024-02-29!sec_2117","canonical_url":"https://mpep.io/akn/us/statement/manual/uspto/2024/mpep/eng@2024-02-29!sec_2117","section_number":"2117","chapter":"2100","depth":0,"title":"Section 2117","children_ids":[]},{"id":"pb_ddlqv2lf","corpus_id":"mpep-e9r01-2024-html","opaque_url":"https://mpep.io/n/pb_ddlqv2lf","effective_range":{"start_revision":"R-10.2019","end_revision":null},"rendered_text_html":"<b id=\"\">II.</b><b id=\"\"> CONSISTING OF</b>","rendered_text_plain":"II. CONSISTING OF","provenance":{"source_file":"s2111.html","source_anchor":"d0e200824/b.2","source_sha256":"4361ab16d766f5a1383832d25f9cd28c174972b5fb38a32f3794fd3df7638d54"},"node_type":"prose_block","kind":"informal_heading","host_section_id":"se_3qvuqrak","heading_level":2,"heading_text":"II. CONSISTING OF"},{"id":"pb_oyy3brff","corpus_id":"mpep-e9r01-2024-html","opaque_url":"https://mpep.io/n/pb_oyy3brff","effective_range":{"start_revision":"R-10.2019","end_revision":null},"rendered_text_html":"The transitional phrase “consisting of” excludes any element, step,\n                           or ingredient not specified in the claim. <i>In re Gray,</i> 53 F.2d 520,\n                           11 USPQ 255 (CCPA 1931); <i>Ex parte Davis,</i> 80 USPQ 448, 450 (Bd.\n                           App. 1948) (“consisting of” defined as “closing the claim to the inclusion of\n                           materials other than those recited except for impurities ordinarily associated\n                           therewith”). But see <i>Norian Corp. v. Stryker Corp.,</i> 363 F.3d 1321,\n                           1331-32, 70 USPQ2d 1508, 1516 (Fed. Cir. 2004) (holding that a bone repair kit\n                           “consisting of” claimed chemicals was infringed by a bone repair kit including a\n                           spatula in addition to the claimed chemicals because the presence of the spatula was\n                           unrelated to the claimed invention). A claim which depends from a claim which\n                           “consists of” the recited elements or steps cannot add an element or step. \n                        ","rendered_text_plain":"The transitional phrase “consisting of” excludes any element, step, or ingredient not specified in the claim. In re Gray, 53 F.2d 520, 11 USPQ 255 (CCPA 1931); Ex parte Davis, 80 USPQ 448, 450 (Bd. App. 1948) (“consisting of” defined as “closing the claim to the inclusion of materials other than those recited except for impurities ordinarily associated therewith”). But see Norian Corp. v. Stryker Corp., 363 F.3d 1321, 1331-32, 70 USPQ2d 1508, 1516 (Fed. Cir. 2004) (holding that a bone repair kit “consisting of” claimed chemicals was infringed by a bone repair kit including a spatula in addition to the claimed chemicals because the presence of the spatula was unrelated to the claimed invention). A claim which depends from a claim which “consists of” the recited elements or steps cannot add an element or step.","provenance":{"source_file":"s2111.html","source_anchor":"d0e200876","source_sha256":"4361ab16d766f5a1383832d25f9cd28c174972b5fb38a32f3794fd3df7638d54"},"node_type":"prose_block","kind":"narrative","host_section_id":"se_3qvuqrak"},{"id":"cs_r5oxu7qh","corpus_id":"mpep-e9r01-2024-html","opaque_url":"https://mpep.io/n/cs_r5oxu7qh","effective_range":{"start_revision":"R-10.2019","end_revision":null},"rendered_text_html":"","rendered_text_plain":"In re Gray, 53 F.2d 520, 11 USPQ 255 (CCPA 1931)","provenance":{"source_file":"s2111.html","source_anchor":"","source_sha256":"4361ab16d766f5a1383832d25f9cd28c174972b5fb38a32f3794fd3df7638d54"},"node_type":"case","short_name":"In re Gray","all_citations":["53 F.2d 520","11 USPQ 255"],"canonical_citation":"In re Gray, 53 F.2d 520, 11 USPQ 255 (CCPA 1931)","decision_year":1931,"court":"CCPA"},{"id":"cs_kth2qy67","corpus_id":"mpep-e9r01-2024-html","opaque_url":"https://mpep.io/n/cs_kth2qy67","effective_range":{"start_revision":"R-10.2019","end_revision":null},"rendered_text_html":"","rendered_text_plain":"Norian Corp. v. Stryker Corp., 363 F.3d 1321, 70 USPQ2d 1508 (Fed. Cir. 2004)","provenance":{"source_file":"s2111.html","source_anchor":"","source_sha256":"4361ab16d766f5a1383832d25f9cd28c174972b5fb38a32f3794fd3df7638d54"},"node_type":"case","short_name":"Norian Corp. v. Stryker Corp.","all_citations":["363 F.3d 1321","70 USPQ2d 1508"],"canonical_citation":"Norian Corp. v. Stryker Corp., 363 F.3d 1321, 70 USPQ2d 1508 (Fed. Cir. 2004)","decision_year":2004,"court":"Fed. Cir."},{"id":"pb_zawwcr6h","corpus_id":"mpep-e9r01-2024-html","opaque_url":"https://mpep.io/n/pb_zawwcr6h","effective_range":{"start_revision":"R-10.2019","end_revision":null},"rendered_text_html":"A claim element defined by selection from a group of\n                           alternatives (a Markush grouping; see <b><a href=\"s2117.html#ch2100_d299b6_1ae8e_380\">MPEP §§\n                                 2117</a></b> and <b><a href=\"s2173.html#d0e218467\">2173.05(h)</a></b>) requires selection from\n                           a closed group “consisting of” (rather than “comprising” or “including”) the\n                           alternative members. <i>Abbott Labs. v. Baxter Pharmaceutical Products\n                              Inc.,</i> 334 F.3d 1274, 1280, 67 USPQ2d 1191, 1196-97 (Fed. Cir. 2003). If\n                           the claim element is intended to encompass combinations or mixtures of the\n                           alternatives set forth in the Markush grouping, the claim may include qualifying\n                           language preceding the recited alternatives (such as “at least one member” selected\n                           from the group), or within the list of alternatives (such as “or mixtures thereof”).\n                           <i>Id.</i> In the absence of such qualifying language there is a\n                           presumption that the Markush group is closed to combinations or mixtures. Cf.\n                           <i>Multilayer Stretch Cling Film Holdings, Inc. v. Berry Plastics\n                              Corp.,</i> 831 F.3d 1350, 1363-64, 119 USPQ2d 1773, 1784-85 (Fed. Cir. 2016)\n                           (presumption that Markush grouping does not encompass mixtures of listed resins\n                           overcome by intrinsic evidence in a dependent claim and the specification). See also\n                           <i>Amgen Inc. v. Amneal Pharmaceuticals LLC,</i> 945 F.3d 1368,\n                           1378-79, 2020 USPQ2d 3179 (Fed. Cir. 2020) (the claim’s “comprising” transition\n                           phrase does not foreclose additional binders and disintegrants when an accused\n                           infringing product contains and meets the limitation’s requirements for one of the\n                           binders or disintegrants recited in the Markush groupings – there is no inconsistency\n                           with another binder or disintegrant outside of the Markush group also being part of\n                           the claimed formulation). \n                        ","rendered_text_plain":"A claim element defined by selection from a group of alternatives (a Markush grouping; see MPEP §§ 2117 and 2173.05(h)) requires selection from a closed group “consisting of” (rather than “comprising” or “including”) the alternative members. Abbott Labs. v. Baxter Pharmaceutical Products Inc., 334 F.3d 1274, 1280, 67 USPQ2d 1191, 1196-97 (Fed. Cir. 2003). If the claim element is intended to encompass combinations or mixtures of the alternatives set forth in the Markush grouping, the claim may include qualifying language preceding the recited alternatives (such as “at least one member” selected from the group), or within the list of alternatives (such as “or mixtures thereof”). Id. In the absence of such qualifying language there is a presumption that the Markush group is closed to combinations or mixtures. Cf. Multilayer Stretch Cling Film Holdings, Inc. v. Berry Plastics Corp., 831 F.3d 1350, 1363-64, 119 USPQ2d 1773, 1784-85 (Fed. Cir. 2016) (presumption that Markush grouping does not encompass mixtures of listed resins overcome by intrinsic evidence in a dependent claim and the specification). See also Amgen Inc. v. Amneal Pharmaceuticals LLC, 945 F.3d 1368, 1378-79, 2020 USPQ2d 3179 (Fed. Cir. 2020) (the claim’s “comprising” transition phrase does not foreclose additional binders and disintegrants when an accused infringing product contains and meets the limitation’s requirements for one of the binders or disintegrants recited in the Markush groupings – there is no inconsistency with another binder or disintegrant outside of the Markush group also being part of the claimed formulation).","provenance":{"source_file":"s2111.html","source_anchor":"ch2100_p_299b6_1940f_313","source_sha256":"4361ab16d766f5a1383832d25f9cd28c174972b5fb38a32f3794fd3df7638d54"},"node_type":"prose_block","kind":"narrative","host_section_id":"se_3qvuqrak"},{"id":"cs_rltw2ue4","corpus_id":"mpep-e9r01-2024-html","opaque_url":"https://mpep.io/n/cs_rltw2ue4","effective_range":{"start_revision":"R-10.2019","end_revision":null},"rendered_text_html":"","rendered_text_plain":"Abbott Labs. v. Baxter Pharmaceutical Products Inc., 334 F.3d 1274, 67 USPQ2d 1191 (Fed. Cir. 2003)","provenance":{"source_file":"s2111.html","source_anchor":"","source_sha256":"4361ab16d766f5a1383832d25f9cd28c174972b5fb38a32f3794fd3df7638d54"},"node_type":"case","short_name":"Abbott Labs. v. Baxter Pharmaceutical Products Inc.","all_citations":["334 F.3d 1274","67 USPQ2d 1191"],"canonical_citation":"Abbott Labs. v. Baxter Pharmaceutical Products Inc., 334 F.3d 1274, 67 USPQ2d 1191 (Fed. Cir. 2003)","decision_year":2003,"court":"Fed. Cir."},{"id":"cs_suqo6v72","corpus_id":"mpep-e9r01-2024-html","opaque_url":"https://mpep.io/n/cs_suqo6v72","effective_range":{"start_revision":"R-10.2019","end_revision":null},"rendered_text_html":"","rendered_text_plain":"Multilayer Stretch Cling Film Holdings, Inc. v. Berry Plastics Corp., 831 F.3d 1350, 119 USPQ2d 1773 (Fed. Cir. 2016)","provenance":{"source_file":"s2111.html","source_anchor":"","source_sha256":"4361ab16d766f5a1383832d25f9cd28c174972b5fb38a32f3794fd3df7638d54"},"node_type":"case","short_name":"Multilayer Stretch Cling Film Holdings, Inc. v. Berry Plastics Corp.","all_citations":["831 F.3d 1350","119 USPQ2d 1773"],"canonical_citation":"Multilayer Stretch Cling Film Holdings, Inc. v. Berry Plastics Corp., 831 F.3d 1350, 119 USPQ2d 1773 (Fed. Cir. 2016)","decision_year":2016,"court":"Fed. Cir."},{"id":"cs_bp7n42q4","corpus_id":"mpep-e9r01-2024-html","opaque_url":"https://mpep.io/n/cs_bp7n42q4","effective_range":{"start_revision":"R-10.2019","end_revision":null},"rendered_text_html":"","rendered_text_plain":"Amgen Inc. v. Amneal Pharmaceuticals LLC, 945 F.3d 1368, 2020 USPQ2d 3179 (Fed. Cir. 2020)","provenance":{"source_file":"s2111.html","source_anchor":"","source_sha256":"4361ab16d766f5a1383832d25f9cd28c174972b5fb38a32f3794fd3df7638d54"},"node_type":"case","short_name":"Amgen Inc. v. Amneal Pharmaceuticals LLC","all_citations":["945 F.3d 1368","2020 USPQ2d 3179"],"canonical_citation":"Amgen Inc. v. Amneal Pharmaceuticals LLC, 945 F.3d 1368, 2020 USPQ2d 3179 (Fed. Cir. 2020)","decision_year":2020,"court":"Fed. Cir."},{"id":"pb_jtrwtl7e","corpus_id":"mpep-e9r01-2024-html","opaque_url":"https://mpep.io/n/pb_jtrwtl7e","effective_range":{"start_revision":"R-10.2019","end_revision":null},"rendered_text_html":"When the phrase “consisting of” appears in a clause\n                           of the body of a claim, rather than immediately following the preamble, there is an\n                           “exceptionally strong presumption that a claim term set off with ‘consisting of’ is\n                           closed to unrecited elements.” <i>Multilayer Stretch Cling Film Holdings, Inc.\n                              v. Berry Plastics Corp.,</i> 831 F.3d 1350, 1359, 119 USPQ2d 1773, 1781\n                           (Fed. Cir. 2016) (a layer “selected from the group consisting of” specific resins is\n                           closed to resins other than those listed). However, the “consisting of” phrase limits\n                           only the element set forth in that clause; other elements are not excluded from the\n                           claim as a whole. <i>Mannesmann Demag Corp.</i><i>v.</i><i>Engineered Metal Products Co.,</i> 793 F.2d 1279, 230 USPQ 45 (Fed.\n                           Cir. 1986). See also <i>In re Crish,</i> 393 F.3d 1253, 73 USPQ2d 1364\n                           (Fed. Cir. 2004) (The claims at issue “related to purified DNA molecules having\n                           promoter activity for the human involucrin gene (hINV).” <i>Id.,</i> 73\n                           USPQ2d at 1365. In determining the scope of applicant’s claims directed to “a\n                           purified oligonucleotide <span class=\"Underline\">comprising at least</span> a portion of the\n                           nucleotide sequence of SEQ ID NO:1 wherein said portion <span class=\"Underline\">consists\n                              of</span> the nucleotide sequence from … to 2473 of SEQ ID NO:1, and wherein\n                           said portion of the nucleotide sequence of SEQ ID NO:1 has promoter activity,” the\n                           court stated that the use of “consists” in the body of the claims did not limit the\n                           open-ended “comprising” language in the claims (emphases added).\n                           <i>Id.</i> at 1257, 73 USPQ2d at 1367. The court held that the claimed\n                           promoter sequence designated as SEQ ID NO:1 was obtained by sequencing the same prior\n                           art plasmid and was therefore anticipated by the prior art plasmid which necessarily\n                           possessed the same DNA sequence as the claimed oligonucleotides.\n                           <i>Id.</i> at 1256 and 1259, 73 USPQ2d at 1366 and 1369. The court\n                           affirmed the Board’s interpretation that the transition phrase “consists” did not\n                           limit the claims to only the recited numbered nucleotide sequences of SEQ ID NO:1 and\n                           that “the transition language ‘comprising’ allowed the claims to cover the entire\n                           involucrin gene plus other portions of the plasmid, as long as the gene contained the\n                           specific portions of SEQ ID NO:1 recited by the claim[s].” <i>Id.</i> at\n                           1256, 73 USPQ2d at 1366.).\n                        ","rendered_text_plain":"When the phrase “consisting of” appears in a clause of the body of a claim, rather than immediately following the preamble, there is an “exceptionally strong presumption that a claim term set off with ‘consisting of’ is closed to unrecited elements.” Multilayer Stretch Cling Film Holdings, Inc. v. Berry Plastics Corp., 831 F.3d 1350, 1359, 119 USPQ2d 1773, 1781 (Fed. Cir. 2016) (a layer “selected from the group consisting of” specific resins is closed to resins other than those listed). However, the “consisting of” phrase limits only the element set forth in that clause; other elements are not excluded from the claim as a whole. Mannesmann Demag Corp.v.Engineered Metal Products Co., 793 F.2d 1279, 230 USPQ 45 (Fed. Cir. 1986). See also In re Crish, 393 F.3d 1253, 73 USPQ2d 1364 (Fed. Cir. 2004) (The claims at issue “related to purified DNA molecules having promoter activity for the human involucrin gene (hINV).” Id., 73 USPQ2d at 1365. In determining the scope of applicant’s claims directed to “a purified oligonucleotide comprising at least a portion of the nucleotide sequence of SEQ ID NO:1 wherein said portion consists of the nucleotide sequence from … to 2473 of SEQ ID NO:1, and wherein said portion of the nucleotide sequence of SEQ ID NO:1 has promoter activity,” the court stated that the use of “consists” in the body of the claims did not limit the open-ended “comprising” language in the claims (emphases added). Id. at 1257, 73 USPQ2d at 1367. The court held that the claimed promoter sequence designated as SEQ ID NO:1 was obtained by sequencing the same prior art plasmid and was therefore anticipated by the prior art plasmid which necessarily possessed the same DNA sequence as the claimed oligonucleotides. Id. at 1256 and 1259, 73 USPQ2d at 1366 and 1369. The court affirmed the Board’s interpretation that the transition phrase “consists” did not limit the claims to only the recited numbered nucleotide sequences of SEQ ID NO:1 and that “the transition language ‘comprising’ allowed the claims to cover the entire involucrin gene plus other portions of the plasmid, as long as the gene contained the specific portions of SEQ ID NO:1 recited by the claim[s].” Id. at 1256, 73 USPQ2d at 1366.).","provenance":{"source_file":"s2111.html","source_anchor":"ch2100_p_299b6_193a4_1d8","source_sha256":"4361ab16d766f5a1383832d25f9cd28c174972b5fb38a32f3794fd3df7638d54"},"node_type":"prose_block","kind":"narrative","host_section_id":"se_3qvuqrak"},{"id":"cs_2tnhir4x","corpus_id":"mpep-e9r01-2024-html","opaque_url":"https://mpep.io/n/cs_2tnhir4x","effective_range":{"start_revision":"R-10.2019","end_revision":null},"rendered_text_html":"","rendered_text_plain":"Mannesmann Demag Corp. v. Engineered Metal Products Co., 793 F.2d 1279, 230 USPQ 45 (Fed. Cir. 1986)","provenance":{"source_file":"s2111.html","source_anchor":"","source_sha256":"4361ab16d766f5a1383832d25f9cd28c174972b5fb38a32f3794fd3df7638d54"},"node_type":"case","short_name":"Mannesmann Demag Corp. v. Engineered Metal Products Co.","all_citations":["793 F.2d 1279","230 USPQ 45"],"canonical_citation":"Mannesmann Demag Corp. v. Engineered Metal Products Co., 793 F.2d 1279, 230 USPQ 45 (Fed. Cir. 1986)","decision_year":1986,"court":"Fed. Cir."},{"id":"cs_bukwzffu","corpus_id":"mpep-e9r01-2024-html","opaque_url":"https://mpep.io/n/cs_bukwzffu","effective_range":{"start_revision":"R-10.2019","end_revision":null},"rendered_text_html":"","rendered_text_plain":"In re Crish, 393 F.3d 1253, 73 USPQ2d 1364 (Fed. Cir. 2004)","provenance":{"source_file":"s2111.html","source_anchor":"","source_sha256":"4361ab16d766f5a1383832d25f9cd28c174972b5fb38a32f3794fd3df7638d54"},"node_type":"case","short_name":"In re Crish","all_citations":["393 F.3d 1253","73 USPQ2d 1364"],"canonical_citation":"In re Crish, 393 F.3d 1253, 73 USPQ2d 1364 (Fed. Cir. 2004)","decision_year":2004,"court":"Fed. Cir."},{"id":"pb_l7sw7j5s","corpus_id":"mpep-e9r01-2024-html","opaque_url":"https://mpep.io/n/pb_l7sw7j5s","effective_range":{"start_revision":"R-10.2019","end_revision":null},"rendered_text_html":"<b id=\"\">III.</b><b id=\"\"> CONSISTING ESSENTIALLY\n                           OF</b>","rendered_text_plain":"III. CONSISTING ESSENTIALLY OF","provenance":{"source_file":"s2111.html","source_anchor":"d0e200824/b.4","source_sha256":"4361ab16d766f5a1383832d25f9cd28c174972b5fb38a32f3794fd3df7638d54"},"node_type":"prose_block","kind":"informal_heading","host_section_id":"se_3qvuqrak","heading_level":2,"heading_text":"III. CONSISTING ESSENTIALLY OF"},{"id":"pb_66luavi7","corpus_id":"mpep-e9r01-2024-html","opaque_url":"https://mpep.io/n/pb_66luavi7","effective_range":{"start_revision":"R-10.2019","end_revision":null},"rendered_text_html":"The transitional phrase “consisting essentially of” limits the scope\n                           of a claim to the specified materials or steps “and those that do not\n                           <span class=\"Underline\">materially</span> affect the <span class=\"Underline\">basic</span> and\n                           <span class=\"Underline\">novel</span> characteristic(s)” of the claimed invention.\n                           <i>In re Herz,</i> 537 F.2d 549, 551-52, 190 USPQ 461, 463 (CCPA 1976)\n                           (emphasis in original) (Prior art hydraulic fluid required a dispersant which\n                           appellants argued was excluded from claims limited to a functional fluid “consisting\n                           essentially of” certain components. In finding the claims did not exclude the prior\n                           art dispersant, the court noted that appellants’ specification indicated the claimed\n                           composition can contain any well-known additive such as a dispersant, and there was\n                           no evidence that the presence of a dispersant would materially affect the basic and\n                           novel characteristic of the claimed invention. The prior art composition had the same\n                           basic and novel characteristic (increased oxidation resistance) as well as additional\n                           enhanced detergent and dispersant characteristics.). “A ‘consisting essentially of’\n                           claim occupies a middle ground between closed claims that are written in a\n                           ‘consisting of’ format and fully open claims that are drafted in a ‘comprising’\n                           format.” <i>PPG Industries v. Guardian Industries,</i> 156 F.3d 1351,\n                           1354, 48 USPQ2d 1351, 1353-54 (Fed. Cir. 1998). See also <i>Atlas Powder v.\n                              E.I. duPont de Nemours &amp; Co.,</i> 750 F.2d 1569, 224 USPQ 409 (Fed. Cir.\n                           1984); <i>In re Janakirama-Rao,</i> 317 F.2d 951, 137 USPQ 893 (CCPA\n                           1963); <i>Water Technologies Corp. vs. Calco, Ltd.,</i> 850 F.2d 660, 7\n                           USPQ2d 1097 (Fed. Cir. 1988). For the purposes of searching for and applying prior\n                           art under <b><a href=\"mpep-9015-appx-l.html#d0e302383\">35 U.S.C.\n                                 102</a></b> and <b><a href=\"mpep-9015-appx-l.html#d0e302450\">103</a></b>, absent a clear indication in\n                           the specification or claims of what the basic and novel characteristics actually are,\n                           “consisting essentially of” will be construed as equivalent to “comprising.” See,\n                           e.g., <i>PPG,</i> 156 F.3d at 1355, 48 USPQ2d at 1355 (“PPG could have\n                           defined the scope of the phrase ‘consisting essentially of’ for purposes of its\n                           patent by making clear in its specification what it regarded as constituting a\n                           material change in the basic and novel characteristics of the invention.”). See also\n                           <i>AK Steel Corp. v. Sollac,</i> 344 F.3d 1234, 1240-41, 68 USPQ2d\n                           1280, 1283-84 (Fed. Cir. 2003) (Applicant’s statement in the specification that\n                           “silicon contents in the coating metal should not exceed about 0.5% by weight” along\n                           with a discussion of the deleterious effects of silicon provided basis to conclude\n                           that silicon in excess of 0.5% by weight would materially alter the basic and\n                           novel properties of the invention. Thus, “consisting essentially of” as recited in\n                           the preamble was interpreted to permit no more than 0.5% by weight of silicon in the\n                           aluminum coating.);<i> In re Janakirama-Rao,</i> 317 F.2d 951, 954, 137\n                           USPQ 893, 895-96 (CCPA 1963). If an applicant contends that additional steps or\n                           materials in the prior art are excluded by the recitation of “consisting essentially\n                           of,” applicant has the burden of showing that the introduction of additional steps or\n                           components would materially change the characteristics of the claimed invention.\n                           <i>In re De Lajarte,</i> 337 F.2d 870, 143 USPQ 256 (CCPA 1964). See\n                           also <i>Ex parte Hoffman,</i> 12 USPQ2d 1061, 1063-64 (Bd. Pat. App.\n                           & Inter. 1989) (“Although ‘consisting essentially of’ is typically used and\n                           defined in the context of compositions of matter, we find nothing intrinsically wrong\n                           with the use of such language as a modifier of method steps. . . [rendering] the\n                           claim open only for the inclusion of steps which do not materially affect the basic\n                           and novel characteristics of the claimed method. To determine the steps included\n                           versus excluded the claim must be read in light of the specification. . . . [I]t is\n                           an applicant’s burden to establish that a step practiced in a prior art method is\n                           excluded from his claims by ‘consisting essentially of’ language.”). \n                        ","rendered_text_plain":"The transitional phrase “consisting essentially of” limits the scope of a claim to the specified materials or steps “and those that do not materially affect the basic and novel characteristic(s)” of the claimed invention. In re Herz, 537 F.2d 549, 551-52, 190 USPQ 461, 463 (CCPA 1976) (emphasis in original) (Prior art hydraulic fluid required a dispersant which appellants argued was excluded from claims limited to a functional fluid “consisting essentially of” certain components. In finding the claims did not exclude the prior art dispersant, the court noted that appellants’ specification indicated the claimed composition can contain any well-known additive such as a dispersant, and there was no evidence that the presence of a dispersant would materially affect the basic and novel characteristic of the claimed invention. The prior art composition had the same basic and novel characteristic (increased oxidation resistance) as well as additional enhanced detergent and dispersant characteristics.). “A ‘consisting essentially of’ claim occupies a middle ground between closed claims that are written in a ‘consisting of’ format and fully open claims that are drafted in a ‘comprising’ format.” PPG Industries v. Guardian Industries, 156 F.3d 1351, 1354, 48 USPQ2d 1351, 1353-54 (Fed. Cir. 1998). See also Atlas Powder v. E.I. duPont de Nemours & Co., 750 F.2d 1569, 224 USPQ 409 (Fed. Cir. 1984); In re Janakirama-Rao, 317 F.2d 951, 137 USPQ 893 (CCPA 1963); Water Technologies Corp. vs. Calco, Ltd., 850 F.2d 660, 7 USPQ2d 1097 (Fed. Cir. 1988). For the purposes of searching for and applying prior art under 35 U.S.C. 102 and 103, absent a clear indication in the specification or claims of what the basic and novel characteristics actually are, “consisting essentially of” will be construed as equivalent to “comprising.” See, e.g., PPG, 156 F.3d at 1355, 48 USPQ2d at 1355 (“PPG could have defined the scope of the phrase ‘consisting essentially of’ for purposes of its patent by making clear in its specification what it regarded as constituting a material change in the basic and novel characteristics of the invention.”). See also AK Steel Corp. v. Sollac, 344 F.3d 1234, 1240-41, 68 USPQ2d 1280, 1283-84 (Fed. Cir. 2003) (Applicant’s statement in the specification that “silicon contents in the coating metal should not exceed about 0.5% by weight” along with a discussion of the deleterious effects of silicon provided basis to conclude that silicon in excess of 0.5% by weight would materially alter the basic and novel properties of the invention. Thus, “consisting essentially of” as recited in the preamble was interpreted to permit no more than 0.5% by weight of silicon in the aluminum coating.); In re Janakirama-Rao, 317 F.2d 951, 954, 137 USPQ 893, 895-96 (CCPA 1963). If an applicant contends that additional steps or materials in the prior art are excluded by the recitation of “consisting essentially of,” applicant has the burden of showing that the introduction of additional steps or components would materially change the characteristics of the claimed invention. In re De Lajarte, 337 F.2d 870, 143 USPQ 256 (CCPA 1964). See also Ex parte Hoffman, 12 USPQ2d 1061, 1063-64 (Bd. Pat. App. & Inter. 1989) (“Although ‘consisting essentially of’ is typically used and defined in the context of compositions of matter, we find nothing intrinsically wrong with the use of such language as a modifier of method steps. . . [rendering] the claim open only for the inclusion of steps which do not materially affect the basic and novel characteristics of the claimed method. To determine the steps included versus excluded the claim must be read in light of the specification. . . . [I]t is an applicant’s burden to establish that a step practiced in a prior art method is excluded from his claims by ‘consisting essentially of’ language.”).","provenance":{"source_file":"s2111.html","source_anchor":"d0e200928","source_sha256":"4361ab16d766f5a1383832d25f9cd28c174972b5fb38a32f3794fd3df7638d54"},"node_type":"prose_block","kind":"narrative","host_section_id":"se_3qvuqrak"},{"id":"cs_mg2tgscl","corpus_id":"mpep-e9r01-2024-html","opaque_url":"https://mpep.io/n/cs_mg2tgscl","effective_range":{"start_revision":"R-10.2019","end_revision":null},"rendered_text_html":"","rendered_text_plain":"In re Herz, 537 F.2d 549, 190 USPQ 461 (CCPA 1976)","provenance":{"source_file":"s2111.html","source_anchor":"","source_sha256":"4361ab16d766f5a1383832d25f9cd28c174972b5fb38a32f3794fd3df7638d54"},"node_type":"case","short_name":"In re Herz","all_citations":["537 F.2d 549","190 USPQ 461"],"canonical_citation":"In re Herz, 537 F.2d 549, 190 USPQ 461 (CCPA 1976)","decision_year":1976,"court":"CCPA"},{"id":"cs_hazmp4jp","corpus_id":"mpep-e9r01-2024-html","opaque_url":"https://mpep.io/n/cs_hazmp4jp","effective_range":{"start_revision":"R-10.2019","end_revision":null},"rendered_text_html":"","rendered_text_plain":"PPG Industries v. Guardian Industries, 156 F.3d 1351, 48 USPQ2d 1351 (Fed. Cir. 1998)","provenance":{"source_file":"s2111.html","source_anchor":"","source_sha256":"4361ab16d766f5a1383832d25f9cd28c174972b5fb38a32f3794fd3df7638d54"},"node_type":"case","short_name":"PPG Industries v. Guardian Industries","all_citations":["156 F.3d 1351","48 USPQ2d 1351"],"canonical_citation":"PPG Industries v. Guardian Industries, 156 F.3d 1351, 48 USPQ2d 1351 (Fed. Cir. 1998)","decision_year":1998,"court":"Fed. Cir."},{"id":"cs_io4kdjef","corpus_id":"mpep-e9r01-2024-html","opaque_url":"https://mpep.io/n/cs_io4kdjef","effective_range":{"start_revision":"R-10.2019","end_revision":null},"rendered_text_html":"","rendered_text_plain":"Atlas Powder v. E.I. duPont de Nemours & Co., 750 F.2d 1569, 224 USPQ 409 (Fed. Cir. 1984)","provenance":{"source_file":"s2111.html","source_anchor":"","source_sha256":"4361ab16d766f5a1383832d25f9cd28c174972b5fb38a32f3794fd3df7638d54"},"node_type":"case","short_name":"Atlas Powder v. E.I. duPont de Nemours & Co.","all_citations":["750 F.2d 1569","224 USPQ 409"],"canonical_citation":"Atlas Powder v. E.I. duPont de Nemours & Co., 750 F.2d 1569, 224 USPQ 409 (Fed. Cir. 1984)","decision_year":1984,"court":"Fed. Cir."},{"id":"cs_qqvgolse","corpus_id":"mpep-e9r01-2024-html","opaque_url":"https://mpep.io/n/cs_qqvgolse","effective_range":{"start_revision":"R-10.2019","end_revision":null},"rendered_text_html":"","rendered_text_plain":"In re Janakirama-Rao, 317 F.2d 951, 137 USPQ 893 (CCPA 1963)","provenance":{"source_file":"s2111.html","source_anchor":"","source_sha256":"4361ab16d766f5a1383832d25f9cd28c174972b5fb38a32f3794fd3df7638d54"},"node_type":"case","short_name":"In re Janakirama-Rao","all_citations":["317 F.2d 951","137 USPQ 893"],"canonical_citation":"In re Janakirama-Rao, 317 F.2d 951, 137 USPQ 893 (CCPA 1963)","decision_year":1963,"court":"CCPA"},{"id":"cs_dpaw24zq","corpus_id":"mpep-e9r01-2024-html","opaque_url":"https://mpep.io/n/cs_dpaw24zq","effective_range":{"start_revision":"R-10.2019","end_revision":null},"rendered_text_html":"","rendered_text_plain":"AK Steel Corp. v. Sollac, 344 F.3d 1234, 68 USPQ2d 1280 (Fed. Cir. 2003)","provenance":{"source_file":"s2111.html","source_anchor":"","source_sha256":"4361ab16d766f5a1383832d25f9cd28c174972b5fb38a32f3794fd3df7638d54"},"node_type":"case","short_name":"AK Steel Corp. v. Sollac","all_citations":["344 F.3d 1234","68 USPQ2d 1280"],"canonical_citation":"AK Steel Corp. v. Sollac, 344 F.3d 1234, 68 USPQ2d 1280 (Fed. Cir. 2003)","decision_year":2003,"court":"Fed. Cir."},{"id":"cs_ksxlf4dd","corpus_id":"mpep-e9r01-2024-html","opaque_url":"https://mpep.io/n/cs_ksxlf4dd","effective_range":{"start_revision":"R-10.2019","end_revision":null},"rendered_text_html":"","rendered_text_plain":"In re De Lajarte, 337 F.2d 870, 143 USPQ 256 (CCPA 1964)","provenance":{"source_file":"s2111.html","source_anchor":"","source_sha256":"4361ab16d766f5a1383832d25f9cd28c174972b5fb38a32f3794fd3df7638d54"},"node_type":"case","short_name":"In re De Lajarte","all_citations":["337 F.2d 870","143 USPQ 256"],"canonical_citation":"In re De Lajarte, 337 F.2d 870, 143 USPQ 256 (CCPA 1964)","decision_year":1964,"court":"CCPA"},{"id":"cs_zjcarith","corpus_id":"mpep-e9r01-2024-html","opaque_url":"https://mpep.io/n/cs_zjcarith","effective_range":{"start_revision":"R-10.2019","end_revision":null},"rendered_text_html":"","rendered_text_plain":"Ex parte Hoffman, 12 USPQ2d 1061 (BPAI 1989)","provenance":{"source_file":"s2111.html","source_anchor":"","source_sha256":"4361ab16d766f5a1383832d25f9cd28c174972b5fb38a32f3794fd3df7638d54"},"node_type":"case","short_name":"Ex parte Hoffman","all_citations":["12 USPQ2d 1061"],"canonical_citation":"Ex parte Hoffman, 12 USPQ2d 1061 (BPAI 1989)","decision_year":1989,"court":"BPAI"},{"id":"st_6sjuzj5u","corpus_id":"mpep-e9r01-2024-html","opaque_url":"https://mpep.io/n/st_6sjuzj5u","effective_range":{"start_revision":"R-10.2019","end_revision":null},"rendered_text_html":"","rendered_text_plain":"","provenance":{"source_file":"s2111.html","source_anchor":"","source_sha256":"4361ab16d766f5a1383832d25f9cd28c174972b5fb38a32f3794fd3df7638d54"},"node_type":"statute","authority":"us_usc","authority_title_num":"35","authority_section_num":"103","canonical_citation":"35 U.S.C. 103","subsection_path":[]},{"id":"pb_fm5wtodn","corpus_id":"mpep-e9r01-2024-html","opaque_url":"https://mpep.io/n/pb_fm5wtodn","effective_range":{"start_revision":"R-10.2019","end_revision":null},"rendered_text_html":"<b id=\"\">IV.</b><b id=\"\"> OTHER TRANSITIONAL PHRASES</b>","rendered_text_plain":"IV. OTHER TRANSITIONAL PHRASES","provenance":{"source_file":"s2111.html","source_anchor":"d0e200824/b.6","source_sha256":"4361ab16d766f5a1383832d25f9cd28c174972b5fb38a32f3794fd3df7638d54"},"node_type":"prose_block","kind":"informal_heading","host_section_id":"se_3qvuqrak","heading_level":2,"heading_text":"IV. OTHER TRANSITIONAL PHRASES"},{"id":"pb_qnbtbufd","corpus_id":"mpep-e9r01-2024-html","opaque_url":"https://mpep.io/n/pb_qnbtbufd","effective_range":{"start_revision":"R-10.2019","end_revision":null},"rendered_text_html":"Transitional phrases such as “having” must be interpreted in light\n                           of the specification to determine whether open or closed claim language is intended.\n                           See, e.g., <i>Lampi Corp. v. American Power Products Inc.,</i> 228 F.3d\n                           1365, 1376, 56 USPQ2d 1445, 1453 (Fed. Cir. 2000) (interpreting the term “having” as\n                           open terminology, allowing the inclusion of other components in addition to those\n                           recited); <i>Crystal Semiconductor Corp. v. TriTech Microelectronics Int’l\n                              Inc.,</i> 246 F.3d 1336, 1348, 57 USPQ2d 1953, 1959 (Fed. Cir. 2001) (term\n                           “having” in transitional phrase “does not create a presumption that the body of the\n                           claim is open”); <i>Regents of the Univ. of Cal. v. Eli Lilly &amp;\n                              Co.,</i> 119 F.3d 1559, 1573, 43 USPQ2d 1398, 1410 (Fed. Cir. 1997) (in the\n                           context of a cDNA having a sequence coding for human PI, the term “having” still\n                           permitted inclusion of other moieties). The transitional phrase “composed of” has\n                           been interpreted in the same manner as either “consisting of” or “consisting\n                           essentially of,” depending on the facts of the particular case. See <i>AFG\n                              Industries, Inc. v. Cardinal IG Company,</i> 239 F.3d 1239, 1245, 57 USPQ2d\n                           1776, 1780-81 (Fed. Cir. 2001) (based on specification and other evidence, “composed\n                           of” interpreted in same manner as “consisting essentially of”); <i>In re\n                              Bertsch,</i> 132 F.2d 1014, 1019-20, 56 USPQ 379, 384 (CCPA 1942) (“Composed\n                           of” interpreted in same manner as “consisting of”; however, the court further\n                           remarked that “the words ‘composed of’ may under certain circumstances be given, in\n                           patent law, a broader meaning than ‘consisting of.’”). \n                        ","rendered_text_plain":"Transitional phrases such as “having” must be interpreted in light of the specification to determine whether open or closed claim language is intended. See, e.g., Lampi Corp. v. American Power Products Inc., 228 F.3d 1365, 1376, 56 USPQ2d 1445, 1453 (Fed. Cir. 2000) (interpreting the term “having” as open terminology, allowing the inclusion of other components in addition to those recited); Crystal Semiconductor Corp. v. TriTech Microelectronics Int’l Inc., 246 F.3d 1336, 1348, 57 USPQ2d 1953, 1959 (Fed. Cir. 2001) (term “having” in transitional phrase “does not create a presumption that the body of the claim is open”); Regents of the Univ. of Cal. v. Eli Lilly & Co., 119 F.3d 1559, 1573, 43 USPQ2d 1398, 1410 (Fed. Cir. 1997) (in the context of a cDNA having a sequence coding for human PI, the term “having” still permitted inclusion of other moieties). The transitional phrase “composed of” has been interpreted in the same manner as either “consisting of” or “consisting essentially of,” depending on the facts of the particular case. See AFG Industries, Inc. v. Cardinal IG Company, 239 F.3d 1239, 1245, 57 USPQ2d 1776, 1780-81 (Fed. Cir. 2001) (based on specification and other evidence, “composed of” interpreted in same manner as “consisting essentially of”); In re Bertsch, 132 F.2d 1014, 1019-20, 56 USPQ 379, 384 (CCPA 1942) (“Composed of” interpreted in same manner as “consisting of”; however, the court further remarked that “the words ‘composed of’ may under certain circumstances be given, in patent law, a broader meaning than ‘consisting of.’”).","provenance":{"source_file":"s2111.html","source_anchor":"d0e200980","source_sha256":"4361ab16d766f5a1383832d25f9cd28c174972b5fb38a32f3794fd3df7638d54"},"node_type":"prose_block","kind":"narrative","host_section_id":"se_3qvuqrak"},{"id":"cs_rfosesrl","corpus_id":"mpep-e9r01-2024-html","opaque_url":"https://mpep.io/n/cs_rfosesrl","effective_range":{"start_revision":"R-10.2019","end_revision":null},"rendered_text_html":"","rendered_text_plain":"Lampi Corp. v. American Power Products Inc., 228 F.3d 1365, 56 USPQ2d 1445 (Fed. Cir. 2000)","provenance":{"source_file":"s2111.html","source_anchor":"","source_sha256":"4361ab16d766f5a1383832d25f9cd28c174972b5fb38a32f3794fd3df7638d54"},"node_type":"case","short_name":"Lampi Corp. v. American Power Products Inc.","all_citations":["228 F.3d 1365","56 USPQ2d 1445"],"canonical_citation":"Lampi Corp. v. American Power Products Inc., 228 F.3d 1365, 56 USPQ2d 1445 (Fed. Cir. 2000)","decision_year":2000,"court":"Fed. Cir."},{"id":"cs_vay6m4ei","corpus_id":"mpep-e9r01-2024-html","opaque_url":"https://mpep.io/n/cs_vay6m4ei","effective_range":{"start_revision":"R-10.2019","end_revision":null},"rendered_text_html":"","rendered_text_plain":"Crystal Semiconductor Corp. v. TriTech Microelectronics Int’l Inc., 246 F.3d 1336, 57 USPQ2d 1953 (Fed. Cir. 2001)","provenance":{"source_file":"s2111.html","source_anchor":"","source_sha256":"4361ab16d766f5a1383832d25f9cd28c174972b5fb38a32f3794fd3df7638d54"},"node_type":"case","short_name":"Crystal Semiconductor Corp. v. TriTech Microelectronics Int’l Inc.","all_citations":["246 F.3d 1336","57 USPQ2d 1953"],"canonical_citation":"Crystal Semiconductor Corp. v. TriTech Microelectronics Int’l Inc., 246 F.3d 1336, 57 USPQ2d 1953 (Fed. Cir. 2001)","decision_year":2001,"court":"Fed. Cir."},{"id":"cs_ziobhqcf","corpus_id":"mpep-e9r01-2024-html","opaque_url":"https://mpep.io/n/cs_ziobhqcf","effective_range":{"start_revision":"R-10.2019","end_revision":null},"rendered_text_html":"","rendered_text_plain":"Regents of the Univ. of Cal. v. Eli Lilly & Co., 119 F.3d 1559, 43 USPQ2d 1398 (Fed. Cir. 1997)","provenance":{"source_file":"s2111.html","source_anchor":"","source_sha256":"4361ab16d766f5a1383832d25f9cd28c174972b5fb38a32f3794fd3df7638d54"},"node_type":"case","short_name":"Regents of the Univ. of Cal. v. Eli Lilly & Co.","all_citations":["119 F.3d 1559","43 USPQ2d 1398"],"canonical_citation":"Regents of the Univ. of Cal. v. Eli Lilly & Co., 119 F.3d 1559, 43 USPQ2d 1398 (Fed. Cir. 1997)","decision_year":1997,"court":"Fed. Cir."},{"id":"cs_p62x2xv3","corpus_id":"mpep-e9r01-2024-html","opaque_url":"https://mpep.io/n/cs_p62x2xv3","effective_range":{"start_revision":"R-10.2019","end_revision":null},"rendered_text_html":"","rendered_text_plain":"AFG Industries, Inc. v. Cardinal IG Company, 239 F.3d 1239, 57 USPQ2d 1776 (Fed. Cir. 2001)","provenance":{"source_file":"s2111.html","source_anchor":"","source_sha256":"4361ab16d766f5a1383832d25f9cd28c174972b5fb38a32f3794fd3df7638d54"},"node_type":"case","short_name":"AFG Industries, Inc. v. Cardinal IG Company","all_citations":["239 F.3d 1239","57 USPQ2d 1776"],"canonical_citation":"AFG Industries, Inc. v. Cardinal IG Company, 239 F.3d 1239, 57 USPQ2d 1776 (Fed. Cir. 2001)","decision_year":2001,"court":"Fed. Cir."},{"id":"cs_7b5i5ji2","corpus_id":"mpep-e9r01-2024-html","opaque_url":"https://mpep.io/n/cs_7b5i5ji2","effective_range":{"start_revision":"R-10.2019","end_revision":null},"rendered_text_html":"","rendered_text_plain":"In re Bertsch, 132 F.2d 1014, 56 USPQ 379 (CCPA 1942)","provenance":{"source_file":"s2111.html","source_anchor":"","source_sha256":"4361ab16d766f5a1383832d25f9cd28c174972b5fb38a32f3794fd3df7638d54"},"node_type":"case","short_name":"In re Bertsch","all_citations":["132 F.2d 1014","56 USPQ 379"],"canonical_citation":"In re Bertsch, 132 F.2d 1014, 56 USPQ 379 (CCPA 1942)","decision_year":1942,"court":"CCPA"},{"id":"se_vz6csedi","corpus_id":"mpep-e9r01-2024-html","opaque_url":"https://mpep.io/n/se_vz6csedi","effective_range":{"start_revision":"R-10.2019","end_revision":null},"rendered_text_html":"","rendered_text_plain":"","provenance":{"source_file":"s2111.html","source_anchor":"d0e201000","source_sha256":"4361ab16d766f5a1383832d25f9cd28c174972b5fb38a32f3794fd3df7638d54"},"node_type":"section","akn_urn":"/akn/us/statement/manual/uspto/2024/mpep/eng@2024-02-29!sec_2111_04","canonical_url":"https://mpep.io/akn/us/statement/manual/uspto/2024/mpep/eng@2024-02-29!sec_2111_04","section_number":"2111.04","chapter":"2100","depth":1,"title":"“Adapted to,” “Adapted for,” “Wherein,” “Whereby,” and Contingent Clauses","children_ids":["pb_cz42zrbs","pb_qamitmzh","ls_fdaotum3","pb_hfgsicwg","pb_v3hqfw3v","pb_eln5etfq","pb_goir2pg6","pb_yawrcyii","pb_q7i6enm3"],"revision_tag":"R-10.2019","parent_section_id":"se_3v44fuac"},{"id":"pb_cz42zrbs","corpus_id":"mpep-e9r01-2024-html","opaque_url":"https://mpep.io/n/pb_cz42zrbs","effective_range":{"start_revision":"R-10.2019","end_revision":null},"rendered_text_html":"<b id=\"\">I.</b><b id=\"\"> “ADAPTED TO,” “ADAPTED FOR,”\n                           “WHEREIN,\" and \"WHEREBY”</b>","rendered_text_plain":"I. “ADAPTED TO,” “ADAPTED FOR,” “WHEREIN,\" and \"WHEREBY”","provenance":{"source_file":"s2111.html","source_anchor":"d0e201000/b.0","source_sha256":"4361ab16d766f5a1383832d25f9cd28c174972b5fb38a32f3794fd3df7638d54"},"node_type":"prose_block","kind":"informal_heading","host_section_id":"se_vz6csedi","heading_level":2,"heading_text":"I. “ADAPTED TO,” “ADAPTED FOR,” “WHEREIN,\" and \"WHEREBY”"},{"id":"pb_qamitmzh","corpus_id":"mpep-e9r01-2024-html","opaque_url":"https://mpep.io/n/pb_qamitmzh","effective_range":{"start_revision":"R-10.2019","end_revision":null},"rendered_text_html":"Claim scope is not limited by claim language that suggests or makes\n                           optional but does not require steps to be performed, or by claim language that does\n                           not limit a claim to a particular structure. However, examples of claim language,\n                           although not exhaustive, that may raise a question as to the limiting effect of the\n                           language in a claim are:\n                        ","rendered_text_plain":"Claim scope is not limited by claim language that suggests or makes optional but does not require steps to be performed, or by claim language that does not limit a claim to a particular structure. However, examples of claim language, although not exhaustive, that may raise a question as to the limiting effect of the language in a claim are:","provenance":{"source_file":"s2111.html","source_anchor":"d0e201004","source_sha256":"4361ab16d766f5a1383832d25f9cd28c174972b5fb38a32f3794fd3df7638d54"},"node_type":"prose_block","kind":"narrative","host_section_id":"se_vz6csedi"},{"id":"li_5u6scqmp","corpus_id":"mpep-e9r01-2024-html","opaque_url":"https://mpep.io/n/li_5u6scqmp","effective_range":{"start_revision":"R-10.2019","end_revision":null},"rendered_text_html":"(A) “adapted to” or “adapted for” clauses; ","rendered_text_plain":"(A) “adapted to” or “adapted for” clauses;","provenance":{"source_file":"s2111.html","source_anchor":"d0e201008","source_sha256":"4361ab16d766f5a1383832d25f9cd28c174972b5fb38a32f3794fd3df7638d54"},"node_type":"list_item","enumerator_label":"(A)","enumerator_ordinal":0,"parent_list_id":"ls_fdaotum3","child_ids":null},{"id":"li_44wbvkkd","corpus_id":"mpep-e9r01-2024-html","opaque_url":"https://mpep.io/n/li_44wbvkkd","effective_range":{"start_revision":"R-10.2019","end_revision":null},"rendered_text_html":"(B)  “wherein” clauses; and","rendered_text_plain":"(B) “wherein” clauses; and","provenance":{"source_file":"s2111.html","source_anchor":"d0e201012","source_sha256":"4361ab16d766f5a1383832d25f9cd28c174972b5fb38a32f3794fd3df7638d54"},"node_type":"list_item","enumerator_label":"(B)","enumerator_ordinal":1,"parent_list_id":"ls_fdaotum3","child_ids":null},{"id":"li_kgfc5cov","corpus_id":"mpep-e9r01-2024-html","opaque_url":"https://mpep.io/n/li_kgfc5cov","effective_range":{"start_revision":"R-10.2019","end_revision":null},"rendered_text_html":"(C) “whereby” clauses.","rendered_text_plain":"(C) “whereby” clauses.","provenance":{"source_file":"s2111.html","source_anchor":"d0e201016","source_sha256":"4361ab16d766f5a1383832d25f9cd28c174972b5fb38a32f3794fd3df7638d54"},"node_type":"list_item","enumerator_label":"(C)","enumerator_ordinal":2,"parent_list_id":"ls_fdaotum3","child_ids":null},{"id":"ls_fdaotum3","corpus_id":"mpep-e9r01-2024-html","opaque_url":"https://mpep.io/n/ls_fdaotum3","effective_range":{"start_revision":"R-10.2019","end_revision":null},"rendered_text_html":"","rendered_text_plain":"","provenance":{"source_file":"s2111.html","source_anchor":"d0e201008","source_sha256":"4361ab16d766f5a1383832d25f9cd28c174972b5fb38a32f3794fd3df7638d54"},"node_type":"list","enumerator_style":"alpha_upper","nesting_depth":1,"host_section_id":"se_vz6csedi","parent_list_item_id":null,"item_ids":["li_5u6scqmp","li_44wbvkkd","li_kgfc5cov"]},{"id":"pb_hfgsicwg","corpus_id":"mpep-e9r01-2024-html","opaque_url":"https://mpep.io/n/pb_hfgsicwg","effective_range":{"start_revision":"R-10.2019","end_revision":null},"rendered_text_html":"The determination of whether each of these clauses is a limitation\n                           in a claim depends on the specific facts of the case. See, e.g., <i>Griffin v.\n                              Bertina,</i> 285 F.3d 1029, 1034, 62 USPQ2d 1431 (Fed. Cir. 2002) (finding\n                           that a “wherein” clause limited a process claim where the clause gave “meaning and\n                           purpose to the manipulative steps”). In <i>In re Giannelli,</i> 739 F.3d\n                           1375, 1378, 109 USPQ2d 1333, 1336 (Fed. Cir. 2014), the court found that an \"adapted\n                           to\" clause limited a machine claim where \"the written description makes clear that\n                           'adapted to,' as used in the [patent] application, has a narrower meaning, viz., that\n                           the claimed machine is designed or constructed to be used as a rowing machine whereby\n                           a pulling force is exerted on the handles.\" In <i>Hoffer v. Microsoft\n                              Corp.,</i> 405 F.3d 1326, 1329, 74 USPQ2d 1481, 1483 (Fed. Cir. 2005), the\n                           court held that when a “‘whereby’ clause states a condition that is material to\n                           patentability, it cannot be ignored in order to change the substance of the\n                           invention.” <i>Id.</i> However, the court noted that a “‘whereby clause\n                           in a method claim is not given weight when it simply expresses the intended result of\n                           a process step positively recited.’” <i>Id.</i> (quoting <i>Minton\n                              v. Nat’l Ass’n of Securities Dealers, Inc.,</i> 336 F.3d 1373, 1381, 67\n                           USPQ2d 1614, 1620 (Fed. Cir. 2003)).\n                        ","rendered_text_plain":"The determination of whether each of these clauses is a limitation in a claim depends on the specific facts of the case. See, e.g., Griffin v. Bertina, 285 F.3d 1029, 1034, 62 USPQ2d 1431 (Fed. Cir. 2002) (finding that a “wherein” clause limited a process claim where the clause gave “meaning and purpose to the manipulative steps”). In In re Giannelli, 739 F.3d 1375, 1378, 109 USPQ2d 1333, 1336 (Fed. Cir. 2014), the court found that an \"adapted to\" clause limited a machine claim where \"the written description makes clear that 'adapted to,' as used in the [patent] application, has a narrower meaning, viz., that the claimed machine is designed or constructed to be used as a rowing machine whereby a pulling force is exerted on the handles.\" In Hoffer v. Microsoft Corp., 405 F.3d 1326, 1329, 74 USPQ2d 1481, 1483 (Fed. Cir. 2005), the court held that when a “‘whereby’ clause states a condition that is material to patentability, it cannot be ignored in order to change the substance of the invention.” Id. However, the court noted that a “‘whereby clause in a method claim is not given weight when it simply expresses the intended result of a process step positively recited.’” Id. (quoting Minton v. Nat’l Ass’n of Securities Dealers, Inc., 336 F.3d 1373, 1381, 67 USPQ2d 1614, 1620 (Fed. Cir. 2003)).","provenance":{"source_file":"s2111.html","source_anchor":"d0e201020","source_sha256":"4361ab16d766f5a1383832d25f9cd28c174972b5fb38a32f3794fd3df7638d54"},"node_type":"prose_block","kind":"narrative","host_section_id":"se_vz6csedi"},{"id":"cs_tgm6bmfe","corpus_id":"mpep-e9r01-2024-html","opaque_url":"https://mpep.io/n/cs_tgm6bmfe","effective_range":{"start_revision":"R-10.2019","end_revision":null},"rendered_text_html":"","rendered_text_plain":"Griffin v. Bertina, 285 F.3d 1029, 62 USPQ2d 1431 (Fed. Cir. 2002)","provenance":{"source_file":"s2111.html","source_anchor":"","source_sha256":"4361ab16d766f5a1383832d25f9cd28c174972b5fb38a32f3794fd3df7638d54"},"node_type":"case","short_name":"Griffin v. Bertina","all_citations":["285 F.3d 1029","62 USPQ2d 1431"],"canonical_citation":"Griffin v. Bertina, 285 F.3d 1029, 62 USPQ2d 1431 (Fed. Cir. 2002)","decision_year":2002,"court":"Fed. Cir."},{"id":"cs_2lyphj2l","corpus_id":"mpep-e9r01-2024-html","opaque_url":"https://mpep.io/n/cs_2lyphj2l","effective_range":{"start_revision":"R-10.2019","end_revision":null},"rendered_text_html":"","rendered_text_plain":"In re Giannelli, 739 F.3d 1375, 109 USPQ2d 1333 (Fed. Cir. 2014)","provenance":{"source_file":"s2111.html","source_anchor":"","source_sha256":"4361ab16d766f5a1383832d25f9cd28c174972b5fb38a32f3794fd3df7638d54"},"node_type":"case","short_name":"In re Giannelli","all_citations":["739 F.3d 1375","109 USPQ2d 1333"],"canonical_citation":"In re Giannelli, 739 F.3d 1375, 109 USPQ2d 1333 (Fed. Cir. 2014)","decision_year":2014,"court":"Fed. Cir."},{"id":"cs_2u23nrui","corpus_id":"mpep-e9r01-2024-html","opaque_url":"https://mpep.io/n/cs_2u23nrui","effective_range":{"start_revision":"R-10.2019","end_revision":null},"rendered_text_html":"","rendered_text_plain":"Hoffer v. Microsoft Corp., 405 F.3d 1326, 74 USPQ2d 1481 (Fed. Cir. 2005)","provenance":{"source_file":"s2111.html","source_anchor":"","source_sha256":"4361ab16d766f5a1383832d25f9cd28c174972b5fb38a32f3794fd3df7638d54"},"node_type":"case","short_name":"Hoffer v. Microsoft Corp.","all_citations":["405 F.3d 1326","74 USPQ2d 1481"],"canonical_citation":"Hoffer v. Microsoft Corp., 405 F.3d 1326, 74 USPQ2d 1481 (Fed. Cir. 2005)","decision_year":2005,"court":"Fed. Cir."},{"id":"cs_pycaw2e7","corpus_id":"mpep-e9r01-2024-html","opaque_url":"https://mpep.io/n/cs_pycaw2e7","effective_range":{"start_revision":"R-10.2019","end_revision":null},"rendered_text_html":"","rendered_text_plain":"Minton v. Nat’l Ass’n of Securities Dealers, Inc., 336 F.3d 1373, 67 USPQ2d 1614 (Fed. Cir. 2003)","provenance":{"source_file":"s2111.html","source_anchor":"","source_sha256":"4361ab16d766f5a1383832d25f9cd28c174972b5fb38a32f3794fd3df7638d54"},"node_type":"case","short_name":"Minton v. Nat’l Ass’n of Securities Dealers, Inc.","all_citations":["336 F.3d 1373","67 USPQ2d 1614"],"canonical_citation":"Minton v. Nat’l Ass’n of Securities Dealers, Inc., 336 F.3d 1373, 67 USPQ2d 1614 (Fed. Cir. 2003)","decision_year":2003,"court":"Fed. Cir."},{"id":"pb_v3hqfw3v","corpus_id":"mpep-e9r01-2024-html","opaque_url":"https://mpep.io/n/pb_v3hqfw3v","effective_range":{"start_revision":"R-10.2019","end_revision":null},"rendered_text_html":"<b id=\"\">II.</b><b id=\"\"> CONTINGENT\n                           LIMITATIONS</b>","rendered_text_plain":"II. CONTINGENT LIMITATIONS","provenance":{"source_file":"s2111.html","source_anchor":"d0e201000/b.2","source_sha256":"4361ab16d766f5a1383832d25f9cd28c174972b5fb38a32f3794fd3df7638d54"},"node_type":"prose_block","kind":"informal_heading","host_section_id":"se_vz6csedi","heading_level":2,"heading_text":"II. CONTINGENT LIMITATIONS"},{"id":"pb_eln5etfq","corpus_id":"mpep-e9r01-2024-html","opaque_url":"https://mpep.io/n/pb_eln5etfq","effective_range":{"start_revision":"R-10.2019","end_revision":null},"rendered_text_html":" The broadest reasonable interpretation of a method\n                           (or process) claim having contingent limitations requires only those steps that must\n                           be performed and does not include steps that are not required to be performed because\n                           the condition(s) precedent are not met. For example, assume a method claim requires\n                           step A if a first condition happens and step B if a second condition happens. If the\n                           claimed invention may be practiced without either the first or second condition\n                           happening, then neither step A or B is required by the broadest reasonable\n                           interpretation of the claim. If the claimed invention requires the first condition to\n                           occur, then the broadest reasonable interpretation of the claim requires step A. If\n                           the claimed invention requires both the first and second conditions to occur, then\n                           the broadest reasonable interpretation of the claim requires both steps A and B. \n                        ","rendered_text_plain":"The broadest reasonable interpretation of a method (or process) claim having contingent limitations requires only those steps that must be performed and does not include steps that are not required to be performed because the condition(s) precedent are not met. For example, assume a method claim requires step A if a first condition happens and step B if a second condition happens. If the claimed invention may be practiced without either the first or second condition happening, then neither step A or B is required by the broadest reasonable interpretation of the claim. If the claimed invention requires the first condition to occur, then the broadest reasonable interpretation of the claim requires step A. If the claimed invention requires both the first and second conditions to occur, then the broadest reasonable interpretation of the claim requires both steps A and B.","provenance":{"source_file":"s2111.html","source_anchor":"ch2100_p_299b6_1973d_103","source_sha256":"4361ab16d766f5a1383832d25f9cd28c174972b5fb38a32f3794fd3df7638d54"},"node_type":"prose_block","kind":"narrative","host_section_id":"se_vz6csedi"},{"id":"pb_goir2pg6","corpus_id":"mpep-e9r01-2024-html","opaque_url":"https://mpep.io/n/pb_goir2pg6","effective_range":{"start_revision":"R-10.2019","end_revision":null},"rendered_text_html":" The broadest reasonable interpretation of a system\n                           (or apparatus or product) claim having structure that performs a function, which only\n                           needs to occur if a condition precedent is met, requires structure for performing the\n                           function should the condition occur. The system claim interpretation differs from a\n                           method claim interpretation because the claimed structure must be present in the\n                           system regardless of whether the condition is met and the function is actually\n                           performed. \n                        ","rendered_text_plain":"The broadest reasonable interpretation of a system (or apparatus or product) claim having structure that performs a function, which only needs to occur if a condition precedent is met, requires structure for performing the function should the condition occur. The system claim interpretation differs from a method claim interpretation because the claimed structure must be present in the system regardless of whether the condition is met and the function is actually performed.","provenance":{"source_file":"s2111.html","source_anchor":"ch2100_p_299b6_19798_3a7","source_sha256":"4361ab16d766f5a1383832d25f9cd28c174972b5fb38a32f3794fd3df7638d54"},"node_type":"prose_block","kind":"narrative","host_section_id":"se_vz6csedi"},{"id":"pb_yawrcyii","corpus_id":"mpep-e9r01-2024-html","opaque_url":"https://mpep.io/n/pb_yawrcyii","effective_range":{"start_revision":"R-10.2019","end_revision":null},"rendered_text_html":" See <i>Ex parte Schulhauser,</i> Appeal\n                           2013-007847 (PTAB April 28, 2016) for an analysis of contingent claim limitations in\n                           the context of both method claims and system claims. In\n                           <i>Schulhauser,</i> both method claims and system claims recited the\n                           same contingent step. When analyzing the claimed method as a whole, the PTAB\n                           determined that giving the claim its broadest reasonable interpretation, “[i]f the\n                           condition for performing a contingent step is not satisfied, the performance recited\n                           by the step need not be carried out in order for the claimed method to be performed”\n                           (quotation omitted). <i>Schulhauser</i> at 10. When analyzing the claimed\n                           system as a whole, the PTAB determined that “[t]he broadest reasonable interpretation\n                           of a system claim having structure that performs a function, which only needs to\n                           occur if a condition precedent is met, still requires structure for performing the\n                           function should the condition occur.” <i>Schulhauser</i> at 14. Therefore\n                           \"[t]he Examiner did not need to present evidence of the obviousness of the [ ] method\n                           steps of claim 1 that are not required to be performed under a broadest reasonable\n                           interpretation of the claim (e.g., instances in which the electrocardiac signal data\n                           is not within the threshold electrocardiac criteria such that the condition precedent\n                           for the determining step and the remaining steps of claim 1 has not been met);\"\n                           however to render the claimed system obvious, the prior art must teach the structure\n                           that performs the function of the contingent step along with the other recited claim\n                           limitations. <i>Schulhauser</i> at 9, 14. \n                        ","rendered_text_plain":"See Ex parte Schulhauser, Appeal 2013-007847 (PTAB April 28, 2016) for an analysis of contingent claim limitations in the context of both method claims and system claims. In Schulhauser, both method claims and system claims recited the same contingent step. When analyzing the claimed method as a whole, the PTAB determined that giving the claim its broadest reasonable interpretation, “[i]f the condition for performing a contingent step is not satisfied, the performance recited by the step need not be carried out in order for the claimed method to be performed” (quotation omitted). Schulhauser at 10. When analyzing the claimed system as a whole, the PTAB determined that “[t]he broadest reasonable interpretation of a system claim having structure that performs a function, which only needs to occur if a condition precedent is met, still requires structure for performing the function should the condition occur.” Schulhauser at 14. Therefore \"[t]he Examiner did not need to present evidence of the obviousness of the [ ] method steps of claim 1 that are not required to be performed under a broadest reasonable interpretation of the claim (e.g., instances in which the electrocardiac signal data is not within the threshold electrocardiac criteria such that the condition precedent for the determining step and the remaining steps of claim 1 has not been met);\" however to render the claimed system obvious, the prior art must teach the structure that performs the function of the contingent step along with the other recited claim limitations. Schulhauser at 9, 14.","provenance":{"source_file":"s2111.html","source_anchor":"ch2100_p_299b6_1979f_210","source_sha256":"4361ab16d766f5a1383832d25f9cd28c174972b5fb38a32f3794fd3df7638d54"},"node_type":"prose_block","kind":"narrative","host_section_id":"se_vz6csedi"},{"id":"pb_q7i6enm3","corpus_id":"mpep-e9r01-2024-html","opaque_url":"https://mpep.io/n/pb_q7i6enm3","effective_range":{"start_revision":"R-10.2019","end_revision":null},"rendered_text_html":"See also <b><a href=\"s2143.html#d0e210501\">MPEP § 2143.03</a></b>.\n                        ","rendered_text_plain":"See also MPEP § 2143.03.","provenance":{"source_file":"s2111.html","source_anchor":"ch2100_p_299b6_1980b_2ca","source_sha256":"4361ab16d766f5a1383832d25f9cd28c174972b5fb38a32f3794fd3df7638d54"},"node_type":"prose_block","kind":"narrative","host_section_id":"se_vz6csedi"},{"id":"se_po6nlpmk","corpus_id":"mpep-e9r01-2024-html","opaque_url":"https://mpep.io/n/se_po6nlpmk","effective_range":{"start_revision":"R-10.2019","end_revision":null},"rendered_text_html":"","rendered_text_plain":"","provenance":{"source_file":"s2111.html","source_anchor":"stub-2143","source_sha256":"4361ab16d766f5a1383832d25f9cd28c174972b5fb38a32f3794fd3df7638d54"},"node_type":"section","akn_urn":"/akn/us/statement/manual/uspto/2024/mpep/eng@2024-02-29!sec_2143","canonical_url":"https://mpep.io/akn/us/statement/manual/uspto/2024/mpep/eng@2024-02-29!sec_2143","section_number":"2143","chapter":"2100","depth":0,"title":"Section 2143","children_ids":[]},{"id":"se_qdlieef7","corpus_id":"mpep-e9r01-2024-html","opaque_url":"https://mpep.io/n/se_qdlieef7","effective_range":{"start_revision":"R-10.2019","end_revision":null},"rendered_text_html":"","rendered_text_plain":"","provenance":{"source_file":"s2111.html","source_anchor":"ch2100_d1b148_1ea0c_2c0","source_sha256":"4361ab16d766f5a1383832d25f9cd28c174972b5fb38a32f3794fd3df7638d54"},"node_type":"section","akn_urn":"/akn/us/statement/manual/uspto/2024/mpep/eng@2024-02-29!sec_2111_05","canonical_url":"https://mpep.io/akn/us/statement/manual/uspto/2024/mpep/eng@2024-02-29!sec_2111_05","section_number":"2111.05","chapter":"2100","depth":1,"title":"Functional and Nonfunctional Descriptive Material","children_ids":["pb_ox3gq2to","pb_p4attmo2","ls_az2lfgx3","pb_fc6vagzp","pb_zrgb7dk5","pb_ucpj23ls","pb_kftjqe7d","pb_ua3o4gmk","pb_nwlljbfj","pb_vbutiyyw","pb_5omtgeg2","pb_pjzpjwf4","pb_dxtvpgm7"],"revision_tag":"R-07.2022","parent_section_id":"se_3v44fuac"},{"id":"pb_ox3gq2to","corpus_id":"mpep-e9r01-2024-html","opaque_url":"https://mpep.io/n/pb_ox3gq2to","effective_range":{"start_revision":"R-10.2019","end_revision":null},"rendered_text_html":"USPTO personnel must consider all claim limitations when\n                           determining patentability of an invention over the prior art. <i>In re\n                              Gulack,</i> 703 F.2d 1381, 1385, 217 USPQ 401, 403-04 (Fed. Cir. 1983). Since a\n                           claim must be read as a whole, USPTO personnel may not disregard claim limitations that\n                           include printed matter. See <i>Id.</i> at 1384, 217 USPQ at 403; see also\n                           <i>Diamond v. Diehr,</i> 450 U.S. 175, 191, 209 USPQ 1, 10 (1981). The\n                           first step of the printed matter analysis is the determination that the limitation in\n                           question is in fact directed toward printed matter. “Our past cases establish a\n                           necessary condition for falling into the category of printed matter: a limitation is\n                           printed matter only if it claims the content of information.” See <i>In re\n                              DiStefano,</i> 808 F.3d 845, 848, 117 USPQ2d 1265, 1267 (Fed. Cir. 2015).\n                           “[O]nce it is determined that the limitation is directed to printed matter, [the\n                           examiner] must then determine if the matter is functionally or structurally related to\n                           the associated physical substrate, and only if the answer is ‘no’ is the printed matter\n                           owed no patentable weight.” <i> Id.</i> at 850, 117 USPQ2d at 1268. If a new\n                           and nonobvious functional relationship between the printed matter and the substrate does\n                           exist, the examiner should give patentable weight to printed matter. See <i>In re\n                              Lowry,</i> 32 F.3d 1579, 1583-84, 32 USPQ2d 1031, 1035 (Fed. Cir.\n                           1994);<i> In re Ngai,</i> 367 F.3d 1336, 70 USPQ2d 1862 (Fed. Cir. 2004);\n                           <i>In re Gulack,</i> 703 F.2d 1381, 1385, 217 USPQ 401, 403-04 (Fed. Cir.\n                           1983). The rationale behind the printed matter cases, in which, for example, written\n                           instructions are added to a known product, has been extended to method claims in which\n                           an instructional limitation is added to a method known in the art. Similar to the\n                           inquiry for products with printed matter thereon, in such method cases the relevant\n                           inquiry is whether a new and nonobvious functional relationship with the known method\n                           exists. See <i>In re DiStefano,</i> 808 F.3d 845, 117 USPQ2d 1265 (Fed. Cir.\n                           2015); <i>In re Kao,</i> 639 F.3d 1057, 1072-73, 98 USPQ2d 1799, 1811-12\n                           (Fed. Cir. 2011); <i>King Pharmaceuticals Inc. v. Eon Labs Inc.,</i> 616\n                           F.3d 1267, 1279, 95 USPQ2d 1833, 1842 (Fed. Cir. 2010). \n                        ","rendered_text_plain":"USPTO personnel must consider all claim limitations when determining patentability of an invention over the prior art. In re Gulack, 703 F.2d 1381, 1385, 217 USPQ 401, 403-04 (Fed. Cir. 1983). Since a claim must be read as a whole, USPTO personnel may not disregard claim limitations that include printed matter. See Id. at 1384, 217 USPQ at 403; see also Diamond v. Diehr, 450 U.S. 175, 191, 209 USPQ 1, 10 (1981). The first step of the printed matter analysis is the determination that the limitation in question is in fact directed toward printed matter. “Our past cases establish a necessary condition for falling into the category of printed matter: a limitation is printed matter only if it claims the content of information.” See In re DiStefano, 808 F.3d 845, 848, 117 USPQ2d 1265, 1267 (Fed. Cir. 2015). “[O]nce it is determined that the limitation is directed to printed matter, [the examiner] must then determine if the matter is functionally or structurally related to the associated physical substrate, and only if the answer is ‘no’ is the printed matter owed no patentable weight.” Id. at 850, 117 USPQ2d at 1268. If a new and nonobvious functional relationship between the printed matter and the substrate does exist, the examiner should give patentable weight to printed matter. See In re Lowry, 32 F.3d 1579, 1583-84, 32 USPQ2d 1031, 1035 (Fed. Cir. 1994); In re Ngai, 367 F.3d 1336, 70 USPQ2d 1862 (Fed. Cir. 2004); In re Gulack, 703 F.2d 1381, 1385, 217 USPQ 401, 403-04 (Fed. Cir. 1983). The rationale behind the printed matter cases, in which, for example, written instructions are added to a known product, has been extended to method claims in which an instructional limitation is added to a method known in the art. Similar to the inquiry for products with printed matter thereon, in such method cases the relevant inquiry is whether a new and nonobvious functional relationship with the known method exists. See In re DiStefano, 808 F.3d 845, 117 USPQ2d 1265 (Fed. Cir. 2015); In re Kao, 639 F.3d 1057, 1072-73, 98 USPQ2d 1799, 1811-12 (Fed. Cir. 2011); King Pharmaceuticals Inc. v. Eon Labs Inc., 616 F.3d 1267, 1279, 95 USPQ2d 1833, 1842 (Fed. Cir. 2010).","provenance":{"source_file":"s2111.html","source_anchor":"ch2100_d1b148_1eb30_139","source_sha256":"4361ab16d766f5a1383832d25f9cd28c174972b5fb38a32f3794fd3df7638d54"},"node_type":"prose_block","kind":"narrative","host_section_id":"se_qdlieef7"},{"id":"cs_iyfprar5","corpus_id":"mpep-e9r01-2024-html","opaque_url":"https://mpep.io/n/cs_iyfprar5","effective_range":{"start_revision":"R-10.2019","end_revision":null},"rendered_text_html":"","rendered_text_plain":"In re Gulack, 703 F.2d 1381, 217 USPQ 401 (Fed. Cir. 1983)","provenance":{"source_file":"s2111.html","source_anchor":"","source_sha256":"4361ab16d766f5a1383832d25f9cd28c174972b5fb38a32f3794fd3df7638d54"},"node_type":"case","short_name":"In re Gulack","all_citations":["703 F.2d 1381","217 USPQ 401"],"canonical_citation":"In re Gulack, 703 F.2d 1381, 217 USPQ 401 (Fed. Cir. 1983)","decision_year":1983,"court":"Fed. Cir."},{"id":"cs_dvp27fsm","corpus_id":"mpep-e9r01-2024-html","opaque_url":"https://mpep.io/n/cs_dvp27fsm","effective_range":{"start_revision":"R-10.2019","end_revision":null},"rendered_text_html":"","rendered_text_plain":"Diamond v. Diehr, 450 U.S. 175, 209 USPQ 1 (SCOTUS 1981)","provenance":{"source_file":"s2111.html","source_anchor":"","source_sha256":"4361ab16d766f5a1383832d25f9cd28c174972b5fb38a32f3794fd3df7638d54"},"node_type":"case","short_name":"Diamond v. Diehr","all_citations":["450 U.S. 175","209 USPQ 1"],"canonical_citation":"Diamond v. Diehr, 450 U.S. 175, 209 USPQ 1 (SCOTUS 1981)","decision_year":1981,"court":"SCOTUS"},{"id":"cs_c4sjgqwg","corpus_id":"mpep-e9r01-2024-html","opaque_url":"https://mpep.io/n/cs_c4sjgqwg","effective_range":{"start_revision":"R-10.2019","end_revision":null},"rendered_text_html":"","rendered_text_plain":"In re DiStefano, 808 F.3d 845, 117 USPQ2d 1265 (Fed. Cir. 2015)","provenance":{"source_file":"s2111.html","source_anchor":"","source_sha256":"4361ab16d766f5a1383832d25f9cd28c174972b5fb38a32f3794fd3df7638d54"},"node_type":"case","short_name":"In re DiStefano","all_citations":["808 F.3d 845","117 USPQ2d 1265"],"canonical_citation":"In re DiStefano, 808 F.3d 845, 117 USPQ2d 1265 (Fed. Cir. 2015)","decision_year":2015,"court":"Fed. Cir."},{"id":"cs_rnu6kcqk","corpus_id":"mpep-e9r01-2024-html","opaque_url":"https://mpep.io/n/cs_rnu6kcqk","effective_range":{"start_revision":"R-10.2019","end_revision":null},"rendered_text_html":"","rendered_text_plain":"In re Lowry, 32 F.3d 1579, 32 USPQ2d 1031 (Fed. Cir. 1994)","provenance":{"source_file":"s2111.html","source_anchor":"","source_sha256":"4361ab16d766f5a1383832d25f9cd28c174972b5fb38a32f3794fd3df7638d54"},"node_type":"case","short_name":"In re Lowry","all_citations":["32 F.3d 1579","32 USPQ2d 1031"],"canonical_citation":"In re Lowry, 32 F.3d 1579, 32 USPQ2d 1031 (Fed. Cir. 1994)","decision_year":1994,"court":"Fed. Cir."},{"id":"cs_qcwhwcaa","corpus_id":"mpep-e9r01-2024-html","opaque_url":"https://mpep.io/n/cs_qcwhwcaa","effective_range":{"start_revision":"R-10.2019","end_revision":null},"rendered_text_html":"","rendered_text_plain":"In re Ngai, 367 F.3d 1336, 70 USPQ2d 1862 (Fed. Cir. 2004)","provenance":{"source_file":"s2111.html","source_anchor":"","source_sha256":"4361ab16d766f5a1383832d25f9cd28c174972b5fb38a32f3794fd3df7638d54"},"node_type":"case","short_name":"In re Ngai","all_citations":["367 F.3d 1336","70 USPQ2d 1862"],"canonical_citation":"In re Ngai, 367 F.3d 1336, 70 USPQ2d 1862 (Fed. Cir. 2004)","decision_year":2004,"court":"Fed. Cir."},{"id":"cs_fkbi4o2x","corpus_id":"mpep-e9r01-2024-html","opaque_url":"https://mpep.io/n/cs_fkbi4o2x","effective_range":{"start_revision":"R-10.2019","end_revision":null},"rendered_text_html":"","rendered_text_plain":"In re Kao, 639 F.3d 1057, 98 USPQ2d 1799 (Fed. Cir. 2011)","provenance":{"source_file":"s2111.html","source_anchor":"","source_sha256":"4361ab16d766f5a1383832d25f9cd28c174972b5fb38a32f3794fd3df7638d54"},"node_type":"case","short_name":"In re Kao","all_citations":["639 F.3d 1057","98 USPQ2d 1799"],"canonical_citation":"In re Kao, 639 F.3d 1057, 98 USPQ2d 1799 (Fed. Cir. 2011)","decision_year":2011,"court":"Fed. Cir."},{"id":"cs_enmpdksh","corpus_id":"mpep-e9r01-2024-html","opaque_url":"https://mpep.io/n/cs_enmpdksh","effective_range":{"start_revision":"R-10.2019","end_revision":null},"rendered_text_html":"","rendered_text_plain":"King Pharmaceuticals Inc. v. Eon Labs Inc., 616 F.3d 1267, 95 USPQ2d 1833 (Fed. Cir. 2010)","provenance":{"source_file":"s2111.html","source_anchor":"","source_sha256":"4361ab16d766f5a1383832d25f9cd28c174972b5fb38a32f3794fd3df7638d54"},"node_type":"case","short_name":"King Pharmaceuticals Inc. v. Eon Labs Inc.","all_citations":["616 F.3d 1267","95 USPQ2d 1833"],"canonical_citation":"King Pharmaceuticals Inc. v. Eon Labs Inc., 616 F.3d 1267, 95 USPQ2d 1833 (Fed. Cir. 2010)","decision_year":2010,"court":"Fed. Cir."},{"id":"pb_p4attmo2","corpus_id":"mpep-e9r01-2024-html","opaque_url":"https://mpep.io/n/pb_p4attmo2","effective_range":{"start_revision":"R-10.2019","end_revision":null},"rendered_text_html":"<b id=\"\">I.</b><b id=\"\"> DETERMINING WHETHER A FUNCTIONAL RELATIONSHIP EXISTS BETWEEN PRINTED MATTER\n                           AND ASSOCIATED SUBSTRATE</b>","rendered_text_plain":"I. DETERMINING WHETHER A FUNCTIONAL RELATIONSHIP EXISTS BETWEEN PRINTED MATTER AND ASSOCIATED SUBSTRATE","provenance":{"source_file":"s2111.html","source_anchor":"ch2100_d1b148_1ea0c_2c0/b.0","source_sha256":"4361ab16d766f5a1383832d25f9cd28c174972b5fb38a32f3794fd3df7638d54"},"node_type":"prose_block","kind":"informal_heading","host_section_id":"se_qdlieef7","heading_level":2,"heading_text":"I. DETERMINING WHETHER A FUNCTIONAL RELATIONSHIP EXISTS BETWEEN PRINTED MATTER AND ASSOCIATED SUBSTRATE"},{"id":"li_rnaemgvl","corpus_id":"mpep-e9r01-2024-html","opaque_url":"https://mpep.io/n/li_rnaemgvl","effective_range":{"start_revision":"R-10.2019","end_revision":null},"rendered_text_html":"","rendered_text_plain":"","provenance":{"source_file":"s2111.html","source_anchor":"se_qdlieef7/ul.1/li.0","source_sha256":"4361ab16d766f5a1383832d25f9cd28c174972b5fb38a32f3794fd3df7638d54"},"node_type":"list_item","enumerator_label":"","enumerator_ordinal":0,"parent_list_id":"ls_az2lfgx3","child_ids":null},{"id":"ls_az2lfgx3","corpus_id":"mpep-e9r01-2024-html","opaque_url":"https://mpep.io/n/ls_az2lfgx3","effective_range":{"start_revision":"R-10.2019","end_revision":null},"rendered_text_html":"","rendered_text_plain":"","provenance":{"source_file":"s2111.html","source_anchor":"se_qdlieef7/ul.1","source_sha256":"4361ab16d766f5a1383832d25f9cd28c174972b5fb38a32f3794fd3df7638d54"},"node_type":"list","enumerator_style":"no_enumerator","nesting_depth":1,"host_section_id":"se_qdlieef7","parent_list_item_id":null,"item_ids":["li_rnaemgvl"]},{"id":"pb_fc6vagzp","corpus_id":"mpep-e9r01-2024-html","opaque_url":"https://mpep.io/n/pb_fc6vagzp","effective_range":{"start_revision":"R-10.2019","end_revision":null},"rendered_text_html":"<b id=\"\"><i>A.</i></b><b id=\"\"><i>Evidence Supporting a Functional Relationship </i></b>","rendered_text_plain":"A. Evidence Supporting a Functional Relationship","provenance":{"source_file":"s2111.html","source_anchor":"ch2100_d1b148_1ea0c_2c0/b.2","source_sha256":"4361ab16d766f5a1383832d25f9cd28c174972b5fb38a32f3794fd3df7638d54"},"node_type":"prose_block","kind":"informal_heading","host_section_id":"se_qdlieef7","heading_level":2,"heading_text":"A. Evidence Supporting a Functional Relationship"},{"id":"pb_zrgb7dk5","corpus_id":"mpep-e9r01-2024-html","opaque_url":"https://mpep.io/n/pb_zrgb7dk5","effective_range":{"start_revision":"R-10.2019","end_revision":null},"rendered_text_html":"To be given patentable weight, the printed matter\n                           and associated product must be in a functional relationship. A functional\n                           relationship can be found where the printed matter performs some function with\n                           respect to the product to which it is associated. See<i> Lowry,</i> 32\n                           F.3d at 1584, 32 USPQ2d at 1035 (citing <i>Gulack,</i> 703 F.2d at\n                           1386, 217 USPQ at 404). For instance, indicia on a measuring cup perform the\n                           function of indicating volume within that measuring cup. See <i>In re\n                              Miller,</i> 418 F.2d 1392, 1396, 164 USPQ 46, 49 (CCPA 1969). A\n                           functional relationship can also be found where the product performs some function\n                           with respect to the printed matter to which it is associated. For instance, where\n                           a hatband places a string of numbers in a certain physical relationship to each\n                           other such that a claimed algorithm is satisfied due to the physical structure of\n                           the hatband, the hatband performs a function with respect to the string of\n                           numbers. See <i>Gulack,</i> 703 F.2d at 1386-87, 217 USPQ at 405. \n                        ","rendered_text_plain":"To be given patentable weight, the printed matter and associated product must be in a functional relationship. A functional relationship can be found where the printed matter performs some function with respect to the product to which it is associated. See Lowry, 32 F.3d at 1584, 32 USPQ2d at 1035 (citing Gulack, 703 F.2d at 1386, 217 USPQ at 404). For instance, indicia on a measuring cup perform the function of indicating volume within that measuring cup. See In re Miller, 418 F.2d 1392, 1396, 164 USPQ 46, 49 (CCPA 1969). A functional relationship can also be found where the product performs some function with respect to the printed matter to which it is associated. For instance, where a hatband places a string of numbers in a certain physical relationship to each other such that a claimed algorithm is satisfied due to the physical structure of the hatband, the hatband performs a function with respect to the string of numbers. See Gulack, 703 F.2d at 1386-87, 217 USPQ at 405.","provenance":{"source_file":"s2111.html","source_anchor":"ch2100_d1b148_1fd6e_15f","source_sha256":"4361ab16d766f5a1383832d25f9cd28c174972b5fb38a32f3794fd3df7638d54"},"node_type":"prose_block","kind":"narrative","host_section_id":"se_qdlieef7"},{"id":"cs_4a6j2gos","corpus_id":"mpep-e9r01-2024-html","opaque_url":"https://mpep.io/n/cs_4a6j2gos","effective_range":{"start_revision":"R-10.2019","end_revision":null},"rendered_text_html":"","rendered_text_plain":"In re Miller, 418 F.2d 1392, 164 USPQ 46 (CCPA 1969)","provenance":{"source_file":"s2111.html","source_anchor":"","source_sha256":"4361ab16d766f5a1383832d25f9cd28c174972b5fb38a32f3794fd3df7638d54"},"node_type":"case","short_name":"In re Miller","all_citations":["418 F.2d 1392","164 USPQ 46"],"canonical_citation":"In re Miller, 418 F.2d 1392, 164 USPQ 46 (CCPA 1969)","decision_year":1969,"court":"CCPA"},{"id":"pb_ucpj23ls","corpus_id":"mpep-e9r01-2024-html","opaque_url":"https://mpep.io/n/pb_ucpj23ls","effective_range":{"start_revision":"R-10.2019","end_revision":null},"rendered_text_html":"<b id=\"\"><i>B.</i></b><b id=\"\"><i>Evidence Against a Functional Relationship </i></b>","rendered_text_plain":"B. Evidence Against a Functional Relationship","provenance":{"source_file":"s2111.html","source_anchor":"ch2100_d1b148_1ea0c_2c0/b.4","source_sha256":"4361ab16d766f5a1383832d25f9cd28c174972b5fb38a32f3794fd3df7638d54"},"node_type":"prose_block","kind":"informal_heading","host_section_id":"se_qdlieef7","heading_level":2,"heading_text":"B. Evidence Against a Functional Relationship"},{"id":"pb_kftjqe7d","corpus_id":"mpep-e9r01-2024-html","opaque_url":"https://mpep.io/n/pb_kftjqe7d","effective_range":{"start_revision":"R-10.2019","end_revision":null},"rendered_text_html":"Where a product merely serves as a support for\n                           printed matter, no functional relationship exists. These situations may arise\n                           where the claim as a whole is directed towards conveying a message or meaning to a\n                           human reader independent of the supporting product. For example, a hatband with\n                           images displayed on the hatband but not arranged in any particular sequence was\n                           found to only serve as support and display for the printed matter. See\n                           <i>Gulack,</i> 703 F.2d at 1386, 217 USPQ at 404. Another example\n                           in which a product merely serves as a support would occur for a deck of playing\n                           cards having images on each card. See <i>In re Bryan,</i> 323 Fed.\n                           App'x 898 (Fed. Cir. 2009) (unpublished). In <i>Bryan</i> the\n                           applicant asserted that the printed matter allowed the cards to be “collected,\n                           traded, and drawn”; “identify and distinguish one deck of cards from another”; and\n                           “enable[] the card to be traded and blind drawn”. However, the court found that\n                           these functions do not pertain to the structure of the apparatus and were instead\n                           drawn to the method or process of playing a game. See also <i>Ex parte\n                              Gwinn,</i> 112 USPQ 439, 446-47 (Bd. Pat. App. & Int. 1955), in which\n                           the invention was directed to a set of dice by means of which a game may be\n                           played. The claims differed from the prior art solely by the printed matter in the\n                           dice. The claims were properly rejected on prior art because there was no new\n                           feature of physical structure and no new relation of printed matter to physical\n                           structure. For example, a claimed measuring tape having electrical wiring\n                           information thereon, or a generically claimed substrate having a picture of a golf\n                           ball thereupon, would lack a functional relationship as the claims as a whole are\n                           directed towards conveying wiring information (unrelated to the measuring tape) or\n                           an aesthetically pleasing image (unrelated to the substrate) to the reader.\n                           Additionally, where the printed matter and product do not depend upon each other,\n                           no functional relationship exists. For example, in a kit containing a set of\n                           chemicals and a printed set of instructions for using the chemicals, the\n                           instructions are not related to that particular set of chemicals.<i> In re\n                              Ngai,</i> 367 F.3d at 1339, 70 USPQ2d at 1864.\n                        ","rendered_text_plain":"Where a product merely serves as a support for printed matter, no functional relationship exists. These situations may arise where the claim as a whole is directed towards conveying a message or meaning to a human reader independent of the supporting product. For example, a hatband with images displayed on the hatband but not arranged in any particular sequence was found to only serve as support and display for the printed matter. See Gulack, 703 F.2d at 1386, 217 USPQ at 404. Another example in which a product merely serves as a support would occur for a deck of playing cards having images on each card. See In re Bryan, 323 Fed. App'x 898 (Fed. Cir. 2009) (unpublished). In Bryan the applicant asserted that the printed matter allowed the cards to be “collected, traded, and drawn”; “identify and distinguish one deck of cards from another”; and “enable[] the card to be traded and blind drawn”. However, the court found that these functions do not pertain to the structure of the apparatus and were instead drawn to the method or process of playing a game. See also Ex parte Gwinn, 112 USPQ 439, 446-47 (Bd. Pat. App. & Int. 1955), in which the invention was directed to a set of dice by means of which a game may be played. The claims differed from the prior art solely by the printed matter in the dice. The claims were properly rejected on prior art because there was no new feature of physical structure and no new relation of printed matter to physical structure. For example, a claimed measuring tape having electrical wiring information thereon, or a generically claimed substrate having a picture of a golf ball thereupon, would lack a functional relationship as the claims as a whole are directed towards conveying wiring information (unrelated to the measuring tape) or an aesthetically pleasing image (unrelated to the substrate) to the reader. Additionally, where the printed matter and product do not depend upon each other, no functional relationship exists. For example, in a kit containing a set of chemicals and a printed set of instructions for using the chemicals, the instructions are not related to that particular set of chemicals. In re Ngai, 367 F.3d at 1339, 70 USPQ2d at 1864.","provenance":{"source_file":"s2111.html","source_anchor":"ch2100_d1b148_1fde1_6a","source_sha256":"4361ab16d766f5a1383832d25f9cd28c174972b5fb38a32f3794fd3df7638d54"},"node_type":"prose_block","kind":"narrative","host_section_id":"se_qdlieef7"},{"id":"cs_otywxk2e","corpus_id":"mpep-e9r01-2024-html","opaque_url":"https://mpep.io/n/cs_otywxk2e","effective_range":{"start_revision":"R-10.2019","end_revision":null},"rendered_text_html":"","rendered_text_plain":"In re Bryan, 323 Fed. App'x 898 (Fed. Cir. 2009)","provenance":{"source_file":"s2111.html","source_anchor":"","source_sha256":"4361ab16d766f5a1383832d25f9cd28c174972b5fb38a32f3794fd3df7638d54"},"node_type":"case","short_name":"In re Bryan","all_citations":["323 Fed. App'x 898"],"canonical_citation":"In re Bryan, 323 Fed. App'x 898 (Fed. Cir. 2009)","decision_year":2009,"court":"Fed. Cir."},{"id":"cs_afpgn44a","corpus_id":"mpep-e9r01-2024-html","opaque_url":"https://mpep.io/n/cs_afpgn44a","effective_range":{"start_revision":"R-10.2019","end_revision":null},"rendered_text_html":"","rendered_text_plain":"Ex parte Gwinn, 112 USPQ 439 (BPAI 1955)","provenance":{"source_file":"s2111.html","source_anchor":"","source_sha256":"4361ab16d766f5a1383832d25f9cd28c174972b5fb38a32f3794fd3df7638d54"},"node_type":"case","short_name":"Ex parte Gwinn","all_citations":["112 USPQ 439"],"canonical_citation":"Ex parte Gwinn, 112 USPQ 439 (BPAI 1955)","decision_year":1955,"court":"BPAI"},{"id":"pb_ua3o4gmk","corpus_id":"mpep-e9r01-2024-html","opaque_url":"https://mpep.io/n/pb_ua3o4gmk","effective_range":{"start_revision":"R-10.2019","end_revision":null},"rendered_text_html":"<b id=\"\">II.</b><b id=\"\"> FUNCTIONAL RELATIONSHIP BETWEEN PRINTED MATTER AND ASSOCIATED SUBSTRATE MUST\n                           BE NEW AND NONOBVIOUS</b>","rendered_text_plain":"II. FUNCTIONAL RELATIONSHIP BETWEEN PRINTED MATTER AND ASSOCIATED SUBSTRATE MUST BE NEW AND NONOBVIOUS","provenance":{"source_file":"s2111.html","source_anchor":"ch2100_d1b148_1ea0c_2c0/b.6","source_sha256":"4361ab16d766f5a1383832d25f9cd28c174972b5fb38a32f3794fd3df7638d54"},"node_type":"prose_block","kind":"informal_heading","host_section_id":"se_qdlieef7","heading_level":2,"heading_text":"II. FUNCTIONAL RELATIONSHIP BETWEEN PRINTED MATTER AND ASSOCIATED SUBSTRATE MUST BE NEW AND NONOBVIOUS"},{"id":"pb_nwlljbfj","corpus_id":"mpep-e9r01-2024-html","opaque_url":"https://mpep.io/n/pb_nwlljbfj","effective_range":{"start_revision":"R-10.2019","end_revision":null},"rendered_text_html":"Once a functional relationship between the product and\n                           associated printed matter is found, the investigation shifts to the determination of\n                           whether the relationship is new and nonobvious. For example, a claim to a color-coded\n                           indicia on a container in which the color indicates the expiration date of the\n                           container may give rise to a functional relationship. The claim may, however, be\n                           anticipated by prior art that reads on the claimed invention, or by a combination of\n                           prior art that teaches the claimed invention.\n                        ","rendered_text_plain":"Once a functional relationship between the product and associated printed matter is found, the investigation shifts to the determination of whether the relationship is new and nonobvious. For example, a claim to a color-coded indicia on a container in which the color indicates the expiration date of the container may give rise to a functional relationship. The claim may, however, be anticipated by prior art that reads on the claimed invention, or by a combination of prior art that teaches the claimed invention.","provenance":{"source_file":"s2111.html","source_anchor":"ch2100_d1b148_1fe8d_231","source_sha256":"4361ab16d766f5a1383832d25f9cd28c174972b5fb38a32f3794fd3df7638d54"},"node_type":"prose_block","kind":"narrative","host_section_id":"se_qdlieef7"},{"id":"pb_vbutiyyw","corpus_id":"mpep-e9r01-2024-html","opaque_url":"https://mpep.io/n/pb_vbutiyyw","effective_range":{"start_revision":"R-10.2019","end_revision":null},"rendered_text_html":"<b id=\"\">III.</b><b id=\"\"> MACHINE-READABLE MEDIA</b>","rendered_text_plain":"III. MACHINE-READABLE MEDIA","provenance":{"source_file":"s2111.html","source_anchor":"ch2100_d1b148_1ea0c_2c0/b.8","source_sha256":"4361ab16d766f5a1383832d25f9cd28c174972b5fb38a32f3794fd3df7638d54"},"node_type":"prose_block","kind":"informal_heading","host_section_id":"se_qdlieef7","heading_level":2,"heading_text":"III. MACHINE-READABLE MEDIA"},{"id":"pb_5omtgeg2","corpus_id":"mpep-e9r01-2024-html","opaque_url":"https://mpep.io/n/pb_5omtgeg2","effective_range":{"start_revision":"R-10.2019","end_revision":null},"rendered_text_html":"When determining the scope of a claim directed to a\n                           computer-readable medium containing certain programming, the examiner should first\n                           look to the relationship between the programming and the intended computer system.\n                           Where the programming performs some function with respect to the computer with which\n                           it is associated, a functional relationship will be found. For instance, a claim to\n                           computer-readable medium programmed with attribute data objects that perform the\n                           function of facilitating retrieval, addition, and removal of information in the\n                           intended computer system, establishes a functional relationship such that the claimed\n                           attribute data objects are given patentable weight. See <i>Lowry,</i> 32\n                           F.3d at 1583-84, 32 USPQ2d at 1035.\n                        ","rendered_text_plain":"When determining the scope of a claim directed to a computer-readable medium containing certain programming, the examiner should first look to the relationship between the programming and the intended computer system. Where the programming performs some function with respect to the computer with which it is associated, a functional relationship will be found. For instance, a claim to computer-readable medium programmed with attribute data objects that perform the function of facilitating retrieval, addition, and removal of information in the intended computer system, establishes a functional relationship such that the claimed attribute data objects are given patentable weight. See Lowry, 32 F.3d at 1583-84, 32 USPQ2d at 1035.","provenance":{"source_file":"s2111.html","source_anchor":"ch2100_d1b148_1fefb_26","source_sha256":"4361ab16d766f5a1383832d25f9cd28c174972b5fb38a32f3794fd3df7638d54"},"node_type":"prose_block","kind":"narrative","host_section_id":"se_qdlieef7"},{"id":"pb_pjzpjwf4","corpus_id":"mpep-e9r01-2024-html","opaque_url":"https://mpep.io/n/pb_pjzpjwf4","effective_range":{"start_revision":"R-10.2019","end_revision":null},"rendered_text_html":"However, where the claim as a whole is directed to\n                           conveying a message or meaning to a human reader independent of the intended computer\n                           system, and/or the computer-readable medium merely serves as a support for\n                           information or data, no functional relationship exists. For example, a claim to a\n                           memory stick containing tables of batting averages, or tracks of recorded music,\n                           utilizes the intended computer system merely as a support for the information. Such\n                           claims are directed toward conveying meaning to the human reader rather than towards\n                           establishing a functional relationship between recorded data and the computer. \n                        ","rendered_text_plain":"However, where the claim as a whole is directed to conveying a message or meaning to a human reader independent of the intended computer system, and/or the computer-readable medium merely serves as a support for information or data, no functional relationship exists. For example, a claim to a memory stick containing tables of batting averages, or tracks of recorded music, utilizes the intended computer system merely as a support for the information. Such claims are directed toward conveying meaning to the human reader rather than towards establishing a functional relationship between recorded data and the computer.","provenance":{"source_file":"s2111.html","source_anchor":"ch2100_d1b1a1_1d7ad_3dd","source_sha256":"4361ab16d766f5a1383832d25f9cd28c174972b5fb38a32f3794fd3df7638d54"},"node_type":"prose_block","kind":"narrative","host_section_id":"se_qdlieef7"},{"id":"pb_dxtvpgm7","corpus_id":"mpep-e9r01-2024-html","opaque_url":"https://mpep.io/n/pb_dxtvpgm7","effective_range":{"start_revision":"R-10.2019","end_revision":null},"rendered_text_html":" A claim directed to a computer readable medium\n                           storing instructions or executable code that recites an abstract idea must be\n                           evaluated for eligibility under <b><a href=\"mpep-9015-appx-l.html#d0e302376\">35 U.S.C. 101</a></b>. See\n                           <b><a href=\"s2106.html#d0e197244\">MPEP §\n                                 2106</a></b>. \n                        ","rendered_text_plain":"A claim directed to a computer readable medium storing instructions or executable code that recites an abstract idea must be evaluated for eligibility under 35 U.S.C. 101. See MPEP § 2106.","provenance":{"source_file":"s2111.html","source_anchor":"ch2100_d24c02_20be9_377","source_sha256":"4361ab16d766f5a1383832d25f9cd28c174972b5fb38a32f3794fd3df7638d54"},"node_type":"prose_block","kind":"narrative","host_section_id":"se_qdlieef7"},{"id":"se_3u6zx3g5","corpus_id":"mpep-e9r01-2024-html","opaque_url":"https://mpep.io/n/se_3u6zx3g5","effective_range":{"start_revision":"R-10.2019","end_revision":null},"rendered_text_html":"","rendered_text_plain":"","provenance":{"source_file":"s2111.html","source_anchor":"stub-2106","source_sha256":"4361ab16d766f5a1383832d25f9cd28c174972b5fb38a32f3794fd3df7638d54"},"node_type":"section","akn_urn":"/akn/us/statement/manual/uspto/2024/mpep/eng@2024-02-29!sec_2106","canonical_url":"https://mpep.io/akn/us/statement/manual/uspto/2024/mpep/eng@2024-02-29!sec_2106","section_number":"2106","chapter":"2100","depth":0,"title":"Section 2106","children_ids":[]}],"edges":[{"id":"e_fgou6k5w","edge_type":"cites-case","source_id":"pb_posq5j4m","target_id":"cs_a3teryyl","properties":{"citation_text":"Phillips v. AWH Corp., 415 F.3d 1303, 75 USPQ2d 1321 (Fed. Cir. 2005)","source_offset":{"start":180,"end":202},"pincite":"1316"},"provenance":{"source_file":"s2111.html","source_anchor":"d0e200360","source_sha256":"4361ab16d766f5a1383832d25f9cd28c174972b5fb38a32f3794fd3df7638d54"}},{"id":"e_3bj52gce","edge_type":"cites-case","source_id":"nq_zexvaesg","target_id":"cs_awc42adi","properties":{"citation_text":"In re Am. Acad. of Sci. Tech. Ctr., 367 F.3d 1359, 70 USPQ2d 1827 (Fed. Cir. 2004)","source_offset":{"start":299,"end":334},"pincite":"1364"},"provenance":{"source_file":"s2111.html","source_anchor":"d0e200371","source_sha256":"4361ab16d766f5a1383832d25f9cd28c174972b5fb38a32f3794fd3df7638d54"}},{"id":"e_e64zwlvm","edge_type":"quotes-from","source_id":"nq_zexvaesg","target_id":"cs_awc42adi","properties":{"quoted_text":"The Patent and Trademark Office (“PTO”) determines the scope of claims in patent applications not solely on the basis of the claim language, but upon giving claims their broadest reasonable construction “in light of the specification as it would be interpreted by one of ordinary skill in the art.” In re Am. Acad. of Sci. Tech. Ctr., 367 F.3d 1359, 1364[, 70 USPQ2d 1827, 1830] (Fed. Cir. 2004). 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