{"section":{"filename":"s2114.html","chapter":"2100","section_number":"2114","title":"Apparatus and Article Claims — Functional Language","revision_tag":"R-07.2015","bytes":73170,"sha256":"0ff39d74ca13fbc7fcc6937f2ccb3d67e5bb9a54270d1897066bd6f6bfa2fd8a","subsection_count":0,"max_depth":0,"subsections":[]},"quality":"structured","cited_authorities":{"file_section":"2114","cases":[{"key":"case:128f.3d1473","slug":"in-re-schreiber","short_name":"In re Schreiber","canonical_citation":"In re Schreiber, 128 F.3d 1473, 44 USPQ2d 1429 (Fed. Cir. 1997)","decision_year":1997,"court":"Fed. Cir.","holding_summary":"A prior art structure capable of performing a claimed intended use anticipates the claim; a spout disclosed for dispensing oil inherently performed the popcorn-dispensing function recited in the claim, given the structural similarity between the prior art spout and the claimed dispensing top.","holding_confidence":"high","mentions":4,"propositions":[]},{"key":"case:439f.2d210","slug":"in-re-swinehart","short_name":"In re Swinehart","canonical_citation":"In re Swinehart, 439 F.2d 210, 169 USPQ 226 (CCPA 1971)","decision_year":1971,"court":"CCPA","holding_summary":"The mere recitation of a newly discovered function or property inherently possessed by the prior art does not distinguish a claim over that art; when the Office reasonably believes a functional limitation is inherent, it may require the applicant to prove otherwise.","holding_confidence":"high","mentions":2,"propositions":["where the Patent Office has reason to believe that a functional limitation asserted to be critical for establishing novelty in the claimed subject matter may, in fact, be an inherent characteristic of the prior art, it possesses the authority to require the applicant to prove that the subject matter shown to be in the prior art does not possess the characteristic relied on","[I]t is elementary that the mere recitation of a newly discovered function or property, inherently possessed by things in the prior art, does not cause a claim drawn to those things to distinguish over the prior art"]},{"key":"case:946f.2d821","slug":"intel-corp-v-u-s-intl-trade-commn","short_name":"Intel Corp. v. U.S. Int'l Trade Comm’n","canonical_citation":"Intel Corp. v. U.S. Int'l Trade Comm’n, 946 F.2d 821, 20 USPQ2d 1161 (Fed. Cir. 1991)","decision_year":1991,"court":"Fed. Cir.","holding_summary":"\"Programmable\" claim language in an apparatus claim requires only that the accused product be capable of being programmed to perform the claimed functionality; functional language directed to capability does not require the function to be actually performed.","holding_confidence":"high","mentions":2,"propositions":[]},{"key":"case:661f.3d629","slug":"bettcher-industries-inc-v-bunzl-usa-inc","short_name":"Bettcher Industries, Inc. v. Bunzl USA, Inc.","canonical_citation":"Bettcher Industries, Inc. v. Bunzl USA, Inc., 661 F.3d 629, 100 USPQ2d 1433 (Fed. Cir. 2011)","decision_year":2011,"court":"Fed. Cir.","holding_summary":"When an examiner explains that a prior art structure inherently possesses a functionally defined limitation of a claimed apparatus, a prima facie case of anticipation or obviousness is established and the burden shifts to the applicant to show otherwise.","holding_confidence":"high","mentions":1,"propositions":[]},{"key":"case:909f.2d1464","slug":"hewlett-packard-co-v-bausch-lomb-inc","short_name":"Hewlett-Packard Co. v. Bausch & Lomb Inc.","canonical_citation":"Hewlett-Packard Co. v. Bausch & Lomb Inc., 909 F.2d 1464, 15 USPQ2d 1525 (Fed. Cir. 1990)","decision_year":1990,"court":"Fed. Cir.","holding_summary":"Apparatus claims cover what a device is, not what a device does, so an apparatus claim is evaluated on its structure rather than its manner of operation.","holding_confidence":"low","mentions":1,"propositions":["emphasis in original"]},{"key":"case:2uspq2d1647","slug":"ex-parte-masham","short_name":"Ex parte Masham","canonical_citation":"Ex parte Masham, 2 USPQ2d 1647 (Bd. Pat. App. & Inter. 1987)","decision_year":1987,"court":"BPAI","holding_summary":"A recitation of the manner in which a claimed apparatus is intended to be employed does not differentiate the claimed apparatus from a prior art apparatus that teaches all the structural limitations of the claim.","holding_confidence":"high","mentions":1,"propositions":[]},{"key":"case:16f.3d1189","slug":"in-re-donaldson-co","short_name":"In re Donaldson Co.","canonical_citation":"In re Donaldson Co., 16 F.3d 1189, 29 USPQ2d 1845 (Fed. Cir. 1994)","decision_year":1994,"court":"Fed. Cir.","holding_summary":"A means- or step-plus-function limitation must be construed, including during examination, as limited to the corresponding structure, materials, or acts described in the specification and their equivalents; failure to disclose sufficient corresponding structure renders the claim indefinite under 35 U.S.C. 112(b).","holding_confidence":"high","mentions":1,"propositions":[]},{"key":"case:169f.3d743","slug":"in-re-robertson","short_name":"In re Robertson","canonical_citation":"In re Robertson, 169 F.3d 743, 49 USPQ2d 1949 (Fed. Cir. 1999)","decision_year":1999,"court":"Fed. Cir.","holding_summary":"Inherency requires that the missing descriptive matter be necessarily present in the thing described in the reference and be so recognized by persons of ordinary skill; inherency may not be established by probabilities or possibilities, and a structural claim requirement is not met by fewer equivalent elements.","holding_confidence":"high","mentions":1,"propositions":[]},{"key":"case:504f.3d1249","slug":"in-re-translogic-technology-inc","short_name":"In re Translogic Technology, Inc.","canonical_citation":"In re Translogic Technology, Inc., 504 F.3d 1249, 84 USPQ2d 1929 (Fed. Cir. 2007)","decision_year":2007,"court":"Fed. Cir.","holding_summary":"Functional claim language not limited to specific structure covers all devices capable of performing the recited function; broad connective phrases like \"coupled to\" and \"coupled to receive\" do not require any specific input or connection, so prior art inherently capable of the function may anticipate or render obvious.","holding_confidence":"high","mentions":1,"propositions":[]},{"key":"case:562f.2d1252","slug":"in-re-best","short_name":"In re Best","canonical_citation":"In re Best, 562 F.2d 1252, 195 USPQ 430 (CCPA 1977)","decision_year":1977,"court":"CCPA","holding_summary":"Claiming a new use, function, or unknown property inherently present in the prior art does not necessarily make a claim patentable; once the examiner shows the claimed and prior art products are identical or substantially identical, the burden shifts to the applicant to prove the prior art does not possess the claimed characteristics, whether under anticipation or obviousness.","holding_confidence":"high","mentions":1,"propositions":[]},{"key":"case:441f.2d660","slug":"in-re-ludtke","short_name":"In re Ludtke","canonical_citation":"In re Ludtke, 441 F.2d 660, 169 USPQ 563 (CCPA 1971)","decision_year":1971,"court":"CCPA","holding_summary":"A claim defined by function may be anticipated where the prior art structure inherently performs the claimed function; reciting a newly discovered function inherently possessed by the prior art does not distinguish the claim.","holding_confidence":"high","mentions":1,"propositions":[]},{"key":"case:739f.3d1339","slug":"nazomi-communications-inc-v-nokia-corp","short_name":"Nazomi Communications, Inc. v. Nokia Corp.","canonical_citation":"Nazomi Communications, Inc. v. Nokia Corp., 739 F.3d 1339, 109 USPQ2d 1258 (Fed. Cir. 2014)","decision_year":2014,"court":"Fed. Cir.","holding_summary":"Computer-implemented functional claim limitations may narrow an apparatus claim by limiting it to specific structure capable of performing the recited function, as with a CPU that can process both register-based and stack-based instructions.","holding_confidence":"high","mentions":1,"propositions":[]},{"key":"case:30f.3d1475","slug":"in-re-paulsen","short_name":"In re Paulsen","canonical_citation":"In re Paulsen, 30 F.3d 1475, 31 USPQ2d 1671 (Fed. Cir. 1994)","decision_year":1994,"court":"Fed. Cir.","holding_summary":"An applicant may act as their own lexicographer but must define terms with reasonable clarity, deliberateness, and precision in the disclosure to displace ordinary meaning; broad terms like \"computer\" are not narrowed absent such definition, and commercial success of articles outside the claims is not probative of nonobviousness.","holding_confidence":"high","mentions":1,"propositions":[]},{"key":"case:485f.3d1157","slug":"leapfrog-enters-inc-v-fisher-price-inc","short_name":"Leapfrog Enters., Inc. v. Fisher-Price, Inc.","canonical_citation":"Leapfrog Enters., Inc. v. Fisher-Price, Inc., 485 F.3d 1157, 82 USPQ2d 1687 (Fed. Cir. 2007)","decision_year":2007,"court":"Fed. Cir.","holding_summary":"Broadly claiming an automated means, such as modern electronics, to replace a manual or mechanical function to accomplish the same result does not distinguish over the prior art; and given a strong prima facie showing of obviousness, secondary-considerations evidence may be inadequate to overcome it.","holding_confidence":"high","mentions":1,"propositions":[]},{"key":"case:262f.2d91","slug":"in-re-venner","short_name":"In re Venner","canonical_citation":"In re Venner, 262 F.2d 91, 120 USPQ 193 (CCPA 1958)","decision_year":1958,"court":"CCPA","holding_summary":"Broadly providing that a prior manual or mechanical activity be performed automatically, such as by adding a timer and solenoid to actuate a known system, does not impart patentability.","holding_confidence":"high","mentions":1,"propositions":[]},{"key":"case:550u.s.398","slug":"ksr-intl-co-v-teleflex-inc","short_name":"KSR Int'l Co. v. Teleflex Inc.","canonical_citation":"KSR Int'l Co. v. Teleflex Inc., 550 U.S. 398, 82 USPQ2d 1385 (2007)","decision_year":2007,"court":"SCOTUS","holding_summary":"Obviousness requires an explicit, flexible analysis that may draw on common sense rather than rigid rules; predictable uses of prior art elements according to their established functions, and choosing among a finite number of identified, predictable solutions with reasonable expectation of success, support obviousness.","holding_confidence":"high","mentions":1,"propositions":[]},{"key":"case:532f.3d1318","slug":"muniauction-inc-v-thomson-corp","short_name":"Muniauction, Inc. v. Thomson Corp.","canonical_citation":"Muniauction, Inc. v. Thomson Corp., 532 F.3d 1318, 87 USPQ2d 1350 (Fed. Cir. 2008)","decision_year":2008,"court":"Fed. Cir.","holding_summary":"It is obvious to adapt an existing process to incorporate Internet and web browser technologies for communicating and displaying information where those technologies have become commonplace for such functions.","holding_confidence":"high","mentions":1,"propositions":[]}],"statutes":[{"key":"us_usc:35:102","slug":"35-usc-102","canonical_citation":"35 U.S.C. 102","mentions":2},{"key":"us_usc:35:103","slug":"35-usc-103","canonical_citation":"35 U.S.C. 103","mentions":1}],"cross_references":[{"key":"mpep:2112","section_number":"2112","title":"Requirements of Rejection Based on Inherency; Burden of Proof","exists":true,"mentions":1},{"key":"mpep:2141","section_number":"2141","title":"Examination Guidelines for Determining Obviousness Under 35 U.S.C. 103","exists":true,"mentions":1},{"key":"mpep:2143","section_number":"2143","title":"Examples of Basic Requirements of a Prima Facie Case of Obviousness","exists":true,"mentions":1},{"key":"mpep:2144","section_number":"2144","title":"Supporting a Rejection Under 35 U.S.C. 103","exists":true,"mentions":1},{"key":"mpep:2173","section_number":"2173","title":"Claims Must Particularly Point Out and Distinctly Claim the Invention","exists":true,"mentions":1},{"key":"mpep:2181","section_number":"2181","title":"Identifying and Interpreting a 35 U.S.C. 112(f) or Pre-AIA 35 U.S.C. 112, Sixth Paragraph Limitation","exists":true,"mentions":1},{"key":"mpep:2186","section_number":"2186","title":"Relationship to the Doctrine of Equivalents","exists":true,"mentions":1}],"form_paragraphs":[]},"structured_data":{"nodes":[{"id":"se_aktda2tt","node_type":"section","corpus_id":"mpep-e9r01-2024-html","opaque_url":"https://mpep.io/n/se_aktda2tt","effective_range":{"start_revision":"R-07.2015","end_revision":null},"rendered_text_html":"","rendered_text_plain":"","provenance":{"source_file":"s2114.html","source_anchor":"d0e201520","source_sha256":"0ff39d74ca13fbc7fcc6937f2ccb3d67e5bb9a54270d1897066bd6f6bfa2fd8a"},"akn_urn":"/akn/us/statement/manual/uspto/2024/mpep/eng@2024-02-29!sec_2114","canonical_url":"https://mpep.io/akn/us/statement/manual/uspto/2024/mpep/eng@2024-02-29!sec_2114","section_number":"2114","chapter":"2100","depth":0,"revision_tag":"R-07.2015","title":"Apparatus and Article Claims — Functional Language","children_ids":["pb_ez75snt3","pb_hz4qbjso","pb_b56bslqi","pb_5rph3ug7","pb_nrzp4dlr","pb_q5fkiwax","pb_sttye7tu","pb_5gukgy7p","pb_idi7m3xv","pb_uagh5ld5","pb_joh6fpd2","pb_crirw3eo","pb_v5to6mzb"]},{"id":"pb_ez75snt3","node_type":"prose_block","corpus_id":"mpep-e9r01-2024-html","opaque_url":"https://mpep.io/n/pb_ez75snt3","effective_range":{"start_revision":"R-07.2015","end_revision":null},"rendered_text_html":"<p id=\"d0e201524\">For a discussion of case law which provides guidance in interpreting the\n                        functional portion of means-plus-function limitations see <b><a href=\"s2181.html#d0e219279\">MPEP § 2181</a></b> -\n                        <b><a href=\"s2186.html#d0e220631\">§\n                              2186</a></b>.\n                     </p>","rendered_text_plain":"For a discussion of case law which provides guidance in interpreting the functional portion of means-plus-function limitations see MPEP § 2181 - § 2186.","provenance":{"source_file":"s2114.html","source_anchor":"d0e201524","source_sha256":"0ff39d74ca13fbc7fcc6937f2ccb3d67e5bb9a54270d1897066bd6f6bfa2fd8a"},"kind":"narrative","host_section_id":"se_aktda2tt"},{"id":"pb_hz4qbjso","node_type":"prose_block","corpus_id":"mpep-e9r01-2024-html","opaque_url":"https://mpep.io/n/pb_hz4qbjso","effective_range":{"start_revision":"R-07.2015","end_revision":null},"rendered_text_html":"<b id=\"\">I.</b><b id=\"\"> INHERENCY AND FUNCTIONAL LIMITATIONS IN APPARATUS CLAIMS</b>","rendered_text_plain":"I. INHERENCY AND FUNCTIONAL LIMITATIONS IN APPARATUS CLAIMS","provenance":{"source_file":"s2114.html","source_anchor":"d0e201520/b.0","source_sha256":"0ff39d74ca13fbc7fcc6937f2ccb3d67e5bb9a54270d1897066bd6f6bfa2fd8a"},"kind":"informal_heading","host_section_id":"se_aktda2tt","heading_level":2,"heading_text":"I. INHERENCY AND FUNCTIONAL LIMITATIONS IN APPARATUS CLAIMS"},{"id":"pb_b56bslqi","node_type":"prose_block","corpus_id":"mpep-e9r01-2024-html","opaque_url":"https://mpep.io/n/pb_b56bslqi","effective_range":{"start_revision":"R-07.2015","end_revision":null},"rendered_text_html":"<p id=\"d0e201537\">Features of an apparatus may be recited either structurally or\n                        functionally. <i>In re Schreiber,</i> 128 F.3d 1473, 1478, 44 USPQ2d 1429,\n                        1432 (Fed. Cir. 1997). See also <b><a href=\"s2173.html#d0e218409\">MPEP § 2173.05(g)</a></b>. If an examiner\n                        concludes that a functional limitation is an inherent characteristic of the prior art,\n                        then to establish a prima case of anticipation or obviousness, the examiner should\n                        explain that the prior art structure inherently possesses the functionally defined\n                        limitations of the claimed apparatus. <i>In re Schreiber,</i> 128 F.3d at\n                        1478, 44 USPQ2d at 1432. See also <i>Bettcher Industries, Inc. v. Bunzl USA,\n                           Inc.,</i> 661 F.3d 629, 639-40, 100 USPQ2d 1433, 1440 (Fed. Cir. 2011). The\n                        burden then shifts to applicant to establish that the prior art does not possess the\n                        characteristic relied on. <i>In re Schreiber,</i> 128 F.3d at 1478, 44\n                        USPQ2d at 1432; <i>In re Swinehart,</i> 439 F.2d 210, 213, 169 USPQ 226, 228\n                        (CCPA 1971) (“where the Patent Office has reason to believe that a functional limitation\n                        asserted to be critical for establishing novelty in the claimed subject matter may, in\n                        fact, be an inherent characteristic of the prior art, it possesses the authority to\n                        require the applicant to prove that the subject matter shown to be in the prior art does\n                        not possess the characteristic relied on”).</p>","rendered_text_plain":"Features of an apparatus may be recited either structurally or functionally. In re Schreiber, 128 F.3d 1473, 1478, 44 USPQ2d 1429, 1432 (Fed. Cir. 1997). See also MPEP § 2173.05(g). If an examiner concludes that a functional limitation is an inherent characteristic of the prior art, then to establish a prima case of anticipation or obviousness, the examiner should explain that the prior art structure inherently possesses the functionally defined limitations of the claimed apparatus. In re Schreiber, 128 F.3d at 1478, 44 USPQ2d at 1432. See also Bettcher Industries, Inc. v. Bunzl USA, Inc., 661 F.3d 629, 639-40, 100 USPQ2d 1433, 1440 (Fed. Cir. 2011). The burden then shifts to applicant to establish that the prior art does not possess the characteristic relied on. In re Schreiber, 128 F.3d at 1478, 44 USPQ2d at 1432; In re Swinehart, 439 F.2d 210, 213, 169 USPQ 226, 228 (CCPA 1971) (“where the Patent Office has reason to believe that a functional limitation asserted to be critical for establishing novelty in the claimed subject matter may, in fact, be an inherent characteristic of the prior art, it possesses the authority to require the applicant to prove that the subject matter shown to be in the prior art does not possess the characteristic relied on”).","provenance":{"source_file":"s2114.html","source_anchor":"d0e201537","source_sha256":"0ff39d74ca13fbc7fcc6937f2ccb3d67e5bb9a54270d1897066bd6f6bfa2fd8a"},"kind":"narrative","host_section_id":"se_aktda2tt"},{"id":"pb_5rph3ug7","node_type":"prose_block","corpus_id":"mpep-e9r01-2024-html","opaque_url":"https://mpep.io/n/pb_5rph3ug7","effective_range":{"start_revision":"R-07.2015","end_revision":null},"rendered_text_html":"<b id=\"\">II.</b><b id=\"\"> MANNER OF OPERATING THE DEVICE DOES NOT DIFFERENTIATE APPARATUS CLAIM FROM THE PRIOR ART</b>","rendered_text_plain":"II. MANNER OF OPERATING THE DEVICE DOES NOT DIFFERENTIATE APPARATUS CLAIM FROM THE PRIOR ART","provenance":{"source_file":"s2114.html","source_anchor":"d0e201520/b.2","source_sha256":"0ff39d74ca13fbc7fcc6937f2ccb3d67e5bb9a54270d1897066bd6f6bfa2fd8a"},"kind":"informal_heading","host_section_id":"se_aktda2tt","heading_level":2,"heading_text":"II. MANNER OF OPERATING THE DEVICE DOES NOT DIFFERENTIATE APPARATUS CLAIM FROM THE PRIOR ART"},{"id":"pb_nrzp4dlr","node_type":"prose_block","corpus_id":"mpep-e9r01-2024-html","opaque_url":"https://mpep.io/n/pb_nrzp4dlr","effective_range":{"start_revision":"R-07.2015","end_revision":null},"rendered_text_html":"<p id=\"d0e201575\">“[A]pparatus claims cover what a device <i>is,</i> not what\n                        a device <i>does</i>.” <i>Hewlett-Packard Co.</i><i>v.</i><i>Bausch &amp; Lomb Inc.,</i> 909 F.2d 1464, 1469, 15 USPQ2d 1525, 1528\n                        (Fed. Cir. 1990) (emphasis in original). A claim containing a “recitation with respect\n                        to the manner in which a claimed apparatus is intended to be employed does not\n                        differentiate the claimed apparatus from a prior art apparatus” if the prior art\n                        apparatus teaches all the <span class=\"Underline\">structural</span> limitations of the claim.\n                        <i>Ex parte Masham,</i> 2 USPQ2d 1647 (Bd. Pat. App. &amp; Inter. 1987)\n                        (The preamble of claim 1 recited that the apparatus was “for mixing flowing developer\n                        material” and the body of the claim recited “means for mixing ..., said mixing means\n                        being stationary and completely submerged in the developer material.” The claim was\n                        rejected over a reference which taught all the structural limitations of the claim for\n                        the intended use of mixing flowing developer. However, the mixer was only partially\n                        submerged in the developer material. The Board held that the amount of submersion is\n                        immaterial to the structure of the mixer and thus the claim was properly rejected.).</p>","rendered_text_plain":"“[A]pparatus claims cover what a device is, not what a device does.” Hewlett-Packard Co.v.Bausch & Lomb Inc., 909 F.2d 1464, 1469, 15 USPQ2d 1525, 1528 (Fed. Cir. 1990) (emphasis in original). A claim containing a “recitation with respect to the manner in which a claimed apparatus is intended to be employed does not differentiate the claimed apparatus from a prior art apparatus” if the prior art apparatus teaches all the structural limitations of the claim. Ex parte Masham, 2 USPQ2d 1647 (Bd. Pat. App. & Inter. 1987) (The preamble of claim 1 recited that the apparatus was “for mixing flowing developer material” and the body of the claim recited “means for mixing ..., said mixing means being stationary and completely submerged in the developer material.” The claim was rejected over a reference which taught all the structural limitations of the claim for the intended use of mixing flowing developer. However, the mixer was only partially submerged in the developer material. The Board held that the amount of submersion is immaterial to the structure of the mixer and thus the claim was properly rejected.).","provenance":{"source_file":"s2114.html","source_anchor":"d0e201575","source_sha256":"0ff39d74ca13fbc7fcc6937f2ccb3d67e5bb9a54270d1897066bd6f6bfa2fd8a"},"kind":"narrative","host_section_id":"se_aktda2tt"},{"id":"pb_q5fkiwax","node_type":"prose_block","corpus_id":"mpep-e9r01-2024-html","opaque_url":"https://mpep.io/n/pb_q5fkiwax","effective_range":{"start_revision":"R-07.2015","end_revision":null},"rendered_text_html":"<b id=\"\">III.</b><b id=\"\"> A PRIOR ART DEVICE CAN PERFORM ALL THE FUNCTIONS OF THE APPARATUS CLAIM AND STILL NOT ANTICIPATE THE CLAIM</b>","rendered_text_plain":"III. A PRIOR ART DEVICE CAN PERFORM ALL THE FUNCTIONS OF THE APPARATUS CLAIM AND STILL NOT ANTICIPATE THE CLAIM","provenance":{"source_file":"s2114.html","source_anchor":"d0e201520/b.4","source_sha256":"0ff39d74ca13fbc7fcc6937f2ccb3d67e5bb9a54270d1897066bd6f6bfa2fd8a"},"kind":"informal_heading","host_section_id":"se_aktda2tt","heading_level":2,"heading_text":"III. A PRIOR ART DEVICE CAN PERFORM ALL THE FUNCTIONS OF THE APPARATUS CLAIM AND STILL NOT ANTICIPATE THE CLAIM"},{"id":"pb_sttye7tu","node_type":"prose_block","corpus_id":"mpep-e9r01-2024-html","opaque_url":"https://mpep.io/n/pb_sttye7tu","effective_range":{"start_revision":"R-07.2015","end_revision":null},"rendered_text_html":"<p id=\"d0e201588\">Even if the prior art device performs all the functions recited in the\n                        claim, the prior art cannot anticipate the claim if there is any structural difference.\n                        It should be noted, however, that means-plus-function limitations are met by structures\n                        which are equivalent to the corresponding structures recited in the specification.\n                        <i>In re Donaldson,</i> 16 F.3d 1189, 1193, 29 USPQ2d 1845, 1848 (Fed.\n                        Cir. 1994). See also <i>In re Robertson,</i> 169 F.3d 743, 745, 49 USPQ2d\n                        1949, 1951 (Fed. Cir. 1999) (The claims were drawn to a disposable diaper having three\n                        fastening elements. The reference disclosed two fastening elements that could perform\n                        the same function as the three fastening elements in the claims. The court construed the\n                        claims to require three separate elements and held that the reference did not disclose a\n                        separate third fastening element, either expressly or inherently.).</p>","rendered_text_plain":"Even if the prior art device performs all the functions recited in the claim, the prior art cannot anticipate the claim if there is any structural difference. It should be noted, however, that means-plus-function limitations are met by structures which are equivalent to the corresponding structures recited in the specification. In re Donaldson, 16 F.3d 1189, 1193, 29 USPQ2d 1845, 1848 (Fed. Cir. 1994). See also In re Robertson, 169 F.3d 743, 745, 49 USPQ2d 1949, 1951 (Fed. Cir. 1999) (The claims were drawn to a disposable diaper having three fastening elements. The reference disclosed two fastening elements that could perform the same function as the three fastening elements in the claims. The court construed the claims to require three separate elements and held that the reference did not disclose a separate third fastening element, either expressly or inherently.).","provenance":{"source_file":"s2114.html","source_anchor":"d0e201588","source_sha256":"0ff39d74ca13fbc7fcc6937f2ccb3d67e5bb9a54270d1897066bd6f6bfa2fd8a"},"kind":"narrative","host_section_id":"se_aktda2tt"},{"id":"pb_5gukgy7p","node_type":"prose_block","corpus_id":"mpep-e9r01-2024-html","opaque_url":"https://mpep.io/n/pb_5gukgy7p","effective_range":{"start_revision":"R-07.2015","end_revision":null},"rendered_text_html":"<b id=\"\">IV.</b><b id=\"\"> DETERMINING WHETHER A COMPUTER-IMPLEMENTED FUNCTIONAL CLAIM LIMITATION IS PATENTABLE OVER THE PRIOR ART UNDER 35 U.S.C. 102 AND 103</b>","rendered_text_plain":"IV. DETERMINING WHETHER A COMPUTER-IMPLEMENTED FUNCTIONAL CLAIM LIMITATION IS PATENTABLE OVER THE PRIOR ART UNDER 35 U.S.C. 102 AND 103","provenance":{"source_file":"s2114.html","source_anchor":"d0e201520/b.6","source_sha256":"0ff39d74ca13fbc7fcc6937f2ccb3d67e5bb9a54270d1897066bd6f6bfa2fd8a"},"kind":"informal_heading","host_section_id":"se_aktda2tt","heading_level":2,"heading_text":"IV. DETERMINING WHETHER A COMPUTER-IMPLEMENTED FUNCTIONAL CLAIM LIMITATION IS PATENTABLE OVER THE PRIOR ART UNDER 35 U.S.C. 102 AND 103"},{"id":"pb_idi7m3xv","node_type":"prose_block","corpus_id":"mpep-e9r01-2024-html","opaque_url":"https://mpep.io/n/pb_idi7m3xv","effective_range":{"start_revision":"R-07.2015","end_revision":null},"rendered_text_html":"<p id=\"ch2100_d1b0dc_1b1c4_164\">Functional claim language that is not limited to a\n                        specific structure covers all devices that are capable of performing the recited\n                        function. Therefore, if the prior art discloses a device that can inherently perform the\n                        claimed function, a rejection under <b><a href=\"mpep-9015-appx-l.html#d0e302383\">35 U.S.C. 102</a></b> and/or\n                        <b><a href=\"mpep-9015-appx-l.html#al_d1fbe1_19797_b0\">35 U.S.C.\n                              103</a></b> may be appropriate. See <i>In re Translogic Technology,\n                           Inc.,</i> 504 F.3d 1249, 1258, 84 USPQ2d 1929, 1935-1936 (Fed. Cir. 2007) (The\n                        claims were drawn to multiplexer circuit. The patent at issue claimed “coupled to” and\n                        “coupled to receive” between various portions of the circuitry. In reference to the\n                        claim phrase “input terminals ‘coupled to receive’ first and second input variables,”\n                        the court held that “the claimed circuit does not require any specific input or\n                        connection … [a]s such, ‘coupled to’ and ‘coupled to receive’ are clearly different …\n                        [a]s shown in [the figures of the] patent, input terminals … only need to be ‘capable of\n                        receiving’ an input variable for the multiplexer circuit as claimed”. Therefore, the\n                        specification supported the claim construction “that ‘coupled to receive’ means ‘capable\n                        of receiving.’”); <i>Intel Corp. v. U.S. Int'l Trade Comm’n,</i> 946 F.2d\n                        821, 832, 20 USPQ2d 1161, 1171 (Fed. Cir. 1991) (The court held that “programmable”\n                        claim language required only that the accused product could be programmed to perform the\n                        claimed functionality.);<i>In re Schreiber,</i> 128 F.3d 1473, 1478, 44\n                        USPQ2d 1429, 1432 (Fed. Cir. 1997); <i>In re Best,</i> 562 F.2d 1252, 1254,\n                        195 USPQ 430, 433 (CCPA 1977); <i>In re Ludtke,</i> 441 F.2d 660, 663-64,\n                        169 USPQ 563, 566-67 (CCPA 1971); <i>In re Swinehart,</i> 439 F.2d 210,\n                        212-13, 169 USPQ 226, 228-29 (CCPA 1971) (“[I]t is elementary that the mere recitation\n                        of a newly discovered function or property, inherently possessed by things in the prior\n                        art, does not cause a claim drawn to those things to distinguish over the prior art”).\n                        See <b><a href=\"s2112.html#d0e201036\">MPEP §\n                              2112</a></b> for more information. </p>","rendered_text_plain":"Functional claim language that is not limited to a specific structure covers all devices that are capable of performing the recited function. Therefore, if the prior art discloses a device that can inherently perform the claimed function, a rejection under 35 U.S.C. 102 and/or 35 U.S.C. 103 may be appropriate. See In re Translogic Technology, Inc., 504 F.3d 1249, 1258, 84 USPQ2d 1929, 1935-1936 (Fed. Cir. 2007) (The claims were drawn to multiplexer circuit. The patent at issue claimed “coupled to” and “coupled to receive” between various portions of the circuitry. In reference to the claim phrase “input terminals ‘coupled to receive’ first and second input variables,” the court held that “the claimed circuit does not require any specific input or connection … [a]s such, ‘coupled to’ and ‘coupled to receive’ are clearly different … [a]s shown in [the figures of the] patent, input terminals … only need to be ‘capable of receiving’ an input variable for the multiplexer circuit as claimed”. Therefore, the specification supported the claim construction “that ‘coupled to receive’ means ‘capable of receiving.’”); Intel Corp. v. U.S. Int'l Trade Comm’n, 946 F.2d 821, 832, 20 USPQ2d 1161, 1171 (Fed. Cir. 1991) (The court held that “programmable” claim language required only that the accused product could be programmed to perform the claimed functionality.);In re Schreiber, 128 F.3d 1473, 1478, 44 USPQ2d 1429, 1432 (Fed. Cir. 1997); In re Best, 562 F.2d 1252, 1254, 195 USPQ 430, 433 (CCPA 1977); In re Ludtke, 441 F.2d 660, 663-64, 169 USPQ 563, 566-67 (CCPA 1971); In re Swinehart, 439 F.2d 210, 212-13, 169 USPQ 226, 228-29 (CCPA 1971) (“[I]t is elementary that the mere recitation of a newly discovered function or property, inherently possessed by things in the prior art, does not cause a claim drawn to those things to distinguish over the prior art”). See MPEP § 2112 for more information.","provenance":{"source_file":"s2114.html","source_anchor":"ch2100_d1b0dc_1b1c4_164","source_sha256":"0ff39d74ca13fbc7fcc6937f2ccb3d67e5bb9a54270d1897066bd6f6bfa2fd8a"},"kind":"narrative","host_section_id":"se_aktda2tt"},{"id":"pb_uagh5ld5","node_type":"prose_block","corpus_id":"mpep-e9r01-2024-html","opaque_url":"https://mpep.io/n/pb_uagh5ld5","effective_range":{"start_revision":"R-07.2015","end_revision":null},"rendered_text_html":"<p id=\"ch2100_d24c02_20f27_112\">Conversely, computer-implemented functional claim\n                        limitations may narrow the functionality of the device, by limiting the specific\n                        structure capable of performing the recited function. <i>Nazomi Communications,\n                           Inc. v. Nokia Corp.,</i> 739 F.3d 1339, 1345, 109 USPQ2d 1258, 1262 (Fed. Cir.\n                        2014) (The claims were drawn to a CPU that can perform processing of both register-based\n                        and stack-based instructions. Appellant alleged infringement of the claims based on\n                        claim construction requiring only hardware capable of performing the claimed\n                        functionalities. Contrasted with the finding of <i>Intel Corp. v. U.S. Int'l Trade\n                           Comm’n,</i> 846 F.2d 821, 832, 20 USPQ2d 1161, 1171 (Fed. Cir. 1991), the court\n                        found that “[s]ince hardware cannot meet these limitations in the absence of enabling\n                        software, the claims are properly construed as claiming an apparatus comprising a\n                        combination of hardware and software capable of practicing the claim limitations.”). </p>","rendered_text_plain":"Conversely, computer-implemented functional claim limitations may narrow the functionality of the device, by limiting the specific structure capable of performing the recited function. Nazomi Communications, Inc. v. Nokia Corp., 739 F.3d 1339, 1345, 109 USPQ2d 1258, 1262 (Fed. Cir. 2014) (The claims were drawn to a CPU that can perform processing of both register-based and stack-based instructions. Appellant alleged infringement of the claims based on claim construction requiring only hardware capable of performing the claimed functionalities. Contrasted with the finding of Intel Corp. v. U.S. Int'l Trade Comm’n, 846 F.2d 821, 832, 20 USPQ2d 1161, 1171 (Fed. Cir. 1991), the court found that “[s]ince hardware cannot meet these limitations in the absence of enabling software, the claims are properly construed as claiming an apparatus comprising a combination of hardware and software capable of practicing the claim limitations.”).","provenance":{"source_file":"s2114.html","source_anchor":"ch2100_d24c02_20f27_112","source_sha256":"0ff39d74ca13fbc7fcc6937f2ccb3d67e5bb9a54270d1897066bd6f6bfa2fd8a"},"kind":"narrative","host_section_id":"se_aktda2tt"},{"id":"pb_joh6fpd2","node_type":"prose_block","corpus_id":"mpep-e9r01-2024-html","opaque_url":"https://mpep.io/n/pb_joh6fpd2","effective_range":{"start_revision":"R-07.2015","end_revision":null},"rendered_text_html":"<p id=\"ch2100_d1b0dc_1b26e_1d5\">Computer-implemented functional claim limitations may\n                        also be broad because the term “computer” is commonly understood by one of ordinary\n                        skill in the art to describe a variety of devices with varying degrees of complexity and\n                        capabilities. <i>In re Paulsen,</i> 30 F.3d 1475, 1479-80, 31 USPQ2d 1671,\n                        1674 (Fed. Cir. 1994). Therefore, a claim containing the term “computer” should not be\n                        construed as limited to a computer having a specific set of characteristics and\n                        capabilities, unless the term is modified by other claim terms or clearly defined in the\n                        specification to be different from its common meaning. <i>Id.</i> In\n                        <i>Paulsen,</i> the claims, directed to a portable computer, were\n                        rejected as anticipated under <b><a href=\"mpep-9015-appx-l.html#d0e302383\">35 U.S.C. 102</a></b> by a reference that\n                        disclosed a calculator, because the term “computer” was given the broadest reasonable\n                        interpretation consistent with the specification to include a calculator, and a\n                        calculator was considered to be a particular type of computer by those of ordinary skill\n                        in the art. <i>Id.</i></p>","rendered_text_plain":"Computer-implemented functional claim limitations may also be broad because the term “computer” is commonly understood by one of ordinary skill in the art to describe a variety of devices with varying degrees of complexity and capabilities. In re Paulsen, 30 F.3d 1475, 1479-80, 31 USPQ2d 1671, 1674 (Fed. Cir. 1994). Therefore, a claim containing the term “computer” should not be construed as limited to a computer having a specific set of characteristics and capabilities, unless the term is modified by other claim terms or clearly defined in the specification to be different from its common meaning. Id. In Paulsen, the claims, directed to a portable computer, were rejected as anticipated under 35 U.S.C. 102 by a reference that disclosed a calculator, because the term “computer” was given the broadest reasonable interpretation consistent with the specification to include a calculator, and a calculator was considered to be a particular type of computer by those of ordinary skill in the art. Id.","provenance":{"source_file":"s2114.html","source_anchor":"ch2100_d1b0dc_1b26e_1d5","source_sha256":"0ff39d74ca13fbc7fcc6937f2ccb3d67e5bb9a54270d1897066bd6f6bfa2fd8a"},"kind":"narrative","host_section_id":"se_aktda2tt"},{"id":"pb_crirw3eo","node_type":"prose_block","corpus_id":"mpep-e9r01-2024-html","opaque_url":"https://mpep.io/n/pb_crirw3eo","effective_range":{"start_revision":"R-07.2015","end_revision":null},"rendered_text_html":"<p id=\"ch2100_d1b0dc_1b279_27e\">When determining whether a computer-implemented\n                        functional claim would have been obvious, examiners should note that broadly claiming an\n                        automated means to replace a manual function to accomplish the same result does not\n                        distinguish over the prior art. See <i>Leapfrog Enters., Inc. v. Fisher-Price,\n                           Inc.,</i> 485 F.3d 1157, 1161, 82 USPQ2d 1687, 1691 (Fed. Cir. 2007)\n                        (“Accommodating a prior art mechanical device that accomplishes [a desired] goal to\n                        modern electronics would have been reasonably obvious to one of ordinary skill in\n                        designing children’s learning devices. Applying modern electronics to older mechanical\n                        devices has been commonplace in recent years.”); <i>In re Venner,</i> 262\n                        F.2d 91, 95, 120 USPQ 193, 194 (CCPA 1958); see also <b><a href=\"s2144.html#d0e210929\">MPEP § 2144.04</a></b>.\n                        Furthermore, implementing a known function on a computer has been deemed obvious to one\n                        of ordinary skill in the art if the automation of the known function on a general\n                        purpose computer is nothing more than the predictable use of prior art elements\n                        according to their established functions. <i>KSR Int’l Co. v. Teleflex\n                           Inc.,</i> 550 U.S. 398, 417, 82 USPQ2d 1385, 1396 (2007); see also\n                        <b><a href=\"s2143.html#d0e209516\">MPEP §\n                              2143</a></b>, Exemplary Rationales D and F. Likewise, it has been\n                        found to be obvious to adapt an existing process to incorporate Internet and Web browser\n                        technologies for communicating and displaying information because these technologies had\n                        become commonplace for those functions. <i>Muniauction, Inc. v. Thomson\n                           Corp.,</i> 532 F.3d 1318, 1326-27, 87 USPQ2d 1350, 1357 (Fed. Cir. 2008).</p>","rendered_text_plain":"When determining whether a computer-implemented functional claim would have been obvious, examiners should note that broadly claiming an automated means to replace a manual function to accomplish the same result does not distinguish over the prior art. See Leapfrog Enters., Inc. v. Fisher-Price, Inc., 485 F.3d 1157, 1161, 82 USPQ2d 1687, 1691 (Fed. Cir. 2007) (“Accommodating a prior art mechanical device that accomplishes [a desired] goal to modern electronics would have been reasonably obvious to one of ordinary skill in designing children’s learning devices. Applying modern electronics to older mechanical devices has been commonplace in recent years.”); In re Venner, 262 F.2d 91, 95, 120 USPQ 193, 194 (CCPA 1958); see also MPEP § 2144.04. Furthermore, implementing a known function on a computer has been deemed obvious to one of ordinary skill in the art if the automation of the known function on a general purpose computer is nothing more than the predictable use of prior art elements according to their established functions. KSR Int’l Co. v. Teleflex Inc., 550 U.S. 398, 417, 82 USPQ2d 1385, 1396 (2007); see also MPEP § 2143, Exemplary Rationales D and F. Likewise, it has been found to be obvious to adapt an existing process to incorporate Internet and Web browser technologies for communicating and displaying information because these technologies had become commonplace for those functions. Muniauction, Inc. v. Thomson Corp., 532 F.3d 1318, 1326-27, 87 USPQ2d 1350, 1357 (Fed. Cir. 2008).","provenance":{"source_file":"s2114.html","source_anchor":"ch2100_d1b0dc_1b279_27e","source_sha256":"0ff39d74ca13fbc7fcc6937f2ccb3d67e5bb9a54270d1897066bd6f6bfa2fd8a"},"kind":"narrative","host_section_id":"se_aktda2tt"},{"id":"pb_v5to6mzb","node_type":"prose_block","corpus_id":"mpep-e9r01-2024-html","opaque_url":"https://mpep.io/n/pb_v5to6mzb","effective_range":{"start_revision":"R-07.2015","end_revision":null},"rendered_text_html":"<p id=\"ch2100_d1b0dc_1b285_13e\"> For more information on the obviousness determination,\n                        see <b><a href=\"s2141.html#d0e208143\">MPEP §\n                              2141</a></b>. </p>","rendered_text_plain":"For more information on the obviousness determination, see MPEP § 2141.","provenance":{"source_file":"s2114.html","source_anchor":"ch2100_d1b0dc_1b285_13e","source_sha256":"0ff39d74ca13fbc7fcc6937f2ccb3d67e5bb9a54270d1897066bd6f6bfa2fd8a"},"kind":"narrative","host_section_id":"se_aktda2tt"},{"id":"cs_bcvvwgih","node_type":"case","corpus_id":"mpep-e9r01-2024-html","opaque_url":"https://mpep.io/n/cs_bcvvwgih","effective_range":{"start_revision":"R-07.2015","end_revision":null},"rendered_text_html":"","rendered_text_plain":"In re Schreiber, 128 F.3d 1473, 44 USPQ2d 1429 (Fed. Cir. 1997)","provenance":{"source_file":"s2114.html","source_anchor":"","source_sha256":"0ff39d74ca13fbc7fcc6937f2ccb3d67e5bb9a54270d1897066bd6f6bfa2fd8a"},"short_name":"In re Schreiber","all_citations":["128 F.3d 1473","44 USPQ2d 1429"],"canonical_citation":"In re Schreiber, 128 F.3d 1473, 44 USPQ2d 1429 (Fed. Cir. 1997)","decision_year":1997,"court":"Fed. Cir."},{"id":"cs_dqtemzss","node_type":"case","corpus_id":"mpep-e9r01-2024-html","opaque_url":"https://mpep.io/n/cs_dqtemzss","effective_range":{"start_revision":"R-07.2015","end_revision":null},"rendered_text_html":"","rendered_text_plain":"Bettcher Industries, Inc. v. Bunzl USA, Inc., 661 F.3d 629, 100 USPQ2d 1433 (Fed. Cir. 2011)","provenance":{"source_file":"s2114.html","source_anchor":"","source_sha256":"0ff39d74ca13fbc7fcc6937f2ccb3d67e5bb9a54270d1897066bd6f6bfa2fd8a"},"short_name":"Bettcher Industries, Inc. v. Bunzl USA, Inc.","all_citations":["661 F.3d 629","100 USPQ2d 1433"],"canonical_citation":"Bettcher Industries, Inc. v. Bunzl USA, Inc., 661 F.3d 629, 100 USPQ2d 1433 (Fed. Cir. 2011)","decision_year":2011,"court":"Fed. Cir."},{"id":"cs_csba5s3l","node_type":"case","corpus_id":"mpep-e9r01-2024-html","opaque_url":"https://mpep.io/n/cs_csba5s3l","effective_range":{"start_revision":"R-07.2015","end_revision":null},"rendered_text_html":"","rendered_text_plain":"In re Swinehart, 439 F.2d 210, 169 USPQ 226 (CCPA 1971)","provenance":{"source_file":"s2114.html","source_anchor":"","source_sha256":"0ff39d74ca13fbc7fcc6937f2ccb3d67e5bb9a54270d1897066bd6f6bfa2fd8a"},"short_name":"In re Swinehart","all_citations":["439 F.2d 210","169 USPQ 226"],"canonical_citation":"In re Swinehart, 439 F.2d 210, 169 USPQ 226 (CCPA 1971)","decision_year":1971,"court":"CCPA"},{"id":"cs_3tatwq3d","node_type":"case","corpus_id":"mpep-e9r01-2024-html","opaque_url":"https://mpep.io/n/cs_3tatwq3d","effective_range":{"start_revision":"R-07.2015","end_revision":null},"rendered_text_html":"","rendered_text_plain":"Hewlett-Packard Co. v. Bausch & Lomb Inc., 909 F.2d 1464, 15 USPQ2d 1525 (Fed. Cir. 1990)","provenance":{"source_file":"s2114.html","source_anchor":"","source_sha256":"0ff39d74ca13fbc7fcc6937f2ccb3d67e5bb9a54270d1897066bd6f6bfa2fd8a"},"short_name":"Hewlett-Packard Co. v. Bausch & Lomb Inc.","all_citations":["909 F.2d 1464","15 USPQ2d 1525"],"canonical_citation":"Hewlett-Packard Co. v. Bausch & Lomb Inc., 909 F.2d 1464, 15 USPQ2d 1525 (Fed. Cir. 1990)","decision_year":1990,"court":"Fed. Cir."},{"id":"cs_t5hxuius","node_type":"case","corpus_id":"mpep-e9r01-2024-html","opaque_url":"https://mpep.io/n/cs_t5hxuius","effective_range":{"start_revision":"R-07.2015","end_revision":null},"rendered_text_html":"","rendered_text_plain":"Ex parte Masham, 2 USPQ2d 1647 (Bd. Pat. App. & Inter. 1987)","provenance":{"source_file":"s2114.html","source_anchor":"","source_sha256":"0ff39d74ca13fbc7fcc6937f2ccb3d67e5bb9a54270d1897066bd6f6bfa2fd8a"},"short_name":"Ex parte Masham","all_citations":["2 USPQ2d 1647"],"canonical_citation":"Ex parte Masham, 2 USPQ2d 1647 (Bd. Pat. App. & Inter. 1987)","decision_year":1987,"court":"BPAI"},{"id":"cs_bdsyun7z","node_type":"case","corpus_id":"mpep-e9r01-2024-html","opaque_url":"https://mpep.io/n/cs_bdsyun7z","effective_range":{"start_revision":"R-07.2015","end_revision":null},"rendered_text_html":"","rendered_text_plain":"In re Donaldson, 16 F.3d 1189, 29 USPQ2d 1845 (Fed. Cir. 1994)","provenance":{"source_file":"s2114.html","source_anchor":"","source_sha256":"0ff39d74ca13fbc7fcc6937f2ccb3d67e5bb9a54270d1897066bd6f6bfa2fd8a"},"short_name":"In re Donaldson","all_citations":["16 F.3d 1189","29 USPQ2d 1845"],"canonical_citation":"In re Donaldson, 16 F.3d 1189, 29 USPQ2d 1845 (Fed. Cir. 1994)","decision_year":1994,"court":"Fed. Cir."},{"id":"cs_lvgcomqk","node_type":"case","corpus_id":"mpep-e9r01-2024-html","opaque_url":"https://mpep.io/n/cs_lvgcomqk","effective_range":{"start_revision":"R-07.2015","end_revision":null},"rendered_text_html":"","rendered_text_plain":"In re Robertson, 169 F.3d 743, 49 USPQ2d 1949 (Fed. Cir. 1999)","provenance":{"source_file":"s2114.html","source_anchor":"","source_sha256":"0ff39d74ca13fbc7fcc6937f2ccb3d67e5bb9a54270d1897066bd6f6bfa2fd8a"},"short_name":"In re Robertson","all_citations":["169 F.3d 743","49 USPQ2d 1949"],"canonical_citation":"In re Robertson, 169 F.3d 743, 49 USPQ2d 1949 (Fed. Cir. 1999)","decision_year":1999,"court":"Fed. Cir."},{"id":"cs_2o2wzfc6","node_type":"case","corpus_id":"mpep-e9r01-2024-html","opaque_url":"https://mpep.io/n/cs_2o2wzfc6","effective_range":{"start_revision":"R-07.2015","end_revision":null},"rendered_text_html":"","rendered_text_plain":"In re Translogic Technology, Inc., 504 F.3d 1249, 84 USPQ2d 1929 (Fed. Cir. 2007)","provenance":{"source_file":"s2114.html","source_anchor":"","source_sha256":"0ff39d74ca13fbc7fcc6937f2ccb3d67e5bb9a54270d1897066bd6f6bfa2fd8a"},"short_name":"In re Translogic Technology, Inc.","all_citations":["504 F.3d 1249","84 USPQ2d 1929"],"canonical_citation":"In re Translogic Technology, Inc., 504 F.3d 1249, 84 USPQ2d 1929 (Fed. Cir. 2007)","decision_year":2007,"court":"Fed. Cir."},{"id":"cs_lzyux5p5","node_type":"case","corpus_id":"mpep-e9r01-2024-html","opaque_url":"https://mpep.io/n/cs_lzyux5p5","effective_range":{"start_revision":"R-07.2015","end_revision":null},"rendered_text_html":"","rendered_text_plain":"Intel Corp. v. U.S. Int'l Trade Comm’n, 946 F.2d 821, 20 USPQ2d 1161 (Fed. Cir. 1991)","provenance":{"source_file":"s2114.html","source_anchor":"","source_sha256":"0ff39d74ca13fbc7fcc6937f2ccb3d67e5bb9a54270d1897066bd6f6bfa2fd8a"},"short_name":"Intel Corp. v. U.S. Int'l Trade Comm’n","all_citations":["946 F.2d 821","20 USPQ2d 1161"],"canonical_citation":"Intel Corp. v. U.S. Int'l Trade Comm’n, 946 F.2d 821, 20 USPQ2d 1161 (Fed. Cir. 1991)","decision_year":1991,"court":"Fed. 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