“[E]ven though product-by-process claims are limited by and defined by\n the process, determination of patentability is based on the product itself. The\n patentability of a product does not depend on its method of production. If the product\n in the product-by-process claim is the same as or obvious from a product of the prior\n art, the claim is unpatentable even though the prior product was made by a different\n process.” In re Thorpe, 777 F.2d 695, 698, 227 USPQ 964, 966 (Fed.\n Cir. 1985) (citations omitted) (Claim was directed to a novolac color developer. The\n process of making the developer was allowed. The difference between the inventive\n process and the prior art was the addition of metal oxide and carboxylic acid as\n separate ingredients instead of adding the more expensive pre-reacted metal carboxylate.\n The product-by-process claim was rejected because the end product, in both the prior art\n and the allowed process, ends up containing metal carboxylate. The fact that the metal\n carboxylate is not directly added, but is instead produced in-situ does not change the\n end product.). Furthermore, “[b]ecause validity is determined based on the requirements\n of patentability, a patent is invalid if a product made by the process recited in a\n product-by-process claim is anticipated by or obvious from prior art products, even if\n those prior art products are made by different processes.” Amgen Inc. v. F.\n Hoffmann-La Roche Ltd., 580 F.3d 1340, 1370 n. 14, 92 USPQ2d 1289, 1312, n.\n 14 (Fed. Cir. 2009). See also Biogen MA Inc. v. EMD Serono, Inc., 976\n F.3d 1326, 1334, 2020 USPQ2d 11129 (Fed. Cir. 2020) (“Biogen is certainly correct that\n the scope of composition and method of treatment claims is generally subject to\n distinctly different analyses. But where, as here, the novelty of the method of\n administration rests wholly on the novelty of the composition administered, which in\n turn rests on the novelty of the source limitation, the Amgen\n analysis will necessarily result in the same conclusion on anticipation for both forms\n of claims.”); United Therapeutics Corp. v Liquidia Techs., Inc., 74\n F.4th 1360, 1373, 2023 USPQ2d 862 (Fed. Cir. 2023) (the court held that\n product-by-process claims were properly rejected as “anticipated by a disclosure of the\n same product irrespective of the processes by which they are made.”); and\n Purdue Pharma v. Epic Pharma, 811 F.3d 1345, 117 USPQ2d 1733 (Fed.\n Cir. 2016). However, in the context of an infringement analysis, a product-by-process\n claim is only infringed by a product made by the process recited in the claim.\n Id. at 1370 (“a product in the prior art made by a different\n process can anticipate a product-by-process claim, but an accused product made by a\n different process cannot infringe a product-by-process claim”). \n
","rendered_text_plain":"“[E]ven though product-by-process claims are limited by and defined by the process, determination of patentability is based on the product itself. The patentability of a product does not depend on its method of production. If the product in the product-by-process claim is the same as or obvious from a product of the prior art, the claim is unpatentable even though the prior product was made by a different process.” In re Thorpe, 777 F.2d 695, 698, 227 USPQ 964, 966 (Fed. Cir. 1985) (citations omitted) (Claim was directed to a novolac color developer. The process of making the developer was allowed. The difference between the inventive process and the prior art was the addition of metal oxide and carboxylic acid as separate ingredients instead of adding the more expensive pre-reacted metal carboxylate. The product-by-process claim was rejected because the end product, in both the prior art and the allowed process, ends up containing metal carboxylate. The fact that the metal carboxylate is not directly added, but is instead produced in-situ does not change the end product.). Furthermore, “[b]ecause validity is determined based on the requirements of patentability, a patent is invalid if a product made by the process recited in a product-by-process claim is anticipated by or obvious from prior art products, even if those prior art products are made by different processes.” Amgen Inc. v. F. Hoffmann-La Roche Ltd., 580 F.3d 1340, 1370 n. 14, 92 USPQ2d 1289, 1312, n. 14 (Fed. Cir. 2009). See also Biogen MA Inc. v. EMD Serono, Inc., 976 F.3d 1326, 1334, 2020 USPQ2d 11129 (Fed. Cir. 2020) (“Biogen is certainly correct that the scope of composition and method of treatment claims is generally subject to distinctly different analyses. But where, as here, the novelty of the method of administration rests wholly on the novelty of the composition administered, which in turn rests on the novelty of the source limitation, the Amgen analysis will necessarily result in the same conclusion on anticipation for both forms of claims.”); United Therapeutics Corp. v Liquidia Techs., Inc., 74 F.4th 1360, 1373, 2023 USPQ2d 862 (Fed. Cir. 2023) (the court held that product-by-process claims were properly rejected as “anticipated by a disclosure of the same product irrespective of the processes by which they are made.”); and Purdue Pharma v. Epic Pharma, 811 F.3d 1345, 117 USPQ2d 1733 (Fed. Cir. 2016). However, in the context of an infringement analysis, a product-by-process claim is only infringed by a product made by the process recited in the claim. Id. at 1370 (“a product in the prior art made by a different process can anticipate a product-by-process claim, but an accused product made by a different process cannot infringe a product-by-process claim”).","provenance":{"source_file":"s2113.html","source_anchor":"d0e201458","source_sha256":"57e27aba3ca745132b379ba98c49ebe1949412c5fe80fdeb0a9d7dced754d1c3"},"node_type":"prose_block","kind":"narrative","host_section_id":"se_uzzbp2hx"},{"id":"pb_37ksqsmk","corpus_id":"mpep-e9r01-2024-html","opaque_url":"https://mpep.io/n/pb_37ksqsmk","effective_range":{"start_revision":"R-01.2024","end_revision":null},"rendered_text_html":"The structure implied by the process steps should be considered when\n assessing the patentability of product-by-process claims over the prior art, especially\n where the product can only be defined by the process steps by which the product is made,\n or where the manufacturing process steps would be expected to impart distinctive\n structural characteristics to the final product. See, e.g., In re\n Garnero, 412 F.2d 276, 279, 162 USPQ 221, 223 (CCPA 1979) (holding\n “interbonded by interfusion” to limit structure of the claimed composite and noting that\n terms such as “welded,” “intermixed,” “ground in place,” “press fitted,” and “etched”\n are capable of construction as structural limitations). See also In re Nordt\n Dev. Co., 881 F.3d 1371,1375-76, 125 USPQ2d 1817, 1820 (Fed. Cir.\n 2018)(holding “the specification demonstrates that ‘injected molded’ connotes an\n integral structure,” and discussing several cases since Garnero that\n held “limitations to convey structure even when they also describe a process of\n manufacture”). \n
","rendered_text_plain":"The structure implied by the process steps should be considered when assessing the patentability of product-by-process claims over the prior art, especially where the product can only be defined by the process steps by which the product is made, or where the manufacturing process steps would be expected to impart distinctive structural characteristics to the final product. See, e.g., In re Garnero, 412 F.2d 276, 279, 162 USPQ 221, 223 (CCPA 1979) (holding “interbonded by interfusion” to limit structure of the claimed composite and noting that terms such as “welded,” “intermixed,” “ground in place,” “press fitted,” and “etched” are capable of construction as structural limitations). See also In re Nordt Dev. Co., 881 F.3d 1371,1375-76, 125 USPQ2d 1817, 1820 (Fed. Cir. 2018)(holding “the specification demonstrates that ‘injected molded’ connotes an integral structure,” and discussing several cases since Garnero that held “limitations to convey structure even when they also describe a process of manufacture”).","provenance":{"source_file":"s2113.html","source_anchor":"d0e201464","source_sha256":"57e27aba3ca745132b379ba98c49ebe1949412c5fe80fdeb0a9d7dced754d1c3"},"node_type":"prose_block","kind":"narrative","host_section_id":"se_uzzbp2hx"},{"id":"pb_nmj2e3dx","corpus_id":"mpep-e9r01-2024-html","opaque_url":"https://mpep.io/n/pb_nmj2e3dx","effective_range":{"start_revision":"R-01.2024","end_revision":null},"rendered_text_html":"II. ONCE A PRODUCT APPEARING TO BE SUBSTANTIALLY IDENTICAL IS FOUND AND A PRIOR ART REJECTION IS MADE, THE BURDEN SHIFTS TO THE APPLICANT TO SHOW AN NONOBVIOUS DIFFERENCE","rendered_text_plain":"II. ONCE A PRODUCT APPEARING TO BE SUBSTANTIALLY IDENTICAL IS FOUND AND A PRIOR ART REJECTION IS MADE, THE BURDEN SHIFTS TO THE APPLICANT TO SHOW AN NONOBVIOUS DIFFERENCE","provenance":{"source_file":"s2113.html","source_anchor":"d0e201450/b.2","source_sha256":"57e27aba3ca745132b379ba98c49ebe1949412c5fe80fdeb0a9d7dced754d1c3"},"node_type":"prose_block","kind":"informal_heading","host_section_id":"se_uzzbp2hx","heading_level":2,"heading_text":"II. ONCE A PRODUCT APPEARING TO BE SUBSTANTIALLY IDENTICAL IS FOUND AND A PRIOR ART REJECTION IS MADE, THE BURDEN SHIFTS TO THE APPLICANT TO SHOW AN NONOBVIOUS DIFFERENCE"},{"id":"pb_km3xkdi6","corpus_id":"mpep-e9r01-2024-html","opaque_url":"https://mpep.io/n/pb_km3xkdi6","effective_range":{"start_revision":"R-01.2024","end_revision":null},"rendered_text_html":"“The Patent Office bears a lesser burden of proof in making out a case\n of prima facie obviousness for product-by-process claims because of\n their peculiar nature” than when a product is claimed in the conventional fashion.\n In re Fessmann, 489 F.2d 742, 744, 180 USPQ 324, 326 (CCPA 1974).\n Once the examiner provides a rationale tending to show that the claimed product appears\n to be the same or similar to that of the prior art, although produced by a different\n process, the burden shifts to applicant to come forward with evidence establishing an\n nonobvious difference between the claimed product and the prior art product. In\n re Marosi, 710 F.2d 799, 803, 218 USPQ 289, 292-33 (Fed. Cir. 1983) (The\n claims were directed to a zeolite manufactured by mixing together various inorganic\n materials in solution and heating the resultant gel to form a crystalline metal silicate\n essentially free of alkali metal. The prior art described a process of making a zeolite\n which, after ion exchange to remove alkali metal, appeared to be “essentially free of\n alkali metal.” The court upheld the rejection because the applicant had not come forward\n with any evidence that the prior art was not “essentially free of alkali metal” and\n therefore a different and nonobvious product.). \n
","rendered_text_plain":"“The Patent Office bears a lesser burden of proof in making out a case of prima facie obviousness for product-by-process claims because of their peculiar nature” than when a product is claimed in the conventional fashion. In re Fessmann, 489 F.2d 742, 744, 180 USPQ 324, 326 (CCPA 1974). Once the examiner provides a rationale tending to show that the claimed product appears to be the same or similar to that of the prior art, although produced by a different process, the burden shifts to applicant to come forward with evidence establishing an nonobvious difference between the claimed product and the prior art product. In re Marosi, 710 F.2d 799, 803, 218 USPQ 289, 292-33 (Fed. Cir. 1983) (The claims were directed to a zeolite manufactured by mixing together various inorganic materials in solution and heating the resultant gel to form a crystalline metal silicate essentially free of alkali metal. The prior art described a process of making a zeolite which, after ion exchange to remove alkali metal, appeared to be “essentially free of alkali metal.” The court upheld the rejection because the applicant had not come forward with any evidence that the prior art was not “essentially free of alkali metal” and therefore a different and nonobvious product.).","provenance":{"source_file":"s2113.html","source_anchor":"d0e201481","source_sha256":"57e27aba3ca745132b379ba98c49ebe1949412c5fe80fdeb0a9d7dced754d1c3"},"node_type":"prose_block","kind":"narrative","host_section_id":"se_uzzbp2hx"},{"id":"pb_wddr7gwg","corpus_id":"mpep-e9r01-2024-html","opaque_url":"https://mpep.io/n/pb_wddr7gwg","effective_range":{"start_revision":"R-01.2024","end_revision":null},"rendered_text_html":"See also Ex parte Gray, 10 USPQ2d 1922 (Bd. Pat.\n App. & Inter. 1989) (The prior art disclosed human nerve growth factor (b-NGF)\n isolated from human placental tissue. The claim was directed to b-NGF produced through\n genetic engineering techniques. The factor produced seemed to be substantially the same\n whether isolated from tissue or produced through genetic engineering. While the\n applicant questioned the purity of the prior art factor, no concrete evidence of an\n nonobvious difference was presented. The Board stated that the dispositive issue is\n whether the claimed factor exhibits any unexpected properties compared with the factor\n disclosed by the prior art. The Board further stated that the applicant should have made\n some comparison between the two factors to establish unexpected properties since the\n materials appeared to be identical or only slightly different.).\n
","rendered_text_plain":"See also Ex parte Gray, 10 USPQ2d 1922 (Bd. Pat. App. & Inter. 1989) (The prior art disclosed human nerve growth factor (b-NGF) isolated from human placental tissue. The claim was directed to b-NGF produced through genetic engineering techniques. The factor produced seemed to be substantially the same whether isolated from tissue or produced through genetic engineering. While the applicant questioned the purity of the prior art factor, no concrete evidence of an nonobvious difference was presented. The Board stated that the dispositive issue is whether the claimed factor exhibits any unexpected properties compared with the factor disclosed by the prior art. The Board further stated that the applicant should have made some comparison between the two factors to establish unexpected properties since the materials appeared to be identical or only slightly different.).","provenance":{"source_file":"s2113.html","source_anchor":"d0e201493","source_sha256":"57e27aba3ca745132b379ba98c49ebe1949412c5fe80fdeb0a9d7dced754d1c3"},"node_type":"prose_block","kind":"narrative","host_section_id":"se_uzzbp2hx"},{"id":"pb_lxexeair","corpus_id":"mpep-e9r01-2024-html","opaque_url":"https://mpep.io/n/pb_lxexeair","effective_range":{"start_revision":"R-01.2024","end_revision":null},"rendered_text_html":"III. A REJECTION BASED ALTERNATIVELY ON 35 U.S.C. 102 OR 103 FOR PRODUCT-BY-PROCESS CLAIMS HAS BEEN APPROVED BY THE COURTS","rendered_text_plain":"III. A REJECTION BASED ALTERNATIVELY ON 35 U.S.C. 102 OR 103 FOR PRODUCT-BY-PROCESS CLAIMS HAS BEEN APPROVED BY THE COURTS","provenance":{"source_file":"s2113.html","source_anchor":"d0e201450/b.4","source_sha256":"57e27aba3ca745132b379ba98c49ebe1949412c5fe80fdeb0a9d7dced754d1c3"},"node_type":"prose_block","kind":"informal_heading","host_section_id":"se_uzzbp2hx","heading_level":2,"heading_text":"III. A REJECTION BASED ALTERNATIVELY ON 35 U.S.C. 102 OR 103 FOR PRODUCT-BY-PROCESS CLAIMS HAS BEEN APPROVED BY THE COURTS"},{"id":"pb_m7gh4tbn","corpus_id":"mpep-e9r01-2024-html","opaque_url":"https://mpep.io/n/pb_m7gh4tbn","effective_range":{"start_revision":"R-01.2024","end_revision":null},"rendered_text_html":"“[T]he lack of physical description in a product-by-process claim makes\n determination of the patentability of the claim more difficult, since in spite of the\n fact that the claim may recite only process limitations, it is the patentability of the\n product claimed and not of the recited process steps which must be established. We are\n therefore of the opinion that when the prior art discloses a product which reasonably\n appears to be either identical with or only slightly different than a product claimed in\n a product-by-process claim, a rejection based alternatively on either section 102 or\n section\n 103 of the statute is eminently fair and acceptable. As a\n practical matter, the Patent Office is not equipped to manufacture products by the\n myriad of processes put before it and then obtain prior art products and make physical\n comparisons therewith.” In re Brown, 459 F.2d 531, 535, 173 USPQ 685,\n 688 (CCPA 1972). Office personnel should note that reliance on the alternative grounds\n of 35 U.S.C.\n 102 or 35 U.S.C. 103 does not eliminate the\n need to explain both the anticipation and obviousness aspects of the rejections.\n
","rendered_text_plain":"“[T]he lack of physical description in a product-by-process claim makes determination of the patentability of the claim more difficult, since in spite of the fact that the claim may recite only process limitations, it is the patentability of the product claimed and not of the recited process steps which must be established. We are therefore of the opinion that when the prior art discloses a product which reasonably appears to be either identical with or only slightly different than a product claimed in a product-by-process claim, a rejection based alternatively on either section 102 or section 103 of the statute is eminently fair and acceptable. As a practical matter, the Patent Office is not equipped to manufacture products by the myriad of processes put before it and then obtain prior art products and make physical comparisons therewith.” In re Brown, 459 F.2d 531, 535, 173 USPQ 685, 688 (CCPA 1972). Office personnel should note that reliance on the alternative grounds of 35 U.S.C. 102 or 35 U.S.C. 103 does not eliminate the need to explain both the anticipation and obviousness aspects of the rejections.","provenance":{"source_file":"s2113.html","source_anchor":"d0e201508","source_sha256":"57e27aba3ca745132b379ba98c49ebe1949412c5fe80fdeb0a9d7dced754d1c3"},"node_type":"prose_block","kind":"narrative","host_section_id":"se_uzzbp2hx"},{"id":"cs_tvagiuto","corpus_id":"mpep-e9r01-2024-html","opaque_url":"https://mpep.io/n/cs_tvagiuto","effective_range":{"start_revision":"R-01.2024","end_revision":null},"rendered_text_html":"","rendered_text_plain":"","provenance":{"source_file":"s2113.html","source_anchor":"","source_sha256":"57e27aba3ca745132b379ba98c49ebe1949412c5fe80fdeb0a9d7dced754d1c3"},"node_type":"case","short_name":"In re Thorpe","canonical_citation":"In re Thorpe, 777 F.2d 695, 227 USPQ 964 (Fed. 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Cir.","holding_summary":null,"holding_reviewer":null},{"id":"cs_vdj6dzgt","corpus_id":"mpep-e9r01-2024-html","opaque_url":"https://mpep.io/n/cs_vdj6dzgt","effective_range":{"start_revision":"R-01.2024","end_revision":null},"rendered_text_html":"","rendered_text_plain":"","provenance":{"source_file":"s2113.html","source_anchor":"","source_sha256":"57e27aba3ca745132b379ba98c49ebe1949412c5fe80fdeb0a9d7dced754d1c3"},"node_type":"case","short_name":"Biogen MA Inc. v. EMD Serono, Inc.","canonical_citation":"Biogen MA Inc. v. EMD Serono, Inc., 976 F.3d 1326, 2020 USPQ2d 11129 (Fed. Cir. 2020)","all_citations":["976 F.3d 1326","2020 USPQ2d 11129"],"decision_year":2020,"court":"Fed. 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