{"section":{"filename":"s2138.html","chapter":"2100","section_number":"2138","title":"Pre-AIA 35 U.S.C. 102(g)","revision_tag":"R-01.2024","bytes":160937,"sha256":"26c7c2a3bdfe077ea7e4b30ae79c9a9fd0d208d7d91da6e74f7f3ce0e157610b","subsection_count":6,"max_depth":1,"subsections":[{"number":"2138.01","title":"Interference Practice","revision_tag":"R-01.2024","depth":1},{"number":"2138.02","title":"“The Invention Was Made in This Country”","revision_tag":"R-01.2024","depth":1},{"number":"2138.03","title":"“By Another Who Has Not Abandoned, Suppressed, or Concealed It”","revision_tag":"R-01.2024","depth":1},{"number":"2138.04","title":"“Conception”","revision_tag":"R-01.2024","depth":1},{"number":"2138.05","title":"“Reduction to Practice”","revision_tag":"R-01.2024","depth":1},{"number":"2138.06","title":"“Reasonable Diligence”","revision_tag":"R-01.2024","depth":1}]},"quality":"structured","cited_authorities":{"file_section":"2138","cases":[{"key":"case:716f.2d1542","slug":"in-re-mulder","short_name":"In re Mulder","canonical_citation":"In re Mulder, 716 F.2d 1542, 219 USPQ 189 (Fed. Cir. 1983)","decision_year":1983,"court":"Fed. Cir.","holding_summary":"Diligence in reducing an invention to practice must be shown throughout the critical period; even a two-day period lacking activity can be fatal to a showing of diligence under 37 CFR 1.131.","holding_confidence":"high","mentions":5,"propositions":[]},{"key":"case:717f.2d1346","slug":"in-re-costello","short_name":"In re Costello","canonical_citation":"In re Costello, 717 F.2d 1346, 219 USPQ 389 (Fed. Cir. 1983)","decision_year":1983,"court":"Fed. Cir.","holding_summary":"A prior application's filing date cannot antedate a reference unless the later application properly claims benefit of the earlier one; a non-statutory-bar reference may be overcome by a 37 CFR 1.131 affidavit or a 1.132 attribution affidavit, and a deriver's disclosure does not bar a patent to the party from whom the subject matter was derived.","holding_confidence":"high","mentions":3,"propositions":[]},{"key":"case:760f.2d1270","slug":"paulik-v-rizkalla","short_name":"Paulik v. Rizkalla","canonical_citation":"Paulik v. Rizkalla, 760 F.2d 1270, 226 USPQ 224 (Fed. Cir. 1985)","decision_year":1985,"court":"Fed. Cir.","holding_summary":"The length of time between an actual reduction to practice and the filing of a patent application is generally of no consequence except in an interference proceeding, where abandonment, suppression, or concealment may be at issue.","holding_confidence":"high","mentions":3,"propositions":[]},{"key":"case:146f.3d1348","slug":"hyatt-v-boone","short_name":"Hyatt v. Boone","canonical_citation":"Hyatt v. Boone, 146 F.3d 1348, 47 USPQ2d 1128 (Fed. Cir. 1998)","decision_year":1998,"court":"Fed. Cir.","holding_summary":"Filing a patent application serves as conception and constructive reduction to practice of the subject matter described in the application, so the inventor need not provide separate evidence of conception or actual reduction to practice when relying on the application's content.","holding_confidence":"high","mentions":3,"propositions":[]},{"key":"case:177uspq332","slug":"justus-v-appenzeller","short_name":"Justus v. Appenzeller","canonical_citation":"Justus v. Appenzeller, 177 USPQ 332 (Bd. Pat. Inter. 1971)","decision_year":1971,"court":"Bd. Pat. Inter.","holding_summary":"Constructive reduction to practice may rest on a chain of priority under 35 U.S.C. 119 and 120, but foreign priority under section 119 fails where a certified copy of the foreign application is not supplied during the pendency of the timely filed application.","holding_confidence":"high","mentions":3,"propositions":[]},{"key":"case:841f.3d1004","slug":"perfect-surgical-techniques-inc-v-olympus-am-inc","short_name":"Perfect Surgical Techniques, Inc. v. Olympus Am., Inc.","canonical_citation":"Perfect Surgical Techniques, Inc. v. Olympus Am., Inc., 841 F.3d 1004, 120 USPQ2d 1605 (Fed. Cir. 2016)","decision_year":2016,"court":"Fed. Cir.","holding_summary":"An inventor seeking to establish diligence need not prove continuous exercise of reasonable diligence throughout the critical period; reasonably continuous diligence suffices, though the entire period must be accounted for by affirmative acts or acceptable excuses.","holding_confidence":"high","mentions":3,"propositions":[]},{"key":"case:927f.2d1200","slug":"amgen-inc-v-chugai-pharm-co","short_name":"Amgen, Inc. v. Chugai Pharm. Co.","canonical_citation":"Amgen Inc. v. Chugai Pharm. Co., 927 F.2d 1200, 18 USPQ2d 1016 (Fed. Cir. 1991)","decision_year":1991,"court":"Fed. Cir.","holding_summary":"Broad generic claims are invalid where the specification enables only a few species, as with claims to all DNA sequences encoding erythropoietin analogs; describing a gene by function alone does not adequately describe it, and prior art references must support a reasonable expectation of success for obviousness.","holding_confidence":"high","mentions":2,"propositions":[]},{"key":"case:474f.2d1276","slug":"in-re-bass","short_name":"In re Bass","canonical_citation":"In re Bass, 474 F.2d 1276, 177 USPQ 178 (CCPA 1973)","decision_year":1973,"court":"CCPA","holding_summary":"Prior invention of another that was not abandoned, suppressed, or concealed is available as prior art under pre-AIA 35 U.S.C. 102(g) for purposes of an obviousness rejection under 35 U.S.C. 103.","holding_confidence":"high","mentions":2,"propositions":[]},{"key":"case:480f.2d880","slug":"kawai-v-metlesics","short_name":"Kawai v. Metlesics","canonical_citation":"Kawai v. Metlesics, 480 F.2d 880, 178 USPQ 158 (CCPA 1973)","decision_year":1973,"court":"CCPA","holding_summary":"Constructive reduction to practice for foreign priority under 35 U.S.C. 119 requires that the foreign application meet the requirements of 35 U.S.C. 101 and 112, including disclosure of a specific utility rather than a general suggestion of pharmacological effects.","holding_confidence":"high","mentions":2,"propositions":[]},{"key":"case:857f.2d1415","slug":"bigham-v-godtfredsen","short_name":"Bigham v. Godtfredsen","canonical_citation":"Bigham v. Godtfredsen, 857 F.2d 1415, 8 USPQ2d 1266 (Fed. Cir. 1988)","decision_year":1988,"court":"Fed. Cir.","holding_summary":"Pre-AIA 102(g) is the statutory basis of interference practice, the inter partes proceeding for determining priority of invention between two parties.","holding_confidence":"high","mentions":2,"propositions":[]},{"key":"case:90f.2d103","slug":"hull-v-davenport","short_name":"Hull v. Davenport","canonical_citation":"Hull v. Davenport, 90 F.2d 103, 33 USPQ 506 (CCPA 1937)","decision_year":1937,"court":"CCPA","holding_summary":"In a priority contest, a first conceiver with a later reduction to practice prevails over an earlier reducer by showing diligence from a time just prior to when the second conceiver entered the field through the first conceiver's reduction to practice.","holding_confidence":"high","mentions":2,"propositions":[]},{"key":"case:50uspq472","slug":"dunn-v-ragin","short_name":"Dunn v. Ragin","canonical_citation":"Dunn v. Ragin, 50 USPQ 472 (Bd. Pat. Inter. 1941)","decision_year":1941,"court":"Bd. Pat. Inter.","holding_summary":"An invention is made, for purposes of pre-AIA 35 U.S.C. 102(g), when there is both a conception and a reduction to practice.","holding_confidence":"high","mentions":2,"propositions":[]},{"key":"case:705f.2d1326","slug":"correge-v-murphy","short_name":"Correge v. Murphy","canonical_citation":"Correge v. Murphy, 705 F.2d 1326, 217 USPQ 753 (Fed. Cir. 1983)","decision_year":1983,"court":"Fed. Cir.","holding_summary":"A completed invention is deemed abandoned, suppressed, or concealed if no steps are taken within a reasonable time to make it publicly known; filing a patent application within one year of a public disclosure of the invention is not an unreasonable delay.","holding_confidence":"high","mentions":2,"propositions":[]},{"key":"case:628f.2d1337","slug":"shindelar-v-holdeman","short_name":"Shindelar v. Holdeman","canonical_citation":"Shindelar v. Holdeman, 628 F.2d 1337, 207 USPQ 112 (CCPA 1980)","decision_year":1980,"court":"CCPA","holding_summary":"Once an invention is actually reduced to practice, an inventor need not rush to file a patent application; the length of delay in filing is generally of no consequence except in an interference proceeding, where too long a delay may support an inference of suppression or concealment.","holding_confidence":"high","mentions":2,"propositions":[]},{"key":"case:535f.2d647","slug":"peeler-v-miller","short_name":"Peeler v. Miller","canonical_citation":"Peeler v. Miller, 535 F.2d 647, 190 USPQ 117 (CCPA 1976)","decision_year":1976,"court":"CCPA","holding_summary":"Mere delay in filing a patent application after reduction to practice, without more, does not establish suppression or concealment, but an excessive delay with inadequate justification can create an inference of suppression.","holding_confidence":"high","mentions":2,"propositions":[]},{"key":"case:369f.2d408","slug":"engelhardt-v-judd","short_name":"Engelhardt v. Judd","canonical_citation":"Engelhardt v. Judd, 369 F.2d 408, 151 USPQ 732 (CCPA 1966)","decision_year":1966,"court":"CCPA","holding_summary":"An inventor of a new series of compounds need not file piecemeal applications on each member; a reasonable time to complete research on the whole series, plus a further reasonable period for drafting and filing, rebuts an inference of suppression or concealment.","holding_confidence":"high","mentions":2,"propositions":[]},{"key":"case:243f.3d1345","slug":"hitzeman-v-rutter","short_name":"Hitzeman v. Rutter","canonical_citation":"Hitzeman v. Rutter, 243 F.3d 1345, 58 USPQ2d 1161 (Fed. Cir. 2001)","decision_year":2001,"court":"Fed. Cir.","holding_summary":"An inventor's mere hope that a genetically altered organism would yield a product with the claimed characteristics does not establish conception, which requires a definite and permanent understanding of, or reasonable expectation as to, how the result would be achieved.","holding_confidence":"high","mentions":2,"propositions":[]},{"key":"case:40f.3d1223","slug":"burroughs-wellcome-co-v-barr-labs-inc","short_name":"Burroughs Wellcome Co. v. Barr Labs., Inc.","canonical_citation":"Burroughs Wellcome Co. v. Barr Labs., Inc., 40 F.3d 1223, 32 USPQ2d 1915 (Fed. Cir. 1994)","decision_year":1994,"court":"Fed. Cir.","holding_summary":"Complete conception does not require the inventor to know that the invention will work; a draft application disclosing dosages, forms, and routes of administration sufficed to corroborate conception regardless of the inventor's belief in efficacy based on initial screening tests.","holding_confidence":"high","mentions":2,"propositions":[]},{"key":"case:308f.3d1317","slug":"in-re-jolley","short_name":"In re Jolley","canonical_citation":"In re Jolley, 308 F.3d 1317, 64 USPQ2d 1901 (Fed. Cir. 2002)","decision_year":2002,"court":"Fed. Cir.","holding_summary":"The first party to conceive of a species is not necessarily the first to conceive of the generic invention.","holding_confidence":"high","mentions":2,"propositions":[]},{"key":"case:268f.2d763","slug":"fitzgerald-v-arbib","short_name":"Fitzgerald v. Arbib","canonical_citation":"Fitzgerald v. Arbib, 268 F.2d 763, 122 USPQ 530 (CCPA 1959)","decision_year":1959,"court":"CCPA","holding_summary":"Actual reduction to practice of a three-dimensional design invention requires producing an article embodying the design in something other than a mere drawing.","holding_confidence":"high","mentions":2,"propositions":[]},{"key":"case:154f.3d1321","slug":"cooper-v-goldfarb","short_name":"Cooper v. Goldfarb","canonical_citation":"Cooper v. Goldfarb, 154 F.3d 1321, 47 USPQ2d 1896 (Fed. Cir. 1998)","decision_year":1998,"court":"Fed. Cir.","holding_summary":"An actual reduction to practice requires contemporaneous appreciation of the invention by the inventor; subsequent testing cannot show contemporaneous appreciation, though it may be admitted to show that an embodiment was produced and met the limitations of the count.","holding_confidence":"high","mentions":2,"propositions":[]},{"key":"case:537f.2d524","slug":"meitzner-v-corte","short_name":"Meitzner v. Corte","canonical_citation":"Meitzner v. Corte, 537 F.2d 524, 190 USPQ 407 (CCPA 1976)","decision_year":1976,"court":"CCPA","holding_summary":"There can be no conception or reduction to practice of a new form of an otherwise old composition, or of a process using that new form, without recognition or appreciation of the new form's existence.","holding_confidence":"high","mentions":2,"propositions":[]},{"key":"case:167uspq467","slug":"wu-v-jucker","short_name":"Wu v. Jucker","canonical_citation":"Wu v. Jucker, 167 USPQ 467 (Bd. Pat. Inter. 1968)","decision_year":1968,"court":"Bd. Pat. Inter.","holding_summary":"A screening test giving only an indication of possible utility is insufficient to establish the practical utility needed for an actual reduction to practice; likewise, allowing test data to accumulate while equipment was used on another project did not show diligence.","holding_confidence":"high","mentions":2,"propositions":[]},{"key":"case:188uspq264","slug":"emery-v-ronden","short_name":"Emery v. Ronden","canonical_citation":"Emery v. Ronden, 188 USPQ 264 (Bd. Pat. Inter. 1974)","decision_year":1974,"court":"Bd. Pat. Inter.","holding_summary":"Reasonable diligence toward reduction to practice does not require that an inventor or attorney drop all other work and concentrate exclusively on the particular invention involved.","holding_confidence":"high","mentions":2,"propositions":[]},{"key":"case:191uspq342","slug":"rebstock-v-flouret","short_name":"Rebstock v. Flouret","canonical_citation":"Rebstock v. Flouret, 191 USPQ 342 (Bd. Pat. Inter. 1975)","decision_year":1975,"court":"Bd. Pat. Inter.","holding_summary":"A first reducer's entry into the field may rest on a constructive reduction to practice effected by filing a United States application, which fixes the start of the critical diligence period for the first conceiver.","holding_confidence":"medium","mentions":2,"propositions":[]},{"key":"case:916f.2d1561","slug":"new-idea-farm-equipment-corp-v-sperry-corp","short_name":"New Idea Farm Equipment Corp. v. Sperry Corp.","canonical_citation":"New Idea Farm Equipment Corp. v. Sperry Corp., 916 F.2d 1561, 16 USPQ2d 1424 (Fed. Cir. 1990)","decision_year":1990,"court":"Fed. Cir.","holding_summary":"Pre-AIA 35 U.S.C. 102(g) can support an ex parte rejection where the subject matter was actually reduced to practice by another before the applicant's invention and was not abandoned, suppressed, or concealed; conception alone does not qualify the subject matter as prior art.","holding_confidence":"high","mentions":1,"propositions":[]},{"key":"case:849f.2d1430","slug":"e-i-dupont-de-nemours-co-v-phillips-petroleum-co","short_name":"E.I. DuPont de Nemours & Co. v. Phillips Petroleum Co.","canonical_citation":"E.I. DuPont de Nemours & Co. v. Phillips Petroleum Co., 849 F.2d 1430, 7 USPQ2d 1129 (Fed. Cir. 1988)","decision_year":1988,"court":"Fed. Cir.","holding_summary":"Another's prior invention may form the basis of an ex parte rejection under pre-AIA 102(g) where the subject matter was actually reduced to practice by another before the applicant's invention and there was no abandonment, suppression, or concealment.","holding_confidence":"high","mentions":1,"propositions":[]},{"key":"case:745f.2d1437","slug":"kimberly-clark-v-johnson-johnson","short_name":"Kimberly-Clark v. Johnson & Johnson","canonical_citation":"Kimberly-Clark v. Johnson & Johnson, 745 F.2d 1437, 223 USPQ 603 (Fed. Cir. 1984)","decision_year":1984,"court":"Fed. Cir.","holding_summary":"Prior invention under pre-AIA 35 U.S.C. 102(g) requires reduction to practice before the applicant's invention and no abandonment, suppression, or concealment; conception alone, without actual reduction to practice, is not sufficient to qualify subject matter as 102(g) prior art.","holding_confidence":"high","mentions":1,"propositions":[]},{"key":"case:893f.2d319","slug":"in-re-zletz","short_name":"In re Zletz","canonical_citation":"In re Zletz, 893 F.2d 319, 13 USPQ2d 1320 (Fed. Cir. 1989)","decision_year":1989,"court":"Fed. Cir.","holding_summary":"During examination, claims are given their broadest reasonable interpretation, and claim words their plain meaning unless inconsistent with the specification; because the applicant can amend, this practice reduces the risk that issued claims will be interpreted more broadly than justified, and indefinite claims are rejected under 35 U.S.C. 112.","holding_confidence":"high","mentions":1,"propositions":[]},{"key":"case:293u.s.1","slug":"radio-corp-of-america-v-radio-engg-labs-inc","short_name":"Radio Corp. of America v. Radio Eng’g Labs., Inc.","canonical_citation":"Radio Corp. of America v. Radio Eng’g Labs., Inc., 293 U.S. 1, 21 USPQ 353 (SCOTUS 1934)","decision_year":1934,"court":"SCOTUS","holding_summary":"In a priority contest among rival inventors, the first of many to reduce an invention to practice around the same time will in some instances be the sole party entitled to the patent.","holding_confidence":"medium","mentions":1,"propositions":[]},{"key":"case:215uspq972","slug":"ex-parte-kusko","short_name":"Ex parte Kusko","canonical_citation":"Ex parte Kusko, 215 USPQ 972 (Bd. App. 1981)","decision_year":1981,"court":"BPAI","holding_summary":"Most, if not all, determinations under pre-AIA 35 U.S.C. 102(f) involve whether one party derived an invention from another, and the relative dates of the events are important in determining derivation.","holding_confidence":"high","mentions":1,"propositions":[]},{"key":"case:988f.2d1187","slug":"price-v-symsek","short_name":"Price v. Symsek","canonical_citation":"Price v. Symsek, 988 F.2d 1187, 26 USPQ2d 1031 (Fed. Cir. 1993)","decision_year":1993,"court":"Fed. Cir.","holding_summary":"Derivation addresses originality — who invented the subject matter — as distinct from priority, which asks who invented it first; derivation requires complete conception by another and communication of that conception to the party charged with derivation.","holding_confidence":"high","mentions":1,"propositions":[]},{"key":"case:10uspq2d1454","slug":"ex-parte-standish","short_name":"Ex parte Standish","canonical_citation":"Ex parte Standish, 10 USPQ2d 1454 (BPAI 1988)","decision_year":1988,"court":"BPAI","holding_summary":"An application claim to the same patentable invention claimed in a domestic patent requires an interference rather than a Rule 1.131 affidavit; and asserting a product was \"constructed according to\" the claims does not establish the nexus needed to tie commercial success to the claimed invention.","holding_confidence":"high","mentions":1,"propositions":[]},{"key":"case:977f.2d1449","slug":"in-re-deckler","short_name":"In re Deckler","canonical_citation":"In re Deckler, 977 F.2d 1449, 24 USPQ2d 1448 (Fed. Cir. 1992)","decision_year":1992,"court":"Fed. Cir.","holding_summary":"Under res judicata and collateral estoppel, an applicant is not entitled to claims patentably indistinguishable from a claim lost in interference; the patent statutes contemplate that only one patent should issue for inventions that are identical or not patentably distinct where different inventive entities are concerned.","holding_confidence":"high","mentions":1,"propositions":[]},{"key":"case:687f.2d450","slug":"in-re-katz-1982","short_name":"In re Katz","canonical_citation":"In re Katz, 687 F.2d 450, 215 USPQ 14 (CCPA 1982)","decision_year":1982,"court":"CCPA","holding_summary":"\"Others\" under pre-AIA 35 U.S.C. 102(a) means any entity differing from the inventive entity by even one person; an inventor's own disclosure is not prior art against the inventor, since any other reading would negate the one-year grace period of 102(b).","holding_confidence":"high","mentions":1,"propositions":[]},{"key":"case:220uspq47","slug":"kondo-v-martel","short_name":"Kondo v. Martel","canonical_citation":"Kondo v. Martel, 220 USPQ 47 (Bd. Pat. Inter. 1983)","decision_year":1983,"court":"Bd. Pat. Inter.","holding_summary":"Under pre-AIA law, prior invention is available only if made in this country; the acts of conception, reduction to practice, and diligence must be demonstrated domestically.","holding_confidence":"high","mentions":1,"propositions":[]},{"key":"case:21uspq2d1068","slug":"colbert-v-lofdahl","short_name":"Colbert v. Lofdahl","canonical_citation":"Colbert v. Lofdahl, 21 USPQ2d 1068 (BPAI 1991)","decision_year":1991,"court":"BPAI","holding_summary":"Where an invention is reduced to practice in a foreign country and knowledge of it is brought into and disclosed in this country, the inventor gains no priority benefit from the foreign work, which serves merely as evidence of conception.","holding_confidence":"high","mentions":1,"propositions":[]},{"key":"case:589f.2d527","slug":"in-re-suska","short_name":"In re Suska","canonical_citation":"In re Suska, 589 F.2d 527, 200 USPQ 497 (CCPA 1979)","decision_year":1979,"court":"CCPA","holding_summary":"Under the suppression and concealment doctrine of pre-AIA 35 U.S.C. 102(g), a first inventor who suppresses or concealed the invention loses the right to rely on the actual invention date, and the later inventor who did not conceal is treated legally as the first to invent.","holding_confidence":"high","mentions":1,"propositions":[]},{"key":"case:489f.2d1277","slug":"young-v-dworkin","short_name":"Young v. Dworkin","canonical_citation":"Young v. Dworkin, 489 F.2d 1277, 180 USPQ 388 (CCPA 1974)","decision_year":1974,"court":"CCPA","holding_summary":"An unreasonably long, unexplained delay between an asserted actual reduction to practice and the filing of an application may give rise to an inference of suppression or concealment, defeating reliance on the earlier reduction to practice; such issues are addressed case by case.","holding_confidence":"high","mentions":1,"propositions":[]},{"key":"case:2uspq2d1942","slug":"holmwood-v-cherpeck","short_name":"Holmwood v. Cherpeck","canonical_citation":"Holmwood v. Cherpeck, 2 USPQ2d 1942 (BPAI 1986)","decision_year":1986,"court":"BPAI","holding_summary":"An inference of suppression or concealment arising from inactivity after reduction to practice may be rebutted by showing activity directed to perfecting the invention, preparing the application, or preparing other compounds within the scope of the generic invention.","holding_confidence":"high","mentions":1,"propositions":[]},{"key":"case:197uspq288","slug":"steierman-v-connelly-1976","short_name":"Steierman v. Connelly","canonical_citation":"Steierman v. Connelly, 197 USPQ 288 (Comm'r Pat. 1976)","decision_year":1976,"court":"Comm'r Pat.","holding_summary":"A finding of suppression or concealment does not necessarily amount to abandonment, in which the right to a patent is lost.","holding_confidence":"high","mentions":1,"propositions":[]},{"key":"case:36f.2d292","slug":"townsend-v-smith","short_name":"Townsend v. Smith","canonical_citation":"Townsend v. Smith, 36 F.2d 292, 4 USPQ 269 (CCPA 1929)","decision_year":1929,"court":"CCPA","holding_summary":"Conception is the complete performance of the mental part of the inventive act: the formation in the inventor's mind of a definite and permanent idea of the complete and operative invention as it is thereafter to be applied in practice.","holding_confidence":"high","mentions":1,"propositions":[]},{"key":"case:179uspq757","slug":"hiatt-v-ziegler","short_name":"Hiatt v. Ziegler","canonical_citation":"Hiatt v. Ziegler, 179 USPQ 757 (Bd. Pat. Inter. 1973)","decision_year":1973,"court":"Bd. Pat. Inter.","holding_summary":"Conception is established when the invention is made sufficiently clear to enable one skilled in the art to reduce it to practice without extensive experimentation or the exercise of inventive skill.","holding_confidence":"high","mentions":1,"propositions":[]},{"key":"case:573f.2d77","slug":"gunter-v-stream","short_name":"Gunter v. Stream","canonical_citation":"Gunter v. Stream, 573 F.2d 77, 197 USPQ 482 (CCPA 1978)","decision_year":1978,"court":"CCPA","holding_summary":"Conception is established by a disclosure of the invention that enables one skilled in the art to reduce it to a practical form without exercise of the inventive faculty.","holding_confidence":"high","mentions":1,"propositions":[]},{"key":"case:754f.2d353","slug":"coleman-v-dines","short_name":"Coleman v. Dines","canonical_citation":"Coleman v. Dines, 754 F.2d 353, 224 USPQ 857 (Fed. Cir. 1985)","decision_year":1985,"court":"Fed. Cir.","holding_summary":"To establish conception a party must show possession of every feature recited in the count, each limitation must have been known to the inventor at the time of the alleged conception, and conception must be proved by corroborating evidence.","holding_confidence":"high","mentions":1,"propositions":[]},{"key":"case:802f.2d1367","slug":"hybritech-inc-v-monoclonal-antibodies-inc","short_name":"Hybritech, Inc. v. Monoclonal Antibodies, Inc.","canonical_citation":"Hybritech, Inc. v. Monoclonal Antibodies, Inc., 802 F.2d 1367, 231 USPQ 81 (Fed. Cir. 1986)","decision_year":1986,"court":"Fed. Cir.","holding_summary":"Conception is the formation in the mind of the inventor of a definite and permanent idea of the complete and operative invention as it is to be applied in practice; separately, a specification need not describe in detail—and preferably omits—what is well known in the art.","holding_confidence":"high","mentions":1,"propositions":[]},{"key":"case:24uspq2d1513","slug":"staehelin-v-secher","short_name":"Staehelin v. Secher","canonical_citation":"Staehelin v. Secher, 24 USPQ2d 1513 (BPAI 1992)","decision_year":1992,"court":"BPAI","holding_summary":"Evidence of conception naming only one member of the actual inventive entity inures to the benefit of, and serves as evidence of conception by, the complete inventive entity.","holding_confidence":"high","mentions":1,"propositions":[]},{"key":"case:27f.3d539","slug":"bosies-v-benedict","short_name":"Bosies v. Benedict","canonical_citation":"Bosies v. Benedict, 27 F.3d 539, 30 USPQ2d 1862 (Fed. Cir. 1994)","decision_year":1994,"court":"Fed. Cir.","holding_summary":"Conception requires the inventor to form a definite and permanent idea of the complete and operable invention in the inventor's own mind; noninventor testimony about the meaning of a variable in the inventor's notebook is insufficient as a matter of law to establish what the inventor conceived.","holding_confidence":"high","mentions":1,"propositions":[]},{"key":"case:888f.3d1362","slug":"in-re-verhoef","short_name":"In re VerHoef","canonical_citation":"In re VerHoef, 888 F.3d 1362, 126 F.2d 1561 (Fed. Cir. 2018)","decision_year":2018,"court":"Fed. Cir.","holding_summary":"A person who shares in the conception of a claimed invention is a joint inventor; pre-AIA 35 U.S.C. 102(f) requires correct inventorship be named, and an applicant's own affidavit showing he did not solely invent the claimed subject matter supports rejection.","holding_confidence":"high","mentions":1,"propositions":[]},{"key":"case:496f.2d593","slug":"silvestri-v-grant","short_name":"Silvestri v. Grant","canonical_citation":"Silvestri v. Grant, 496 F.2d 593, 181 USPQ 706 (CCPA 1974)","decision_year":1974,"court":"CCPA","holding_summary":"Conception requires contemporaneous recognition and appreciation of the invention; an accidental and unappreciated duplication does not defeat the patent right of one who, though later in time, is first to recognize the inventive subject matter.","holding_confidence":"high","mentions":1,"propositions":[]},{"key":"case:465f.2d915","slug":"langer-v-kaufman","short_name":"Langer v. Kaufman","canonical_citation":"Langer v. Kaufman, 465 F.2d 915, 175 USPQ 172 (CCPA 1972)","decision_year":1972,"court":"CCPA","holding_summary":"Conception requires contemporaneous recognition of the invention; where a new form of catalyst was not recognized when first produced, conception cannot be established nunc pro tunc.","holding_confidence":"high","mentions":1,"propositions":[]},{"key":"case:267f.3d1334","slug":"dow-chem-co-v-astro-valcour-inc","short_name":"Dow Chem. Co. v. Astro-Valcour, Inc.","canonical_citation":"Dow Chem. Co. v. Astro-Valcour, Inc., 267 F.3d 1334, 60 USPQ2d 1519 (Fed. Cir. 2001)","decision_year":2001,"court":"Fed. Cir.","holding_summary":"An inventor need not appreciate the patentability of the invention to establish conception.","holding_confidence":"high","mentions":1,"propositions":[]},{"key":"case:849f.2d581","slug":"oka-v-youssefyeh","short_name":"Oka v. Youssefyeh","canonical_citation":"Oka v. Youssefyeh, 849 F.2d 581, 7 USPQ2d 1169 (Fed. Cir. 1988)","decision_year":1988,"court":"Fed. Cir.","holding_summary":"Conception of a chemical compound requires both the idea of the compound's structure and possession of an operative method of making it; conception of one species and the genus does not necessarily constitute conception of another species within the genus.","holding_confidence":"high","mentions":1,"propositions":[]},{"key":"case:984f.2d1164","slug":"fiers-v-revel","short_name":"Fiers v. Revel","canonical_citation":"Fiers v. Revel, 984 F.2d 1164, 25 USPQ2d 1601 (Fed. Cir. 1993)","decision_year":1993,"court":"Fed. Cir.","holding_summary":"Inventorship turns on conception, to which reduction to practice is irrelevant except where conception and reduction to practice occur simultaneously; conception of a substance requires a structural or equivalent definition, not merely a process for making it, and written description of a genus requires more than similar generic language.","holding_confidence":"high","mentions":1,"propositions":[]},{"key":"case:305f.2d891","slug":"alpert-v-slatin","short_name":"Alpert v. Slatin","canonical_citation":"Alpert v. Slatin, 305 F.2d 891, 134 USPQ 296 (CCPA 1962)","decision_year":1962,"court":"CCPA","holding_summary":"In unpredictable technologies, conception and reduction to practice can on rare occasions occur simultaneously; in some unpredictable areas of chemistry and biology there is no conception until the invention has been reduced to practice.","holding_confidence":"high","mentions":1,"propositions":[]},{"key":"case:568f.2d1349","slug":"in-re-edwards","short_name":"In re Edwards","canonical_citation":"In re Edwards, 568 F.2d 1349, 196 USPQ 465 (CCPA 1978)","decision_year":1978,"court":"CCPA","holding_summary":"The written description requirement ensures that the inventor had possession, as of the filing date of the application relied on, of the specific subject matter later claimed.","holding_confidence":"high","mentions":1,"propositions":[]},{"key":"case:204f.3d1094","slug":"eaton-v-evans","short_name":"Eaton v. Evans","canonical_citation":"Eaton v. Evans, 204 F.3d 1094, 53 USPQ2d 1696 (Fed. Cir. 2000)","decision_year":2000,"court":"Fed. Cir.","holding_summary":"Establishing an actual reduction to practice in an interference requires satisfying a two-prong test: the party constructed an embodiment or performed a process meeting every element of the count, and the embodiment or process operated for its intended purpose.","holding_confidence":"high","mentions":1,"propositions":[]},{"key":"case:536f.2d937","slug":"wetmore-v-quick","short_name":"Wetmore v. Quick","canonical_citation":"Wetmore v. Quick, 536 F.2d 937, 190 USPQ 223 (CCPA 1976)","decision_year":1976,"court":"CCPA","holding_summary":"Actual reduction to practice requires a showing of the invention in a physical or tangible form embodying every element of the count; evidence sufficient for a constructive reduction to practice may be insufficient to establish an actual reduction to practice.","holding_confidence":"high","mentions":1,"propositions":[]},{"key":"case:34f.3d1058","slug":"scott-v-finney","short_name":"Scott v. Finney","canonical_citation":"Scott v. Finney, 34 F.3d 1058, 32 USPQ2d 1115 (Fed. Cir. 1994)","decision_year":1994,"court":"Fed. Cir.","holding_summary":"FDA approval is not a prerequisite to finding a compound useful under the patent laws, and an actual reduction to practice requires testing sufficient to show the invention works for its intended purpose, not development to a commercially satisfactory stage; the required testing varies with the invention's complexity.","holding_confidence":"high","mentions":1,"propositions":[]},{"key":"case:767f.2d853","slug":"king-instrument-corp-v-otari-corp","short_name":"King Instrument Corp. v. Otari Corp.","canonical_citation":"King Instrument Corp. v. Otari Corp., 767 F.2d 853, 226 USPQ 402 (Fed. Cir. 1985)","decision_year":1985,"court":"Fed. Cir.","holding_summary":"If a device is so simple, and its purpose and efficacy so obvious, construction alone is sufficient to demonstrate workability for purposes of actual reduction to practice.","holding_confidence":"high","mentions":1,"propositions":[]},{"key":"case:928f.2d1122","slug":"dsl-dynamic-sciences-ltd-v-union-switch-signal-inc","short_name":"DSL Dynamic Sciences, Ltd. v. Union Switch & Signal, Inc.","canonical_citation":"DSL Dynamic Sciences, Ltd. v. Union Switch & Signal, Inc., 928 F.2d 1122, 18 USPQ2d 1152 (Fed. Cir. 1991)","decision_year":1991,"court":"Fed. Cir.","holding_summary":"Events occurring after an alleged actual reduction to practice can call into question whether reduction to practice has in fact occurred.","holding_confidence":"high","mentions":1,"propositions":[]},{"key":"case:171f.2d957","slug":"birmingham-v-randall","short_name":"Birmingham v. Randall","canonical_citation":"Birmingham v. Randall, 171 F.2d 957, 80 USPQ 371 (CCPA 1948)","decision_year":1948,"court":"CCPA","holding_summary":"An invention directed to a method of making a product is not actually reduced to practice merely by performing the method; it must be established that the product made by the process is satisfactory, which may require successful testing of the product.","holding_confidence":"high","mentions":1,"propositions":[]},{"key":"case:495f.2d779","slug":"gellert-v-wanberg","short_name":"Gellert v. Wanberg","canonical_citation":"Gellert v. Wanberg, 495 F.2d 779, 181 USPQ 648 (CCPA 1974)","decision_year":1974,"court":"CCPA","holding_summary":"The nature of testing required to establish an actual reduction to practice depends on the particular facts of each case, especially the nature of the invention; testing may suffice even where less than all conditions of actual use are duplicated.","holding_confidence":"high","mentions":1,"propositions":[]},{"key":"case:177uspq22","slug":"wells-v-fremont","short_name":"Wells v. Fremont","canonical_citation":"Wells v. Fremont, 177 USPQ 22 (Bd. Pat. Inter. 1972)","decision_year":1972,"court":"Bd. Pat. Inter.","holding_summary":"Bench or laboratory tests offered to prove actual reduction to practice must fully duplicate each condition of actual use, or the evidence must establish a relationship between the subject matter, the test conditions, and the invention's intended functional setting; not every condition of every actual use need be duplicated.","holding_confidence":"high","mentions":1,"propositions":[]},{"key":"case:129f.3d588","slug":"estee-lauder-inc-v-loreal-s-a","short_name":"Estee Lauder, Inc. v. L’Oreal S.A.","canonical_citation":"Estee Lauder, Inc. v. L’Oreal S.A., 129 F.3d 588, 44 USPQ2d 1610 (Fed. Cir. 1997)","decision_year":1997,"court":"Fed. Cir.","holding_summary":"When testing is necessary to establish utility, reduction to practice does not occur until there is recognition and appreciation that the tests were successful; showing that testing was completed before the critical date and later proved successful is insufficient.","holding_confidence":"high","mentions":1,"propositions":[]},{"key":"case:462f.2d544","slug":"parker-v-frilette","short_name":"Parker v. Frilette","canonical_citation":"Parker v. Frilette, 462 F.2d 544, 174 USPQ 321 (CCPA 1972)","decision_year":1972,"court":"CCPA","holding_summary":"An inventor need not understand precisely why the invention works in order to achieve an actual reduction to practice.","holding_confidence":"high","mentions":1,"propositions":[]},{"key":"case:220f.3d1345","slug":"genentech-inc-v-chiron-corp-2000","short_name":"Genentech, Inc. v. Chiron Corp.","canonical_citation":"Genentech, Inc. v. Chiron Corp., 220 F.3d 1345, 55 USPQ2d 1636 (Fed. Cir. 2000)","decision_year":2000,"court":"Fed. Cir.","holding_summary":"A non-inventor's recognition of an invention's utility inures to the inventor only if the inventor conceived the invention, expected the tested embodiment to work for its intended purpose, and submitted the embodiment for testing for that purpose.","holding_confidence":"high","mentions":1,"propositions":[]},{"key":"case:240f.3d1378","slug":"cooper-v-goldfarb-2001","short_name":"Cooper v. Goldfarb","canonical_citation":"Cooper v. Goldfarb, 240 F.3d 1378, 57 USPQ2d 1990 (Fed. Cir. 2001)","decision_year":2001,"court":"Fed. Cir.","holding_summary":"An actual reduction to practice requires the inventor's contemporaneous appreciation of the invention; subsequent testing or later recognition cannot supply that appreciation, though it may show that an embodiment meeting the count was produced.","holding_confidence":"high","mentions":1,"propositions":[]},{"key":"case:397f.2d342","slug":"fredkin-v-irasek","short_name":"Fredkin v. Irasek","canonical_citation":"Fredkin v. Irasek, 397 F.2d 342, 158 USPQ 280 (CCPA 1968)","decision_year":1968,"court":"CCPA","holding_summary":"In an interference proceeding, a device reduced to practice must include every limitation of the count; every limitation is material and must be proved to establish an actual reduction to practice.","holding_confidence":"high","mentions":1,"propositions":[]},{"key":"case:214uspq731","slug":"hull-v-bonis","short_name":"Hull v. Bonis","canonical_citation":"Hull v. Bonis, 214 USPQ 731 (Bd. Pat. Inter. 1982)","decision_year":1982,"court":"Bd. Pat. Inter.","holding_summary":"There is no doctrine of equivalents in proving actual reduction to practice of an interference count; the remedy for proofs that do not match the count is a preliminary motion to amend the count to conform to the proofs.","holding_confidence":"high","mentions":1,"propositions":[]},{"key":"case:666f.2d582","slug":"wiesner-v-weigert","short_name":"Wiesner v. Weigert","canonical_citation":"Wiesner v. Weigert, 666 F.2d 582, 212 USPQ 721 (CCPA 1981)","decision_year":1981,"court":"CCPA","holding_summary":"An invention is not actually reduced to practice unless its utility is known at the time of the reduction to practice, except for plant and design inventions.","holding_confidence":"high","mentions":1,"propositions":[]},{"key":"case:188uspq601","slug":"azar-v-burns","short_name":"Azar v. Burns","canonical_citation":"Azar v. Burns, 188 USPQ 601 (Bd. Pat. Inter. 1975)","decision_year":1975,"court":"Bd. Pat. Inter.","holding_summary":"A composition and a method cannot be actually reduced to practice unless the composition and the product produced by the method have a practical utility known at the time of the reduction to practice.","holding_confidence":"high","mentions":1,"propositions":[]},{"key":"case:511f.2d1182","slug":"ciric-v-flanigen","short_name":"Ciric v. Flanigen","canonical_citation":"Ciric v. Flanigen, 511 F.2d 1182, 185 USPQ 103 (CCPA 1975)","decision_year":1975,"court":"CCPA","holding_summary":"When an interference count does not recite any particular utility, evidence establishing a substantial utility for any purpose suffices to prove reduction to practice; demonstrated similarity of properties between new compounds and known useful ones can establish that utility.","holding_confidence":"high","mentions":1,"propositions":[]},{"key":"case:493f.2d1380","slug":"rey-bellet-v-englehardt","short_name":"Rey-Bellet v. Englehardt","canonical_citation":"Rey-Bellet v. Englehardt, 493 F.2d 1380, 181 USPQ 453 (CCPA 1974)","decision_year":1974,"court":"CCPA","holding_summary":"Data from animal testing is relevant to an asserted human therapeutic utility if there is a satisfactory correlation between the effect observed in animals and that ultimately observed in human beings.","holding_confidence":"high","mentions":1,"propositions":[]},{"key":"case:206uspq570","slug":"bindra-v-kelly","short_name":"Bindra v. Kelly","canonical_citation":"Bindra v. Kelly, 206 USPQ 570 (Bd. Pat. Inter. 1979)","decision_year":1979,"court":"Bd. Pat. Inter.","holding_summary":"A probable utility does not establish practical utility, which requires actual testing or a utility that can be foretold with certainty; a high probability of successfully preparing a useful product does not establish reduction to practice of an intermediate.","holding_confidence":"high","mentions":1,"propositions":[]},{"key":"case:628f.2d853","slug":"nelson-v-bowler-1980","short_name":"Nelson v. Bowler","canonical_citation":"Nelson v. Bowler, 628 F.2d 853, 206 USPQ 881 (CCPA 1980)","decision_year":1980,"court":"CCPA","holding_summary":"Evidence of utility for an actual reduction to practice is judged as a whole for its persuasiveness in linking observed properties to suggested uses; a reasonable correlation between the properties and the uses is sufficient.","holding_confidence":"high","mentions":1,"propositions":[]},{"key":"case:270f.2d396","slug":"keizer-v-bradley","short_name":"Keizer v. Bradley","canonical_citation":"Keizer v. Bradley, 270 F.2d 396, 123 USPQ 215 (CCPA 1959)","decision_year":1959,"court":"CCPA","holding_summary":"Diligence in reduction to practice encompasses both reasonable \"attorney-diligence\" and \"engineering-diligence.\"","holding_confidence":"high","mentions":1,"propositions":[]},{"key":"case:21uspq2d1731","slug":"fritsch-v-lin","short_name":"Fritsch v. Lin","canonical_citation":"Fritsch v. Lin, 21 USPQ2d 1731 (BPAI 1991)","decision_year":1991,"court":"BPAI","holding_summary":"A first reducer's entry date into the field depends on what is relied upon, such as conception coupled with reasonable diligence toward reduction to practice, an actual reduction to practice, or a constructive reduction to practice by filing.","holding_confidence":"medium","mentions":1,"propositions":[]},{"key":"case:774f.3d968","slug":"tyco-healthcare-grp-v-ethicon-endosurgery-inc","short_name":"Tyco Healthcare Grp. v. Ethicon EndoSurgery, Inc.","canonical_citation":"Tyco Healthcare Grp. v. Ethicon EndoSurgery, Inc., 774 F.3d 968, 112 USPQ2d 1979 (Fed. Cir. 2014)","decision_year":2014,"court":"Fed. Cir.","holding_summary":"A patent owner need not prove the inventor continuously exercised reasonable diligence throughout the critical period; it must show there was reasonably continuous diligence.","holding_confidence":"high","mentions":1,"propositions":[]},{"key":"case:261f.3d1356","slug":"monsanto-co-v-mycogen-plant-sci-inc","short_name":"Monsanto Co. v. Mycogen Plant Sci., Inc.","canonical_citation":"Monsanto Co. v. Mycogen Plant Sci., Inc., 261 F.3d 1356, 59 USPQ2d 1930 (Fed. Cir. 2001)","decision_year":2001,"court":"Fed. Cir.","holding_summary":"Establishing diligence does not require continuous effort throughout the critical period, only reasonably continuous diligence, with the entire period accounted for.","holding_confidence":"high","mentions":1,"propositions":[]},{"key":"case:363f.2d908","slug":"gould-v-schawlow","short_name":"Gould v. Schawlow","canonical_citation":"Gould v. Schawlow, 363 F.2d 908, 150 USPQ 634 (CCPA 1966)","decision_year":1966,"court":"CCPA","holding_summary":"An inventor must account for the entire period during which reasonable diligence is required; merely stating that no weeks or months passed without work on the invention is not enough.","holding_confidence":"high","mentions":1,"propositions":[]},{"key":"case:333f.2d920","slug":"in-re-harry","short_name":"In re Harry","canonical_citation":"In re Harry, 333 F.2d 920, 142 USPQ 164 (CCPA 1964)","decision_year":1964,"court":"CCPA","holding_summary":"An affidavit that merely states the subject matter \"was diligently reduced to practice\" is a mere pleading, not a showing; asserting that facts exist without saying what they are or when they occurred is insufficient to establish diligence or prior invention.","holding_confidence":"high","mentions":1,"propositions":[]},{"key":"case:173f.2d986","slug":"kendall-v-searles","short_name":"Kendall v. Searles","canonical_citation":"Kendall v. Searles, 173 F.2d 986, 81 USPQ 363 (CCPA 1949)","decision_year":1949,"court":"CCPA","holding_summary":"Evidence of diligence toward reduction to practice must be specific as to dates and facts.","holding_confidence":"high","mentions":1,"propositions":[]},{"key":"case:255f.2d419","slug":"rieser-v-williams","short_name":"Rieser v. Williams","canonical_citation":"Rieser v. Williams, 255 F.2d 419, 118 USPQ 96 (CCPA 1958)","decision_year":1958,"court":"CCPA","holding_summary":"A party last to reduce to practice cannot prevail unless it was first to conceive and exercised reasonable diligence during the critical period; the diligence period must be accounted for by affirmative acts or acceptable excuses.","holding_confidence":"high","mentions":1,"propositions":[]},{"key":"case:816f.2d624","slug":"griffith-v-kanamaru","short_name":"Griffith v. Kanamaru","canonical_citation":"Griffith v. Kanamaru, 816 F.2d 624, 2 USPQ2d 1361 (Fed. Cir. 1987)","decision_year":1987,"court":"Fed. Cir.","holding_summary":"Periods of inactivity during the critical diligence period must be accounted for by affirmative acts or acceptable excuses; lack of university funding and personnel are not acceptable excuses for inactivity in reducing an invention to practice.","holding_confidence":"high","mentions":1,"propositions":[]},{"key":"case:535f.2d72","slug":"litchfield-v-eigen","short_name":"Litchfield v. Eigen","canonical_citation":"Litchfield v. Eigen, 535 F.2d 72, 190 USPQ 113 (CCPA 1976)","decision_year":1976,"court":"CCPA","holding_summary":"Insufficiently described budgetary limits and limited availability of animals for testing are not acceptable excuses for inactivity when attempting to establish reasonable diligence toward reduction to practice.","holding_confidence":"high","mentions":1,"propositions":[]},{"key":"case:203f.2d741","slug":"morway-v-bondi","short_name":"Morway v. Bondi","canonical_citation":"Morway v. Bondi, 203 F.2d 741, 97 USPQ 318 (CCPA 1953)","decision_year":1953,"court":"CCPA","holding_summary":"Voluntarily laying aside the inventive concept in pursuit of other projects is generally not an acceptable excuse for inactivity in reducing an invention to practice, although circumstances may create exceptions.","holding_confidence":"high","mentions":1,"propositions":[]},{"key":"case:152uspq504","slug":"anderson-v-crowther","short_name":"Anderson v. Crowther","canonical_citation":"Anderson v. Crowther, 152 USPQ 504 (Bd. Pat. Inter. 1965)","decision_year":1965,"court":"Bd. Pat. Inter.","holding_summary":"Preparation of routine periodic reports covering all accomplishments of a laboratory is insufficient to show diligence toward reduction to practice.","holding_confidence":"high","mentions":1,"propositions":[]},{"key":"case:171uspq494","slug":"tucker-v-natta","short_name":"Tucker v. Natta","canonical_citation":"Tucker v. Natta, 171 USPQ 494 (Bd. Pat. Inter. 1971)","decision_year":1971,"court":"Bd. Pat. Inter.","holding_summary":"Activity directed toward the reduction to practice of a genus does not establish, prima facie, diligence toward the reduction to practice of a species embraced by that genus.","holding_confidence":"high","mentions":1,"propositions":[]},{"key":"case:567f.2d382","slug":"naber-v-cricchi","short_name":"Naber v. Cricchi","canonical_citation":"Naber v. Cricchi, 567 F.2d 382, 196 USPQ 294 (CCPA 1977)","decision_year":1977,"court":"CCPA","holding_summary":"Work relied upon to show reasonable diligence toward reduction to practice must be directly related to the reduction to practice of the invention at issue.","holding_confidence":"high","mentions":1,"propositions":[]},{"key":"case:281f.3d1243","slug":"scott-v-koyama","short_name":"Scott v. Koyama","canonical_citation":"Scott v. Koyama, 281 F.3d 1243, 61 USPQ2d 1856 (Fed. Cir. 2002)","decision_year":2002,"court":"Fed. Cir.","holding_summary":"Activities directed at building a plant to practice a claimed large-scale production process constitute efforts toward actual reduction to practice and thus evidence of reasonable diligence, unlike cases where inventors discontinued development or merely pursued financing.","holding_confidence":"high","mentions":1,"propositions":[]},{"key":"case:220uspq831","slug":"ginos-v-nedelec","short_name":"Ginos v. Nedelec","canonical_citation":"Ginos v. Nedelec, 220 USPQ 831 (Bd. Pat. Inter. 1983)","decision_year":1983,"court":"Bd. Pat. Inter.","holding_summary":"An inventor may, under some circumstances, rely on work directed to closely related inventions considered part of the same invention as support for diligence toward reducing the claimed invention to practice.","holding_confidence":"high","mentions":1,"propositions":[]},{"key":"case:181uspq758","slug":"gunn-v-bosch","short_name":"Gunn v. Bosch","canonical_citation":"Gunn v. Bosch, 181 USPQ 758 (Bd. Pat. Inter. 1973)","decision_year":1973,"court":"Bd. Pat. Inter.","holding_summary":"Diligence requires activity directed to reducing to practice the subject matter of the counts; a fortuitous reduction to practice occurring while working on a different invention is inconsistent with the continuous intent or effort that diligence demands.","holding_confidence":"high","mentions":1,"propositions":[]},{"key":"case:142f.2d690","slug":"broos-v-barton","short_name":"Broos v. Barton","canonical_citation":"Broos v. Barton, 142 F.2d 690, 61 USPQ 447 (CCPA 1944)","decision_year":1944,"court":"CCPA","holding_summary":"Preparation of a patent application in the United States for foreign filing constitutes diligence toward reduction to practice.","holding_confidence":"high","mentions":1,"propositions":[]},{"key":"case:15uspq2d1507","slug":"de-solms-v-schoenwald","short_name":"De Solms v. Schoenwald","canonical_citation":"De Solms v. Schoenwald, 15 USPQ2d 1507 (BPAI 1990)","decision_year":1990,"court":"BPAI","holding_summary":"Diligence toward reduction to practice must be evaluated in light of the inventor's individual circumstances, including skill and available time, and the corroboration requirement applies only to the inventor's own testimony.","holding_confidence":"high","mentions":1,"propositions":[]},{"key":"case:168f.2d542","slug":"huelster-v-reiter","short_name":"Huelster v. Reiter","canonical_citation":"Huelster v. Reiter, 168 F.2d 542, 78 USPQ 82 (CCPA 1948)","decision_year":1948,"court":"CCPA","holding_summary":"An inventor who was unable to make an actual reduction to practice must also show why a constructive reduction to practice, by filing a patent application, was not possible.","holding_confidence":"high","mentions":1,"propositions":[]},{"key":"case:671f.2d1362","slug":"haskell-v-coleburne","short_name":"Haskell v. Coleburne","canonical_citation":"Haskell v. Coleburne, 671 F.2d 1362, 213 USPQ 192 (CCPA 1982)","decision_year":1982,"court":"CCPA","holding_summary":"Conception may be established as early as the date an attorney finished drafting the patent application on the inventor's behalf, since conception turns on disclosure rather than signature; a six-day period to execute and file the application is acceptable.","holding_confidence":"high","mentions":1,"propositions":[]},{"key":"case:806f.2d1024","slug":"bey-v-kollonitsch","short_name":"Bey v. Kollonitsch","canonical_citation":"Bey v. Kollonitsch, 806 F.2d 1024, 231 USPQ 967 (Fed. Cir. 1986)","decision_year":1986,"court":"Fed. Cir.","holding_summary":"Reasonable diligence is all that is required of an attorney preparing a patent application; taking up a reasonable backlog of unrelated cases in chronological order and proceeding expeditiously suffices, and work on a related case contributing substantially to preparing the application counts toward diligence.","holding_confidence":"high","mentions":1,"propositions":[]}],"statutes":[{"key":"us_usc:35:102","slug":"35-usc-102","canonical_citation":"35 U.S.C. 102","mentions":44},{"key":"us_cfr:37:1.131","slug":"37-cfr-1-131","canonical_citation":"37 CFR 1.131","mentions":9},{"key":"us_usc:35:100","slug":"35-usc-100","canonical_citation":"35 U.S.C. 100","mentions":7},{"key":"us_usc:35:103","slug":"35-usc-103","canonical_citation":"35 U.S.C. 103","mentions":7},{"key":"us_usc:35:119","slug":"35-usc-119","canonical_citation":"35 U.S.C. 119","mentions":5},{"key":"us_usc:35:112","slug":"35-usc-112","canonical_citation":"35 U.S.C. 112","mentions":5},{"key":"us_usc:35:104","slug":"35-usc-104","canonical_citation":"35 U.S.C. 104","mentions":3},{"key":"us_usc:35:101","slug":"35-usc-101","canonical_citation":"35 U.S.C. 101","mentions":2},{"key":"us_usc:35:135","slug":"35-usc-135","canonical_citation":"35 U.S.C. 135","mentions":2},{"key":"us_usc:35:120","slug":"35-usc-120","canonical_citation":"35 U.S.C. 120","mentions":2}],"cross_references":[{"key":"mpep:2106","section_number":"2106","title":"Patent Subject Matter Eligibility","exists":true,"mentions":1},{"key":"mpep:2146","section_number":"2146","title":"Pre-AIA 35 U.S.C. 103(c)","exists":true,"mentions":1},{"key":"mpep:2159","section_number":"2159","title":"Applicability Date Provisions and Determining Whether an Application Is Subject to the First Inventor To File Provisions of the AIA","exists":true,"mentions":7},{"key":"mpep:2300","section_number":"2300","title":null,"exists":true,"mentions":2}],"form_paragraphs":[]},"structured_data":{"nodes":[{"id":"pb_xgnfvtg7","corpus_id":"mpep-e9r01-2024-html","opaque_url":"https://mpep.io/n/pb_xgnfvtg7","effective_range":{"start_revision":"R-01.2024","end_revision":null},"node_type":"prose_block","rendered_text_html":"

[Editor Note: This MPEP section has limited applicability to\n applications subject to examination under the first inventor to file (FITF) provisions\n of the AIA as set forth in 35 U.S.C. 100 (note). Patents and\n applications that contain (or contained at any time) at least one claim with a pre-AIA\n effective filing date (before March 16, 2013) and at least one claim with a post-AIA\n effective filing date (on or after March 16, 2013) are subject to the patentability\n requirements in AIA 35 U.S.C. 102-103 and\n subject to pre-AIA 35\n U.S.C. 102(g).See MPEP §\n 2159 et seq.]

","rendered_text_plain":"[Editor Note: This MPEP section has limited applicability to applications subject to examination under the first inventor to file (FITF) provisions of the AIA as set forth in 35 U.S.C. 100 (note). Patents and applications that contain (or contained at any time) at least one claim with a pre-AIA effective filing date (before March 16, 2013) and at least one claim with a post-AIA effective filing date (on or after March 16, 2013) are subject to the patentability requirements in AIA 35 U.S.C. 102-103 and subject to pre-AIA 35 U.S.C. 102(g).See MPEP § 2159 et seq.]","provenance":{"source_file":"s2138.html","source_anchor":"ch2100_d222e6_1902b_274","source_sha256":"26c7c2a3bdfe077ea7e4b30ae79c9a9fd0d208d7d91da6e74f7f3ce0e157610b"},"kind":"narrative","host_section_id":"se_oly7ctjt"},{"id":"st_6eiqohhr","corpus_id":"mpep-e9r01-2024-html","opaque_url":"https://mpep.io/n/st_6eiqohhr","effective_range":{"start_revision":"R-01.2024","end_revision":null},"node_type":"statute","rendered_text_html":"","rendered_text_plain":"","provenance":{"source_file":"s2138.html","source_anchor":"","source_sha256":"26c7c2a3bdfe077ea7e4b30ae79c9a9fd0d208d7d91da6e74f7f3ce0e157610b"},"authority":"us_usc","authority_title_num":"35","authority_section_num":"100","subsection_path":[],"canonical_citation":"35 U.S.C. 100"},{"id":"st_lptprwv7","corpus_id":"mpep-e9r01-2024-html","opaque_url":"https://mpep.io/n/st_lptprwv7","effective_range":{"start_revision":"R-01.2024","end_revision":null},"node_type":"statute","rendered_text_html":"","rendered_text_plain":"","provenance":{"source_file":"s2138.html","source_anchor":"","source_sha256":"26c7c2a3bdfe077ea7e4b30ae79c9a9fd0d208d7d91da6e74f7f3ce0e157610b"},"authority":"us_usc","authority_title_num":"35","authority_section_num":"102","subsection_path":[],"canonical_citation":"35 U.S.C. 102"},{"id":"st_qjmahotn","corpus_id":"mpep-e9r01-2024-html","opaque_url":"https://mpep.io/n/st_qjmahotn","effective_range":{"start_revision":"R-01.2024","end_revision":null},"node_type":"statute","rendered_text_html":"","rendered_text_plain":"","provenance":{"source_file":"s2138.html","source_anchor":"","source_sha256":"26c7c2a3bdfe077ea7e4b30ae79c9a9fd0d208d7d91da6e74f7f3ce0e157610b"},"authority":"us_usc","authority_title_num":"35","authority_section_num":"102","subsection_path":["g"],"canonical_citation":"35 U.S.C. 102(g)"},{"id":"se_a7ggpn7r","corpus_id":"mpep-e9r01-2024-html","opaque_url":"https://mpep.io/n/se_a7ggpn7r","effective_range":{"start_revision":"R-01.2024","end_revision":null},"node_type":"section","rendered_text_html":"","rendered_text_plain":"","provenance":{"source_file":"s2138.html","source_anchor":"stub-2159","source_sha256":"26c7c2a3bdfe077ea7e4b30ae79c9a9fd0d208d7d91da6e74f7f3ce0e157610b"},"akn_urn":"/akn/us/statement/manual/uspto/2024/mpep/eng@2024-02-29!sec_2159","canonical_url":"https://mpep.io/akn/us/statement/manual/uspto/2024/mpep/eng@2024-02-29!sec_2159","section_number":"2159","chapter":"2100","depth":0,"title":"Section 2159","children_ids":[]},{"id":"li_fvmmw5a7","corpus_id":"mpep-e9r01-2024-html","opaque_url":"https://mpep.io/n/li_fvmmw5a7","effective_range":{"start_revision":"R-01.2024","end_revision":null},"node_type":"list_item","rendered_text_html":"
  • (g) (1) during the course of an interference conducted under section 135 or section 291, another inventor involved therein establishes, to the extent permitted in section 104, that before such person’s invention thereof the invention was made by such other inventor and not abandoned, suppressed, or concealed, or (2) before such person’s invention thereof, the invention was made in this country by another inventor who had not abandoned, suppressed, or concealed it. In determining priority of invention under this subsection, there shall be considered not only the respective dates of conception and reduction to practice of the invention, but also the reasonable diligence of one who was first to conceive and last to reduce to practice, from a time prior to conception by the other.
    • ","rendered_text_plain":"(g) (1) during the course of an interference conducted under section 135 or section 291, another inventor involved therein establishes, to the extent permitted in section 104, that before such person’s invention thereof the invention was made by such other inventor and not abandoned, suppressed, or concealed, or (2) before such person’s invention thereof, the invention was made in this country by another inventor who had not abandoned, suppressed, or concealed it. In determining priority of invention under this subsection, there shall be considered not only the respective dates of conception and reduction to practice of the invention, but also the reasonable diligence of one who was first to conceive and last to reduce to practice, from a time prior to conception by the other.","provenance":{"source_file":"s2138.html","source_anchor":"d0e207019","source_sha256":"26c7c2a3bdfe077ea7e4b30ae79c9a9fd0d208d7d91da6e74f7f3ce0e157610b"},"enumerator_label":"(g)","enumerator_ordinal":0,"parent_list_id":"ls_gmqqv5yr"},{"id":"ls_gmqqv5yr","corpus_id":"mpep-e9r01-2024-html","opaque_url":"https://mpep.io/n/ls_gmqqv5yr","effective_range":{"start_revision":"R-01.2024","end_revision":null},"node_type":"list","rendered_text_html":"","rendered_text_plain":"","provenance":{"source_file":"s2138.html","source_anchor":"d0e207019","source_sha256":"26c7c2a3bdfe077ea7e4b30ae79c9a9fd0d208d7d91da6e74f7f3ce0e157610b"},"enumerator_style":"alpha_lower","nesting_depth":1,"host_section_id":"se_oly7ctjt","parent_list_item_id":null,"item_ids":["li_fvmmw5a7"]},{"id":"sb_z6f4hu24","corpus_id":"mpep-e9r01-2024-html","opaque_url":"https://mpep.io/n/sb_z6f4hu24","effective_range":{"start_revision":"R-01.2024","end_revision":null},"node_type":"statutory_block","rendered_text_html":"","rendered_text_plain":"","provenance":{"source_file":"s2138.html","source_anchor":"d0e207009","source_sha256":"26c7c2a3bdfe077ea7e4b30ae79c9a9fd0d208d7d91da6e74f7f3ce0e157610b"},"authority":"us_usc","authority_title_num":"35","authority_section_num":"102","citation_title_text":"Pre-AIA 35 U.S.C. 102","heading":"Conditions for patentability; novelty and loss of right to patent.","body_list_id":"ls_gmqqv5yr","host_section_id":"se_oly7ctjt"},{"id":"pb_hduet4tp","corpus_id":"mpep-e9r01-2024-html","opaque_url":"https://mpep.io/n/pb_hduet4tp","effective_range":{"start_revision":"R-01.2024","end_revision":null},"node_type":"prose_block","rendered_text_html":"

    *****

    ","rendered_text_plain":"*****","provenance":{"source_file":"s2138.html","source_anchor":"d0e207009/p.0","source_sha256":"26c7c2a3bdfe077ea7e4b30ae79c9a9fd0d208d7d91da6e74f7f3ce0e157610b"},"kind":"excluded_text","host_section_id":"se_oly7ctjt","tags":["edit_history:excluded"]},{"id":"pb_rlpzt776","corpus_id":"mpep-e9r01-2024-html","opaque_url":"https://mpep.io/n/pb_rlpzt776","effective_range":{"start_revision":"R-01.2024","end_revision":null},"node_type":"prose_block","rendered_text_html":"

    Pre-AIA 35 U.S.C.\n 102(g) bars the issuance of a patent where another made the invention\n in the United States before the inventor and had not abandoned, suppressed, or concealed\n it. This section of pre-AIA 35 U.S.C. 102 forms a basis for interference practice. See\n MPEP Chapter\n 2300 for more information on interference procedure. See below\n and MPEP §§\n 2138.01-2138.06 for more information on the\n requirements of pre-AIA\n 35 U.S.C. 102(g).\n

    ","rendered_text_plain":"Pre-AIA 35 U.S.C. 102(g) bars the issuance of a patent where another made the invention in the United States before the inventor and had not abandoned, suppressed, or concealed it. This section of pre-AIA 35 U.S.C. 102 forms a basis for interference practice. See MPEP Chapter 2300 for more information on interference procedure. See below and MPEP §§ 2138.01-2138.06 for more information on the requirements of pre-AIA 35 U.S.C. 102(g).","provenance":{"source_file":"s2138.html","source_anchor":"d0e60955","source_sha256":"26c7c2a3bdfe077ea7e4b30ae79c9a9fd0d208d7d91da6e74f7f3ce0e157610b"},"kind":"narrative","host_section_id":"se_oly7ctjt"},{"id":"se_lbeubzgb","corpus_id":"mpep-e9r01-2024-html","opaque_url":"https://mpep.io/n/se_lbeubzgb","effective_range":{"start_revision":"R-01.2024","end_revision":null},"node_type":"section","rendered_text_html":"","rendered_text_plain":"","provenance":{"source_file":"s2138.html","source_anchor":"stub-2300","source_sha256":"26c7c2a3bdfe077ea7e4b30ae79c9a9fd0d208d7d91da6e74f7f3ce0e157610b"},"akn_urn":"/akn/us/statement/manual/uspto/2024/mpep/eng@2024-02-29!sec_2300","canonical_url":"https://mpep.io/akn/us/statement/manual/uspto/2024/mpep/eng@2024-02-29!sec_2300","section_number":"2300","chapter":"2300","depth":0,"title":"Section 2300","children_ids":[]},{"id":"pb_xpkj4voj","corpus_id":"mpep-e9r01-2024-html","opaque_url":"https://mpep.io/n/pb_xpkj4voj","effective_range":{"start_revision":"R-01.2024","end_revision":null},"node_type":"prose_block","rendered_text_html":"

    Pre-AIA 35 U.S.C.\n 102(g) issues such as conception, reduction to practice and\n diligence, while more commonly applied to interference matters, also arise in other\n contexts. \n

    ","rendered_text_plain":"Pre-AIA 35 U.S.C. 102(g) issues such as conception, reduction to practice and diligence, while more commonly applied to interference matters, also arise in other contexts.","provenance":{"source_file":"s2138.html","source_anchor":"d0e207023","source_sha256":"26c7c2a3bdfe077ea7e4b30ae79c9a9fd0d208d7d91da6e74f7f3ce0e157610b"},"kind":"narrative","host_section_id":"se_oly7ctjt"},{"id":"pb_silbovw2","corpus_id":"mpep-e9r01-2024-html","opaque_url":"https://mpep.io/n/pb_silbovw2","effective_range":{"start_revision":"R-01.2024","end_revision":null},"node_type":"prose_block","rendered_text_html":"

    Pre-AIA 35 U.S.C.\n 102(g) may form the basis for an ex parte\n rejection if: (1) the subject matter at issue has been actually reduced to\n practice by another before the inventor’s invention; and (2) there has been no abandonment,\n suppression or concealment. See, e.g., Amgen, Inc. v. Chugai Pharmaceutical\n Co., 927 F.2d 1200, 1205, 18 USPQ2d 1016, 1020 (Fed. Cir. 1991); New\n Idea Farm Equipment Corp. v. Sperry Corp., 916 F.2d 1561, 1566, 16 USPQ2d\n 1424, 1428 (Fed. Cir. 1990); E.I. DuPont de Nemours & Co. v. Phillips\n Petroleum Co., 849 F.2d 1430, 1434, 7 USPQ2d 1129, 1132 (Fed. Cir. 1988);\n Kimberly-Clark v. Johnson & Johnson, 745 F.2d 1437, 1444-46, 223\n USPQ 603, 606-08 (Fed. Cir. 1984). To qualify as prior art under pre-AIA 35 U.S.C.\n 102(g), however, there must be evidence that the subject matter was\n actually reduced to practice, in that conception alone is not sufficient. See\n Kimberly-Clark, 745 F.2d at 1445, 223 USPQ at 607. While the filing\n of an application for patent is a constructive reduction to practice, the filing of an\n application does not in itself provide the evidence necessary to show an actual reduction\n to practice of any of the subject matter disclosed in the application as is necessary to\n provide the basis for an ex parte rejection under pre-AIA 35 U.S.C.\n 102(g). Thus, absent evidence showing an actual reduction to practice\n (which is generally not available during ex parte examination), the\n disclosure of a United States patent application publication or patent falls under\n pre-AIA 35 U.S.C.\n 102(e) and not under pre-AIA 35 U.S.C. 102(g).\n Cf.In re Zletz, 893 F.2d 319, 323, 13 USPQ2d 1320, 1323 (Fed. Cir. 1989)\n (the disclosure in a reference United States patent does not fall under pre-AIA 35 U.S.C.\n 102(g) but under pre-AIA 35 U.S.C. 102(e)).\n

    ","rendered_text_plain":"Pre-AIA 35 U.S.C. 102(g) may form the basis for an ex parte rejection if: (1) the subject matter at issue has been actually reduced to practice by another before the inventor’s invention; and (2) there has been no abandonment, suppression or concealment. See, e.g., Amgen, Inc. v. Chugai Pharmaceutical Co., 927 F.2d 1200, 1205, 18 USPQ2d 1016, 1020 (Fed. Cir. 1991); New Idea Farm Equipment Corp. v. Sperry Corp., 916 F.2d 1561, 1566, 16 USPQ2d 1424, 1428 (Fed. Cir. 1990); E.I. DuPont de Nemours & Co. v. Phillips Petroleum Co., 849 F.2d 1430, 1434, 7 USPQ2d 1129, 1132 (Fed. Cir. 1988); Kimberly-Clark v. Johnson & Johnson, 745 F.2d 1437, 1444-46, 223 USPQ 603, 606-08 (Fed. Cir. 1984). To qualify as prior art under pre-AIA 35 U.S.C. 102(g), however, there must be evidence that the subject matter was actually reduced to practice, in that conception alone is not sufficient. See Kimberly-Clark, 745 F.2d at 1445, 223 USPQ at 607. While the filing of an application for patent is a constructive reduction to practice, the filing of an application does not in itself provide the evidence necessary to show an actual reduction to practice of any of the subject matter disclosed in the application as is necessary to provide the basis for an ex parte rejection under pre-AIA 35 U.S.C. 102(g). Thus, absent evidence showing an actual reduction to practice (which is generally not available during ex parte examination), the disclosure of a United States patent application publication or patent falls under pre-AIA 35 U.S.C. 102(e) and not under pre-AIA 35 U.S.C. 102(g). Cf.In re Zletz, 893 F.2d 319, 323, 13 USPQ2d 1320, 1323 (Fed. Cir. 1989) (the disclosure in a reference United States patent does not fall under pre-AIA 35 U.S.C. 102(g) but under pre-AIA 35 U.S.C. 102(e)).","provenance":{"source_file":"s2138.html","source_anchor":"d0e207029","source_sha256":"26c7c2a3bdfe077ea7e4b30ae79c9a9fd0d208d7d91da6e74f7f3ce0e157610b"},"kind":"narrative","host_section_id":"se_oly7ctjt"},{"id":"cs_tjhbalj6","corpus_id":"mpep-e9r01-2024-html","opaque_url":"https://mpep.io/n/cs_tjhbalj6","effective_range":{"start_revision":"R-01.2024","end_revision":null},"node_type":"case","rendered_text_html":"","rendered_text_plain":"Amgen, Inc. v. Chugai Pharmaceutical Co., 927 F.2d 1200 (Fed. Cir. 1991)","provenance":{"source_file":"s2138.html","source_anchor":"","source_sha256":"26c7c2a3bdfe077ea7e4b30ae79c9a9fd0d208d7d91da6e74f7f3ce0e157610b"},"short_name":"Amgen, Inc. v. Chugai Pharmaceutical Co.","all_citations":["927 F.2d 1200","18 USPQ2d 1016"],"canonical_citation":"Amgen, Inc. v. Chugai Pharmaceutical Co., 927 F.2d 1200, 18 USPQ2d 1016 (Fed. Cir. 1991)","decision_year":1991,"court":"Fed. Cir."},{"id":"cs_deafedwm","corpus_id":"mpep-e9r01-2024-html","opaque_url":"https://mpep.io/n/cs_deafedwm","effective_range":{"start_revision":"R-01.2024","end_revision":null},"node_type":"case","rendered_text_html":"","rendered_text_plain":"New Idea Farm Equipment Corp. v. Sperry Corp., 916 F.2d 1561 (Fed. Cir. 1990)","provenance":{"source_file":"s2138.html","source_anchor":"","source_sha256":"26c7c2a3bdfe077ea7e4b30ae79c9a9fd0d208d7d91da6e74f7f3ce0e157610b"},"short_name":"New Idea Farm Equipment Corp. v. Sperry Corp.","all_citations":["916 F.2d 1561","16 USPQ2d 1424"],"canonical_citation":"New Idea Farm Equipment Corp. v. Sperry Corp., 916 F.2d 1561, 16 USPQ2d 1424 (Fed. Cir. 1990)","decision_year":1990,"court":"Fed. Cir."},{"id":"cs_xoke6axn","corpus_id":"mpep-e9r01-2024-html","opaque_url":"https://mpep.io/n/cs_xoke6axn","effective_range":{"start_revision":"R-01.2024","end_revision":null},"node_type":"case","rendered_text_html":"","rendered_text_plain":"E.I. DuPont de Nemours & Co. v. Phillips Petroleum Co., 849 F.2d 1430 (Fed. Cir. 1988)","provenance":{"source_file":"s2138.html","source_anchor":"","source_sha256":"26c7c2a3bdfe077ea7e4b30ae79c9a9fd0d208d7d91da6e74f7f3ce0e157610b"},"short_name":"E.I. DuPont de Nemours & Co. v. Phillips Petroleum Co.","all_citations":["849 F.2d 1430","7 USPQ2d 1129"],"canonical_citation":"E.I. DuPont de Nemours & Co. v. Phillips Petroleum Co., 849 F.2d 1430, 7 USPQ2d 1129 (Fed. Cir. 1988)","decision_year":1988,"court":"Fed. Cir."},{"id":"cs_h6yee24p","corpus_id":"mpep-e9r01-2024-html","opaque_url":"https://mpep.io/n/cs_h6yee24p","effective_range":{"start_revision":"R-01.2024","end_revision":null},"node_type":"case","rendered_text_html":"","rendered_text_plain":"Kimberly-Clark v. Johnson & Johnson, 745 F.2d 1437 (Fed. Cir. 1984)","provenance":{"source_file":"s2138.html","source_anchor":"","source_sha256":"26c7c2a3bdfe077ea7e4b30ae79c9a9fd0d208d7d91da6e74f7f3ce0e157610b"},"short_name":"Kimberly-Clark v. Johnson & Johnson","all_citations":["745 F.2d 1437","223 USPQ 603"],"canonical_citation":"Kimberly-Clark v. Johnson & Johnson, 745 F.2d 1437, 223 USPQ 603 (Fed. Cir. 1984)","decision_year":1984,"court":"Fed. Cir."},{"id":"cs_qz2jortz","corpus_id":"mpep-e9r01-2024-html","opaque_url":"https://mpep.io/n/cs_qz2jortz","effective_range":{"start_revision":"R-01.2024","end_revision":null},"node_type":"case","rendered_text_html":"","rendered_text_plain":"In re Zletz, 893 F.2d 319 (Fed. Cir. 1989)","provenance":{"source_file":"s2138.html","source_anchor":"","source_sha256":"26c7c2a3bdfe077ea7e4b30ae79c9a9fd0d208d7d91da6e74f7f3ce0e157610b"},"short_name":"In re Zletz","all_citations":["893 F.2d 319","13 USPQ2d 1320"],"canonical_citation":"In re Zletz, 893 F.2d 319, 13 USPQ2d 1320 (Fed. Cir. 1989)","decision_year":1989,"court":"Fed. Cir."},{"id":"pb_ggjwkbpp","corpus_id":"mpep-e9r01-2024-html","opaque_url":"https://mpep.io/n/pb_ggjwkbpp","effective_range":{"start_revision":"R-01.2024","end_revision":null},"node_type":"prose_block","rendered_text_html":"

    In addition, subject matter qualifying as prior art only under\n pre-AIA 35 U.S.C.\n 102(g) may also be the basis for an ex parte\n rejection under pre-AIA\n 35 U.S.C. 103. See In re Bass, 474 F.2d 1276,\n 1283, 177 USPQ 178, 183 (CCPA 1973) (in an unsuccessful attempt to utilize a\n 37 CFR\n 1.131 affidavit relating to a combination application, the inventors\n admitted that the subcombination screen of a copending application which issued as a patent\n was earlier conceived than the combination). Pre-AIA 35 U.S.C. 103(c), however,\n states that subsection (g) of pre-AIA 35 U.S.C. 102 will not preclude\n patentability where subject matter developed by another person, that would otherwise\n qualify under pre-AIA 35\n U.S.C. 102(g), and the claimed invention of an application under\n examination were owned by the same person, subject to an obligation of assignment to the\n same person, or involved in a joint research agreement, which meets the requirements of\n pre-AIA 35 U.S.C.\n 103(c)(2) and (c)(3), at the time the invention was made. See\n MPEP §\n 2146.\n

    ","rendered_text_plain":"In addition, subject matter qualifying as prior art only under pre-AIA 35 U.S.C. 102(g) may also be the basis for an ex parte rejection under pre-AIA 35 U.S.C. 103. See In re Bass, 474 F.2d 1276, 1283, 177 USPQ 178, 183 (CCPA 1973) (in an unsuccessful attempt to utilize a 37 CFR 1.131 affidavit relating to a combination application, the inventors admitted that the subcombination screen of a copending application which issued as a patent was earlier conceived than the combination). Pre-AIA 35 U.S.C. 103(c), however, states that subsection (g) of pre-AIA 35 U.S.C. 102 will not preclude patentability where subject matter developed by another person, that would otherwise qualify under pre-AIA 35 U.S.C. 102(g), and the claimed invention of an application under examination were owned by the same person, subject to an obligation of assignment to the same person, or involved in a joint research agreement, which meets the requirements of pre-AIA 35 U.S.C. 103(c)(2) and (c)(3), at the time the invention was made. See MPEP § 2146.","provenance":{"source_file":"s2138.html","source_anchor":"d0e207082","source_sha256":"26c7c2a3bdfe077ea7e4b30ae79c9a9fd0d208d7d91da6e74f7f3ce0e157610b"},"kind":"narrative","host_section_id":"se_oly7ctjt"},{"id":"cs_r5v6jguv","corpus_id":"mpep-e9r01-2024-html","opaque_url":"https://mpep.io/n/cs_r5v6jguv","effective_range":{"start_revision":"R-01.2024","end_revision":null},"node_type":"case","rendered_text_html":"","rendered_text_plain":"In re Bass, 474 F.2d 1276 (CCPA 1973)","provenance":{"source_file":"s2138.html","source_anchor":"","source_sha256":"26c7c2a3bdfe077ea7e4b30ae79c9a9fd0d208d7d91da6e74f7f3ce0e157610b"},"short_name":"In re Bass","all_citations":["474 F.2d 1276","177 USPQ 178"],"canonical_citation":"In re Bass, 474 F.2d 1276, 177 USPQ 178 (CCPA 1973)","decision_year":1973,"court":"CCPA"},{"id":"st_wjfdbmd2","corpus_id":"mpep-e9r01-2024-html","opaque_url":"https://mpep.io/n/st_wjfdbmd2","effective_range":{"start_revision":"R-01.2024","end_revision":null},"node_type":"statute","rendered_text_html":"","rendered_text_plain":"","provenance":{"source_file":"s2138.html","source_anchor":"","source_sha256":"26c7c2a3bdfe077ea7e4b30ae79c9a9fd0d208d7d91da6e74f7f3ce0e157610b"},"authority":"us_usc","authority_title_num":"35","authority_section_num":"103","subsection_path":[],"canonical_citation":"35 U.S.C. 103"},{"id":"st_4bmj7qa3","corpus_id":"mpep-e9r01-2024-html","opaque_url":"https://mpep.io/n/st_4bmj7qa3","effective_range":{"start_revision":"R-01.2024","end_revision":null},"node_type":"statute","rendered_text_html":"","rendered_text_plain":"","provenance":{"source_file":"s2138.html","source_anchor":"","source_sha256":"26c7c2a3bdfe077ea7e4b30ae79c9a9fd0d208d7d91da6e74f7f3ce0e157610b"},"authority":"us_cfr","authority_title_num":"37","authority_section_num":"1.131","subsection_path":[],"canonical_citation":"37 CFR 1.131"},{"id":"st_cswgfgnr","corpus_id":"mpep-e9r01-2024-html","opaque_url":"https://mpep.io/n/st_cswgfgnr","effective_range":{"start_revision":"R-01.2024","end_revision":null},"node_type":"statute","rendered_text_html":"","rendered_text_plain":"","provenance":{"source_file":"s2138.html","source_anchor":"","source_sha256":"26c7c2a3bdfe077ea7e4b30ae79c9a9fd0d208d7d91da6e74f7f3ce0e157610b"},"authority":"us_usc","authority_title_num":"35","authority_section_num":"103","subsection_path":["c"],"canonical_citation":"35 U.S.C. 103(c)"},{"id":"st_vvcjazrk","corpus_id":"mpep-e9r01-2024-html","opaque_url":"https://mpep.io/n/st_vvcjazrk","effective_range":{"start_revision":"R-01.2024","end_revision":null},"node_type":"statute","rendered_text_html":"","rendered_text_plain":"","provenance":{"source_file":"s2138.html","source_anchor":"","source_sha256":"26c7c2a3bdfe077ea7e4b30ae79c9a9fd0d208d7d91da6e74f7f3ce0e157610b"},"authority":"us_usc","authority_title_num":"35","authority_section_num":"103","subsection_path":["c","2"],"canonical_citation":"35 U.S.C. 103(c)(2)"},{"id":"se_3fozinza","corpus_id":"mpep-e9r01-2024-html","opaque_url":"https://mpep.io/n/se_3fozinza","effective_range":{"start_revision":"R-01.2024","end_revision":null},"node_type":"section","rendered_text_html":"","rendered_text_plain":"","provenance":{"source_file":"s2138.html","source_anchor":"stub-2146","source_sha256":"26c7c2a3bdfe077ea7e4b30ae79c9a9fd0d208d7d91da6e74f7f3ce0e157610b"},"akn_urn":"/akn/us/statement/manual/uspto/2024/mpep/eng@2024-02-29!sec_2146","canonical_url":"https://mpep.io/akn/us/statement/manual/uspto/2024/mpep/eng@2024-02-29!sec_2146","section_number":"2146","chapter":"2100","depth":0,"title":"Section 2146","children_ids":[]},{"id":"pb_esrzpztw","corpus_id":"mpep-e9r01-2024-html","opaque_url":"https://mpep.io/n/pb_esrzpztw","effective_range":{"start_revision":"R-01.2024","end_revision":null},"node_type":"prose_block","rendered_text_html":"

    For additional examples of pre-AIA 35 U.S.C. 102(g) issues such as\n conception, reduction to practice and diligence outside the context of interference\n matters, see In re Costello, 717 F.2d 1346, 219 USPQ 389 (Fed. Cir.\n 1983) (discussing the concepts of conception and constructive reduction to practice in the\n context of a declaration under 37 CFR 1.131), and Kawai v.\n Metlesics, 480 F.2d 880, 178 USPQ 158 (CCPA 1973) (holding constructive\n reduction to practice for foreign priority under 35 U.S.C. 119 requires meeting the\n requirements of 35 U.S.C.\n 101 and 35 U.S.C. 112).\n

    ","rendered_text_plain":"For additional examples of pre-AIA 35 U.S.C. 102(g) issues such as conception, reduction to practice and diligence outside the context of interference matters, see In re Costello, 717 F.2d 1346, 219 USPQ 389 (Fed. Cir. 1983) (discussing the concepts of conception and constructive reduction to practice in the context of a declaration under 37 CFR 1.131), and Kawai v. Metlesics, 480 F.2d 880, 178 USPQ 158 (CCPA 1973) (holding constructive reduction to practice for foreign priority under 35 U.S.C. 119 requires meeting the requirements of 35 U.S.C. 101 and 35 U.S.C. 112).","provenance":{"source_file":"s2138.html","source_anchor":"d0e207127","source_sha256":"26c7c2a3bdfe077ea7e4b30ae79c9a9fd0d208d7d91da6e74f7f3ce0e157610b"},"kind":"narrative","host_section_id":"se_oly7ctjt"},{"id":"cs_s2iww47p","corpus_id":"mpep-e9r01-2024-html","opaque_url":"https://mpep.io/n/cs_s2iww47p","effective_range":{"start_revision":"R-01.2024","end_revision":null},"node_type":"case","rendered_text_html":"","rendered_text_plain":"In re Costello, 717 F.2d 1346 (Fed. Cir. 1983)","provenance":{"source_file":"s2138.html","source_anchor":"","source_sha256":"26c7c2a3bdfe077ea7e4b30ae79c9a9fd0d208d7d91da6e74f7f3ce0e157610b"},"short_name":"In re Costello","all_citations":["717 F.2d 1346","219 USPQ 389"],"canonical_citation":"In re Costello, 717 F.2d 1346, 219 USPQ 389 (Fed. Cir. 1983)","decision_year":1983,"court":"Fed. Cir."},{"id":"cs_ekn3poo6","corpus_id":"mpep-e9r01-2024-html","opaque_url":"https://mpep.io/n/cs_ekn3poo6","effective_range":{"start_revision":"R-01.2024","end_revision":null},"node_type":"case","rendered_text_html":"","rendered_text_plain":"Kawai v. Metlesics, 480 F.2d 880 (CCPA 1973)","provenance":{"source_file":"s2138.html","source_anchor":"","source_sha256":"26c7c2a3bdfe077ea7e4b30ae79c9a9fd0d208d7d91da6e74f7f3ce0e157610b"},"short_name":"Kawai v. Metlesics","all_citations":["480 F.2d 880","178 USPQ 158"],"canonical_citation":"Kawai v. Metlesics, 480 F.2d 880, 178 USPQ 158 (CCPA 1973)","decision_year":1973,"court":"CCPA"},{"id":"st_ngpfcfec","corpus_id":"mpep-e9r01-2024-html","opaque_url":"https://mpep.io/n/st_ngpfcfec","effective_range":{"start_revision":"R-01.2024","end_revision":null},"node_type":"statute","rendered_text_html":"","rendered_text_plain":"","provenance":{"source_file":"s2138.html","source_anchor":"","source_sha256":"26c7c2a3bdfe077ea7e4b30ae79c9a9fd0d208d7d91da6e74f7f3ce0e157610b"},"authority":"us_usc","authority_title_num":"35","authority_section_num":"119","subsection_path":[],"canonical_citation":"35 U.S.C. 119"},{"id":"st_gpw5zq23","corpus_id":"mpep-e9r01-2024-html","opaque_url":"https://mpep.io/n/st_gpw5zq23","effective_range":{"start_revision":"R-01.2024","end_revision":null},"node_type":"statute","rendered_text_html":"","rendered_text_plain":"","provenance":{"source_file":"s2138.html","source_anchor":"","source_sha256":"26c7c2a3bdfe077ea7e4b30ae79c9a9fd0d208d7d91da6e74f7f3ce0e157610b"},"authority":"us_usc","authority_title_num":"35","authority_section_num":"101","subsection_path":[],"canonical_citation":"35 U.S.C. 101"},{"id":"st_j7pcpacx","corpus_id":"mpep-e9r01-2024-html","opaque_url":"https://mpep.io/n/st_j7pcpacx","effective_range":{"start_revision":"R-01.2024","end_revision":null},"node_type":"statute","rendered_text_html":"","rendered_text_plain":"","provenance":{"source_file":"s2138.html","source_anchor":"","source_sha256":"26c7c2a3bdfe077ea7e4b30ae79c9a9fd0d208d7d91da6e74f7f3ce0e157610b"},"authority":"us_usc","authority_title_num":"35","authority_section_num":"112","subsection_path":[],"canonical_citation":"35 U.S.C. 112"},{"id":"se_oly7ctjt","corpus_id":"mpep-e9r01-2024-html","opaque_url":"https://mpep.io/n/se_oly7ctjt","effective_range":{"start_revision":"R-01.2024","end_revision":null},"node_type":"section","rendered_text_html":"","rendered_text_plain":"","provenance":{"source_file":"s2138.html","source_anchor":"d0e207005","source_sha256":"26c7c2a3bdfe077ea7e4b30ae79c9a9fd0d208d7d91da6e74f7f3ce0e157610b"},"akn_urn":"/akn/us/statement/manual/uspto/2024/mpep/eng@2024-02-29!sec_2138","canonical_url":"https://mpep.io/akn/us/statement/manual/uspto/2024/mpep/eng@2024-02-29!sec_2138","section_number":"2138","chapter":"2100","depth":0,"title":"Pre-AIA 35 U.S.C. 102(g)","children_ids":["pb_xgnfvtg7","sb_z6f4hu24","pb_hduet4tp","pb_rlpzt776","pb_xpkj4voj","pb_silbovw2","pb_ggjwkbpp","pb_esrzpztw","se_bhecysdg","se_6vosto3y","se_hqjja4f5","se_4ssncmw5","se_ntidrsl3","se_ofsyoihz"],"revision_tag":"R-01.2024"},{"id":"pb_cyjnb2ma","corpus_id":"mpep-e9r01-2024-html","opaque_url":"https://mpep.io/n/pb_cyjnb2ma","effective_range":{"start_revision":"R-01.2024","end_revision":null},"node_type":"prose_block","rendered_text_html":"

    [Editor Note: This MPEP section has limited applicability to\n applications subject to examination under the first inventor to file (FITF)\n provisions of the AIA as set forth in 35 U.S.C. 100 (note). Patents and\n applications that contain (or contained at any time) at least one claim with a\n pre-AIA effective filing date (before March 16, 2013) and at least one claim with a\n post-AIA effective filing date (on or after March 16, 2013) are subject to the\n patentability requirements in AIA 35 U.S.C.\n 102-103 and subject to\n pre-AIA 35\n U.S.C. 102(g).See MPEP §\n 2159 et seq.]

    ","rendered_text_plain":"[Editor Note: This MPEP section has limited applicability to applications subject to examination under the first inventor to file (FITF) provisions of the AIA as set forth in 35 U.S.C. 100 (note). Patents and applications that contain (or contained at any time) at least one claim with a pre-AIA effective filing date (before March 16, 2013) and at least one claim with a post-AIA effective filing date (on or after March 16, 2013) are subject to the patentability requirements in AIA 35 U.S.C. 102-103 and subject to pre-AIA 35 U.S.C. 102(g).See MPEP § 2159 et seq.]","provenance":{"source_file":"s2138.html","source_anchor":"ch2100_d222e6_1906d_3cd","source_sha256":"26c7c2a3bdfe077ea7e4b30ae79c9a9fd0d208d7d91da6e74f7f3ce0e157610b"},"kind":"narrative","host_section_id":"se_bhecysdg"},{"id":"pb_zyyynoqz","corpus_id":"mpep-e9r01-2024-html","opaque_url":"https://mpep.io/n/pb_zyyynoqz","effective_range":{"start_revision":"R-01.2024","end_revision":null},"node_type":"prose_block","rendered_text_html":"I. PRE-AIA 35 U.S.C. 102(g) IS THE BASIS OF INTERFERENCE PRACTICE","rendered_text_plain":"I. PRE-AIA 35 U.S.C. 102(g) IS THE BASIS OF INTERFERENCE PRACTICE","provenance":{"source_file":"s2138.html","source_anchor":"d0e207148/b.0","source_sha256":"26c7c2a3bdfe077ea7e4b30ae79c9a9fd0d208d7d91da6e74f7f3ce0e157610b"},"kind":"informal_heading","host_section_id":"se_bhecysdg","heading_level":2,"heading_text":"I. PRE-AIA 35 U.S.C. 102(g) IS THE BASIS OF INTERFERENCE PRACTICE"},{"id":"pb_456ilx7y","corpus_id":"mpep-e9r01-2024-html","opaque_url":"https://mpep.io/n/pb_456ilx7y","effective_range":{"start_revision":"R-01.2024","end_revision":null},"node_type":"prose_block","rendered_text_html":"

    Subsection (g) of pre-AIA 35 U.S.C.\n 102 is the basis of interference practice for determining\n priority of invention between two parties. See Bigham v.\n Godtfredsen, 857 F.2d 1415, 1416, 8 USPQ2d 1266, 1267 (Fed. Cir. 1988);\n Paulik v. Rizkalla, 760 F.2d 1270, 1276-81, 226 USPQ 224, 225\n (Fed. Cir. 1985) (reviews the legislative history of the subsection in a concurring\n opinion by Judge Rich). 35 U.S.C. 135, 37 CFR Part 41,\n Subparts D and E and MPEP Chapter 2300. An interference is an inter\n partes proceeding directed at determining the first to invent as among\n the parties to the proceeding, involving two or more pending applications naming\n different inventors or one or more pending applications and one or more unexpired\n patents naming different inventors. The first of many to reduce an invention to\n practice around the same time will be the sole party to obtain a patent in some\n instances, Radio Corp. of America v. Radio Eng’g Labs., Inc., 293\n U.S. 1, 2, 21 USPQ 353, 353-4 (1934), unless another was the first to conceive and\n couple a later-in-time reduction to practice with diligence from a time just prior to\n when the second conceiver entered the field to the first conceiver’s reduction to\n practice. Hull v. Davenport, 90 F.2d 103, 105, 33 USPQ 506, 508\n (CCPA 1937). See the priority time charts below illustrating this point. Upon\n conclusion of an interference, subject matter claimed by the losing party that was\n the basis of the interference is rejected under pre-AIA 35 U.S.C. 102(g), unless\n the acts showing prior invention were not in this country.\n

    ","rendered_text_plain":"Subsection (g) of pre-AIA 35 U.S.C. 102 is the basis of interference practice for determining priority of invention between two parties. See Bigham v. Godtfredsen, 857 F.2d 1415, 1416, 8 USPQ2d 1266, 1267 (Fed. Cir. 1988); Paulik v. Rizkalla, 760 F.2d 1270, 1276-81, 226 USPQ 224, 225 (Fed. Cir. 1985) (reviews the legislative history of the subsection in a concurring opinion by Judge Rich). 35 U.S.C. 135, 37 CFR Part 41, Subparts D and E and MPEP Chapter 2300. An interference is an inter partes proceeding directed at determining the first to invent as among the parties to the proceeding, involving two or more pending applications naming different inventors or one or more pending applications and one or more unexpired patents naming different inventors. The first of many to reduce an invention to practice around the same time will be the sole party to obtain a patent in some instances, Radio Corp. of America v. Radio Eng’g Labs., Inc., 293 U.S. 1, 2, 21 USPQ 353, 353-4 (1934), unless another was the first to conceive and couple a later-in-time reduction to practice with diligence from a time just prior to when the second conceiver entered the field to the first conceiver’s reduction to practice. Hull v. Davenport, 90 F.2d 103, 105, 33 USPQ 506, 508 (CCPA 1937). See the priority time charts below illustrating this point. Upon conclusion of an interference, subject matter claimed by the losing party that was the basis of the interference is rejected under pre-AIA 35 U.S.C. 102(g), unless the acts showing prior invention were not in this country.","provenance":{"source_file":"s2138.html","source_anchor":"d0e207159","source_sha256":"26c7c2a3bdfe077ea7e4b30ae79c9a9fd0d208d7d91da6e74f7f3ce0e157610b"},"kind":"narrative","host_section_id":"se_bhecysdg"},{"id":"cs_etvaeauj","corpus_id":"mpep-e9r01-2024-html","opaque_url":"https://mpep.io/n/cs_etvaeauj","effective_range":{"start_revision":"R-01.2024","end_revision":null},"node_type":"case","rendered_text_html":"","rendered_text_plain":"Bigham v. Godtfredsen, 857 F.2d 1415 (Fed. Cir. 1988)","provenance":{"source_file":"s2138.html","source_anchor":"","source_sha256":"26c7c2a3bdfe077ea7e4b30ae79c9a9fd0d208d7d91da6e74f7f3ce0e157610b"},"short_name":"Bigham v. Godtfredsen","all_citations":["857 F.2d 1415","8 USPQ2d 1266"],"canonical_citation":"Bigham v. Godtfredsen, 857 F.2d 1415, 8 USPQ2d 1266 (Fed. Cir. 1988)","decision_year":1988,"court":"Fed. Cir."},{"id":"cs_3lz4lofa","corpus_id":"mpep-e9r01-2024-html","opaque_url":"https://mpep.io/n/cs_3lz4lofa","effective_range":{"start_revision":"R-01.2024","end_revision":null},"node_type":"case","rendered_text_html":"","rendered_text_plain":"Paulik v. Rizkalla, 760 F.2d 1270 (Fed. Cir. 1985)","provenance":{"source_file":"s2138.html","source_anchor":"","source_sha256":"26c7c2a3bdfe077ea7e4b30ae79c9a9fd0d208d7d91da6e74f7f3ce0e157610b"},"short_name":"Paulik v. Rizkalla","all_citations":["760 F.2d 1270","226 USPQ 224"],"canonical_citation":"Paulik v. Rizkalla, 760 F.2d 1270, 226 USPQ 224 (Fed. Cir. 1985)","decision_year":1985,"court":"Fed. Cir."},{"id":"cs_nu5mlvlf","corpus_id":"mpep-e9r01-2024-html","opaque_url":"https://mpep.io/n/cs_nu5mlvlf","effective_range":{"start_revision":"R-01.2024","end_revision":null},"node_type":"case","rendered_text_html":"","rendered_text_plain":"Radio Corp. of America v. Radio Eng’g Labs., Inc., 293 U.S. 1 (SCOTUS 1934)","provenance":{"source_file":"s2138.html","source_anchor":"","source_sha256":"26c7c2a3bdfe077ea7e4b30ae79c9a9fd0d208d7d91da6e74f7f3ce0e157610b"},"short_name":"Radio Corp. of America v. Radio Eng’g Labs., Inc.","all_citations":["293 U.S. 1","21 USPQ 353"],"canonical_citation":"Radio Corp. of America v. Radio Eng’g Labs., Inc., 293 U.S. 1, 21 USPQ 353 (SCOTUS 1934)","decision_year":1934,"court":"SCOTUS"},{"id":"cs_fvuccuo3","corpus_id":"mpep-e9r01-2024-html","opaque_url":"https://mpep.io/n/cs_fvuccuo3","effective_range":{"start_revision":"R-01.2024","end_revision":null},"node_type":"case","rendered_text_html":"","rendered_text_plain":"Hull v. Davenport, 90 F.2d 103 (CCPA 1937)","provenance":{"source_file":"s2138.html","source_anchor":"","source_sha256":"26c7c2a3bdfe077ea7e4b30ae79c9a9fd0d208d7d91da6e74f7f3ce0e157610b"},"short_name":"Hull v. Davenport","all_citations":["90 F.2d 103","33 USPQ 506"],"canonical_citation":"Hull v. Davenport, 90 F.2d 103, 33 USPQ 506 (CCPA 1937)","decision_year":1937,"court":"CCPA"},{"id":"st_rsgkiums","corpus_id":"mpep-e9r01-2024-html","opaque_url":"https://mpep.io/n/st_rsgkiums","effective_range":{"start_revision":"R-01.2024","end_revision":null},"node_type":"statute","rendered_text_html":"","rendered_text_plain":"","provenance":{"source_file":"s2138.html","source_anchor":"","source_sha256":"26c7c2a3bdfe077ea7e4b30ae79c9a9fd0d208d7d91da6e74f7f3ce0e157610b"},"authority":"us_usc","authority_title_num":"35","authority_section_num":"135","subsection_path":[],"canonical_citation":"35 U.S.C. 135"},{"id":"pb_53c4d6cm","corpus_id":"mpep-e9r01-2024-html","opaque_url":"https://mpep.io/n/pb_53c4d6cm","effective_range":{"start_revision":"R-01.2024","end_revision":null},"node_type":"prose_block","rendered_text_html":"

    It is noted that 35 U.S.C. 101 requires that\n whoever invents or discovers the claimed invention is the party that must be named as\n the inventor before a patent may be granted. Where it can be shown that a named\n inventor has “derived” an invention from another, a rejection under pre-AIA 35 U.S.C.\n 102(f) is proper if applicable. Ex parte\n Kusko, 215 USPQ 972, 974 (Bd. App. 1981) (“most, if not all,\n determinations under [pre-AIA] Section 102(f) involve\n the question of whether one party derived an invention from another”); Price\n v. Symsek, 988 F.2d 1187, 1190, 26 USPQ2d 1031, 1033 (Fed. Cir. 1993)\n (Although derivation and priority of invention both focus on inventorship, derivation\n addresses originality, i.e., who invented the subject matter, whereas priority\n focuses on which party invented the subject matter first.). \n

    ","rendered_text_plain":"It is noted that 35 U.S.C. 101 requires that whoever invents or discovers the claimed invention is the party that must be named as the inventor before a patent may be granted. Where it can be shown that a named inventor has “derived” an invention from another, a rejection under pre-AIA 35 U.S.C. 102(f) is proper if applicable. Ex parte Kusko, 215 USPQ 972, 974 (Bd. App. 1981) (“most, if not all, determinations under [pre-AIA] Section 102(f) involve the question of whether one party derived an invention from another”); Price v. Symsek, 988 F.2d 1187, 1190, 26 USPQ2d 1031, 1033 (Fed. Cir. 1993) (Although derivation and priority of invention both focus on inventorship, derivation addresses originality, i.e., who invented the subject matter, whereas priority focuses on which party invented the subject matter first.).","provenance":{"source_file":"s2138.html","source_anchor":"d0e207202","source_sha256":"26c7c2a3bdfe077ea7e4b30ae79c9a9fd0d208d7d91da6e74f7f3ce0e157610b"},"kind":"narrative","host_section_id":"se_bhecysdg"},{"id":"cs_s6q5zdix","corpus_id":"mpep-e9r01-2024-html","opaque_url":"https://mpep.io/n/cs_s6q5zdix","effective_range":{"start_revision":"R-01.2024","end_revision":null},"node_type":"case","rendered_text_html":"","rendered_text_plain":"Ex parte Kusko, 215 USPQ 972 (Bd. App. 1981)","provenance":{"source_file":"s2138.html","source_anchor":"","source_sha256":"26c7c2a3bdfe077ea7e4b30ae79c9a9fd0d208d7d91da6e74f7f3ce0e157610b"},"short_name":"Ex parte Kusko","all_citations":["215 USPQ 972"],"canonical_citation":"Ex parte Kusko, 215 USPQ 972 (Bd. App. 1981)","decision_year":1981,"court":"Bd. App."},{"id":"cs_bbv7pgco","corpus_id":"mpep-e9r01-2024-html","opaque_url":"https://mpep.io/n/cs_bbv7pgco","effective_range":{"start_revision":"R-01.2024","end_revision":null},"node_type":"case","rendered_text_html":"","rendered_text_plain":"Price v. Symsek, 988 F.2d 1187 (Fed. Cir. 1993)","provenance":{"source_file":"s2138.html","source_anchor":"","source_sha256":"26c7c2a3bdfe077ea7e4b30ae79c9a9fd0d208d7d91da6e74f7f3ce0e157610b"},"short_name":"Price v. Symsek","all_citations":["988 F.2d 1187","26 USPQ2d 1031"],"canonical_citation":"Price v. Symsek, 988 F.2d 1187, 26 USPQ2d 1031 (Fed. Cir. 1993)","decision_year":1993,"court":"Fed. Cir."},{"id":"st_tjqaidzg","corpus_id":"mpep-e9r01-2024-html","opaque_url":"https://mpep.io/n/st_tjqaidzg","effective_range":{"start_revision":"R-01.2024","end_revision":null},"node_type":"statute","rendered_text_html":"","rendered_text_plain":"","provenance":{"source_file":"s2138.html","source_anchor":"","source_sha256":"26c7c2a3bdfe077ea7e4b30ae79c9a9fd0d208d7d91da6e74f7f3ce0e157610b"},"authority":"us_usc","authority_title_num":"35","authority_section_num":"102","subsection_path":["f"],"canonical_citation":"35 U.S.C. 102(f)"},{"id":"pb_jrzzcx34","corpus_id":"mpep-e9r01-2024-html","opaque_url":"https://mpep.io/n/pb_jrzzcx34","effective_range":{"start_revision":"R-01.2024","end_revision":null},"node_type":"prose_block","rendered_text_html":"II. PRIORITY TIME CHARTS","rendered_text_plain":"II. PRIORITY TIME CHARTS","provenance":{"source_file":"s2138.html","source_anchor":"d0e207148/b.2","source_sha256":"26c7c2a3bdfe077ea7e4b30ae79c9a9fd0d208d7d91da6e74f7f3ce0e157610b"},"kind":"informal_heading","host_section_id":"se_bhecysdg","heading_level":2,"heading_text":"II. PRIORITY TIME CHARTS"},{"id":"pb_soaobspm","corpus_id":"mpep-e9r01-2024-html","opaque_url":"https://mpep.io/n/pb_soaobspm","effective_range":{"start_revision":"R-01.2024","end_revision":null},"node_type":"prose_block","rendered_text_html":"

    The following priority time charts illustrate the award of invention\n priority in several situations. The time charts apply to interference proceedings and\n are also applicable to declarations or affidavits filed under 37 CFR\n 1.131 to antedate references which are available as prior art\n under pre-AIA\n 35 U.S.C. 102(a) or 102(e). Note, however, in the\n context of 37\n CFR 1.131, an inventor does not have to show that the invention\n was not abandoned, suppressed, or concealed from the time of an actual reduction to\n practice to a constructive reduction to practice because the length of time taken to\n file a patent application after an actual reduction to practice is generally of no\n consequence except in an interference proceeding. Paulik v.\n Rizkalla, 760 F.2d 1270, 226 USPQ 224 (Fed. Cir. 1985). See the\n discussion of abandonment, suppression, and concealment in MPEP §\n 2138.03.\n

    ","rendered_text_plain":"The following priority time charts illustrate the award of invention priority in several situations. The time charts apply to interference proceedings and are also applicable to declarations or affidavits filed under 37 CFR 1.131 to antedate references which are available as prior art under pre-AIA 35 U.S.C. 102(a) or 102(e). Note, however, in the context of 37 CFR 1.131, an inventor does not have to show that the invention was not abandoned, suppressed, or concealed from the time of an actual reduction to practice to a constructive reduction to practice because the length of time taken to file a patent application after an actual reduction to practice is generally of no consequence except in an interference proceeding. Paulik v. Rizkalla, 760 F.2d 1270, 226 USPQ 224 (Fed. Cir. 1985). See the discussion of abandonment, suppression, and concealment in MPEP § 2138.03.","provenance":{"source_file":"s2138.html","source_anchor":"d0e207233","source_sha256":"26c7c2a3bdfe077ea7e4b30ae79c9a9fd0d208d7d91da6e74f7f3ce0e157610b"},"kind":"narrative","host_section_id":"se_bhecysdg"},{"id":"st_egkio462","corpus_id":"mpep-e9r01-2024-html","opaque_url":"https://mpep.io/n/st_egkio462","effective_range":{"start_revision":"R-01.2024","end_revision":null},"node_type":"statute","rendered_text_html":"","rendered_text_plain":"","provenance":{"source_file":"s2138.html","source_anchor":"","source_sha256":"26c7c2a3bdfe077ea7e4b30ae79c9a9fd0d208d7d91da6e74f7f3ce0e157610b"},"authority":"us_usc","authority_title_num":"35","authority_section_num":"102","subsection_path":["a"],"canonical_citation":"35 U.S.C. 102(a)"},{"id":"pb_j6tmpz6x","corpus_id":"mpep-e9r01-2024-html","opaque_url":"https://mpep.io/n/pb_j6tmpz6x","effective_range":{"start_revision":"R-01.2024","end_revision":null},"node_type":"prose_block","rendered_text_html":"

    For purposes of analysis under 37 CFR\n 1.131, the conception and reduction to practice of the\n reference to be antedated are both considered to be on the effective filing date of\n domestic patent or foreign patent or the date of printed publication.\n

    ","rendered_text_plain":"For purposes of analysis under 37 CFR 1.131, the conception and reduction to practice of the reference to be antedated are both considered to be on the effective filing date of domestic patent or foreign patent or the date of printed publication.","provenance":{"source_file":"s2138.html","source_anchor":"d0e207254","source_sha256":"26c7c2a3bdfe077ea7e4b30ae79c9a9fd0d208d7d91da6e74f7f3ce0e157610b"},"kind":"narrative","host_section_id":"se_bhecysdg"},{"id":"pb_sfrelcsx","corpus_id":"mpep-e9r01-2024-html","opaque_url":"https://mpep.io/n/pb_sfrelcsx","effective_range":{"start_revision":"R-01.2024","end_revision":null},"node_type":"prose_block","rendered_text_html":"

    In the charts, C = conception, R = reduction to practice (either\n actual or constructive), Ra = actual reduction to practice, Rc = constructive\n reduction to practice, and TD = commencement of diligence.\n

    ","rendered_text_plain":"In the charts, C = conception, R = reduction to practice (either actual or constructive), Ra = actual reduction to practice, Rc = constructive reduction to practice, and TD = commencement of diligence.","provenance":{"source_file":"s2138.html","source_anchor":"d0e207260","source_sha256":"26c7c2a3bdfe077ea7e4b30ae79c9a9fd0d208d7d91da6e74f7f3ce0e157610b"},"kind":"narrative","host_section_id":"se_bhecysdg"},{"id":"we_pdpkgifs","corpus_id":"mpep-e9r01-2024-html","opaque_url":"https://mpep.io/n/we_pdpkgifs","effective_range":{"start_revision":"R-01.2024","end_revision":null},"node_type":"worked_example","rendered_text_html":"
    Example 1
    \"Priority
    \n

    A is awarded priority in an interference, or antedates B as a\n reference in the context of a declaration or affidavit filed under\n 37 CFR\n 1.131, because A conceived the invention before B and\n constructively reduced the invention to practice before B reduced the invention to\n practice. The same result would be reached if the conception date was the same for\n both inventors A and B. \n

    \n
    ","rendered_text_plain":"Example 1 A is awarded priority in an interference, or antedates B as a reference in the context of a declaration or affidavit filed under 37 CFR 1.131, because A conceived the invention before B and constructively reduced the invention to practice before B reduced the invention to practice. The same result would be reached if the conception date was the same for both inventors A and B.","provenance":{"source_file":"s2138.html","source_anchor":"d0e207266","source_sha256":"26c7c2a3bdfe077ea7e4b30ae79c9a9fd0d208d7d91da6e74f7f3ce0e157610b"},"example_number":1,"example_type":"other","host_section_id":"se_bhecysdg"},{"id":"fg_5fox7wul","corpus_id":"mpep-e9r01-2024-html","opaque_url":"https://mpep.io/n/fg_5fox7wul","effective_range":{"start_revision":"R-01.2024","end_revision":null},"node_type":"figure","rendered_text_html":"","rendered_text_plain":"","provenance":{"source_file":"s2138.html","source_anchor":"d0e207271","source_sha256":"26c7c2a3bdfe077ea7e4b30ae79c9a9fd0d208d7d91da6e74f7f3ce0e157610b"},"graphic_uri":"graphics/2138_01-1.png","alt_text":"Priority Time Chart Example 1","width":394,"height":197,"host_section_id":"se_bhecysdg"},{"id":"we_uw65yqah","corpus_id":"mpep-e9r01-2024-html","opaque_url":"https://mpep.io/n/we_uw65yqah","effective_range":{"start_revision":"R-01.2024","end_revision":null},"node_type":"worked_example","rendered_text_html":"
    Example 2
    \"Priority
    \n

    A is awarded priority in an interference, or antedates B as a\n reference in the context of a declaration or affidavit filed under\n 37 CFR\n 1.131, if A can show reasonable diligence from\n TD (a point just prior to B’s conception) until Rc\n because A conceived the invention before B, and diligently constructively reduced\n the invention to practice even though this was after B reduced the invention to\n practice.\n

    \n
    ","rendered_text_plain":"Example 2 A is awarded priority in an interference, or antedates B as a reference in the context of a declaration or affidavit filed under 37 CFR 1.131, if A can show reasonable diligence from TD (a point just prior to B’s conception) until Rc because A conceived the invention before B, and diligently constructively reduced the invention to practice even though this was after B reduced the invention to practice.","provenance":{"source_file":"s2138.html","source_anchor":"d0e207280","source_sha256":"26c7c2a3bdfe077ea7e4b30ae79c9a9fd0d208d7d91da6e74f7f3ce0e157610b"},"example_number":2,"example_type":"other","host_section_id":"se_bhecysdg"},{"id":"fg_mse4o7lc","corpus_id":"mpep-e9r01-2024-html","opaque_url":"https://mpep.io/n/fg_mse4o7lc","effective_range":{"start_revision":"R-01.2024","end_revision":null},"node_type":"figure","rendered_text_html":"","rendered_text_plain":"","provenance":{"source_file":"s2138.html","source_anchor":"d0e207284","source_sha256":"26c7c2a3bdfe077ea7e4b30ae79c9a9fd0d208d7d91da6e74f7f3ce0e157610b"},"graphic_uri":"graphics/2138_01-2.png","alt_text":"Priority Time Chart Example 2","width":394,"height":196,"host_section_id":"se_bhecysdg"},{"id":"we_fb5cjxls","corpus_id":"mpep-e9r01-2024-html","opaque_url":"https://mpep.io/n/we_fb5cjxls","effective_range":{"start_revision":"R-01.2024","end_revision":null},"node_type":"worked_example","rendered_text_html":"
    Example 3
    \"Priority
    \n

    A is awarded priority in an interference in the absence of\n abandonment, suppression, or concealment from Ra to Rc, because A conceived the\n invention before B, actually reduced the invention to practice before B reduced\n the invention to practice, and did not abandon, suppress, or conceal the invention\n after actually reducing the invention to practice and before constructively\n reducing the invention to practice.\n

    \n

    A antedates B as a reference in the context of a declaration or\n affidavit filed under 37 CFR 1.131 because A\n conceived the invention before B and actually reduced the invention to practice\n before B reduced the invention to practice.\n

    \n
    ","rendered_text_plain":"Example 3 A is awarded priority in an interference in the absence of abandonment, suppression, or concealment from Ra to Rc, because A conceived the invention before B, actually reduced the invention to practice before B reduced the invention to practice, and did not abandon, suppress, or conceal the invention after actually reducing the invention to practice and before constructively reducing the invention to practice. A antedates B as a reference in the context of a declaration or affidavit filed under 37 CFR 1.131 because A conceived the invention before B and actually reduced the invention to practice before B reduced the invention to practice.","provenance":{"source_file":"s2138.html","source_anchor":"d0e207296","source_sha256":"26c7c2a3bdfe077ea7e4b30ae79c9a9fd0d208d7d91da6e74f7f3ce0e157610b"},"example_number":3,"example_type":"other","host_section_id":"se_bhecysdg"},{"id":"fg_xf2ni5pt","corpus_id":"mpep-e9r01-2024-html","opaque_url":"https://mpep.io/n/fg_xf2ni5pt","effective_range":{"start_revision":"R-01.2024","end_revision":null},"node_type":"figure","rendered_text_html":"","rendered_text_plain":"","provenance":{"source_file":"s2138.html","source_anchor":"d0e207300","source_sha256":"26c7c2a3bdfe077ea7e4b30ae79c9a9fd0d208d7d91da6e74f7f3ce0e157610b"},"graphic_uri":"graphics/2138_01-3.png","alt_text":"Priority Time Chart Example 3","width":394,"height":193,"host_section_id":"se_bhecysdg"},{"id":"we_6ji2pwyi","corpus_id":"mpep-e9r01-2024-html","opaque_url":"https://mpep.io/n/we_6ji2pwyi","effective_range":{"start_revision":"R-01.2024","end_revision":null},"node_type":"worked_example","rendered_text_html":"
    Example 4
    \"Priority
    \n

    A is awarded priority in an interference if A can show reasonable\n diligence from TD (a point just prior to B’s conception)\n until Ra in the absence of abandonment, suppression, or concealment from Ra to Rc,\n because A conceived the invention before B, diligently actually reduced the\n invention to practice (after B reduced the invention to practice), and did not\n abandon, suppress, or conceal the invention after actually reducing the invention\n to practice and before constructively reducing the invention to practice.\n

    \n

    A antedates B as a reference in the context of a declaration or\n affidavit filed under 37 CFR 1.131 because A\n conceived the invention before B, and diligently actually reduced the invention to\n practice, even though this was after B reduced the invention to practice.\n

    \n
    ","rendered_text_plain":"Example 4 A is awarded priority in an interference if A can show reasonable diligence from TD (a point just prior to B’s conception) until Ra in the absence of abandonment, suppression, or concealment from Ra to Rc, because A conceived the invention before B, diligently actually reduced the invention to practice (after B reduced the invention to practice), and did not abandon, suppress, or conceal the invention after actually reducing the invention to practice and before constructively reducing the invention to practice. A antedates B as a reference in the context of a declaration or affidavit filed under 37 CFR 1.131 because A conceived the invention before B, and diligently actually reduced the invention to practice, even though this was after B reduced the invention to practice.","provenance":{"source_file":"s2138.html","source_anchor":"d0e207312","source_sha256":"26c7c2a3bdfe077ea7e4b30ae79c9a9fd0d208d7d91da6e74f7f3ce0e157610b"},"example_number":4,"example_type":"other","host_section_id":"se_bhecysdg"},{"id":"fg_7tiqk2gr","corpus_id":"mpep-e9r01-2024-html","opaque_url":"https://mpep.io/n/fg_7tiqk2gr","effective_range":{"start_revision":"R-01.2024","end_revision":null},"node_type":"figure","rendered_text_html":"","rendered_text_plain":"","provenance":{"source_file":"s2138.html","source_anchor":"d0e207316","source_sha256":"26c7c2a3bdfe077ea7e4b30ae79c9a9fd0d208d7d91da6e74f7f3ce0e157610b"},"graphic_uri":"graphics/2138_01-4.png","alt_text":"Priority Time Chart Example 4","width":394,"height":192,"host_section_id":"se_bhecysdg"},{"id":"pb_3ddp3urt","corpus_id":"mpep-e9r01-2024-html","opaque_url":"https://mpep.io/n/pb_3ddp3urt","effective_range":{"start_revision":"R-01.2024","end_revision":null},"node_type":"prose_block","rendered_text_html":"III. 37 CFR 1.131 DOES NOT APPLY IN INTERFERENCE PROCEEDINGS","rendered_text_plain":"III. 37 CFR 1.131 DOES NOT APPLY IN INTERFERENCE PROCEEDINGS","provenance":{"source_file":"s2138.html","source_anchor":"d0e207148/b.4","source_sha256":"26c7c2a3bdfe077ea7e4b30ae79c9a9fd0d208d7d91da6e74f7f3ce0e157610b"},"kind":"informal_heading","host_section_id":"se_bhecysdg","heading_level":2,"heading_text":"III. 37 CFR 1.131 DOES NOT APPLY IN INTERFERENCE PROCEEDINGS"},{"id":"pb_ucz3rt7h","corpus_id":"mpep-e9r01-2024-html","opaque_url":"https://mpep.io/n/pb_ucz3rt7h","effective_range":{"start_revision":"R-01.2024","end_revision":null},"node_type":"prose_block","rendered_text_html":"

    Interference practice operates to the exclusion of ex\n parte practice under 37 CFR 1.131 which permits an\n inventor to show an actual date of invention prior to the effective date of a\n reference or activity applied under pre-AIA 35 U.S.C. 102 or\n 103, as long as the reference is not a statutory bar under\n pre-AIA 35\n U.S.C. 102(b) or a U.S. patent application publication claiming\n the same patentable invention. Ex parte Standish, 10 USPQ2d 1454,\n 1457 (Bd. Pat. App. & Inter. 1988) (An application claim to the “same patentable\n invention” claimed in a domestic patent requires interference rather than an\n affidavit under 37 CFR 1.131 to antedate the patent. The term “same patentable\n invention” encompasses a claim that is either anticipated by or obvious in view of\n the subject matter recited in the patent claim.). Subject matter which is prior art\n under pre-AIA 35\n U.S.C. 102(g) and is subject to an interference is not open to\n further inquiry under 37 CFR 1.131 during the\n interference proceeding.\n

    ","rendered_text_plain":"Interference practice operates to the exclusion of ex parte practice under 37 CFR 1.131 which permits an inventor to show an actual date of invention prior to the effective date of a reference or activity applied under pre-AIA 35 U.S.C. 102 or 103, as long as the reference is not a statutory bar under pre-AIA 35 U.S.C. 102(b) or a U.S. patent application publication claiming the same patentable invention. Ex parte Standish, 10 USPQ2d 1454, 1457 (Bd. Pat. App. & Inter. 1988) (An application claim to the “same patentable invention” claimed in a domestic patent requires interference rather than an affidavit under 37 CFR 1.131 to antedate the patent. The term “same patentable invention” encompasses a claim that is either anticipated by or obvious in view of the subject matter recited in the patent claim.). Subject matter which is prior art under pre-AIA 35 U.S.C. 102(g) and is subject to an interference is not open to further inquiry under 37 CFR 1.131 during the interference proceeding.","provenance":{"source_file":"s2138.html","source_anchor":"d0e207340","source_sha256":"26c7c2a3bdfe077ea7e4b30ae79c9a9fd0d208d7d91da6e74f7f3ce0e157610b"},"kind":"narrative","host_section_id":"se_bhecysdg"},{"id":"cs_axngs2fo","corpus_id":"mpep-e9r01-2024-html","opaque_url":"https://mpep.io/n/cs_axngs2fo","effective_range":{"start_revision":"R-01.2024","end_revision":null},"node_type":"case","rendered_text_html":"","rendered_text_plain":"Ex parte Standish, 10 USPQ2d 1454 (BPAI 1988)","provenance":{"source_file":"s2138.html","source_anchor":"","source_sha256":"26c7c2a3bdfe077ea7e4b30ae79c9a9fd0d208d7d91da6e74f7f3ce0e157610b"},"short_name":"Ex parte Standish","all_citations":["10 USPQ2d 1454"],"canonical_citation":"Ex parte Standish, 10 USPQ2d 1454 (BPAI 1988)","decision_year":1988,"court":"BPAI"},{"id":"st_whuefsch","corpus_id":"mpep-e9r01-2024-html","opaque_url":"https://mpep.io/n/st_whuefsch","effective_range":{"start_revision":"R-01.2024","end_revision":null},"node_type":"statute","rendered_text_html":"","rendered_text_plain":"","provenance":{"source_file":"s2138.html","source_anchor":"","source_sha256":"26c7c2a3bdfe077ea7e4b30ae79c9a9fd0d208d7d91da6e74f7f3ce0e157610b"},"authority":"us_usc","authority_title_num":"35","authority_section_num":"102","subsection_path":["b"],"canonical_citation":"35 U.S.C. 102(b)"},{"id":"pb_6eoqasce","corpus_id":"mpep-e9r01-2024-html","opaque_url":"https://mpep.io/n/pb_6eoqasce","effective_range":{"start_revision":"R-01.2024","end_revision":null},"node_type":"prose_block","rendered_text_html":"IV. LOST COUNTS IN AN INTERFERENCE ARE NOT, PER SE, STATUTORY PRIOR ART","rendered_text_plain":"IV. LOST COUNTS IN AN INTERFERENCE ARE NOT, PER SE, STATUTORY PRIOR ART","provenance":{"source_file":"s2138.html","source_anchor":"d0e207148/b.6","source_sha256":"26c7c2a3bdfe077ea7e4b30ae79c9a9fd0d208d7d91da6e74f7f3ce0e157610b"},"kind":"informal_heading","host_section_id":"se_bhecysdg","heading_level":2,"heading_text":"IV. LOST COUNTS IN AN INTERFERENCE ARE NOT, PER SE, STATUTORY PRIOR ART"},{"id":"pb_sp2goudr","corpus_id":"mpep-e9r01-2024-html","opaque_url":"https://mpep.io/n/pb_sp2goudr","effective_range":{"start_revision":"R-01.2024","end_revision":null},"node_type":"prose_block","rendered_text_html":"

    Loss of an interference count alone does not make its subject matter\n statutory prior art to losing party; however, lost count\n subject matter that is available as prior art under pre-AIA 35 U.S.C.\n 102 may be used alone or in combination with other references\n under pre-AIA 35\n U.S.C. 103. But see In re Deckler, 977 F.2d\n 1449, 24 USPQ2d 1448 (Fed. Cir. 1992) (Under the principles of res\n judicata and collateral estoppel, Deckler was not\n entitled to claims that were patentably indistinguishable from the claim lost in\n interference even though the subject matter of the lost count was not available for\n use in an obviousness rejection under 35 U.S.C. 103.).\n

    ","rendered_text_plain":"Loss of an interference count alone does not make its subject matter statutory prior art to losing party; however, lost count subject matter that is available as prior art under pre-AIA 35 U.S.C. 102 may be used alone or in combination with other references under pre-AIA 35 U.S.C. 103. But see In re Deckler, 977 F.2d 1449, 24 USPQ2d 1448 (Fed. Cir. 1992) (Under the principles of res judicata and collateral estoppel, Deckler was not entitled to claims that were patentably indistinguishable from the claim lost in interference even though the subject matter of the lost count was not available for use in an obviousness rejection under 35 U.S.C. 103.).","provenance":{"source_file":"s2138.html","source_anchor":"d0e207374","source_sha256":"26c7c2a3bdfe077ea7e4b30ae79c9a9fd0d208d7d91da6e74f7f3ce0e157610b"},"kind":"narrative","host_section_id":"se_bhecysdg"},{"id":"cs_vaxllxcc","corpus_id":"mpep-e9r01-2024-html","opaque_url":"https://mpep.io/n/cs_vaxllxcc","effective_range":{"start_revision":"R-01.2024","end_revision":null},"node_type":"case","rendered_text_html":"","rendered_text_plain":"In re Deckler, 977 F.2d 1449 (Fed. Cir. 1992)","provenance":{"source_file":"s2138.html","source_anchor":"","source_sha256":"26c7c2a3bdfe077ea7e4b30ae79c9a9fd0d208d7d91da6e74f7f3ce0e157610b"},"short_name":"In re Deckler","all_citations":["977 F.2d 1449","24 USPQ2d 1448"],"canonical_citation":"In re Deckler, 977 F.2d 1449, 24 USPQ2d 1448 (Fed. Cir. 1992)","decision_year":1992,"court":"Fed. Cir."},{"id":"se_bhecysdg","corpus_id":"mpep-e9r01-2024-html","opaque_url":"https://mpep.io/n/se_bhecysdg","effective_range":{"start_revision":"R-01.2024","end_revision":null},"node_type":"section","rendered_text_html":"","rendered_text_plain":"","provenance":{"source_file":"s2138.html","source_anchor":"d0e207148","source_sha256":"26c7c2a3bdfe077ea7e4b30ae79c9a9fd0d208d7d91da6e74f7f3ce0e157610b"},"akn_urn":"/akn/us/statement/manual/uspto/2024/mpep/eng@2024-02-29!sec_2138_01","canonical_url":"https://mpep.io/akn/us/statement/manual/uspto/2024/mpep/eng@2024-02-29!sec_2138_01","section_number":"2138.01","chapter":"2100","depth":1,"title":"Interference Practice","children_ids":["pb_cyjnb2ma","pb_zyyynoqz","pb_456ilx7y","pb_53c4d6cm","pb_jrzzcx34","pb_soaobspm","pb_j6tmpz6x","pb_sfrelcsx","we_pdpkgifs","fg_5fox7wul","we_uw65yqah","fg_mse4o7lc","we_fb5cjxls","fg_xf2ni5pt","we_6ji2pwyi","fg_7tiqk2gr","pb_3ddp3urt","pb_ucz3rt7h","pb_6eoqasce","pb_sp2goudr"],"revision_tag":"R-01.2024","parent_section_id":"se_oly7ctjt"},{"id":"pb_owjxfypz","corpus_id":"mpep-e9r01-2024-html","opaque_url":"https://mpep.io/n/pb_owjxfypz","effective_range":{"start_revision":"R-01.2024","end_revision":null},"node_type":"prose_block","rendered_text_html":"

    [Editor Note: This MPEP section has limited applicability to\n applications subject to examination under the first inventor to file (FITF)\n provisions of the AIA as set forth in 35 U.S.C. 100 (note). Patents and\n applications that contain (or contained at any time) at least one claim with a\n pre-AIA effective filing date (before March 16, 2013) and at least one claim with a\n post-AIA effective filing date (on or after March 16, 2013) are subject to the\n patentability requirements in AIA 35 U.S.C.\n 102-103 and subject to\n pre-AIA 35\n U.S.C. 102(g).See MPEP §\n 2159 et seq.]

    ","rendered_text_plain":"[Editor Note: This MPEP section has limited applicability to applications subject to examination under the first inventor to file (FITF) provisions of the AIA as set forth in 35 U.S.C. 100 (note). Patents and applications that contain (or contained at any time) at least one claim with a pre-AIA effective filing date (before March 16, 2013) and at least one claim with a post-AIA effective filing date (on or after March 16, 2013) are subject to the patentability requirements in AIA 35 U.S.C. 102-103 and subject to pre-AIA 35 U.S.C. 102(g).See MPEP § 2159 et seq.]","provenance":{"source_file":"s2138.html","source_anchor":"ch2100_d222e6_19082_247","source_sha256":"26c7c2a3bdfe077ea7e4b30ae79c9a9fd0d208d7d91da6e74f7f3ce0e157610b"},"kind":"narrative","host_section_id":"se_6vosto3y"},{"id":"pb_j5maopxb","corpus_id":"mpep-e9r01-2024-html","opaque_url":"https://mpep.io/n/pb_j5maopxb","effective_range":{"start_revision":"R-01.2024","end_revision":null},"node_type":"prose_block","rendered_text_html":"

    An invention is made when there is a conception and a reduction to\n practice. Dunn v. Ragin, 50 USPQ 472, 474 (Bd. Pat. Inter. 1941).\n Prior art under pre-AIA 35 U.S.C. 102(g) is limited to an invention that is made.\n In re Katz, 687 F.2d 450, 454, 215 USPQ 14, 17 (CCPA 1982) (the\n publication of an article, alone, is not deemed a constructive reduction to practice,\n and therefore its disclosure does not prove that any invention within the meaning of\n pre-AIA 35 U.S.C.\n 102(g) has ever been made). \n

    ","rendered_text_plain":"An invention is made when there is a conception and a reduction to practice. Dunn v. Ragin, 50 USPQ 472, 474 (Bd. Pat. Inter. 1941). Prior art under pre-AIA 35 U.S.C. 102(g) is limited to an invention that is made. In re Katz, 687 F.2d 450, 454, 215 USPQ 14, 17 (CCPA 1982) (the publication of an article, alone, is not deemed a constructive reduction to practice, and therefore its disclosure does not prove that any invention within the meaning of pre-AIA 35 U.S.C. 102(g) has ever been made).","provenance":{"source_file":"s2138.html","source_anchor":"d0e207406","source_sha256":"26c7c2a3bdfe077ea7e4b30ae79c9a9fd0d208d7d91da6e74f7f3ce0e157610b"},"kind":"narrative","host_section_id":"se_6vosto3y"},{"id":"cs_7bxum4lu","corpus_id":"mpep-e9r01-2024-html","opaque_url":"https://mpep.io/n/cs_7bxum4lu","effective_range":{"start_revision":"R-01.2024","end_revision":null},"node_type":"case","rendered_text_html":"","rendered_text_plain":"Dunn v. Ragin, 50 USPQ 472 (Bd. Pat. Inter. 1941)","provenance":{"source_file":"s2138.html","source_anchor":"","source_sha256":"26c7c2a3bdfe077ea7e4b30ae79c9a9fd0d208d7d91da6e74f7f3ce0e157610b"},"short_name":"Dunn v. Ragin","all_citations":["50 USPQ 472"],"canonical_citation":"Dunn v. Ragin, 50 USPQ 472 (Bd. Pat. Inter. 1941)","decision_year":1941,"court":"Bd. Pat. Inter."},{"id":"cs_v2dbagsv","corpus_id":"mpep-e9r01-2024-html","opaque_url":"https://mpep.io/n/cs_v2dbagsv","effective_range":{"start_revision":"R-01.2024","end_revision":null},"node_type":"case","rendered_text_html":"","rendered_text_plain":"In re Katz, 687 F.2d 450 (CCPA 1982)","provenance":{"source_file":"s2138.html","source_anchor":"","source_sha256":"26c7c2a3bdfe077ea7e4b30ae79c9a9fd0d208d7d91da6e74f7f3ce0e157610b"},"short_name":"In re Katz","all_citations":["687 F.2d 450","215 USPQ 14"],"canonical_citation":"In re Katz, 687 F.2d 450, 215 USPQ 14 (CCPA 1982)","decision_year":1982,"court":"CCPA"},{"id":"pb_qgketipx","corpus_id":"mpep-e9r01-2024-html","opaque_url":"https://mpep.io/n/pb_qgketipx","effective_range":{"start_revision":"R-01.2024","end_revision":null},"node_type":"prose_block","rendered_text_html":"

    Subject matter under pre-AIA 35 U.S.C. 102(g) is\n available only if made in this country. Pre-AIA 35 U.S.C. 104.\n Kondo v. Martel, 220 USPQ 47 (Bd. Pat. Inter. 1983) (acts of\n conception, reduction to practice and diligence must be demonstrated in this country).\n Compare Colbert v. Lofdahl, 21 USPQ2d 1068, 1071 (Bd. Pat. App. &\n Inter. 1991) (“[i]f the invention is reduced to practice in a foreign country and\n knowledge of the invention was brought into this country and disclosed to others, the\n inventor can derive no benefit from the work done abroad and such knowledge is merely\n evidence of conception of the invention”).\n

    ","rendered_text_plain":"Subject matter under pre-AIA 35 U.S.C. 102(g) is available only if made in this country. Pre-AIA 35 U.S.C. 104. Kondo v. Martel, 220 USPQ 47 (Bd. Pat. Inter. 1983) (acts of conception, reduction to practice and diligence must be demonstrated in this country). Compare Colbert v. Lofdahl, 21 USPQ2d 1068, 1071 (Bd. Pat. App. & Inter. 1991) (“[i]f the invention is reduced to practice in a foreign country and knowledge of the invention was brought into this country and disclosed to others, the inventor can derive no benefit from the work done abroad and such knowledge is merely evidence of conception of the invention”).","provenance":{"source_file":"s2138.html","source_anchor":"d0e207421","source_sha256":"26c7c2a3bdfe077ea7e4b30ae79c9a9fd0d208d7d91da6e74f7f3ce0e157610b"},"kind":"narrative","host_section_id":"se_6vosto3y"},{"id":"cs_3wjry6mi","corpus_id":"mpep-e9r01-2024-html","opaque_url":"https://mpep.io/n/cs_3wjry6mi","effective_range":{"start_revision":"R-01.2024","end_revision":null},"node_type":"case","rendered_text_html":"","rendered_text_plain":"Kondo v. Martel, 220 USPQ 47 (Bd. Pat. Inter. 1983)","provenance":{"source_file":"s2138.html","source_anchor":"","source_sha256":"26c7c2a3bdfe077ea7e4b30ae79c9a9fd0d208d7d91da6e74f7f3ce0e157610b"},"short_name":"Kondo v. Martel","all_citations":["220 USPQ 47"],"canonical_citation":"Kondo v. Martel, 220 USPQ 47 (Bd. Pat. Inter. 1983)","decision_year":1983,"court":"Bd. Pat. Inter."},{"id":"cs_nwa5dxep","corpus_id":"mpep-e9r01-2024-html","opaque_url":"https://mpep.io/n/cs_nwa5dxep","effective_range":{"start_revision":"R-01.2024","end_revision":null},"node_type":"case","rendered_text_html":"","rendered_text_plain":"Colbert v. Lofdahl, 21 USPQ2d 1068 (BPAI 1991)","provenance":{"source_file":"s2138.html","source_anchor":"","source_sha256":"26c7c2a3bdfe077ea7e4b30ae79c9a9fd0d208d7d91da6e74f7f3ce0e157610b"},"short_name":"Colbert v. Lofdahl","all_citations":["21 USPQ2d 1068"],"canonical_citation":"Colbert v. Lofdahl, 21 USPQ2d 1068 (BPAI 1991)","decision_year":1991,"court":"BPAI"},{"id":"st_6r4lrnxl","corpus_id":"mpep-e9r01-2024-html","opaque_url":"https://mpep.io/n/st_6r4lrnxl","effective_range":{"start_revision":"R-01.2024","end_revision":null},"node_type":"statute","rendered_text_html":"","rendered_text_plain":"","provenance":{"source_file":"s2138.html","source_anchor":"","source_sha256":"26c7c2a3bdfe077ea7e4b30ae79c9a9fd0d208d7d91da6e74f7f3ce0e157610b"},"authority":"us_usc","authority_title_num":"35","authority_section_num":"104","subsection_path":[],"canonical_citation":"35 U.S.C. 104"},{"id":"pb_avdyucdr","corpus_id":"mpep-e9r01-2024-html","opaque_url":"https://mpep.io/n/pb_avdyucdr","effective_range":{"start_revision":"R-01.2024","end_revision":null},"node_type":"prose_block","rendered_text_html":"

    In accordance with pre-AIA 35 U.S.C. 102(g)(1), a party\n involved in an interference proceeding under pre-AIA 35 U.S.C. 135 or\n 291 may establish a date of invention under pre-AIA 35 U.S.C.\n 104. Pre-AIA 35 U.S.C. 104, as amended by\n GATT (Public Law 103-465, 108 Stat. 4809 (1994)) and NAFTA (Public Law 103-182, 107\n Stat. 2057 (1993)), provides that an inventor can establish a date of invention in a\n NAFTA member country on or after December 8, 1993 or in WTO member country other than a\n NAFTA member country on or after January 1, 1996. Accordingly, an interference count may\n be won or lost on the basis of establishment of invention by one of the parties in a\n NAFTA or WTO member country, thereby rendering the subject matter of that count\n unpatentable to the other party under the principles of res judicata\n and collateral estoppel, even though such subject matter is not\n available as statutory prior art under pre-AIA 35 U.S.C. 102(g). See\n MPEP\n § 2138.01 regarding lost interference counts which are not\n statutory prior art. \n

    ","rendered_text_plain":"In accordance with pre-AIA 35 U.S.C. 102(g)(1), a party involved in an interference proceeding under pre-AIA 35 U.S.C. 135 or 291 may establish a date of invention under pre-AIA 35 U.S.C. 104. Pre-AIA 35 U.S.C. 104, as amended by GATT (Public Law 103-465, 108 Stat. 4809 (1994)) and NAFTA (Public Law 103-182, 107 Stat. 2057 (1993)), provides that an inventor can establish a date of invention in a NAFTA member country on or after December 8, 1993 or in WTO member country other than a NAFTA member country on or after January 1, 1996. Accordingly, an interference count may be won or lost on the basis of establishment of invention by one of the parties in a NAFTA or WTO member country, thereby rendering the subject matter of that count unpatentable to the other party under the principles of res judicata and collateral estoppel, even though such subject matter is not available as statutory prior art under pre-AIA 35 U.S.C. 102(g). See MPEP § 2138.01 regarding lost interference counts which are not statutory prior art.","provenance":{"source_file":"s2138.html","source_anchor":"d0e207448","source_sha256":"26c7c2a3bdfe077ea7e4b30ae79c9a9fd0d208d7d91da6e74f7f3ce0e157610b"},"kind":"narrative","host_section_id":"se_6vosto3y"},{"id":"st_eb5kabi7","corpus_id":"mpep-e9r01-2024-html","opaque_url":"https://mpep.io/n/st_eb5kabi7","effective_range":{"start_revision":"R-01.2024","end_revision":null},"node_type":"statute","rendered_text_html":"","rendered_text_plain":"","provenance":{"source_file":"s2138.html","source_anchor":"","source_sha256":"26c7c2a3bdfe077ea7e4b30ae79c9a9fd0d208d7d91da6e74f7f3ce0e157610b"},"authority":"us_usc","authority_title_num":"35","authority_section_num":"102","subsection_path":["g","1"],"canonical_citation":"35 U.S.C. 102(g)(1)"},{"id":"se_6vosto3y","corpus_id":"mpep-e9r01-2024-html","opaque_url":"https://mpep.io/n/se_6vosto3y","effective_range":{"start_revision":"R-01.2024","end_revision":null},"node_type":"section","rendered_text_html":"","rendered_text_plain":"","provenance":{"source_file":"s2138.html","source_anchor":"d0e207398","source_sha256":"26c7c2a3bdfe077ea7e4b30ae79c9a9fd0d208d7d91da6e74f7f3ce0e157610b"},"akn_urn":"/akn/us/statement/manual/uspto/2024/mpep/eng@2024-02-29!sec_2138_02","canonical_url":"https://mpep.io/akn/us/statement/manual/uspto/2024/mpep/eng@2024-02-29!sec_2138_02","section_number":"2138.02","chapter":"2100","depth":1,"title":"“The Invention Was Made in This Country”","children_ids":["pb_owjxfypz","pb_j5maopxb","pb_qgketipx","pb_avdyucdr"],"revision_tag":"R-01.2024","parent_section_id":"se_oly7ctjt"},{"id":"pb_kge6dd5s","corpus_id":"mpep-e9r01-2024-html","opaque_url":"https://mpep.io/n/pb_kge6dd5s","effective_range":{"start_revision":"R-01.2024","end_revision":null},"node_type":"prose_block","rendered_text_html":"

    [Editor Note: This MPEP section has limited applicability to\n applications subject to examination under the first inventor to file (FITF)\n provisions of the AIA as set forth in 35 U.S.C. 100 (note). Patents and\n applications that contain (or contained at any time) at least one claim with a\n pre-AIA effective filing date (before March 16, 2013) and at least one claim with a\n post-AIA effective filing date (on or after March 16, 2013) are subject to the\n patentability requirements in AIA 35 U.S.C.\n 102-103 and subject to\n pre-AIA 35\n U.S.C. 102(g).See MPEP §\n 2159 et seq.]

    ","rendered_text_plain":"[Editor Note: This MPEP section has limited applicability to applications subject to examination under the first inventor to file (FITF) provisions of the AIA as set forth in 35 U.S.C. 100 (note). Patents and applications that contain (or contained at any time) at least one claim with a pre-AIA effective filing date (before March 16, 2013) and at least one claim with a post-AIA effective filing date (on or after March 16, 2013) are subject to the patentability requirements in AIA 35 U.S.C. 102-103 and subject to pre-AIA 35 U.S.C. 102(g).See MPEP § 2159 et seq.]","provenance":{"source_file":"s2138.html","source_anchor":"ch2100_d222e6_190cd_26a","source_sha256":"26c7c2a3bdfe077ea7e4b30ae79c9a9fd0d208d7d91da6e74f7f3ce0e157610b"},"kind":"narrative","host_section_id":"se_hqjja4f5"},{"id":"pb_5bb7z6qt","corpus_id":"mpep-e9r01-2024-html","opaque_url":"https://mpep.io/n/pb_5bb7z6qt","effective_range":{"start_revision":"R-01.2024","end_revision":null},"node_type":"prose_block","rendered_text_html":"

    Pre-AIA 35 U.S.C.\n 102(g) generally makes available as prior art within the meaning\n of 35 U.S.C.\n 103, the prior invention of another who has not abandoned,\n suppressed or concealed it. In re Bass, 474 F.2d 1276, 177 USPQ 178\n (CCPA 1973); In re Suska, 589 F.2d 527, 200 USPQ 497 (CCPA 1979) (The\n result of applying the suppression and concealment doctrine is that the inventor who did\n not conceal (but was the de facto last inventor) is treated legally\n as the first to invent, while the de facto first inventor who\n suppressed or concealed is treated as a later inventor. The de facto\n first inventor, by suppression and concealment, lost the right to rely on the actual\n date of invention not only for priority purposes, but also for purposes of avoiding the\n invention of the counts as prior art.).\n

    ","rendered_text_plain":"Pre-AIA 35 U.S.C. 102(g) generally makes available as prior art within the meaning of 35 U.S.C. 103, the prior invention of another who has not abandoned, suppressed or concealed it. In re Bass, 474 F.2d 1276, 177 USPQ 178 (CCPA 1973); In re Suska, 589 F.2d 527, 200 USPQ 497 (CCPA 1979) (The result of applying the suppression and concealment doctrine is that the inventor who did not conceal (but was the de facto last inventor) is treated legally as the first to invent, while the de facto first inventor who suppressed or concealed is treated as a later inventor. The de facto first inventor, by suppression and concealment, lost the right to rely on the actual date of invention not only for priority purposes, but also for purposes of avoiding the invention of the counts as prior art.).","provenance":{"source_file":"s2138.html","source_anchor":"d0e207482","source_sha256":"26c7c2a3bdfe077ea7e4b30ae79c9a9fd0d208d7d91da6e74f7f3ce0e157610b"},"kind":"narrative","host_section_id":"se_hqjja4f5"},{"id":"cs_oxqj7rxi","corpus_id":"mpep-e9r01-2024-html","opaque_url":"https://mpep.io/n/cs_oxqj7rxi","effective_range":{"start_revision":"R-01.2024","end_revision":null},"node_type":"case","rendered_text_html":"","rendered_text_plain":"In re Suska, 589 F.2d 527 (CCPA 1979)","provenance":{"source_file":"s2138.html","source_anchor":"","source_sha256":"26c7c2a3bdfe077ea7e4b30ae79c9a9fd0d208d7d91da6e74f7f3ce0e157610b"},"short_name":"In re Suska","all_citations":["589 F.2d 527","200 USPQ 497"],"canonical_citation":"In re Suska, 589 F.2d 527, 200 USPQ 497 (CCPA 1979)","decision_year":1979,"court":"CCPA"},{"id":"pb_dtkxukeu","corpus_id":"mpep-e9r01-2024-html","opaque_url":"https://mpep.io/n/pb_dtkxukeu","effective_range":{"start_revision":"R-01.2024","end_revision":null},"node_type":"prose_block","rendered_text_html":"

    “The courts have consistently held that an invention, though completed,\n is deemed abandoned, suppressed, or concealed if, within a reasonable time after\n completion, no steps are taken to make the invention publicly known. Thus, failure to\n file a patent application; to describe the invention in a publicly disseminated\n document; or to use the invention publicly, have been held to constitute abandonment,\n suppression, or concealment.” Correge v. Murphy, 705 F.2d 1326, 1330,\n 217 USPQ 753, 756 (Fed. Cir. 1983) (quoting International Glass Co.v.United States, 408 F.2d 395, 403, 159 USPQ 434, 441 (Ct. Cl. 1968)).\n In Correge, an invention was actually reduced to practice, 7 months\n later there was a public disclosure of the invention, and 8 months thereafter a patent\n application was filed. The court held filing a patent application within 1 year of a\n public disclosure is not an unreasonable delay, therefore reasonable diligence must only\n be shown between the date of the actual reduction to practice and the public disclosure\n to avoid the inference of abandonment.\n

    ","rendered_text_plain":"“The courts have consistently held that an invention, though completed, is deemed abandoned, suppressed, or concealed if, within a reasonable time after completion, no steps are taken to make the invention publicly known. Thus, failure to file a patent application; to describe the invention in a publicly disseminated document; or to use the invention publicly, have been held to constitute abandonment, suppression, or concealment.” Correge v. Murphy, 705 F.2d 1326, 1330, 217 USPQ 753, 756 (Fed. Cir. 1983) (quoting International Glass Co.v.United States, 408 F.2d 395, 403, 159 USPQ 434, 441 (Ct. Cl. 1968)). In Correge, an invention was actually reduced to practice, 7 months later there was a public disclosure of the invention, and 8 months thereafter a patent application was filed. The court held filing a patent application within 1 year of a public disclosure is not an unreasonable delay, therefore reasonable diligence must only be shown between the date of the actual reduction to practice and the public disclosure to avoid the inference of abandonment.","provenance":{"source_file":"s2138.html","source_anchor":"d0e207505","source_sha256":"26c7c2a3bdfe077ea7e4b30ae79c9a9fd0d208d7d91da6e74f7f3ce0e157610b"},"kind":"narrative","host_section_id":"se_hqjja4f5"},{"id":"cs_rdqrklfs","corpus_id":"mpep-e9r01-2024-html","opaque_url":"https://mpep.io/n/cs_rdqrklfs","effective_range":{"start_revision":"R-01.2024","end_revision":null},"node_type":"case","rendered_text_html":"","rendered_text_plain":"Correge v. Murphy, 705 F.2d 1326 (Fed. Cir. 1983)","provenance":{"source_file":"s2138.html","source_anchor":"","source_sha256":"26c7c2a3bdfe077ea7e4b30ae79c9a9fd0d208d7d91da6e74f7f3ce0e157610b"},"short_name":"Correge v. Murphy","all_citations":["705 F.2d 1326","217 USPQ 753"],"canonical_citation":"Correge v. Murphy, 705 F.2d 1326, 217 USPQ 753 (Fed. Cir. 1983)","decision_year":1983,"court":"Fed. Cir."},{"id":"pb_cgogsx5d","corpus_id":"mpep-e9r01-2024-html","opaque_url":"https://mpep.io/n/pb_cgogsx5d","effective_range":{"start_revision":"R-01.2024","end_revision":null},"node_type":"prose_block","rendered_text_html":"I. DURING AN INTERFERENCE PROCEEDING, AN INFERENCE OF SUPPRESSION OR CONCEALMENT MAY ARISE FROM DELAY IN FILING PATENT APPLICATION","rendered_text_plain":"I. DURING AN INTERFERENCE PROCEEDING, AN INFERENCE OF SUPPRESSION OR CONCEALMENT MAY ARISE FROM DELAY IN FILING PATENT APPLICATION","provenance":{"source_file":"s2138.html","source_anchor":"d0e207478/b.0","source_sha256":"26c7c2a3bdfe077ea7e4b30ae79c9a9fd0d208d7d91da6e74f7f3ce0e157610b"},"kind":"informal_heading","host_section_id":"se_hqjja4f5","heading_level":2,"heading_text":"I. DURING AN INTERFERENCE PROCEEDING, AN INFERENCE OF SUPPRESSION OR CONCEALMENT MAY ARISE FROM DELAY IN FILING PATENT APPLICATION"},{"id":"pb_7m5tyhr4","corpus_id":"mpep-e9r01-2024-html","opaque_url":"https://mpep.io/n/pb_7m5tyhr4","effective_range":{"start_revision":"R-01.2024","end_revision":null},"node_type":"prose_block","rendered_text_html":"

    Once an invention is actually reduced to practice an inventor need\n not rush to file a patent application. Shindelar v. Holdeman, 628\n F.2d 1337, 1341, 207 USPQ 112, 116 (CCPA 1980). The length of time taken to file a\n patent application after an actual reduction to practice is generally of no\n consequence except in an interference proceeding. Paulik v.\n Rizkalla, 760 F.2d 1270, 1271, 226 USPQ 225, 226 (Fed. Cir. 1985)\n (suppression or concealment may be deliberate or may arise due to an inference from a\n “too long” delay in filing a patent application). Peeler v.\n Miller, 535 F.2d 647, 656, 190 USPQ 117,124 (CCPA 1976) (“mere delay,\n without more, is not sufficient to establish suppression or concealment.” “What we\n are deciding here is that Monsanto’s delay is not ‘merely delay’ and that Monsanto's\n justification for the delay is inadequate to overcome the inference of suppression\n created by the excessive delay.” The word “mere” does not imply a total absence of a\n limit on the duration of delay. Whether any delay is “mere” is decided only on a\n case-by-case basis.).\n

    ","rendered_text_plain":"Once an invention is actually reduced to practice an inventor need not rush to file a patent application. Shindelar v. Holdeman, 628 F.2d 1337, 1341, 207 USPQ 112, 116 (CCPA 1980). The length of time taken to file a patent application after an actual reduction to practice is generally of no consequence except in an interference proceeding. Paulik v. Rizkalla, 760 F.2d 1270, 1271, 226 USPQ 225, 226 (Fed. Cir. 1985) (suppression or concealment may be deliberate or may arise due to an inference from a “too long” delay in filing a patent application). Peeler v. Miller, 535 F.2d 647, 656, 190 USPQ 117,124 (CCPA 1976) (“mere delay, without more, is not sufficient to establish suppression or concealment.” “What we are deciding here is that Monsanto’s delay is not ‘merely delay’ and that Monsanto's justification for the delay is inadequate to overcome the inference of suppression created by the excessive delay.” The word “mere” does not imply a total absence of a limit on the duration of delay. Whether any delay is “mere” is decided only on a case-by-case basis.).","provenance":{"source_file":"s2138.html","source_anchor":"d0e207529","source_sha256":"26c7c2a3bdfe077ea7e4b30ae79c9a9fd0d208d7d91da6e74f7f3ce0e157610b"},"kind":"narrative","host_section_id":"se_hqjja4f5"},{"id":"cs_4vgzhhwq","corpus_id":"mpep-e9r01-2024-html","opaque_url":"https://mpep.io/n/cs_4vgzhhwq","effective_range":{"start_revision":"R-01.2024","end_revision":null},"node_type":"case","rendered_text_html":"","rendered_text_plain":"Shindelar v. Holdeman, 628 F.2d 1337 (CCPA 1980)","provenance":{"source_file":"s2138.html","source_anchor":"","source_sha256":"26c7c2a3bdfe077ea7e4b30ae79c9a9fd0d208d7d91da6e74f7f3ce0e157610b"},"short_name":"Shindelar v. Holdeman","all_citations":["628 F.2d 1337","207 USPQ 112"],"canonical_citation":"Shindelar v. Holdeman, 628 F.2d 1337, 207 USPQ 112 (CCPA 1980)","decision_year":1980,"court":"CCPA"},{"id":"cs_cs6ejrbf","corpus_id":"mpep-e9r01-2024-html","opaque_url":"https://mpep.io/n/cs_cs6ejrbf","effective_range":{"start_revision":"R-01.2024","end_revision":null},"node_type":"case","rendered_text_html":"","rendered_text_plain":"Peeler v. Miller, 535 F.2d 647 (CCPA 1976)","provenance":{"source_file":"s2138.html","source_anchor":"","source_sha256":"26c7c2a3bdfe077ea7e4b30ae79c9a9fd0d208d7d91da6e74f7f3ce0e157610b"},"short_name":"Peeler v. Miller","all_citations":["535 F.2d 647","190 USPQ 117"],"canonical_citation":"Peeler v. Miller, 535 F.2d 647, 190 USPQ 117 (CCPA 1976)","decision_year":1976,"court":"CCPA"},{"id":"pb_5m6sqgkb","corpus_id":"mpep-e9r01-2024-html","opaque_url":"https://mpep.io/n/pb_5m6sqgkb","effective_range":{"start_revision":"R-01.2024","end_revision":null},"node_type":"prose_block","rendered_text_html":"

    Where a junior party in an interference relies upon an actual\n reduction to practice to demonstrate first inventorship, and where the hiatus in time\n between the date for the junior party's asserted reduction to practice and the filing\n of its application is unreasonably long, the hiatus may give rise to an inference\n that the junior party in fact suppressed or concealed the invention and the junior\n party will not be allowed to rely upon the earlier actual reduction to practice.\n Young v. Dworkin, 489 F.2d 1277, 1280 n.3, 180 USPQ 388, 391\n n.3 (CCPA 1974) (suppression and concealment issues are to be addressed on a\n case-by-case basis). \n

    ","rendered_text_plain":"Where a junior party in an interference relies upon an actual reduction to practice to demonstrate first inventorship, and where the hiatus in time between the date for the junior party's asserted reduction to practice and the filing of its application is unreasonably long, the hiatus may give rise to an inference that the junior party in fact suppressed or concealed the invention and the junior party will not be allowed to rely upon the earlier actual reduction to practice. Young v. Dworkin, 489 F.2d 1277, 1280 n.3, 180 USPQ 388, 391 n.3 (CCPA 1974) (suppression and concealment issues are to be addressed on a case-by-case basis).","provenance":{"source_file":"s2138.html","source_anchor":"d0e207541","source_sha256":"26c7c2a3bdfe077ea7e4b30ae79c9a9fd0d208d7d91da6e74f7f3ce0e157610b"},"kind":"narrative","host_section_id":"se_hqjja4f5"},{"id":"cs_3a325w7x","corpus_id":"mpep-e9r01-2024-html","opaque_url":"https://mpep.io/n/cs_3a325w7x","effective_range":{"start_revision":"R-01.2024","end_revision":null},"node_type":"case","rendered_text_html":"","rendered_text_plain":"Young v. Dworkin, 489 F.2d 1277 (CCPA 1974)","provenance":{"source_file":"s2138.html","source_anchor":"","source_sha256":"26c7c2a3bdfe077ea7e4b30ae79c9a9fd0d208d7d91da6e74f7f3ce0e157610b"},"short_name":"Young v. Dworkin","all_citations":["489 F.2d 1277","180 USPQ 388"],"canonical_citation":"Young v. Dworkin, 489 F.2d 1277, 180 USPQ 388 (CCPA 1974)","decision_year":1974,"court":"CCPA"},{"id":"pb_qpuocm34","corpus_id":"mpep-e9r01-2024-html","opaque_url":"https://mpep.io/n/pb_qpuocm34","effective_range":{"start_revision":"R-01.2024","end_revision":null},"node_type":"prose_block","rendered_text_html":"II. SUPPRESSION OR CONCEALMENT NEED NOT BE ATTRIBUTED TO INVENTOR","rendered_text_plain":"II. SUPPRESSION OR CONCEALMENT NEED NOT BE ATTRIBUTED TO INVENTOR","provenance":{"source_file":"s2138.html","source_anchor":"d0e207478/b.2","source_sha256":"26c7c2a3bdfe077ea7e4b30ae79c9a9fd0d208d7d91da6e74f7f3ce0e157610b"},"kind":"informal_heading","host_section_id":"se_hqjja4f5","heading_level":2,"heading_text":"II. SUPPRESSION OR CONCEALMENT NEED NOT BE ATTRIBUTED TO INVENTOR"},{"id":"pb_jj7das5e","corpus_id":"mpep-e9r01-2024-html","opaque_url":"https://mpep.io/n/pb_jj7das5e","effective_range":{"start_revision":"R-01.2024","end_revision":null},"node_type":"prose_block","rendered_text_html":"

    Suppression or concealment need not be attributed to the inventor.\n Peeler v. Miller, 535 F.2d 647, 653-54, 190 USPQ 117, 122 (CCPA\n 1976) (“four year delay from the time an inventor … completes his work … and the time\n his assignee-employer files a patent application is, prima facie,\n unreasonably long in an interference with a party who filed first”); \n Shindelar v. Holdeman, 628 F.2d 1337, 1341-42, 207 USPQ 112, 116-17\n (CCPA 1980) (A patent attorney’s workload will not preclude a holding of an\n unreasonable delay— the court identified that a total of 3 months was possibly\n excusable in regard to the filing of an application.).\n

    ","rendered_text_plain":"Suppression or concealment need not be attributed to the inventor. Peeler v. Miller, 535 F.2d 647, 653-54, 190 USPQ 117, 122 (CCPA 1976) (“four year delay from the time an inventor … completes his work … and the time his assignee-employer files a patent application is, prima facie, unreasonably long in an interference with a party who filed first”); Shindelar v. Holdeman, 628 F.2d 1337, 1341-42, 207 USPQ 112, 116-17 (CCPA 1980) (A patent attorney’s workload will not preclude a holding of an unreasonable delay— the court identified that a total of 3 months was possibly excusable in regard to the filing of an application.).","provenance":{"source_file":"s2138.html","source_anchor":"d0e207551","source_sha256":"26c7c2a3bdfe077ea7e4b30ae79c9a9fd0d208d7d91da6e74f7f3ce0e157610b"},"kind":"narrative","host_section_id":"se_hqjja4f5"},{"id":"pb_h6npwdns","corpus_id":"mpep-e9r01-2024-html","opaque_url":"https://mpep.io/n/pb_h6npwdns","effective_range":{"start_revision":"R-01.2024","end_revision":null},"node_type":"prose_block","rendered_text_html":"III. INFERENCE OF SUPPRESSION OR CONCEALMENT IS REBUTTABLE","rendered_text_plain":"III. INFERENCE OF SUPPRESSION OR CONCEALMENT IS REBUTTABLE","provenance":{"source_file":"s2138.html","source_anchor":"d0e207478/b.4","source_sha256":"26c7c2a3bdfe077ea7e4b30ae79c9a9fd0d208d7d91da6e74f7f3ce0e157610b"},"kind":"informal_heading","host_section_id":"se_hqjja4f5","heading_level":2,"heading_text":"III. INFERENCE OF SUPPRESSION OR CONCEALMENT IS REBUTTABLE"},{"id":"pb_plo7m3ys","corpus_id":"mpep-e9r01-2024-html","opaque_url":"https://mpep.io/n/pb_plo7m3ys","effective_range":{"start_revision":"R-01.2024","end_revision":null},"node_type":"prose_block","rendered_text_html":"

    Notwithstanding an inference of suppression or concealment due to\n time(s) of inactivity after reduction to practice, the senior party may still prevail\n if the senior party shows renewed activity on the invention that is just prior to the\n junior party’s entry into field coupled with the diligent filing of an application.\n Lutzkerv.Plet, 843 F.2d 1364, 1367-69, 6 USPQ2d 1370, 1371-72 (Fed. Cir.\n 1988) (activities directed towards commercialization not sufficient to rebut\n inference); Holmwood v. Cherpeck, 2 USPQ2d 1942, 1945 (Bd. Pat.\n App. & Inter. 1986) (the inference of suppression or concealment may be rebutted\n by showing activity directed to perfecting the invention, preparing the application,\n or preparing other compounds within the scope of the generic invention);\n Engelhardt v. Judd, 369 F.2d 408, 411, 151 USPQ 732, 735 (CCPA\n 1966) (“We recognize that an inventor of a new series of compounds should not be\n forced to file applications piecemeal on each new member as it is synthesized,\n identified and tested for utility. A reasonable amount of time should be allowed for\n completion of the research project on the whole series of new compounds, and a\n further reasonable time period should then be allowed for drafting and filing the\n patent application(s) thereon.”); Bogoslowskyv.Huse, 142 F.2d 75, 77, 61 USPQ 349, 351 (CCPA 1944) (The doctrine\n of suppression and concealment is not applicable to conception without an actual\n reduction to practice.).\n

    ","rendered_text_plain":"Notwithstanding an inference of suppression or concealment due to time(s) of inactivity after reduction to practice, the senior party may still prevail if the senior party shows renewed activity on the invention that is just prior to the junior party’s entry into field coupled with the diligent filing of an application. Lutzkerv.Plet, 843 F.2d 1364, 1367-69, 6 USPQ2d 1370, 1371-72 (Fed. Cir. 1988) (activities directed towards commercialization not sufficient to rebut inference); Holmwood v. Cherpeck, 2 USPQ2d 1942, 1945 (Bd. Pat. App. & Inter. 1986) (the inference of suppression or concealment may be rebutted by showing activity directed to perfecting the invention, preparing the application, or preparing other compounds within the scope of the generic invention); Engelhardt v. Judd, 369 F.2d 408, 411, 151 USPQ 732, 735 (CCPA 1966) (“We recognize that an inventor of a new series of compounds should not be forced to file applications piecemeal on each new member as it is synthesized, identified and tested for utility. A reasonable amount of time should be allowed for completion of the research project on the whole series of new compounds, and a further reasonable time period should then be allowed for drafting and filing the patent application(s) thereon.”); Bogoslowskyv.Huse, 142 F.2d 75, 77, 61 USPQ 349, 351 (CCPA 1944) (The doctrine of suppression and concealment is not applicable to conception without an actual reduction to practice.).","provenance":{"source_file":"s2138.html","source_anchor":"d0e207567","source_sha256":"26c7c2a3bdfe077ea7e4b30ae79c9a9fd0d208d7d91da6e74f7f3ce0e157610b"},"kind":"narrative","host_section_id":"se_hqjja4f5"},{"id":"cs_uzmhzpdb","corpus_id":"mpep-e9r01-2024-html","opaque_url":"https://mpep.io/n/cs_uzmhzpdb","effective_range":{"start_revision":"R-01.2024","end_revision":null},"node_type":"case","rendered_text_html":"","rendered_text_plain":"Holmwood v. Cherpeck, 2 USPQ2d 1942 (BPAI 1986)","provenance":{"source_file":"s2138.html","source_anchor":"","source_sha256":"26c7c2a3bdfe077ea7e4b30ae79c9a9fd0d208d7d91da6e74f7f3ce0e157610b"},"short_name":"Holmwood v. Cherpeck","all_citations":["2 USPQ2d 1942"],"canonical_citation":"Holmwood v. Cherpeck, 2 USPQ2d 1942 (BPAI 1986)","decision_year":1986,"court":"BPAI"},{"id":"cs_63ha5ycv","corpus_id":"mpep-e9r01-2024-html","opaque_url":"https://mpep.io/n/cs_63ha5ycv","effective_range":{"start_revision":"R-01.2024","end_revision":null},"node_type":"case","rendered_text_html":"","rendered_text_plain":"Engelhardt v. Judd, 369 F.2d 408 (CCPA 1966)","provenance":{"source_file":"s2138.html","source_anchor":"","source_sha256":"26c7c2a3bdfe077ea7e4b30ae79c9a9fd0d208d7d91da6e74f7f3ce0e157610b"},"short_name":"Engelhardt v. Judd","all_citations":["369 F.2d 408","151 USPQ 732"],"canonical_citation":"Engelhardt v. Judd, 369 F.2d 408, 151 USPQ 732 (CCPA 1966)","decision_year":1966,"court":"CCPA"},{"id":"pb_lbyupbff","corpus_id":"mpep-e9r01-2024-html","opaque_url":"https://mpep.io/n/pb_lbyupbff","effective_range":{"start_revision":"R-01.2024","end_revision":null},"node_type":"prose_block","rendered_text_html":"IV. ABANDONMENT","rendered_text_plain":"IV. ABANDONMENT","provenance":{"source_file":"s2138.html","source_anchor":"d0e207478/b.6","source_sha256":"26c7c2a3bdfe077ea7e4b30ae79c9a9fd0d208d7d91da6e74f7f3ce0e157610b"},"kind":"informal_heading","host_section_id":"se_hqjja4f5","heading_level":2,"heading_text":"IV. ABANDONMENT"},{"id":"pb_e3hr5eda","corpus_id":"mpep-e9r01-2024-html","opaque_url":"https://mpep.io/n/pb_e3hr5eda","effective_range":{"start_revision":"R-01.2024","end_revision":null},"node_type":"prose_block","rendered_text_html":"

    A finding of suppression or concealment may not amount to a finding\n of abandonment wherein a right to a patent is lost. Steierman v.\n Connelly, 197 USPQ 288, 289 (Comm'r Pat. 1976); Correge v.\n Murphy, 705 F.2d 1326, 1329, 217 USPQ 753, 755 (Fed. Cir. 1983) (an\n invention cannot be abandoned until it is first reduced to practice). \n

    ","rendered_text_plain":"A finding of suppression or concealment may not amount to a finding of abandonment wherein a right to a patent is lost. Steierman v. Connelly, 197 USPQ 288, 289 (Comm'r Pat. 1976); Correge v. Murphy, 705 F.2d 1326, 1329, 217 USPQ 753, 755 (Fed. Cir. 1983) (an invention cannot be abandoned until it is first reduced to practice).","provenance":{"source_file":"s2138.html","source_anchor":"d0e207598","source_sha256":"26c7c2a3bdfe077ea7e4b30ae79c9a9fd0d208d7d91da6e74f7f3ce0e157610b"},"kind":"narrative","host_section_id":"se_hqjja4f5"},{"id":"cs_cz7x434p","corpus_id":"mpep-e9r01-2024-html","opaque_url":"https://mpep.io/n/cs_cz7x434p","effective_range":{"start_revision":"R-01.2024","end_revision":null},"node_type":"case","rendered_text_html":"","rendered_text_plain":"Steierman v. Connelly, 197 USPQ 288 (Comm'r Pat. 1976)","provenance":{"source_file":"s2138.html","source_anchor":"","source_sha256":"26c7c2a3bdfe077ea7e4b30ae79c9a9fd0d208d7d91da6e74f7f3ce0e157610b"},"short_name":"Steierman v. Connelly","all_citations":["197 USPQ 288"],"canonical_citation":"Steierman v. Connelly, 197 USPQ 288 (Comm'r Pat. 1976)","decision_year":1976,"court":"Comm'r Pat."},{"id":"se_hqjja4f5","corpus_id":"mpep-e9r01-2024-html","opaque_url":"https://mpep.io/n/se_hqjja4f5","effective_range":{"start_revision":"R-01.2024","end_revision":null},"node_type":"section","rendered_text_html":"","rendered_text_plain":"","provenance":{"source_file":"s2138.html","source_anchor":"d0e207478","source_sha256":"26c7c2a3bdfe077ea7e4b30ae79c9a9fd0d208d7d91da6e74f7f3ce0e157610b"},"akn_urn":"/akn/us/statement/manual/uspto/2024/mpep/eng@2024-02-29!sec_2138_03","canonical_url":"https://mpep.io/akn/us/statement/manual/uspto/2024/mpep/eng@2024-02-29!sec_2138_03","section_number":"2138.03","chapter":"2100","depth":1,"title":"“By Another Who Has Not Abandoned, Suppressed, or Concealed It”","children_ids":["pb_kge6dd5s","pb_5bb7z6qt","pb_dtkxukeu","pb_cgogsx5d","pb_7m5tyhr4","pb_5m6sqgkb","pb_qpuocm34","pb_jj7das5e","pb_h6npwdns","pb_plo7m3ys","pb_lbyupbff","pb_e3hr5eda"],"revision_tag":"R-01.2024","parent_section_id":"se_oly7ctjt"},{"id":"pb_cdmq7pig","corpus_id":"mpep-e9r01-2024-html","opaque_url":"https://mpep.io/n/pb_cdmq7pig","effective_range":{"start_revision":"R-01.2024","end_revision":null},"node_type":"prose_block","rendered_text_html":"

    [Editor Note: This MPEP section has limited applicability to\n applications subject to examination under the first inventor to file (FITF)\n provisions of the AIA as set forth in 35 U.S.C. 100 (note). Patents and\n applications that contain (or contained at any time) at least one claim with a\n pre-AIA effective filing date (before March 16, 2013) and at least one claim with a\n post-AIA effective filing date (on or after March 16, 2013) are subject to the\n patentability requirements in AIA 35 U.S.C.\n 102-103 and subject to\n pre-AIA 35\n U.S.C. 102(g).See MPEP §\n 2159 et seq.]

    ","rendered_text_plain":"[Editor Note: This MPEP section has limited applicability to applications subject to examination under the first inventor to file (FITF) provisions of the AIA as set forth in 35 U.S.C. 100 (note). Patents and applications that contain (or contained at any time) at least one claim with a pre-AIA effective filing date (before March 16, 2013) and at least one claim with a post-AIA effective filing date (on or after March 16, 2013) are subject to the patentability requirements in AIA 35 U.S.C. 102-103 and subject to pre-AIA 35 U.S.C. 102(g).See MPEP § 2159 et seq.]","provenance":{"source_file":"s2138.html","source_anchor":"ch2100_d222e6_190e3_5","source_sha256":"26c7c2a3bdfe077ea7e4b30ae79c9a9fd0d208d7d91da6e74f7f3ce0e157610b"},"kind":"narrative","host_section_id":"se_4ssncmw5"},{"id":"pb_mx6f2ouj","corpus_id":"mpep-e9r01-2024-html","opaque_url":"https://mpep.io/n/pb_mx6f2ouj","effective_range":{"start_revision":"R-01.2024","end_revision":null},"node_type":"prose_block","rendered_text_html":"

    Conception has been defined as “the complete performance of the mental\n part of the inventive act” and it is “the formation in the mind of the inventor of a\n definite and permanent idea of the complete and operative invention as it is thereafter\n to be applied in practice….” Townsend v. Smith, 36 F.2d 292, 295, 4\n USPQ 269, 271 (CCPA 1929). “[C]onception is established when the invention is made\n sufficiently clear to enable one skilled in the art to reduce it to practice without the\n exercise of extensive experimentation or the exercise of inventive skill.”\n Hiatt v. Ziegler, 179 USPQ 757, 763 (Bd. Pat. Inter. 1973).\n Conception has also been defined as a disclosure of an invention which enables one\n skilled in the art to reduce the invention to a practical form without “exercise of the\n inventive faculty.” Gunter v. Stream, 573 F.2d 77, 197 USPQ 482 (CCPA\n 1978). See also Coleman v. Dines, 754 F.2d 353, 224 USPQ 857 (Fed.\n Cir. 1985) (It is settled that in establishing conception a party must show possession\n of every feature recited in the count, and that every limitation of the count must have\n been known to the inventor at the time of the alleged conception. Conception must be\n proved by corroborating evidence.); Hybritech Inc. v. Monoclonal Antibodies\n Inc., 802 F. 2d 1367, 1376, 231 USPQ 81, 87 (Fed. Cir. 1986) (Conception is\n the “formation in the mind of the inventor, of a definite and permanent idea of the\n complete and operative invention, as it is hereafter to be applied in practice.”);\n Hitzeman v. Rutter, 243 F.3d 1345, 58 USPQ2d 1161 (Fed. Cir. 2001)\n (Inventor’s “hope” that a genetically altered yeast would produce antigen particles\n having the particle size and sedimentation rates recited in the claims did not establish\n conception, since the inventor did not show that he had a “definite and permanent\n understanding” as to whether or how, or a reasonable expectation that, the yeast would\n produce the recited antigen particles.); Staehelin v. Secher, 24\n USPQ2d 1513, 1522 (Bd. Pat. App. & Inter. 1992) (“evidence of conception naming only\n one of the actual inventive entity inures to the benefit of and serves as evidence of\n conception by the complete inventive entity”).\n

    ","rendered_text_plain":"Conception has been defined as “the complete performance of the mental part of the inventive act” and it is “the formation in the mind of the inventor of a definite and permanent idea of the complete and operative invention as it is thereafter to be applied in practice….” Townsend v. Smith, 36 F.2d 292, 295, 4 USPQ 269, 271 (CCPA 1929). “[C]onception is established when the invention is made sufficiently clear to enable one skilled in the art to reduce it to practice without the exercise of extensive experimentation or the exercise of inventive skill.” Hiatt v. Ziegler, 179 USPQ 757, 763 (Bd. Pat. Inter. 1973). Conception has also been defined as a disclosure of an invention which enables one skilled in the art to reduce the invention to a practical form without “exercise of the inventive faculty.” Gunter v. Stream, 573 F.2d 77, 197 USPQ 482 (CCPA 1978). See also Coleman v. Dines, 754 F.2d 353, 224 USPQ 857 (Fed. Cir. 1985) (It is settled that in establishing conception a party must show possession of every feature recited in the count, and that every limitation of the count must have been known to the inventor at the time of the alleged conception. Conception must be proved by corroborating evidence.); Hybritech Inc. v. Monoclonal Antibodies Inc., 802 F. 2d 1367, 1376, 231 USPQ 81, 87 (Fed. Cir. 1986) (Conception is the “formation in the mind of the inventor, of a definite and permanent idea of the complete and operative invention, as it is hereafter to be applied in practice.”); Hitzeman v. Rutter, 243 F.3d 1345, 58 USPQ2d 1161 (Fed. Cir. 2001) (Inventor’s “hope” that a genetically altered yeast would produce antigen particles having the particle size and sedimentation rates recited in the claims did not establish conception, since the inventor did not show that he had a “definite and permanent understanding” as to whether or how, or a reasonable expectation that, the yeast would produce the recited antigen particles.); Staehelin v. Secher, 24 USPQ2d 1513, 1522 (Bd. Pat. App. & Inter. 1992) (“evidence of conception naming only one of the actual inventive entity inures to the benefit of and serves as evidence of conception by the complete inventive entity”).","provenance":{"source_file":"s2138.html","source_anchor":"d0e207611","source_sha256":"26c7c2a3bdfe077ea7e4b30ae79c9a9fd0d208d7d91da6e74f7f3ce0e157610b"},"kind":"narrative","host_section_id":"se_4ssncmw5"},{"id":"cs_faltsf3d","corpus_id":"mpep-e9r01-2024-html","opaque_url":"https://mpep.io/n/cs_faltsf3d","effective_range":{"start_revision":"R-01.2024","end_revision":null},"node_type":"case","rendered_text_html":"","rendered_text_plain":"Townsend v. Smith, 36 F.2d 292 (CCPA 1929)","provenance":{"source_file":"s2138.html","source_anchor":"","source_sha256":"26c7c2a3bdfe077ea7e4b30ae79c9a9fd0d208d7d91da6e74f7f3ce0e157610b"},"short_name":"Townsend v. Smith","all_citations":["36 F.2d 292","4 USPQ 269"],"canonical_citation":"Townsend v. Smith, 36 F.2d 292, 4 USPQ 269 (CCPA 1929)","decision_year":1929,"court":"CCPA"},{"id":"cs_2kwfjs6n","corpus_id":"mpep-e9r01-2024-html","opaque_url":"https://mpep.io/n/cs_2kwfjs6n","effective_range":{"start_revision":"R-01.2024","end_revision":null},"node_type":"case","rendered_text_html":"","rendered_text_plain":"Hiatt v. Ziegler, 179 USPQ 757 (Bd. Pat. Inter. 1973)","provenance":{"source_file":"s2138.html","source_anchor":"","source_sha256":"26c7c2a3bdfe077ea7e4b30ae79c9a9fd0d208d7d91da6e74f7f3ce0e157610b"},"short_name":"Hiatt v. Ziegler","all_citations":["179 USPQ 757"],"canonical_citation":"Hiatt v. Ziegler, 179 USPQ 757 (Bd. Pat. Inter. 1973)","decision_year":1973,"court":"Bd. Pat. Inter."},{"id":"cs_etmm4h6u","corpus_id":"mpep-e9r01-2024-html","opaque_url":"https://mpep.io/n/cs_etmm4h6u","effective_range":{"start_revision":"R-01.2024","end_revision":null},"node_type":"case","rendered_text_html":"","rendered_text_plain":"Gunter v. Stream, 573 F.2d 77 (CCPA 1978)","provenance":{"source_file":"s2138.html","source_anchor":"","source_sha256":"26c7c2a3bdfe077ea7e4b30ae79c9a9fd0d208d7d91da6e74f7f3ce0e157610b"},"short_name":"Gunter v. Stream","all_citations":["573 F.2d 77","197 USPQ 482"],"canonical_citation":"Gunter v. Stream, 573 F.2d 77, 197 USPQ 482 (CCPA 1978)","decision_year":1978,"court":"CCPA"},{"id":"cs_exhato3f","corpus_id":"mpep-e9r01-2024-html","opaque_url":"https://mpep.io/n/cs_exhato3f","effective_range":{"start_revision":"R-01.2024","end_revision":null},"node_type":"case","rendered_text_html":"","rendered_text_plain":"Coleman v. Dines, 754 F.2d 353 (Fed. Cir. 1985)","provenance":{"source_file":"s2138.html","source_anchor":"","source_sha256":"26c7c2a3bdfe077ea7e4b30ae79c9a9fd0d208d7d91da6e74f7f3ce0e157610b"},"short_name":"Coleman v. Dines","all_citations":["754 F.2d 353","224 USPQ 857"],"canonical_citation":"Coleman v. Dines, 754 F.2d 353, 224 USPQ 857 (Fed. Cir. 1985)","decision_year":1985,"court":"Fed. Cir."},{"id":"cs_2lunzuwx","corpus_id":"mpep-e9r01-2024-html","opaque_url":"https://mpep.io/n/cs_2lunzuwx","effective_range":{"start_revision":"R-01.2024","end_revision":null},"node_type":"case","rendered_text_html":"","rendered_text_plain":"Hybritech Inc. v. Monoclonal Antibodies Inc., 802 F. 2d 1367 (Fed. Cir. 1986)","provenance":{"source_file":"s2138.html","source_anchor":"","source_sha256":"26c7c2a3bdfe077ea7e4b30ae79c9a9fd0d208d7d91da6e74f7f3ce0e157610b"},"short_name":"Hybritech Inc. v. Monoclonal Antibodies Inc.","all_citations":["802 F. 2d 1367","231 USPQ 81"],"canonical_citation":"Hybritech Inc. v. Monoclonal Antibodies Inc., 802 F. 2d 1367, 231 USPQ 81 (Fed. Cir. 1986)","decision_year":1986,"court":"Fed. Cir."},{"id":"cs_kd6qq55k","corpus_id":"mpep-e9r01-2024-html","opaque_url":"https://mpep.io/n/cs_kd6qq55k","effective_range":{"start_revision":"R-01.2024","end_revision":null},"node_type":"case","rendered_text_html":"","rendered_text_plain":"Hitzeman v. Rutter, 243 F.3d 1345 (Fed. Cir. 2001)","provenance":{"source_file":"s2138.html","source_anchor":"","source_sha256":"26c7c2a3bdfe077ea7e4b30ae79c9a9fd0d208d7d91da6e74f7f3ce0e157610b"},"short_name":"Hitzeman v. Rutter","all_citations":["243 F.3d 1345","58 USPQ2d 1161"],"canonical_citation":"Hitzeman v. Rutter, 243 F.3d 1345, 58 USPQ2d 1161 (Fed. Cir. 2001)","decision_year":2001,"court":"Fed. Cir."},{"id":"cs_ltyzfh2r","corpus_id":"mpep-e9r01-2024-html","opaque_url":"https://mpep.io/n/cs_ltyzfh2r","effective_range":{"start_revision":"R-01.2024","end_revision":null},"node_type":"case","rendered_text_html":"","rendered_text_plain":"Staehelin v. Secher, 24 USPQ2d 1513 (BPAI 1992)","provenance":{"source_file":"s2138.html","source_anchor":"","source_sha256":"26c7c2a3bdfe077ea7e4b30ae79c9a9fd0d208d7d91da6e74f7f3ce0e157610b"},"short_name":"Staehelin v. Secher","all_citations":["24 USPQ2d 1513"],"canonical_citation":"Staehelin v. Secher, 24 USPQ2d 1513 (BPAI 1992)","decision_year":1992,"court":"BPAI"},{"id":"pb_ipta4krj","corpus_id":"mpep-e9r01-2024-html","opaque_url":"https://mpep.io/n/pb_ipta4krj","effective_range":{"start_revision":"R-01.2024","end_revision":null},"node_type":"prose_block","rendered_text_html":"I. CONCEPTION MUST BE DONE IN THE MIND OF THE INVENTOR","rendered_text_plain":"I. CONCEPTION MUST BE DONE IN THE MIND OF THE INVENTOR","provenance":{"source_file":"s2138.html","source_anchor":"d0e207607/b.0","source_sha256":"26c7c2a3bdfe077ea7e4b30ae79c9a9fd0d208d7d91da6e74f7f3ce0e157610b"},"kind":"informal_heading","host_section_id":"se_4ssncmw5","heading_level":2,"heading_text":"I. CONCEPTION MUST BE DONE IN THE MIND OF THE INVENTOR"},{"id":"pb_uehhnhgu","corpus_id":"mpep-e9r01-2024-html","opaque_url":"https://mpep.io/n/pb_uehhnhgu","effective_range":{"start_revision":"R-01.2024","end_revision":null},"node_type":"prose_block","rendered_text_html":"

    The inventor must form a definite and\n permanent idea of the complete and operable invention to establish conception.\n Bosies v. Benedict, 27 F.3d 539, 543, 30 USPQ2d 1862, 1865\n (Fed. Cir. 1994) (Testimony by a noninventor as to the meaning of a variable of a\n generic compound described in an inventor’s notebook was insufficient as a matter of\n law to establish the meaning of the variable because the testimony was not probative\n of what the inventor conceived.). A person who shares in the conception of a claimed\n invention is a joint inventor of that invention. In re VerHoef,\n 888 F.3d 1362, 1366-67, 126 F.2d 1561, 1564-65 (Fed. Cir. 2018).\n

    ","rendered_text_plain":"The inventor must form a definite and permanent idea of the complete and operable invention to establish conception. Bosies v. Benedict, 27 F.3d 539, 543, 30 USPQ2d 1862, 1865 (Fed. Cir. 1994) (Testimony by a noninventor as to the meaning of a variable of a generic compound described in an inventor’s notebook was insufficient as a matter of law to establish the meaning of the variable because the testimony was not probative of what the inventor conceived.). A person who shares in the conception of a claimed invention is a joint inventor of that invention. In re VerHoef, 888 F.3d 1362, 1366-67, 126 F.2d 1561, 1564-65 (Fed. Cir. 2018).","provenance":{"source_file":"s2138.html","source_anchor":"d0e207639","source_sha256":"26c7c2a3bdfe077ea7e4b30ae79c9a9fd0d208d7d91da6e74f7f3ce0e157610b"},"kind":"narrative","host_section_id":"se_4ssncmw5"},{"id":"cs_fupzldfh","corpus_id":"mpep-e9r01-2024-html","opaque_url":"https://mpep.io/n/cs_fupzldfh","effective_range":{"start_revision":"R-01.2024","end_revision":null},"node_type":"case","rendered_text_html":"","rendered_text_plain":"Bosies v. Benedict, 27 F.3d 539 (Fed. Cir. 1994)","provenance":{"source_file":"s2138.html","source_anchor":"","source_sha256":"26c7c2a3bdfe077ea7e4b30ae79c9a9fd0d208d7d91da6e74f7f3ce0e157610b"},"short_name":"Bosies v. Benedict","all_citations":["27 F.3d 539","30 USPQ2d 1862"],"canonical_citation":"Bosies v. Benedict, 27 F.3d 539, 30 USPQ2d 1862 (Fed. Cir. 1994)","decision_year":1994,"court":"Fed. Cir."},{"id":"cs_hb3gpbyi","corpus_id":"mpep-e9r01-2024-html","opaque_url":"https://mpep.io/n/cs_hb3gpbyi","effective_range":{"start_revision":"R-01.2024","end_revision":null},"node_type":"case","rendered_text_html":"","rendered_text_plain":"In re VerHoef, 888 F.3d 1362 (Fed. Cir. 2018)","provenance":{"source_file":"s2138.html","source_anchor":"","source_sha256":"26c7c2a3bdfe077ea7e4b30ae79c9a9fd0d208d7d91da6e74f7f3ce0e157610b"},"short_name":"In re VerHoef","all_citations":["888 F.3d 1362","126 F.2d 1561"],"canonical_citation":"In re VerHoef, 888 F.3d 1362, 126 F.2d 1561 (Fed. Cir. 2018)","decision_year":2018,"court":"Fed. Cir."},{"id":"pb_biizbvs6","corpus_id":"mpep-e9r01-2024-html","opaque_url":"https://mpep.io/n/pb_biizbvs6","effective_range":{"start_revision":"R-01.2024","end_revision":null},"node_type":"prose_block","rendered_text_html":"II. CONCEPTION REQUIRES CONTEMPORANEOUS RECOGNITION AND APPRECIATION OF THE INVENTION","rendered_text_plain":"II. CONCEPTION REQUIRES CONTEMPORANEOUS RECOGNITION AND APPRECIATION OF THE INVENTION","provenance":{"source_file":"s2138.html","source_anchor":"d0e207607/b.2","source_sha256":"26c7c2a3bdfe077ea7e4b30ae79c9a9fd0d208d7d91da6e74f7f3ce0e157610b"},"kind":"informal_heading","host_section_id":"se_4ssncmw5","heading_level":2,"heading_text":"II. CONCEPTION REQUIRES CONTEMPORANEOUS RECOGNITION AND APPRECIATION OF THE INVENTION"},{"id":"pb_wj23m6gs","corpus_id":"mpep-e9r01-2024-html","opaque_url":"https://mpep.io/n/pb_wj23m6gs","effective_range":{"start_revision":"R-01.2024","end_revision":null},"node_type":"prose_block","rendered_text_html":"

    There must be a contemporaneous recognition and appreciation of the\n invention for there to be conception. Silvestri v. Grant, 496 F.2d\n 593, 596, 181 USPQ 706, 708 (CCPA 1974) (“an accidental and unappreciated duplication\n of an invention does not defeat the patent right of one who, though later in time was\n the first to recognize that which constitutes the inventive subject matter”);\n Invitrogen,Corp. v. Clontech Laboratories, Inc., 429 F.3d 1052, 1064,\n 77 USPQ2d 1161, 1169 (Fed. Cir. 2005) (In situations where there is unrecognized\n accidental duplication, establishing conception requires evidence that the inventor\n actually made the invention and understood the invention to have the features that\n comprise the inventive subject matter at issue).Langer v. Kaufman,\n 465 F.2d 915, 918, 175 USPQ 172, 174 (CCPA 1972) (new form of catalyst was not\n recognized when it was first produced; conception cannot be established nunc\n pro tunc). However, an inventor does not need to know that the invention\n will work for there to be complete conception. Burroughs Wellcome Co. v.\n Barr Labs., Inc., 40 F.3d 1223, 1228, 32 USPQ2d 1915, 1919 (Fed. Cir.\n 1994) (Draft patent application disclosing treatment of AIDS with AZT reciting\n dosages, forms, and routes of administration was sufficient to collaborate conception\n whether or not the inventor believed the inventions would work based on initial\n screening tests.) Furthermore, the inventor does not need to appreciate the\n patentability of the invention. Dow Chem. Co. v. Astro-Valcour,\n Inc., 267 F.3d 1334, 1341, 60 USPQ2d 1519, 1523 (Fed. Cir. 2001).\n

    ","rendered_text_plain":"There must be a contemporaneous recognition and appreciation of the invention for there to be conception. Silvestri v. Grant, 496 F.2d 593, 596, 181 USPQ 706, 708 (CCPA 1974) (“an accidental and unappreciated duplication of an invention does not defeat the patent right of one who, though later in time was the first to recognize that which constitutes the inventive subject matter”); Invitrogen,Corp. v. Clontech Laboratories, Inc., 429 F.3d 1052, 1064, 77 USPQ2d 1161, 1169 (Fed. Cir. 2005) (In situations where there is unrecognized accidental duplication, establishing conception requires evidence that the inventor actually made the invention and understood the invention to have the features that comprise the inventive subject matter at issue).Langer v. Kaufman, 465 F.2d 915, 918, 175 USPQ 172, 174 (CCPA 1972) (new form of catalyst was not recognized when it was first produced; conception cannot be established nunc pro tunc). However, an inventor does not need to know that the invention will work for there to be complete conception. Burroughs Wellcome Co. v. Barr Labs., Inc., 40 F.3d 1223, 1228, 32 USPQ2d 1915, 1919 (Fed. Cir. 1994) (Draft patent application disclosing treatment of AIDS with AZT reciting dosages, forms, and routes of administration was sufficient to collaborate conception whether or not the inventor believed the inventions would work based on initial screening tests.) Furthermore, the inventor does not need to appreciate the patentability of the invention. Dow Chem. Co. v. Astro-Valcour, Inc., 267 F.3d 1334, 1341, 60 USPQ2d 1519, 1523 (Fed. Cir. 2001).","provenance":{"source_file":"s2138.html","source_anchor":"d0e207671","source_sha256":"26c7c2a3bdfe077ea7e4b30ae79c9a9fd0d208d7d91da6e74f7f3ce0e157610b"},"kind":"narrative","host_section_id":"se_4ssncmw5"},{"id":"cs_5rxqdga3","corpus_id":"mpep-e9r01-2024-html","opaque_url":"https://mpep.io/n/cs_5rxqdga3","effective_range":{"start_revision":"R-01.2024","end_revision":null},"node_type":"case","rendered_text_html":"","rendered_text_plain":"Silvestri v. Grant, 496 F.2d 593 (CCPA 1974)","provenance":{"source_file":"s2138.html","source_anchor":"","source_sha256":"26c7c2a3bdfe077ea7e4b30ae79c9a9fd0d208d7d91da6e74f7f3ce0e157610b"},"short_name":"Silvestri v. Grant","all_citations":["496 F.2d 593","181 USPQ 706"],"canonical_citation":"Silvestri v. Grant, 496 F.2d 593, 181 USPQ 706 (CCPA 1974)","decision_year":1974,"court":"CCPA"},{"id":"cs_lm5wvz7a","corpus_id":"mpep-e9r01-2024-html","opaque_url":"https://mpep.io/n/cs_lm5wvz7a","effective_range":{"start_revision":"R-01.2024","end_revision":null},"node_type":"case","rendered_text_html":"","rendered_text_plain":"Langer v. Kaufman, 465 F.2d 915 (CCPA 1972)","provenance":{"source_file":"s2138.html","source_anchor":"","source_sha256":"26c7c2a3bdfe077ea7e4b30ae79c9a9fd0d208d7d91da6e74f7f3ce0e157610b"},"short_name":"Langer v. Kaufman","all_citations":["465 F.2d 915","175 USPQ 172"],"canonical_citation":"Langer v. Kaufman, 465 F.2d 915, 175 USPQ 172 (CCPA 1972)","decision_year":1972,"court":"CCPA"},{"id":"cs_zrui6sbi","corpus_id":"mpep-e9r01-2024-html","opaque_url":"https://mpep.io/n/cs_zrui6sbi","effective_range":{"start_revision":"R-01.2024","end_revision":null},"node_type":"case","rendered_text_html":"","rendered_text_plain":"Burroughs Wellcome Co. v. Barr Labs., Inc., 40 F.3d 1223 (Fed. Cir. 1994)","provenance":{"source_file":"s2138.html","source_anchor":"","source_sha256":"26c7c2a3bdfe077ea7e4b30ae79c9a9fd0d208d7d91da6e74f7f3ce0e157610b"},"short_name":"Burroughs Wellcome Co. v. Barr Labs., Inc.","all_citations":["40 F.3d 1223","32 USPQ2d 1915"],"canonical_citation":"Burroughs Wellcome Co. v. Barr Labs., Inc., 40 F.3d 1223, 32 USPQ2d 1915 (Fed. Cir. 1994)","decision_year":1994,"court":"Fed. Cir."},{"id":"cs_odayqvbt","corpus_id":"mpep-e9r01-2024-html","opaque_url":"https://mpep.io/n/cs_odayqvbt","effective_range":{"start_revision":"R-01.2024","end_revision":null},"node_type":"case","rendered_text_html":"","rendered_text_plain":"Dow Chem. Co. v. Astro-Valcour, Inc., 267 F.3d 1334 (Fed. Cir. 2001)","provenance":{"source_file":"s2138.html","source_anchor":"","source_sha256":"26c7c2a3bdfe077ea7e4b30ae79c9a9fd0d208d7d91da6e74f7f3ce0e157610b"},"short_name":"Dow Chem. Co. v. Astro-Valcour, Inc.","all_citations":["267 F.3d 1334","60 USPQ2d 1519"],"canonical_citation":"Dow Chem. Co. v. Astro-Valcour, Inc., 267 F.3d 1334, 60 USPQ2d 1519 (Fed. Cir. 2001)","decision_year":2001,"court":"Fed. Cir."},{"id":"pb_o7ahhfrv","corpus_id":"mpep-e9r01-2024-html","opaque_url":"https://mpep.io/n/pb_o7ahhfrv","effective_range":{"start_revision":"R-01.2024","end_revision":null},"node_type":"prose_block","rendered_text_html":"

    The first to conceive of a species is not necessarily the first to\n conceive of the generic invention. In re Jolley, 308 F.3d 1317,\n 1323 n.2, 64 USPQ2d 1901, 1905 n.2 (Fed. Cir. 2002). Further, while conception of a\n species within a genus may constitute conception of the genus, conception of one\n species and the genus may not constitute conception of another species in the genus.\n Oka v. Youssefyeh, 849 F.2d 581, 7 USPQ2d 1169 (Fed. Cir. 1988)\n (conception of a chemical requires both the idea of the structure of the chemical and\n possession of an operative method of making it). See also Amgen, Inc. v.\n Chugai Pharmaceutical Co., 927 F.2d 1200, 1206, 18 USPQ2d 1016, 1021\n (Fed. Cir. 1991) (in the isolation of a gene, defining a gene by its principal\n biological property is not sufficient for conception absent an ability to envision\n the detailed constitution as well as a method for obtaining it); Fiers v.\n Revel, 984 F.2d 1164, 1170, 25 USPQ2d 1601, 1605 (Fed. Cir. 1993)\n (“[b]efore reduction to practice, conception only of a process for making a\n substance, without conception of a structural or equivalent definition of that\n substance, can at most constitute a conception of the substance claimed as a process”\n but cannot constitute conception of the substance; as “conception is not enablement,”\n conception of a purified DNA sequence coding for a specific protein by function and a\n method for its isolation that could be carried out by one of ordinary skill in the\n art is not conception of that material). See MPEP §§\n 2106.04(b) and 2106.04(c) for information on the subject matter\n eligibility of inventions involving isolated genes.\n

    ","rendered_text_plain":"The first to conceive of a species is not necessarily the first to conceive of the generic invention. In re Jolley, 308 F.3d 1317, 1323 n.2, 64 USPQ2d 1901, 1905 n.2 (Fed. Cir. 2002). Further, while conception of a species within a genus may constitute conception of the genus, conception of one species and the genus may not constitute conception of another species in the genus. Oka v. Youssefyeh, 849 F.2d 581, 7 USPQ2d 1169 (Fed. Cir. 1988) (conception of a chemical requires both the idea of the structure of the chemical and possession of an operative method of making it). See also Amgen, Inc. v. Chugai Pharmaceutical Co., 927 F.2d 1200, 1206, 18 USPQ2d 1016, 1021 (Fed. Cir. 1991) (in the isolation of a gene, defining a gene by its principal biological property is not sufficient for conception absent an ability to envision the detailed constitution as well as a method for obtaining it); Fiers v. Revel, 984 F.2d 1164, 1170, 25 USPQ2d 1601, 1605 (Fed. Cir. 1993) (“[b]efore reduction to practice, conception only of a process for making a substance, without conception of a structural or equivalent definition of that substance, can at most constitute a conception of the substance claimed as a process” but cannot constitute conception of the substance; as “conception is not enablement,” conception of a purified DNA sequence coding for a specific protein by function and a method for its isolation that could be carried out by one of ordinary skill in the art is not conception of that material). See MPEP §§ 2106.04(b) and 2106.04(c) for information on the subject matter eligibility of inventions involving isolated genes.","provenance":{"source_file":"s2138.html","source_anchor":"d0e207701","source_sha256":"26c7c2a3bdfe077ea7e4b30ae79c9a9fd0d208d7d91da6e74f7f3ce0e157610b"},"kind":"narrative","host_section_id":"se_4ssncmw5"},{"id":"cs_xpc46acz","corpus_id":"mpep-e9r01-2024-html","opaque_url":"https://mpep.io/n/cs_xpc46acz","effective_range":{"start_revision":"R-01.2024","end_revision":null},"node_type":"case","rendered_text_html":"","rendered_text_plain":"In re Jolley, 308 F.3d 1317 (Fed. Cir. 2002)","provenance":{"source_file":"s2138.html","source_anchor":"","source_sha256":"26c7c2a3bdfe077ea7e4b30ae79c9a9fd0d208d7d91da6e74f7f3ce0e157610b"},"short_name":"In re Jolley","all_citations":["308 F.3d 1317","64 USPQ2d 1901"],"canonical_citation":"In re Jolley, 308 F.3d 1317, 64 USPQ2d 1901 (Fed. Cir. 2002)","decision_year":2002,"court":"Fed. Cir."},{"id":"cs_ho2kqnh4","corpus_id":"mpep-e9r01-2024-html","opaque_url":"https://mpep.io/n/cs_ho2kqnh4","effective_range":{"start_revision":"R-01.2024","end_revision":null},"node_type":"case","rendered_text_html":"","rendered_text_plain":"Oka v. Youssefyeh, 849 F.2d 581 (Fed. Cir. 1988)","provenance":{"source_file":"s2138.html","source_anchor":"","source_sha256":"26c7c2a3bdfe077ea7e4b30ae79c9a9fd0d208d7d91da6e74f7f3ce0e157610b"},"short_name":"Oka v. Youssefyeh","all_citations":["849 F.2d 581","7 USPQ2d 1169"],"canonical_citation":"Oka v. Youssefyeh, 849 F.2d 581, 7 USPQ2d 1169 (Fed. Cir. 1988)","decision_year":1988,"court":"Fed. Cir."},{"id":"cs_nrjrnqqb","corpus_id":"mpep-e9r01-2024-html","opaque_url":"https://mpep.io/n/cs_nrjrnqqb","effective_range":{"start_revision":"R-01.2024","end_revision":null},"node_type":"case","rendered_text_html":"","rendered_text_plain":"Fiers v. Revel, 984 F.2d 1164 (Fed. Cir. 1993)","provenance":{"source_file":"s2138.html","source_anchor":"","source_sha256":"26c7c2a3bdfe077ea7e4b30ae79c9a9fd0d208d7d91da6e74f7f3ce0e157610b"},"short_name":"Fiers v. Revel","all_citations":["984 F.2d 1164","25 USPQ2d 1601"],"canonical_citation":"Fiers v. Revel, 984 F.2d 1164, 25 USPQ2d 1601 (Fed. Cir. 1993)","decision_year":1993,"court":"Fed. Cir."},{"id":"se_uwg5dlfo","corpus_id":"mpep-e9r01-2024-html","opaque_url":"https://mpep.io/n/se_uwg5dlfo","effective_range":{"start_revision":"R-01.2024","end_revision":null},"node_type":"section","rendered_text_html":"","rendered_text_plain":"","provenance":{"source_file":"s2138.html","source_anchor":"stub-2106","source_sha256":"26c7c2a3bdfe077ea7e4b30ae79c9a9fd0d208d7d91da6e74f7f3ce0e157610b"},"akn_urn":"/akn/us/statement/manual/uspto/2024/mpep/eng@2024-02-29!sec_2106","canonical_url":"https://mpep.io/akn/us/statement/manual/uspto/2024/mpep/eng@2024-02-29!sec_2106","section_number":"2106","chapter":"2100","depth":0,"title":"Section 2106","children_ids":[]},{"id":"pb_ua5me6lc","corpus_id":"mpep-e9r01-2024-html","opaque_url":"https://mpep.io/n/pb_ua5me6lc","effective_range":{"start_revision":"R-01.2024","end_revision":null},"node_type":"prose_block","rendered_text_html":"

    On rare occasions conception and reduction to practice occur\n simultaneously in unpredictable technologies. Alpert v. Slatin,\n 305 F.2d 891, 894, 134 USPQ 296, 299 (CCPA 1962). “[I]n some unpredictable areas of\n chemistry and biology, there is no conception until the invention has been reduced to\n practice.” MacMillan v.Moffett, 432 F.2d 1237, 1234-40, 167 USPQ 550, 552-553 (CCPA\n 1970). See also Hitzeman v. Rutter, 243 F.3d 1345, 58 USPQ2d 1161\n (Fed. Cir. 2001) (conception simultaneous with reduction to practice where appellant\n lacked reasonable certainty that yeast’s performance of certain intracellular\n processes would result in the claimed antigen particles); Dunn v.\n Ragin, 50 USPQ 472, 475 (Bd. Pat. Inter. 1941) (a new variety of\n asexually reproduced plant is conceived and reduced to practice when it is grown and\n recognized as a new variety). Under these circumstances, conception is not complete\n if subsequent experimentation reveals factual uncertainty which “so undermines the\n specificity of the inventor’s idea that it is not yet a definite and permanent\n reflection of the complete invention as it will be used in practice.”\n Burroughs Wellcome Co. v. Barr Labs., Inc., 40 F.3d 1223, 1229,\n 32 USPQ2d 1915, 1920 (Fed. Cir. 1994).\n

    ","rendered_text_plain":"On rare occasions conception and reduction to practice occur simultaneously in unpredictable technologies. Alpert v. Slatin, 305 F.2d 891, 894, 134 USPQ 296, 299 (CCPA 1962). “[I]n some unpredictable areas of chemistry and biology, there is no conception until the invention has been reduced to practice.” MacMillan v.Moffett, 432 F.2d 1237, 1234-40, 167 USPQ 550, 552-553 (CCPA 1970). See also Hitzeman v. Rutter, 243 F.3d 1345, 58 USPQ2d 1161 (Fed. Cir. 2001) (conception simultaneous with reduction to practice where appellant lacked reasonable certainty that yeast’s performance of certain intracellular processes would result in the claimed antigen particles); Dunn v. Ragin, 50 USPQ 472, 475 (Bd. Pat. Inter. 1941) (a new variety of asexually reproduced plant is conceived and reduced to practice when it is grown and recognized as a new variety). Under these circumstances, conception is not complete if subsequent experimentation reveals factual uncertainty which “so undermines the specificity of the inventor’s idea that it is not yet a definite and permanent reflection of the complete invention as it will be used in practice.” Burroughs Wellcome Co. v. Barr Labs., Inc., 40 F.3d 1223, 1229, 32 USPQ2d 1915, 1920 (Fed. Cir. 1994).","provenance":{"source_file":"s2138.html","source_anchor":"d0e207719","source_sha256":"26c7c2a3bdfe077ea7e4b30ae79c9a9fd0d208d7d91da6e74f7f3ce0e157610b"},"kind":"narrative","host_section_id":"se_4ssncmw5"},{"id":"cs_6rgittxr","corpus_id":"mpep-e9r01-2024-html","opaque_url":"https://mpep.io/n/cs_6rgittxr","effective_range":{"start_revision":"R-01.2024","end_revision":null},"node_type":"case","rendered_text_html":"","rendered_text_plain":"Alpert v. Slatin, 305 F.2d 891 (CCPA 1962)","provenance":{"source_file":"s2138.html","source_anchor":"","source_sha256":"26c7c2a3bdfe077ea7e4b30ae79c9a9fd0d208d7d91da6e74f7f3ce0e157610b"},"short_name":"Alpert v. Slatin","all_citations":["305 F.2d 891","134 USPQ 296"],"canonical_citation":"Alpert v. Slatin, 305 F.2d 891, 134 USPQ 296 (CCPA 1962)","decision_year":1962,"court":"CCPA"},{"id":"pb_e5qnv2to","corpus_id":"mpep-e9r01-2024-html","opaque_url":"https://mpep.io/n/pb_e5qnv2to","effective_range":{"start_revision":"R-01.2024","end_revision":null},"node_type":"prose_block","rendered_text_html":"III. A PREVIOUSLY ABANDONED APPLICATION WHICH WAS NOT COPENDING WITH A SUBSEQUENT APPLICATION IS EVIDENCE ONLY OF CONCEPTION","rendered_text_plain":"III. A PREVIOUSLY ABANDONED APPLICATION WHICH WAS NOT COPENDING WITH A SUBSEQUENT APPLICATION IS EVIDENCE ONLY OF CONCEPTION","provenance":{"source_file":"s2138.html","source_anchor":"d0e207607/b.4","source_sha256":"26c7c2a3bdfe077ea7e4b30ae79c9a9fd0d208d7d91da6e74f7f3ce0e157610b"},"kind":"informal_heading","host_section_id":"se_4ssncmw5","heading_level":2,"heading_text":"III. A PREVIOUSLY ABANDONED APPLICATION WHICH WAS NOT COPENDING WITH A SUBSEQUENT APPLICATION IS EVIDENCE ONLY OF CONCEPTION"},{"id":"pb_wx64wbp5","corpus_id":"mpep-e9r01-2024-html","opaque_url":"https://mpep.io/n/pb_wx64wbp5","effective_range":{"start_revision":"R-01.2024","end_revision":null},"node_type":"prose_block","rendered_text_html":"

    An abandoned application with which no subsequent application was\n copending serves to abandon benefit of the application’s filing as a constructive\n reduction to practice and the abandoned application is evidence only of conception.\n In re Costello, 717 F.2d 1346, 1350, 219 USPQ 389, 392 (Fed.\n Cir. 1983).\n

    ","rendered_text_plain":"An abandoned application with which no subsequent application was copending serves to abandon benefit of the application’s filing as a constructive reduction to practice and the abandoned application is evidence only of conception. In re Costello, 717 F.2d 1346, 1350, 219 USPQ 389, 392 (Fed. Cir. 1983).","provenance":{"source_file":"s2138.html","source_anchor":"d0e207747","source_sha256":"26c7c2a3bdfe077ea7e4b30ae79c9a9fd0d208d7d91da6e74f7f3ce0e157610b"},"kind":"narrative","host_section_id":"se_4ssncmw5"},{"id":"se_4ssncmw5","corpus_id":"mpep-e9r01-2024-html","opaque_url":"https://mpep.io/n/se_4ssncmw5","effective_range":{"start_revision":"R-01.2024","end_revision":null},"node_type":"section","rendered_text_html":"","rendered_text_plain":"","provenance":{"source_file":"s2138.html","source_anchor":"d0e207607","source_sha256":"26c7c2a3bdfe077ea7e4b30ae79c9a9fd0d208d7d91da6e74f7f3ce0e157610b"},"akn_urn":"/akn/us/statement/manual/uspto/2024/mpep/eng@2024-02-29!sec_2138_04","canonical_url":"https://mpep.io/akn/us/statement/manual/uspto/2024/mpep/eng@2024-02-29!sec_2138_04","section_number":"2138.04","chapter":"2100","depth":1,"title":"“Conception”","children_ids":["pb_cdmq7pig","pb_mx6f2ouj","pb_ipta4krj","pb_uehhnhgu","pb_biizbvs6","pb_wj23m6gs","pb_o7ahhfrv","pb_ua5me6lc","pb_e5qnv2to","pb_wx64wbp5"],"revision_tag":"R-01.2024","parent_section_id":"se_oly7ctjt"},{"id":"pb_76khq67c","corpus_id":"mpep-e9r01-2024-html","opaque_url":"https://mpep.io/n/pb_76khq67c","effective_range":{"start_revision":"R-01.2024","end_revision":null},"node_type":"prose_block","rendered_text_html":"

    [Editor Note: This MPEP section has limited\n applicability to applications subject to examination under the first inventor\n to file (FITF) provisions of the AIA as set forth in 35 U.S.C. 100\n (note). Patents and applications that contain (or contained at any\n time) at least one claim with a pre-AIA effective filing date (before March 16, 2013)\n and at least one claim with a post-AIA effective filing date (on or after March 16,\n 2013) are subject to the patentability requirements in AIA 35 U.S.C.\n 102-103 and subject to pre-AIA 35 U.S.C.\n 102(g).See MPEP § 2159et seq.] \n

    ","rendered_text_plain":"[Editor Note: This MPEP section has limited applicability to applications subject to examination under the first inventor to file (FITF) provisions of the AIA as set forth in 35 U.S.C. 100 (note). Patents and applications that contain (or contained at any time) at least one claim with a pre-AIA effective filing date (before March 16, 2013) and at least one claim with a post-AIA effective filing date (on or after March 16, 2013) are subject to the patentability requirements in AIA 35 U.S.C. 102-103 and subject to pre-AIA 35 U.S.C. 102(g).See MPEP § 2159et seq.]","provenance":{"source_file":"s2138.html","source_anchor":"ch2100_d222e6_190f7_22","source_sha256":"26c7c2a3bdfe077ea7e4b30ae79c9a9fd0d208d7d91da6e74f7f3ce0e157610b"},"kind":"narrative","host_section_id":"se_ntidrsl3"},{"id":"pb_cygt2vus","corpus_id":"mpep-e9r01-2024-html","opaque_url":"https://mpep.io/n/pb_cygt2vus","effective_range":{"start_revision":"R-01.2024","end_revision":null},"node_type":"prose_block","rendered_text_html":"

    Reduction to practice may be an actual reduction or a constructive\n reduction to practice which occurs when a patent application on the claimed invention is\n filed. The filing of a patent application serves as conception and constructive\n reduction to practice of the subject matter described in the application. Thus, the\n inventor need not provide evidence of either conception or actual reduction to practice\n when relying on the content of the patent application. Hyatt v.\n Boone, 146 F.3d 1348, 1352, 47 USPQ2d 1128, 1130 (Fed. Cir. 1998). A\n reduction to practice can be done by another on behalf of the inventor. De\n Solms v.Schoenwald, 15 USPQ2d 1507, 1510 (Bd. Pat. App. & Inter. 1990).\n “While the filing of the original application theoretically constituted a constructive\n reduction to practice at the time, the subsequent abandonment of that application also\n resulted in an abandonment of the benefit of that filing as a constructive reduction to\n practice. The filing of the original application is, however, evidence of conception of\n the invention.” In re Costello, 717 F.2d 1346, 1350, 219 USPQ 389,\n 392 (Fed. Cir. 1983)(The second application was not co-pending with the original\n application and it did not reference the original application. Because of the\n requirements of 35\n U.S.C. 120 had not been satisfied, the filing of the original\n application was not recognized as constructive reduction to practice of the\n invention.).\n

    ","rendered_text_plain":"Reduction to practice may be an actual reduction or a constructive reduction to practice which occurs when a patent application on the claimed invention is filed. The filing of a patent application serves as conception and constructive reduction to practice of the subject matter described in the application. Thus, the inventor need not provide evidence of either conception or actual reduction to practice when relying on the content of the patent application. Hyatt v. Boone, 146 F.3d 1348, 1352, 47 USPQ2d 1128, 1130 (Fed. Cir. 1998). A reduction to practice can be done by another on behalf of the inventor. De Solms v.Schoenwald, 15 USPQ2d 1507, 1510 (Bd. Pat. App. & Inter. 1990). “While the filing of the original application theoretically constituted a constructive reduction to practice at the time, the subsequent abandonment of that application also resulted in an abandonment of the benefit of that filing as a constructive reduction to practice. The filing of the original application is, however, evidence of conception of the invention.” In re Costello, 717 F.2d 1346, 1350, 219 USPQ 389, 392 (Fed. Cir. 1983)(The second application was not co-pending with the original application and it did not reference the original application. Because of the requirements of 35 U.S.C. 120 had not been satisfied, the filing of the original application was not recognized as constructive reduction to practice of the invention.).","provenance":{"source_file":"s2138.html","source_anchor":"d0e207757","source_sha256":"26c7c2a3bdfe077ea7e4b30ae79c9a9fd0d208d7d91da6e74f7f3ce0e157610b"},"kind":"narrative","host_section_id":"se_ntidrsl3"},{"id":"cs_r2skul2y","corpus_id":"mpep-e9r01-2024-html","opaque_url":"https://mpep.io/n/cs_r2skul2y","effective_range":{"start_revision":"R-01.2024","end_revision":null},"node_type":"case","rendered_text_html":"","rendered_text_plain":"Hyatt v. Boone, 146 F.3d 1348 (Fed. Cir. 1998)","provenance":{"source_file":"s2138.html","source_anchor":"","source_sha256":"26c7c2a3bdfe077ea7e4b30ae79c9a9fd0d208d7d91da6e74f7f3ce0e157610b"},"short_name":"Hyatt v. Boone","all_citations":["146 F.3d 1348","47 USPQ2d 1128"],"canonical_citation":"Hyatt v. Boone, 146 F.3d 1348, 47 USPQ2d 1128 (Fed. Cir. 1998)","decision_year":1998,"court":"Fed. Cir."},{"id":"st_3brvlvym","corpus_id":"mpep-e9r01-2024-html","opaque_url":"https://mpep.io/n/st_3brvlvym","effective_range":{"start_revision":"R-01.2024","end_revision":null},"node_type":"statute","rendered_text_html":"","rendered_text_plain":"","provenance":{"source_file":"s2138.html","source_anchor":"","source_sha256":"26c7c2a3bdfe077ea7e4b30ae79c9a9fd0d208d7d91da6e74f7f3ce0e157610b"},"authority":"us_usc","authority_title_num":"35","authority_section_num":"120","subsection_path":[],"canonical_citation":"35 U.S.C. 120"},{"id":"pb_36extu4v","corpus_id":"mpep-e9r01-2024-html","opaque_url":"https://mpep.io/n/pb_36extu4v","effective_range":{"start_revision":"R-01.2024","end_revision":null},"node_type":"prose_block","rendered_text_html":"I. CONSTRUCTIVE REDUCTION TO PRACTICE REQUIRES COMPLIANCE WITH 35 U.S.C. 112(a) or PRE-AIA 35 U.S.C. 112, FIRST PARAGRAPH","rendered_text_plain":"I. CONSTRUCTIVE REDUCTION TO PRACTICE REQUIRES COMPLIANCE WITH 35 U.S.C. 112(a) or PRE-AIA 35 U.S.C. 112, FIRST PARAGRAPH","provenance":{"source_file":"s2138.html","source_anchor":"d0e207753/b.0","source_sha256":"26c7c2a3bdfe077ea7e4b30ae79c9a9fd0d208d7d91da6e74f7f3ce0e157610b"},"kind":"informal_heading","host_section_id":"se_ntidrsl3","heading_level":2,"heading_text":"I. CONSTRUCTIVE REDUCTION TO PRACTICE REQUIRES COMPLIANCE WITH 35 U.S.C. 112(a) or PRE-AIA 35 U.S.C. 112, FIRST PARAGRAPH"},{"id":"pb_eimlgh6r","corpus_id":"mpep-e9r01-2024-html","opaque_url":"https://mpep.io/n/pb_eimlgh6r","effective_range":{"start_revision":"R-01.2024","end_revision":null},"node_type":"prose_block","rendered_text_html":"

    When a party to an interference seeks the benefit of an\n earlier-filed U.S. patent application, the earlier application must meet the\n requirements of 35 U.S.C. 120 and 35 U.S.C.\n 112(a) or pre-AIA 35 U.S.C. 112, first\n paragraph for the subject matter of the count. The earlier application must meet the\n enablement requirement and must contain a written description of the subject matter\n of the interference count. Hyatt v. Boone, 146 F.3d 1348, 1352,\n 47 USPQ2d 1128, 1130 (Fed. Cir. 1998). Proof of a constructive reduction to practice\n requires sufficient disclosure under the “how to use” and “how to make” requirements\n of 35\n U.S.C. 112(a) or pre-AIA 35 U.S.C. 112, first\n paragraph. Kawai v. Metlesics, 480 F.2d 880, 886, 178 USPQ 158,\n 163 (CCPA 1973) (A constructive reduction to practice is not proven unless the\n specification discloses a practical utility where one would not be obvious. Prior art\n which disclosed an anticonvulsant compound which differed from the claimed compound\n only in the absence of a -CH2- group connecting two functional\n groups was not sufficient to establish utility of the claimed compound because the\n compounds were not so closely related that they could be presumed to have the same\n utility.). The purpose of the written description requirement is “to ensure that the\n inventor had possession, as of the filing date of the application relied on, of the\n specific subject matter later claimed by him.” In re Edwards, 568\n F.2d 1349, 1351-52, 196 USPQ 465, 467 (CCPA 1978). The written description must\n include all of the limitations of the interference count, or the inventor must show\n that any absent text is necessarily comprehended in the description provided and\n would have been so understood at the time the patent application was filed.\n Furthermore, the written description must be sufficient, when the entire\n specification is considered, such that the “necessary and only reasonable\n construction” that would be given it by a person skilled in the art is one that\n clearly supports each positive limitation in the count. Hyatt v.\n Boone, 146 F.3d at 1354-55, 47 USPQ2d at 1130-1132 (Fed. Cir. 1998) (The\n claim could be read as describing subject matter other than that of the count and\n thus did not establish that the inventor was in possession of the invention of the\n count.). See also Bigham v. Godtfredsen, 857 F.2d 1415, 1417,\n 8 USPQ2d 1266, 1268 (Fed. Cir. 1988) (“[t]he generic term halogen comprehends a\n limited number of species, and ordinarily constitutes a sufficient written\n description of the common halogen species,” except where the halogen species are\n patentably distinct). \n

    ","rendered_text_plain":"When a party to an interference seeks the benefit of an earlier-filed U.S. patent application, the earlier application must meet the requirements of 35 U.S.C. 120 and 35 U.S.C. 112(a) or pre-AIA 35 U.S.C. 112, first paragraph for the subject matter of the count. The earlier application must meet the enablement requirement and must contain a written description of the subject matter of the interference count. Hyatt v. Boone, 146 F.3d 1348, 1352, 47 USPQ2d 1128, 1130 (Fed. Cir. 1998). Proof of a constructive reduction to practice requires sufficient disclosure under the “how to use” and “how to make” requirements of 35 U.S.C. 112(a) or pre-AIA 35 U.S.C. 112, first paragraph. Kawai v. Metlesics, 480 F.2d 880, 886, 178 USPQ 158, 163 (CCPA 1973) (A constructive reduction to practice is not proven unless the specification discloses a practical utility where one would not be obvious. Prior art which disclosed an anticonvulsant compound which differed from the claimed compound only in the absence of a -CH2- group connecting two functional groups was not sufficient to establish utility of the claimed compound because the compounds were not so closely related that they could be presumed to have the same utility.). The purpose of the written description requirement is “to ensure that the inventor had possession, as of the filing date of the application relied on, of the specific subject matter later claimed by him.” In re Edwards, 568 F.2d 1349, 1351-52, 196 USPQ 465, 467 (CCPA 1978). The written description must include all of the limitations of the interference count, or the inventor must show that any absent text is necessarily comprehended in the description provided and would have been so understood at the time the patent application was filed. Furthermore, the written description must be sufficient, when the entire specification is considered, such that the “necessary and only reasonable construction” that would be given it by a person skilled in the art is one that clearly supports each positive limitation in the count. Hyatt v. Boone, 146 F.3d at 1354-55, 47 USPQ2d at 1130-1132 (Fed. Cir. 1998) (The claim could be read as describing subject matter other than that of the count and thus did not establish that the inventor was in possession of the invention of the count.). See also Bigham v. Godtfredsen, 857 F.2d 1415, 1417, 8 USPQ2d 1266, 1268 (Fed. Cir. 1988) (“[t]he generic term halogen comprehends a limited number of species, and ordinarily constitutes a sufficient written description of the common halogen species,” except where the halogen species are patentably distinct).","provenance":{"source_file":"s2138.html","source_anchor":"d0e207779","source_sha256":"26c7c2a3bdfe077ea7e4b30ae79c9a9fd0d208d7d91da6e74f7f3ce0e157610b"},"kind":"narrative","host_section_id":"se_ntidrsl3"},{"id":"cs_qe7boios","corpus_id":"mpep-e9r01-2024-html","opaque_url":"https://mpep.io/n/cs_qe7boios","effective_range":{"start_revision":"R-01.2024","end_revision":null},"node_type":"case","rendered_text_html":"","rendered_text_plain":"In re Edwards, 568 F.2d 1349 (CCPA 1978)","provenance":{"source_file":"s2138.html","source_anchor":"","source_sha256":"26c7c2a3bdfe077ea7e4b30ae79c9a9fd0d208d7d91da6e74f7f3ce0e157610b"},"short_name":"In re Edwards","all_citations":["568 F.2d 1349","196 USPQ 465"],"canonical_citation":"In re Edwards, 568 F.2d 1349, 196 USPQ 465 (CCPA 1978)","decision_year":1978,"court":"CCPA"},{"id":"st_b7jyfghk","corpus_id":"mpep-e9r01-2024-html","opaque_url":"https://mpep.io/n/st_b7jyfghk","effective_range":{"start_revision":"R-01.2024","end_revision":null},"node_type":"statute","rendered_text_html":"","rendered_text_plain":"","provenance":{"source_file":"s2138.html","source_anchor":"","source_sha256":"26c7c2a3bdfe077ea7e4b30ae79c9a9fd0d208d7d91da6e74f7f3ce0e157610b"},"authority":"us_usc","authority_title_num":"35","authority_section_num":"112","subsection_path":["a"],"canonical_citation":"35 U.S.C. 112(a)"},{"id":"pb_chnnr5c3","corpus_id":"mpep-e9r01-2024-html","opaque_url":"https://mpep.io/n/pb_chnnr5c3","effective_range":{"start_revision":"R-01.2024","end_revision":null},"node_type":"prose_block","rendered_text_html":"II. REQUIREMENTS TO ESTABLISH ACTUAL REDUCTION TO PRACTICE","rendered_text_plain":"II. REQUIREMENTS TO ESTABLISH ACTUAL REDUCTION TO PRACTICE","provenance":{"source_file":"s2138.html","source_anchor":"d0e207753/b.2","source_sha256":"26c7c2a3bdfe077ea7e4b30ae79c9a9fd0d208d7d91da6e74f7f3ce0e157610b"},"kind":"informal_heading","host_section_id":"se_ntidrsl3","heading_level":2,"heading_text":"II. REQUIREMENTS TO ESTABLISH ACTUAL REDUCTION TO PRACTICE"},{"id":"pb_purjardq","corpus_id":"mpep-e9r01-2024-html","opaque_url":"https://mpep.io/n/pb_purjardq","effective_range":{"start_revision":"R-01.2024","end_revision":null},"node_type":"prose_block","rendered_text_html":"

    “In an interference proceeding, a party seeking to establish an\n actual reduction to practice must satisfy a two-prong test: (1) the party constructed\n an embodiment or performed a process that met every element of the interference\n count, and (2) the embodiment or process operated for its intended purpose.”\n Eaton v. Evans, 204 F.3d 1094, 1097, 53 USPQ2d 1696, 1698 (Fed.\n Cir. 2000).\n

    ","rendered_text_plain":"“In an interference proceeding, a party seeking to establish an actual reduction to practice must satisfy a two-prong test: (1) the party constructed an embodiment or performed a process that met every element of the interference count, and (2) the embodiment or process operated for its intended purpose.” Eaton v. Evans, 204 F.3d 1094, 1097, 53 USPQ2d 1696, 1698 (Fed. Cir. 2000).","provenance":{"source_file":"s2138.html","source_anchor":"d0e207813","source_sha256":"26c7c2a3bdfe077ea7e4b30ae79c9a9fd0d208d7d91da6e74f7f3ce0e157610b"},"kind":"narrative","host_section_id":"se_ntidrsl3"},{"id":"cs_myk32cms","corpus_id":"mpep-e9r01-2024-html","opaque_url":"https://mpep.io/n/cs_myk32cms","effective_range":{"start_revision":"R-01.2024","end_revision":null},"node_type":"case","rendered_text_html":"","rendered_text_plain":"Eaton v. Evans, 204 F.3d 1094 (Fed. Cir. 2000)","provenance":{"source_file":"s2138.html","source_anchor":"","source_sha256":"26c7c2a3bdfe077ea7e4b30ae79c9a9fd0d208d7d91da6e74f7f3ce0e157610b"},"short_name":"Eaton v. Evans","all_citations":["204 F.3d 1094","53 USPQ2d 1696"],"canonical_citation":"Eaton v. Evans, 204 F.3d 1094, 53 USPQ2d 1696 (Fed. Cir. 2000)","decision_year":2000,"court":"Fed. Cir."},{"id":"pb_2axdyfzu","corpus_id":"mpep-e9r01-2024-html","opaque_url":"https://mpep.io/n/pb_2axdyfzu","effective_range":{"start_revision":"R-01.2024","end_revision":null},"node_type":"prose_block","rendered_text_html":"

    The same evidence sufficient for a constructive reduction to\n practice may be insufficient to establish an actual reduction to practice, which\n requires a showing of the invention in a physical or tangible form that shows every\n element of the count. Wetmore v. Quick, 536 F.2d 937, 942, 190\n USPQ 223, 227 (CCPA 1976). For an actual reduction to practice, the invention must\n have been sufficiently tested to demonstrate that it will work for its intended\n purpose, but it need not be in a commercially satisfactory stage of development. See,\n e.g., Scott v. Finney, 34 F.3d 1058, 1062, 32 USPQ2d 1115, 1118-19\n (Fed. Cir. 1994) (citing numerous cases wherein the character of the testing\n necessary to support an actual reduction to practice varied with the complexity of\n the invention and the problem it solved). If a device is so simple, and its purpose\n and efficacy so obvious, construction alone is sufficient to demonstrate workability.\n King Instrument Corp. v. Otari Corp., 767 F.2d 853, 860, 226\n USPQ 402, 407 (Fed. Cir. 1985).\n

    ","rendered_text_plain":"The same evidence sufficient for a constructive reduction to practice may be insufficient to establish an actual reduction to practice, which requires a showing of the invention in a physical or tangible form that shows every element of the count. Wetmore v. Quick, 536 F.2d 937, 942, 190 USPQ 223, 227 (CCPA 1976). For an actual reduction to practice, the invention must have been sufficiently tested to demonstrate that it will work for its intended purpose, but it need not be in a commercially satisfactory stage of development. See, e.g., Scott v. Finney, 34 F.3d 1058, 1062, 32 USPQ2d 1115, 1118-19 (Fed. Cir. 1994) (citing numerous cases wherein the character of the testing necessary to support an actual reduction to practice varied with the complexity of the invention and the problem it solved). If a device is so simple, and its purpose and efficacy so obvious, construction alone is sufficient to demonstrate workability. King Instrument Corp. v. Otari Corp., 767 F.2d 853, 860, 226 USPQ 402, 407 (Fed. Cir. 1985).","provenance":{"source_file":"s2138.html","source_anchor":"d0e207819","source_sha256":"26c7c2a3bdfe077ea7e4b30ae79c9a9fd0d208d7d91da6e74f7f3ce0e157610b"},"kind":"narrative","host_section_id":"se_ntidrsl3"},{"id":"cs_lvurc4d3","corpus_id":"mpep-e9r01-2024-html","opaque_url":"https://mpep.io/n/cs_lvurc4d3","effective_range":{"start_revision":"R-01.2024","end_revision":null},"node_type":"case","rendered_text_html":"","rendered_text_plain":"Wetmore v. Quick, 536 F.2d 937 (CCPA 1976)","provenance":{"source_file":"s2138.html","source_anchor":"","source_sha256":"26c7c2a3bdfe077ea7e4b30ae79c9a9fd0d208d7d91da6e74f7f3ce0e157610b"},"short_name":"Wetmore v. Quick","all_citations":["536 F.2d 937","190 USPQ 223"],"canonical_citation":"Wetmore v. Quick, 536 F.2d 937, 190 USPQ 223 (CCPA 1976)","decision_year":1976,"court":"CCPA"},{"id":"cs_ychotynm","corpus_id":"mpep-e9r01-2024-html","opaque_url":"https://mpep.io/n/cs_ychotynm","effective_range":{"start_revision":"R-01.2024","end_revision":null},"node_type":"case","rendered_text_html":"","rendered_text_plain":"Scott v. Finney, 34 F.3d 1058 (Fed. Cir. 1994)","provenance":{"source_file":"s2138.html","source_anchor":"","source_sha256":"26c7c2a3bdfe077ea7e4b30ae79c9a9fd0d208d7d91da6e74f7f3ce0e157610b"},"short_name":"Scott v. Finney","all_citations":["34 F.3d 1058","32 USPQ2d 1115"],"canonical_citation":"Scott v. Finney, 34 F.3d 1058, 32 USPQ2d 1115 (Fed. Cir. 1994)","decision_year":1994,"court":"Fed. Cir."},{"id":"cs_6lwvb3lb","corpus_id":"mpep-e9r01-2024-html","opaque_url":"https://mpep.io/n/cs_6lwvb3lb","effective_range":{"start_revision":"R-01.2024","end_revision":null},"node_type":"case","rendered_text_html":"","rendered_text_plain":"King Instrument Corp. v. Otari Corp., 767 F.2d 853 (Fed. Cir. 1985)","provenance":{"source_file":"s2138.html","source_anchor":"","source_sha256":"26c7c2a3bdfe077ea7e4b30ae79c9a9fd0d208d7d91da6e74f7f3ce0e157610b"},"short_name":"King Instrument Corp. v. Otari Corp.","all_citations":["767 F.2d 853","226 USPQ 402"],"canonical_citation":"King Instrument Corp. v. Otari Corp., 767 F.2d 853, 226 USPQ 402 (Fed. Cir. 1985)","decision_year":1985,"court":"Fed. Cir."},{"id":"pb_3zyzammw","corpus_id":"mpep-e9r01-2024-html","opaque_url":"https://mpep.io/n/pb_3zyzammw","effective_range":{"start_revision":"R-01.2024","end_revision":null},"node_type":"prose_block","rendered_text_html":"

    For additional cases pertaining to the requirements necessary to\n establish actual reduction to practice see DSL Dynamic Sciences, Ltd. v.\n Union Switch & Signal, Inc., 928 F.2d 1122, 1126, 18 USPQ2d 1152,\n 1155 (Fed. Cir. 1991) (“events occurring after an alleged actual reduction to\n practice can call into question whether reduction to practice has in fact occurred”);\n Fitzgerald v. Arbib, 268 F.2d 763, 765-66, 122 USPQ 530, 531-32\n (CCPA 1959) (“the reduction to practice of a three-dimensional design invention\n requires the production of an article embodying that design” in “other than a mere\n drawing”); Birmingham v. Randall, 171 F.2d 957, 80 USPQ 371, 372\n (CCPA 1948) (To establish an actual reduction to practice of an invention directed to\n a method of making a product, it is not enough to show that the method was performed.\n “[S]uch an invention is not reduced to practice until it is established that the\n product made by the process is satisfactory, and [ ] this may require successful\n testing of the product.”). \n

    ","rendered_text_plain":"For additional cases pertaining to the requirements necessary to establish actual reduction to practice see DSL Dynamic Sciences, Ltd. v. Union Switch & Signal, Inc., 928 F.2d 1122, 1126, 18 USPQ2d 1152, 1155 (Fed. Cir. 1991) (“events occurring after an alleged actual reduction to practice can call into question whether reduction to practice has in fact occurred”); Fitzgerald v. Arbib, 268 F.2d 763, 765-66, 122 USPQ 530, 531-32 (CCPA 1959) (“the reduction to practice of a three-dimensional design invention requires the production of an article embodying that design” in “other than a mere drawing”); Birmingham v. Randall, 171 F.2d 957, 80 USPQ 371, 372 (CCPA 1948) (To establish an actual reduction to practice of an invention directed to a method of making a product, it is not enough to show that the method was performed. “[S]uch an invention is not reduced to practice until it is established that the product made by the process is satisfactory, and [ ] this may require successful testing of the product.”).","provenance":{"source_file":"s2138.html","source_anchor":"d0e207835","source_sha256":"26c7c2a3bdfe077ea7e4b30ae79c9a9fd0d208d7d91da6e74f7f3ce0e157610b"},"kind":"narrative","host_section_id":"se_ntidrsl3"},{"id":"cs_7iww6uvg","corpus_id":"mpep-e9r01-2024-html","opaque_url":"https://mpep.io/n/cs_7iww6uvg","effective_range":{"start_revision":"R-01.2024","end_revision":null},"node_type":"case","rendered_text_html":"","rendered_text_plain":"DSL Dynamic Sciences, Ltd. v. Union Switch & Signal, Inc., 928 F.2d 1122 (Fed. Cir. 1991)","provenance":{"source_file":"s2138.html","source_anchor":"","source_sha256":"26c7c2a3bdfe077ea7e4b30ae79c9a9fd0d208d7d91da6e74f7f3ce0e157610b"},"short_name":"DSL Dynamic Sciences, Ltd. v. Union Switch & Signal, Inc.","all_citations":["928 F.2d 1122","18 USPQ2d 1152"],"canonical_citation":"DSL Dynamic Sciences, Ltd. v. Union Switch & Signal, Inc., 928 F.2d 1122, 18 USPQ2d 1152 (Fed. Cir. 1991)","decision_year":1991,"court":"Fed. Cir."},{"id":"cs_wd4qxmlp","corpus_id":"mpep-e9r01-2024-html","opaque_url":"https://mpep.io/n/cs_wd4qxmlp","effective_range":{"start_revision":"R-01.2024","end_revision":null},"node_type":"case","rendered_text_html":"","rendered_text_plain":"Fitzgerald v. Arbib, 268 F.2d 763 (CCPA 1959)","provenance":{"source_file":"s2138.html","source_anchor":"","source_sha256":"26c7c2a3bdfe077ea7e4b30ae79c9a9fd0d208d7d91da6e74f7f3ce0e157610b"},"short_name":"Fitzgerald v. Arbib","all_citations":["268 F.2d 763","122 USPQ 530"],"canonical_citation":"Fitzgerald v. Arbib, 268 F.2d 763, 122 USPQ 530 (CCPA 1959)","decision_year":1959,"court":"CCPA"},{"id":"cs_hg4tcg5x","corpus_id":"mpep-e9r01-2024-html","opaque_url":"https://mpep.io/n/cs_hg4tcg5x","effective_range":{"start_revision":"R-01.2024","end_revision":null},"node_type":"case","rendered_text_html":"","rendered_text_plain":"Birmingham v. Randall, 171 F.2d 957 (CCPA 1948)","provenance":{"source_file":"s2138.html","source_anchor":"","source_sha256":"26c7c2a3bdfe077ea7e4b30ae79c9a9fd0d208d7d91da6e74f7f3ce0e157610b"},"short_name":"Birmingham v. Randall","all_citations":["171 F.2d 957","80 USPQ 371"],"canonical_citation":"Birmingham v. Randall, 171 F.2d 957, 80 USPQ 371 (CCPA 1948)","decision_year":1948,"court":"CCPA"},{"id":"pb_zkitcu6l","corpus_id":"mpep-e9r01-2024-html","opaque_url":"https://mpep.io/n/pb_zkitcu6l","effective_range":{"start_revision":"R-01.2024","end_revision":null},"node_type":"prose_block","rendered_text_html":"III. TESTING REQUIRED TO ESTABLISH AN ACTUAL REDUCTION TO PRACTICE","rendered_text_plain":"III. TESTING REQUIRED TO ESTABLISH AN ACTUAL REDUCTION TO PRACTICE","provenance":{"source_file":"s2138.html","source_anchor":"d0e207753/b.4","source_sha256":"26c7c2a3bdfe077ea7e4b30ae79c9a9fd0d208d7d91da6e74f7f3ce0e157610b"},"kind":"informal_heading","host_section_id":"se_ntidrsl3","heading_level":2,"heading_text":"III. TESTING REQUIRED TO ESTABLISH AN ACTUAL REDUCTION TO PRACTICE"},{"id":"pb_dsjz7kj5","corpus_id":"mpep-e9r01-2024-html","opaque_url":"https://mpep.io/n/pb_dsjz7kj5","effective_range":{"start_revision":"R-01.2024","end_revision":null},"node_type":"prose_block","rendered_text_html":"

    “The nature of testing which is required to establish a reduction to\n practice depends on the particular facts of each case, especially the nature of the\n invention.” Gellert v. Wanberg, 495 F.2d 779, 783, 181 USPQ 648,\n 652 (CCPA 1974) (“an invention may be tested sufficiently … where less than all of\n the conditions of actual use are duplicated by the tests”); Wells v.\n Fremont, 177 USPQ 22, 24-5 (Bd. Pat. Inter. 1972) (“even where tests are\n conducted under ‘bench’ or laboratory conditions, those conditions must ‘fully\n duplicate each and every condition of actual use’ or if they do not, then the\n evidence must establish a relationship between the subject matter, the test condition\n and the intended functional setting of the invention,” but it is not required that\n all the conditions of all actual uses be duplicated, such as rain, snow, mud, dust\n and submersion in water). \n

    ","rendered_text_plain":"“The nature of testing which is required to establish a reduction to practice depends on the particular facts of each case, especially the nature of the invention.” Gellert v. Wanberg, 495 F.2d 779, 783, 181 USPQ 648, 652 (CCPA 1974) (“an invention may be tested sufficiently … where less than all of the conditions of actual use are duplicated by the tests”); Wells v. Fremont, 177 USPQ 22, 24-5 (Bd. Pat. Inter. 1972) (“even where tests are conducted under ‘bench’ or laboratory conditions, those conditions must ‘fully duplicate each and every condition of actual use’ or if they do not, then the evidence must establish a relationship between the subject matter, the test condition and the intended functional setting of the invention,” but it is not required that all the conditions of all actual uses be duplicated, such as rain, snow, mud, dust and submersion in water).","provenance":{"source_file":"s2138.html","source_anchor":"d0e207863","source_sha256":"26c7c2a3bdfe077ea7e4b30ae79c9a9fd0d208d7d91da6e74f7f3ce0e157610b"},"kind":"narrative","host_section_id":"se_ntidrsl3"},{"id":"cs_hzisdwkd","corpus_id":"mpep-e9r01-2024-html","opaque_url":"https://mpep.io/n/cs_hzisdwkd","effective_range":{"start_revision":"R-01.2024","end_revision":null},"node_type":"case","rendered_text_html":"","rendered_text_plain":"Gellert v. Wanberg, 495 F.2d 779 (CCPA 1974)","provenance":{"source_file":"s2138.html","source_anchor":"","source_sha256":"26c7c2a3bdfe077ea7e4b30ae79c9a9fd0d208d7d91da6e74f7f3ce0e157610b"},"short_name":"Gellert v. Wanberg","all_citations":["495 F.2d 779","181 USPQ 648"],"canonical_citation":"Gellert v. Wanberg, 495 F.2d 779, 181 USPQ 648 (CCPA 1974)","decision_year":1974,"court":"CCPA"},{"id":"cs_sb3swmj7","corpus_id":"mpep-e9r01-2024-html","opaque_url":"https://mpep.io/n/cs_sb3swmj7","effective_range":{"start_revision":"R-01.2024","end_revision":null},"node_type":"case","rendered_text_html":"","rendered_text_plain":"Wells v. Fremont, 177 USPQ 22 (Bd. Pat. Inter. 1972)","provenance":{"source_file":"s2138.html","source_anchor":"","source_sha256":"26c7c2a3bdfe077ea7e4b30ae79c9a9fd0d208d7d91da6e74f7f3ce0e157610b"},"short_name":"Wells v. Fremont","all_citations":["177 USPQ 22"],"canonical_citation":"Wells v. Fremont, 177 USPQ 22 (Bd. Pat. Inter. 1972)","decision_year":1972,"court":"Bd. Pat. Inter."},{"id":"pb_4fy6l2cq","corpus_id":"mpep-e9r01-2024-html","opaque_url":"https://mpep.io/n/pb_4fy6l2cq","effective_range":{"start_revision":"R-01.2024","end_revision":null},"node_type":"prose_block","rendered_text_html":"IV. REDUCTION TO PRACTICE REQUIRES RECOGNITION AND APPRECIATION OF THE INVENTION","rendered_text_plain":"IV. REDUCTION TO PRACTICE REQUIRES RECOGNITION AND APPRECIATION OF THE INVENTION","provenance":{"source_file":"s2138.html","source_anchor":"d0e207753/b.6","source_sha256":"26c7c2a3bdfe077ea7e4b30ae79c9a9fd0d208d7d91da6e74f7f3ce0e157610b"},"kind":"informal_heading","host_section_id":"se_ntidrsl3","heading_level":2,"heading_text":"IV. REDUCTION TO PRACTICE REQUIRES RECOGNITION AND APPRECIATION OF THE INVENTION"},{"id":"pb_cbjlgvq5","corpus_id":"mpep-e9r01-2024-html","opaque_url":"https://mpep.io/n/pb_cbjlgvq5","effective_range":{"start_revision":"R-01.2024","end_revision":null},"node_type":"prose_block","rendered_text_html":"

    The invention must be recognized and appreciated for a reduction to\n practice to occur. “The rule that conception and reduction to practice cannot be\n established nunc pro tunc simply requires that in order for an experiment to\n constitute an actual reduction to practice, there must have been contemporaneous\n appreciation of the invention at issue by the inventor…. Subsequent testing or later\n recognition may not be used to show that a party had contemporaneous appreciation of\n the invention. However, evidence of subsequent testing may be admitted for the\n purpose of showing that an embodiment was produced and that it met the limitations of\n the count.” Cooper v. Goldfarb, 154 F.3d 1321, 1331, 47 USPQ2d\n 1896, 1904 (Fed. Cir. 1998) (citations omitted). Meitzner v.\n Corte, 537 F.2d 524, 528, 190 USPQ 407, 410 (CCPA 1976) (there can be no\n conception or reduction to practice of a new form or of a process using such a new\n form of an otherwise old composition where there has been no recognition or\n appreciation of the existence of the new form); Estee Lauder, Inc. v.\n L’Oreal S.A., 129 F.3d 588, 593, 44 USPQ2d 1610, 1615 (Fed. Cir. 1997)\n (“[W]hen testing is necessary to establish utility, there must be recognition and\n appreciation that the tests were successful for reduction to practice to occur.” A\n showing that testing was completed before the critical date, and that testing\n ultimately proved successful, was held insufficient to establish a reduction to\n practice before the critical date, since the success of the testing was not\n appreciated or recognized until after the critical date.); Parker v.\n Frilette, 462 F.2d 544, 547, 174 USPQ 321, 324 (CCPA 1972) (“[an]\n inventor need not understand precisely why his invention works in order to achieve an\n actual reduction to practice”). \n

    ","rendered_text_plain":"The invention must be recognized and appreciated for a reduction to practice to occur. “The rule that conception and reduction to practice cannot be established nunc pro tunc simply requires that in order for an experiment to constitute an actual reduction to practice, there must have been contemporaneous appreciation of the invention at issue by the inventor…. Subsequent testing or later recognition may not be used to show that a party had contemporaneous appreciation of the invention. However, evidence of subsequent testing may be admitted for the purpose of showing that an embodiment was produced and that it met the limitations of the count.” Cooper v. Goldfarb, 154 F.3d 1321, 1331, 47 USPQ2d 1896, 1904 (Fed. Cir. 1998) (citations omitted). Meitzner v. Corte, 537 F.2d 524, 528, 190 USPQ 407, 410 (CCPA 1976) (there can be no conception or reduction to practice of a new form or of a process using such a new form of an otherwise old composition where there has been no recognition or appreciation of the existence of the new form); Estee Lauder, Inc. v. L’Oreal S.A., 129 F.3d 588, 593, 44 USPQ2d 1610, 1615 (Fed. Cir. 1997) (“[W]hen testing is necessary to establish utility, there must be recognition and appreciation that the tests were successful for reduction to practice to occur.” A showing that testing was completed before the critical date, and that testing ultimately proved successful, was held insufficient to establish a reduction to practice before the critical date, since the success of the testing was not appreciated or recognized until after the critical date.); Parker v. Frilette, 462 F.2d 544, 547, 174 USPQ 321, 324 (CCPA 1972) (“[an] inventor need not understand precisely why his invention works in order to achieve an actual reduction to practice”).","provenance":{"source_file":"s2138.html","source_anchor":"d0e207876","source_sha256":"26c7c2a3bdfe077ea7e4b30ae79c9a9fd0d208d7d91da6e74f7f3ce0e157610b"},"kind":"narrative","host_section_id":"se_ntidrsl3"},{"id":"cs_njf6cuqi","corpus_id":"mpep-e9r01-2024-html","opaque_url":"https://mpep.io/n/cs_njf6cuqi","effective_range":{"start_revision":"R-01.2024","end_revision":null},"node_type":"case","rendered_text_html":"","rendered_text_plain":"Cooper v. Goldfarb, 154 F.3d 1321 (Fed. Cir. 1998)","provenance":{"source_file":"s2138.html","source_anchor":"","source_sha256":"26c7c2a3bdfe077ea7e4b30ae79c9a9fd0d208d7d91da6e74f7f3ce0e157610b"},"short_name":"Cooper v. Goldfarb","all_citations":["154 F.3d 1321","47 USPQ2d 1896"],"canonical_citation":"Cooper v. Goldfarb, 154 F.3d 1321, 47 USPQ2d 1896 (Fed. Cir. 1998)","decision_year":1998,"court":"Fed. Cir."},{"id":"cs_dntnwnxi","corpus_id":"mpep-e9r01-2024-html","opaque_url":"https://mpep.io/n/cs_dntnwnxi","effective_range":{"start_revision":"R-01.2024","end_revision":null},"node_type":"case","rendered_text_html":"","rendered_text_plain":"Meitzner v. Corte, 537 F.2d 524 (CCPA 1976)","provenance":{"source_file":"s2138.html","source_anchor":"","source_sha256":"26c7c2a3bdfe077ea7e4b30ae79c9a9fd0d208d7d91da6e74f7f3ce0e157610b"},"short_name":"Meitzner v. Corte","all_citations":["537 F.2d 524","190 USPQ 407"],"canonical_citation":"Meitzner v. Corte, 537 F.2d 524, 190 USPQ 407 (CCPA 1976)","decision_year":1976,"court":"CCPA"},{"id":"cs_b6viyrwc","corpus_id":"mpep-e9r01-2024-html","opaque_url":"https://mpep.io/n/cs_b6viyrwc","effective_range":{"start_revision":"R-01.2024","end_revision":null},"node_type":"case","rendered_text_html":"","rendered_text_plain":"Estee Lauder, Inc. v. L’Oreal S.A., 129 F.3d 588 (Fed. Cir. 1997)","provenance":{"source_file":"s2138.html","source_anchor":"","source_sha256":"26c7c2a3bdfe077ea7e4b30ae79c9a9fd0d208d7d91da6e74f7f3ce0e157610b"},"short_name":"Estee Lauder, Inc. v. L’Oreal S.A.","all_citations":["129 F.3d 588","44 USPQ2d 1610"],"canonical_citation":"Estee Lauder, Inc. v. L’Oreal S.A., 129 F.3d 588, 44 USPQ2d 1610 (Fed. Cir. 1997)","decision_year":1997,"court":"Fed. Cir."},{"id":"cs_hd6h2cxm","corpus_id":"mpep-e9r01-2024-html","opaque_url":"https://mpep.io/n/cs_hd6h2cxm","effective_range":{"start_revision":"R-01.2024","end_revision":null},"node_type":"case","rendered_text_html":"","rendered_text_plain":"Parker v. Frilette, 462 F.2d 544 (CCPA 1972)","provenance":{"source_file":"s2138.html","source_anchor":"","source_sha256":"26c7c2a3bdfe077ea7e4b30ae79c9a9fd0d208d7d91da6e74f7f3ce0e157610b"},"short_name":"Parker v. Frilette","all_citations":["462 F.2d 544","174 USPQ 321"],"canonical_citation":"Parker v. Frilette, 462 F.2d 544, 174 USPQ 321 (CCPA 1972)","decision_year":1972,"court":"CCPA"},{"id":"pb_higdk6fi","corpus_id":"mpep-e9r01-2024-html","opaque_url":"https://mpep.io/n/pb_higdk6fi","effective_range":{"start_revision":"R-01.2024","end_revision":null},"node_type":"prose_block","rendered_text_html":"V. RECOGNITION OF THE INVENTION BY ANOTHER MAY INURE TO THE BENEFIT OF THE INVENTOR","rendered_text_plain":"V. RECOGNITION OF THE INVENTION BY ANOTHER MAY INURE TO THE BENEFIT OF THE INVENTOR","provenance":{"source_file":"s2138.html","source_anchor":"d0e207753/b.8","source_sha256":"26c7c2a3bdfe077ea7e4b30ae79c9a9fd0d208d7d91da6e74f7f3ce0e157610b"},"kind":"informal_heading","host_section_id":"se_ntidrsl3","heading_level":2,"heading_text":"V. RECOGNITION OF THE INVENTION BY ANOTHER MAY INURE TO THE BENEFIT OF THE INVENTOR"},{"id":"pb_llcor3fk","corpus_id":"mpep-e9r01-2024-html","opaque_url":"https://mpep.io/n/pb_llcor3fk","effective_range":{"start_revision":"R-01.2024","end_revision":null},"node_type":"prose_block","rendered_text_html":"

    “Inurement involves a claim by an inventor that, as a matter of\n law, the acts of another person should accrue to the benefit of the inventor.”\n Cooper v. Goldfarb, 154 F.3d 1321, 1331, 47 USPQ2d 1896, 1904\n (Fed. Cir. 1998). Before a non-inventor’s recognition of the utility of the invention\n can inure to the benefit of the inventor, the following three-prong test must be met:\n (1) the inventor must have conceived of the invention, (2) the inventor must have had\n an expectation that the embodiment tested would work for the intended purpose of the\n invention, and (3) the inventor must have submitted the embodiment for testing for\n the intended purpose of the invention. Genentech, Inc. v. Chiron\n Corp., 220 F.3d 1345, 1354, 55 USPQ2d 1636, 1643 (Fed. Cir. 2000). In\n Genentech, a non-inventor hired by the inventor to test yeast\n samples for the presence of the fusion protein encoded by the DNA construct of the\n invention recognized the growth-enhancing property of the fusion protein, but did not\n communicate this recognition to the inventor. The court found that because the\n inventor did not submit the samples for testing growth-promoting activity, the\n intended purpose of the invention, the third prong was not satisfied and the\n uncommunicated recognition of the activity of the fusion protein by the non-inventor\n did not inure to the benefit of the inventor. See also Cooper v.\n Goldfarb, 240 F.3d 1378, 1385, 57 USPQ2d 1990, 1995 (Fed. Cir. 2001)\n (Cooper sent to Goldfarb samples of a material for use in vascular grafts. At the\n time the samples were sent, Cooper was unaware of the importance of the fibril length\n of the material. Cooper did not at any time later convey to, or request from,\n Goldfarb any information regarding fibril length. Therefore, Goldfarb’s determination\n of the fibril lengths of the material could not inure to Cooper’s benefit.). \n

    ","rendered_text_plain":"“Inurement involves a claim by an inventor that, as a matter of law, the acts of another person should accrue to the benefit of the inventor.” Cooper v. Goldfarb, 154 F.3d 1321, 1331, 47 USPQ2d 1896, 1904 (Fed. Cir. 1998). Before a non-inventor’s recognition of the utility of the invention can inure to the benefit of the inventor, the following three-prong test must be met: (1) the inventor must have conceived of the invention, (2) the inventor must have had an expectation that the embodiment tested would work for the intended purpose of the invention, and (3) the inventor must have submitted the embodiment for testing for the intended purpose of the invention. Genentech, Inc. v. Chiron Corp., 220 F.3d 1345, 1354, 55 USPQ2d 1636, 1643 (Fed. Cir. 2000). In Genentech, a non-inventor hired by the inventor to test yeast samples for the presence of the fusion protein encoded by the DNA construct of the invention recognized the growth-enhancing property of the fusion protein, but did not communicate this recognition to the inventor. The court found that because the inventor did not submit the samples for testing growth-promoting activity, the intended purpose of the invention, the third prong was not satisfied and the uncommunicated recognition of the activity of the fusion protein by the non-inventor did not inure to the benefit of the inventor. See also Cooper v. Goldfarb, 240 F.3d 1378, 1385, 57 USPQ2d 1990, 1995 (Fed. Cir. 2001) (Cooper sent to Goldfarb samples of a material for use in vascular grafts. At the time the samples were sent, Cooper was unaware of the importance of the fibril length of the material. Cooper did not at any time later convey to, or request from, Goldfarb any information regarding fibril length. Therefore, Goldfarb’s determination of the fibril lengths of the material could not inure to Cooper’s benefit.).","provenance":{"source_file":"s2138.html","source_anchor":"d0e207895","source_sha256":"26c7c2a3bdfe077ea7e4b30ae79c9a9fd0d208d7d91da6e74f7f3ce0e157610b"},"kind":"narrative","host_section_id":"se_ntidrsl3"},{"id":"cs_jbh23rq2","corpus_id":"mpep-e9r01-2024-html","opaque_url":"https://mpep.io/n/cs_jbh23rq2","effective_range":{"start_revision":"R-01.2024","end_revision":null},"node_type":"case","rendered_text_html":"","rendered_text_plain":"Genentech, Inc. v. Chiron Corp., 220 F.3d 1345 (Fed. Cir. 2000)","provenance":{"source_file":"s2138.html","source_anchor":"","source_sha256":"26c7c2a3bdfe077ea7e4b30ae79c9a9fd0d208d7d91da6e74f7f3ce0e157610b"},"short_name":"Genentech, Inc. v. Chiron Corp.","all_citations":["220 F.3d 1345","55 USPQ2d 1636"],"canonical_citation":"Genentech, Inc. v. Chiron Corp., 220 F.3d 1345, 55 USPQ2d 1636 (Fed. Cir. 2000)","decision_year":2000,"court":"Fed. Cir."},{"id":"cs_elz2uedm","corpus_id":"mpep-e9r01-2024-html","opaque_url":"https://mpep.io/n/cs_elz2uedm","effective_range":{"start_revision":"R-01.2024","end_revision":null},"node_type":"case","rendered_text_html":"","rendered_text_plain":"Cooper v. Goldfarb, 240 F.3d 1378 (Fed. Cir. 2001)","provenance":{"source_file":"s2138.html","source_anchor":"","source_sha256":"26c7c2a3bdfe077ea7e4b30ae79c9a9fd0d208d7d91da6e74f7f3ce0e157610b"},"short_name":"Cooper v. Goldfarb","all_citations":["240 F.3d 1378","57 USPQ2d 1990"],"canonical_citation":"Cooper v. Goldfarb, 240 F.3d 1378, 57 USPQ2d 1990 (Fed. Cir. 2001)","decision_year":2001,"court":"Fed. Cir."},{"id":"pb_s6jgn3mp","corpus_id":"mpep-e9r01-2024-html","opaque_url":"https://mpep.io/n/pb_s6jgn3mp","effective_range":{"start_revision":"R-01.2024","end_revision":null},"node_type":"prose_block","rendered_text_html":"VI. IN AN INTERFERENCE PROCEEDING, ALL LIMITATIONS OF A COUNT MUST BE REDUCED TO PRACTICE","rendered_text_plain":"VI. IN AN INTERFERENCE PROCEEDING, ALL LIMITATIONS OF A COUNT MUST BE REDUCED TO PRACTICE","provenance":{"source_file":"s2138.html","source_anchor":"d0e207753/b.10","source_sha256":"26c7c2a3bdfe077ea7e4b30ae79c9a9fd0d208d7d91da6e74f7f3ce0e157610b"},"kind":"informal_heading","host_section_id":"se_ntidrsl3","heading_level":2,"heading_text":"VI. IN AN INTERFERENCE PROCEEDING, ALL LIMITATIONS OF A COUNT MUST BE REDUCED TO PRACTICE"},{"id":"pb_iysiflzt","corpus_id":"mpep-e9r01-2024-html","opaque_url":"https://mpep.io/n/pb_iysiflzt","effective_range":{"start_revision":"R-01.2024","end_revision":null},"node_type":"prose_block","rendered_text_html":"

    The device reduced to practice must include every limitation of the\n count. Fredkin v. Irasek, 397 F.2d 342, 158 USPQ 280, 285 (CCPA\n 1968); every limitation in a count is material and must be proved to establish an\n actual reduction to practice. Meitzner v. Corte, 537 F.2d 524,\n 528, 190 USPQ 407, 410 (CCPA 1976). See also Hull v. Bonis, 214\n USPQ 731, 734 (Bd. Pat. Inter. 1982) (no doctrine of equivalents—remedy is a\n preliminary motion to amend the count to conform to the proofs). \n

    ","rendered_text_plain":"The device reduced to practice must include every limitation of the count. Fredkin v. Irasek, 397 F.2d 342, 158 USPQ 280, 285 (CCPA 1968); every limitation in a count is material and must be proved to establish an actual reduction to practice. Meitzner v. Corte, 537 F.2d 524, 528, 190 USPQ 407, 410 (CCPA 1976). See also Hull v. Bonis, 214 USPQ 731, 734 (Bd. Pat. Inter. 1982) (no doctrine of equivalents—remedy is a preliminary motion to amend the count to conform to the proofs).","provenance":{"source_file":"s2138.html","source_anchor":"d0e207914","source_sha256":"26c7c2a3bdfe077ea7e4b30ae79c9a9fd0d208d7d91da6e74f7f3ce0e157610b"},"kind":"narrative","host_section_id":"se_ntidrsl3"},{"id":"cs_5ukepvnj","corpus_id":"mpep-e9r01-2024-html","opaque_url":"https://mpep.io/n/cs_5ukepvnj","effective_range":{"start_revision":"R-01.2024","end_revision":null},"node_type":"case","rendered_text_html":"","rendered_text_plain":"Fredkin v. Irasek, 397 F.2d 342 (CCPA 1968)","provenance":{"source_file":"s2138.html","source_anchor":"","source_sha256":"26c7c2a3bdfe077ea7e4b30ae79c9a9fd0d208d7d91da6e74f7f3ce0e157610b"},"short_name":"Fredkin v. Irasek","all_citations":["397 F.2d 342","158 USPQ 280"],"canonical_citation":"Fredkin v. Irasek, 397 F.2d 342, 158 USPQ 280 (CCPA 1968)","decision_year":1968,"court":"CCPA"},{"id":"cs_5pvmfv5i","corpus_id":"mpep-e9r01-2024-html","opaque_url":"https://mpep.io/n/cs_5pvmfv5i","effective_range":{"start_revision":"R-01.2024","end_revision":null},"node_type":"case","rendered_text_html":"","rendered_text_plain":"Hull v. Bonis, 214 USPQ 731 (Bd. Pat. Inter. 1982)","provenance":{"source_file":"s2138.html","source_anchor":"","source_sha256":"26c7c2a3bdfe077ea7e4b30ae79c9a9fd0d208d7d91da6e74f7f3ce0e157610b"},"short_name":"Hull v. Bonis","all_citations":["214 USPQ 731"],"canonical_citation":"Hull v. Bonis, 214 USPQ 731 (Bd. Pat. Inter. 1982)","decision_year":1982,"court":"Bd. Pat. Inter."},{"id":"pb_a4qjy57d","corpus_id":"mpep-e9r01-2024-html","opaque_url":"https://mpep.io/n/pb_a4qjy57d","effective_range":{"start_revision":"R-01.2024","end_revision":null},"node_type":"prose_block","rendered_text_html":"VII. CLAIMED INVENTION IS NOT ACTUALLY REDUCED TO PRACTICE UNLESS THERE IS A KNOWN UTILITY","rendered_text_plain":"VII. CLAIMED INVENTION IS NOT ACTUALLY REDUCED TO PRACTICE UNLESS THERE IS A KNOWN UTILITY","provenance":{"source_file":"s2138.html","source_anchor":"d0e207753/b.12","source_sha256":"26c7c2a3bdfe077ea7e4b30ae79c9a9fd0d208d7d91da6e74f7f3ce0e157610b"},"kind":"informal_heading","host_section_id":"se_ntidrsl3","heading_level":2,"heading_text":"VII. CLAIMED INVENTION IS NOT ACTUALLY REDUCED TO PRACTICE UNLESS THERE IS A KNOWN UTILITY"},{"id":"pb_5366idau","corpus_id":"mpep-e9r01-2024-html","opaque_url":"https://mpep.io/n/pb_5366idau","effective_range":{"start_revision":"R-01.2024","end_revision":null},"node_type":"prose_block","rendered_text_html":"

    Utility for the invention must be known at the time of the reduction\n to practice. Wiesner v. Weigert, 666 F.2d 582, 588, 212 USPQ 721,\n 726 (CCPA 1981) (except for plant and design inventions); Azar v.\n Burns, 188 USPQ 601, 604 (Bd. Pat. Inter. 1975) (a composition and a\n method cannot be actually reduced to practice unless the composition and the product\n produced by the method have a practical utility); Ciric v.\n Flanigen, 511 F.2d 1182, 1185, 185 USPQ 103, 105-6 (CCPA 1975) (“when a\n count does not recite any particular utility, evidence establishing a substantial\n utility for any purpose is sufficient to prove a reduction to practice”; “the\n demonstrated similarity of ion exchange and adsorptive properties between the newly\n discovered zeolites and known crystalline zeolites … have established utility for the\n zeolites of the count”); Engelhardt v. Judd, 369 F.2d 408, 411,\n 151 USPQ 732, 735 (CCPA 1966) (When considering an actual reduction to practice as a\n bar to patentability for claims to compounds, it is sufficient to successfully\n demonstrate utility of the compounds in animals for somewhat different pharmaceutical\n purposes than those asserted in the specification for humans.); Rey-Bellet\n v. Engelhardt, 493 F.2d 1380, 1384, 181 USPQ 453, 455 (CCPA 1974) (Two\n categories of tests on laboratory animals have been considered adequate to show\n utility and reduction to practice: first, tests carried out to prove utility in\n humans where there is a satisfactory correlation between humans and animals, and\n second, tests carried out to prove utility for treating animals.).\n

    ","rendered_text_plain":"Utility for the invention must be known at the time of the reduction to practice. Wiesner v. Weigert, 666 F.2d 582, 588, 212 USPQ 721, 726 (CCPA 1981) (except for plant and design inventions); Azar v. Burns, 188 USPQ 601, 604 (Bd. Pat. Inter. 1975) (a composition and a method cannot be actually reduced to practice unless the composition and the product produced by the method have a practical utility); Ciric v. Flanigen, 511 F.2d 1182, 1185, 185 USPQ 103, 105-6 (CCPA 1975) (“when a count does not recite any particular utility, evidence establishing a substantial utility for any purpose is sufficient to prove a reduction to practice”; “the demonstrated similarity of ion exchange and adsorptive properties between the newly discovered zeolites and known crystalline zeolites … have established utility for the zeolites of the count”); Engelhardt v. Judd, 369 F.2d 408, 411, 151 USPQ 732, 735 (CCPA 1966) (When considering an actual reduction to practice as a bar to patentability for claims to compounds, it is sufficient to successfully demonstrate utility of the compounds in animals for somewhat different pharmaceutical purposes than those asserted in the specification for humans.); Rey-Bellet v. Engelhardt, 493 F.2d 1380, 1384, 181 USPQ 453, 455 (CCPA 1974) (Two categories of tests on laboratory animals have been considered adequate to show utility and reduction to practice: first, tests carried out to prove utility in humans where there is a satisfactory correlation between humans and animals, and second, tests carried out to prove utility for treating animals.).","provenance":{"source_file":"s2138.html","source_anchor":"d0e207930","source_sha256":"26c7c2a3bdfe077ea7e4b30ae79c9a9fd0d208d7d91da6e74f7f3ce0e157610b"},"kind":"narrative","host_section_id":"se_ntidrsl3"},{"id":"cs_fm6s5wyv","corpus_id":"mpep-e9r01-2024-html","opaque_url":"https://mpep.io/n/cs_fm6s5wyv","effective_range":{"start_revision":"R-01.2024","end_revision":null},"node_type":"case","rendered_text_html":"","rendered_text_plain":"Wiesner v. Weigert, 666 F.2d 582 (CCPA 1981)","provenance":{"source_file":"s2138.html","source_anchor":"","source_sha256":"26c7c2a3bdfe077ea7e4b30ae79c9a9fd0d208d7d91da6e74f7f3ce0e157610b"},"short_name":"Wiesner v. Weigert","all_citations":["666 F.2d 582","212 USPQ 721"],"canonical_citation":"Wiesner v. Weigert, 666 F.2d 582, 212 USPQ 721 (CCPA 1981)","decision_year":1981,"court":"CCPA"},{"id":"cs_q3t4zyjh","corpus_id":"mpep-e9r01-2024-html","opaque_url":"https://mpep.io/n/cs_q3t4zyjh","effective_range":{"start_revision":"R-01.2024","end_revision":null},"node_type":"case","rendered_text_html":"","rendered_text_plain":"Azar v. Burns, 188 USPQ 601 (Bd. Pat. Inter. 1975)","provenance":{"source_file":"s2138.html","source_anchor":"","source_sha256":"26c7c2a3bdfe077ea7e4b30ae79c9a9fd0d208d7d91da6e74f7f3ce0e157610b"},"short_name":"Azar v. Burns","all_citations":["188 USPQ 601"],"canonical_citation":"Azar v. Burns, 188 USPQ 601 (Bd. Pat. Inter. 1975)","decision_year":1975,"court":"Bd. Pat. Inter."},{"id":"cs_v7rphspp","corpus_id":"mpep-e9r01-2024-html","opaque_url":"https://mpep.io/n/cs_v7rphspp","effective_range":{"start_revision":"R-01.2024","end_revision":null},"node_type":"case","rendered_text_html":"","rendered_text_plain":"Ciric v. Flanigen, 511 F.2d 1182 (CCPA 1975)","provenance":{"source_file":"s2138.html","source_anchor":"","source_sha256":"26c7c2a3bdfe077ea7e4b30ae79c9a9fd0d208d7d91da6e74f7f3ce0e157610b"},"short_name":"Ciric v. Flanigen","all_citations":["511 F.2d 1182","185 USPQ 103"],"canonical_citation":"Ciric v. Flanigen, 511 F.2d 1182, 185 USPQ 103 (CCPA 1975)","decision_year":1975,"court":"CCPA"},{"id":"cs_2xcolynu","corpus_id":"mpep-e9r01-2024-html","opaque_url":"https://mpep.io/n/cs_2xcolynu","effective_range":{"start_revision":"R-01.2024","end_revision":null},"node_type":"case","rendered_text_html":"","rendered_text_plain":"Rey-Bellet v. Engelhardt, 493 F.2d 1380 (CCPA 1974)","provenance":{"source_file":"s2138.html","source_anchor":"","source_sha256":"26c7c2a3bdfe077ea7e4b30ae79c9a9fd0d208d7d91da6e74f7f3ce0e157610b"},"short_name":"Rey-Bellet v. Engelhardt","all_citations":["493 F.2d 1380","181 USPQ 453"],"canonical_citation":"Rey-Bellet v. Engelhardt, 493 F.2d 1380, 181 USPQ 453 (CCPA 1974)","decision_year":1974,"court":"CCPA"},{"id":"pb_qv7xxmsr","corpus_id":"mpep-e9r01-2024-html","opaque_url":"https://mpep.io/n/pb_qv7xxmsr","effective_range":{"start_revision":"R-01.2024","end_revision":null},"node_type":"prose_block","rendered_text_html":"VIII. A PROBABLE UTILITY MAY NOT BE SUFFICIENT TO ESTABLISH UTILITY","rendered_text_plain":"VIII. A PROBABLE UTILITY MAY NOT BE SUFFICIENT TO ESTABLISH UTILITY","provenance":{"source_file":"s2138.html","source_anchor":"d0e207753/b.14","source_sha256":"26c7c2a3bdfe077ea7e4b30ae79c9a9fd0d208d7d91da6e74f7f3ce0e157610b"},"kind":"informal_heading","host_section_id":"se_ntidrsl3","heading_level":2,"heading_text":"VIII. A PROBABLE UTILITY MAY NOT BE SUFFICIENT TO ESTABLISH UTILITY"},{"id":"pb_rj4vjbh5","corpus_id":"mpep-e9r01-2024-html","opaque_url":"https://mpep.io/n/pb_rj4vjbh5","effective_range":{"start_revision":"R-01.2024","end_revision":null},"node_type":"prose_block","rendered_text_html":"

    A probable utility does not establish a practical utility, which is\n established by actual testing or where the utility can be “foretold with certainty.”\n Bindra v. Kelly, 206 USPQ 570, 575 (Bd. Pat. Inter. 1979)\n (Reduction to practice was not established for an intermediate useful in the\n preparation of a second intermediate with a known utility in the preparation of a\n pharmaceutical. The record established there was a high degree of probability of a\n successful preparation because one skilled in the art may have been motivated, in the\n sense of 35 U.S.C.\n 103, to prepare the second intermediate from the first\n intermediate. However, a strong probability of utility is not sufficient to establish\n practical utility.); Wu v. Jucker, 167 USPQ 467, 472 (Bd. Pat.\n Inter. 1968) (screening test where there was an indication of possible utility is\n insufficient to establish practical utility). But see Nelson v.\n Bowler, 628 F.2d 853, 858, 206 USPQ 881, 885 (CCPA 1980) (Relevant\n evidence is judged as a whole for its persuasiveness in linking observed properties\n to suggested uses. Reasonable correlation between the two is sufficient for an actual\n reduction to practice.).\n

    ","rendered_text_plain":"A probable utility does not establish a practical utility, which is established by actual testing or where the utility can be “foretold with certainty.” Bindra v. Kelly, 206 USPQ 570, 575 (Bd. Pat. Inter. 1979) (Reduction to practice was not established for an intermediate useful in the preparation of a second intermediate with a known utility in the preparation of a pharmaceutical. The record established there was a high degree of probability of a successful preparation because one skilled in the art may have been motivated, in the sense of 35 U.S.C. 103, to prepare the second intermediate from the first intermediate. However, a strong probability of utility is not sufficient to establish practical utility.); Wu v. Jucker, 167 USPQ 467, 472 (Bd. Pat. Inter. 1968) (screening test where there was an indication of possible utility is insufficient to establish practical utility). But see Nelson v. Bowler, 628 F.2d 853, 858, 206 USPQ 881, 885 (CCPA 1980) (Relevant evidence is judged as a whole for its persuasiveness in linking observed properties to suggested uses. Reasonable correlation between the two is sufficient for an actual reduction to practice.).","provenance":{"source_file":"s2138.html","source_anchor":"d0e207952","source_sha256":"26c7c2a3bdfe077ea7e4b30ae79c9a9fd0d208d7d91da6e74f7f3ce0e157610b"},"kind":"narrative","host_section_id":"se_ntidrsl3"},{"id":"cs_wjlr46hc","corpus_id":"mpep-e9r01-2024-html","opaque_url":"https://mpep.io/n/cs_wjlr46hc","effective_range":{"start_revision":"R-01.2024","end_revision":null},"node_type":"case","rendered_text_html":"","rendered_text_plain":"Bindra v. Kelly, 206 USPQ 570 (Bd. Pat. Inter. 1979)","provenance":{"source_file":"s2138.html","source_anchor":"","source_sha256":"26c7c2a3bdfe077ea7e4b30ae79c9a9fd0d208d7d91da6e74f7f3ce0e157610b"},"short_name":"Bindra v. Kelly","all_citations":["206 USPQ 570"],"canonical_citation":"Bindra v. Kelly, 206 USPQ 570 (Bd. Pat. Inter. 1979)","decision_year":1979,"court":"Bd. Pat. Inter."},{"id":"cs_3axkjohc","corpus_id":"mpep-e9r01-2024-html","opaque_url":"https://mpep.io/n/cs_3axkjohc","effective_range":{"start_revision":"R-01.2024","end_revision":null},"node_type":"case","rendered_text_html":"","rendered_text_plain":"Wu v. Jucker, 167 USPQ 467 (Bd. Pat. Inter. 1968)","provenance":{"source_file":"s2138.html","source_anchor":"","source_sha256":"26c7c2a3bdfe077ea7e4b30ae79c9a9fd0d208d7d91da6e74f7f3ce0e157610b"},"short_name":"Wu v. Jucker","all_citations":["167 USPQ 467"],"canonical_citation":"Wu v. Jucker, 167 USPQ 467 (Bd. Pat. Inter. 1968)","decision_year":1968,"court":"Bd. Pat. Inter."},{"id":"cs_uewolalw","corpus_id":"mpep-e9r01-2024-html","opaque_url":"https://mpep.io/n/cs_uewolalw","effective_range":{"start_revision":"R-01.2024","end_revision":null},"node_type":"case","rendered_text_html":"","rendered_text_plain":"Nelson v. Bowler, 628 F.2d 853 (CCPA 1980)","provenance":{"source_file":"s2138.html","source_anchor":"","source_sha256":"26c7c2a3bdfe077ea7e4b30ae79c9a9fd0d208d7d91da6e74f7f3ce0e157610b"},"short_name":"Nelson v. Bowler","all_citations":["628 F.2d 853","206 USPQ 881"],"canonical_citation":"Nelson v. Bowler, 628 F.2d 853, 206 USPQ 881 (CCPA 1980)","decision_year":1980,"court":"CCPA"},{"id":"se_ntidrsl3","corpus_id":"mpep-e9r01-2024-html","opaque_url":"https://mpep.io/n/se_ntidrsl3","effective_range":{"start_revision":"R-01.2024","end_revision":null},"node_type":"section","rendered_text_html":"","rendered_text_plain":"","provenance":{"source_file":"s2138.html","source_anchor":"d0e207753","source_sha256":"26c7c2a3bdfe077ea7e4b30ae79c9a9fd0d208d7d91da6e74f7f3ce0e157610b"},"akn_urn":"/akn/us/statement/manual/uspto/2024/mpep/eng@2024-02-29!sec_2138_05","canonical_url":"https://mpep.io/akn/us/statement/manual/uspto/2024/mpep/eng@2024-02-29!sec_2138_05","section_number":"2138.05","chapter":"2100","depth":1,"title":"“Reduction to Practice”","children_ids":["pb_76khq67c","pb_cygt2vus","pb_36extu4v","pb_eimlgh6r","pb_chnnr5c3","pb_purjardq","pb_2axdyfzu","pb_3zyzammw","pb_zkitcu6l","pb_dsjz7kj5","pb_4fy6l2cq","pb_cbjlgvq5","pb_higdk6fi","pb_llcor3fk","pb_s6jgn3mp","pb_iysiflzt","pb_a4qjy57d","pb_5366idau","pb_qv7xxmsr","pb_rj4vjbh5"],"revision_tag":"R-01.2024","parent_section_id":"se_oly7ctjt"},{"id":"pb_uqad2iez","corpus_id":"mpep-e9r01-2024-html","opaque_url":"https://mpep.io/n/pb_uqad2iez","effective_range":{"start_revision":"R-01.2024","end_revision":null},"node_type":"prose_block","rendered_text_html":"

    [Editor Note: This MPEP section has limited applicability to\n applications subject to examination under the first inventor to file (FITF)\n provisions of the AIA as set forth in 35 U.S.C. 100 (note). Patents and\n applications that contain (or contained at any time) at least one claim with a\n pre-AIA effective filing date (before March 16, 2013) and at least one claim with a\n post-AIA effective filing date (on or after March 16, 2013) are subject to the\n patentability requirements in AIA 35 U.S.C.\n 102-103 and subject to\n pre-AIA 35\n U.S.C. 102(g).See MPEP §\n 2159 et seq.]

    ","rendered_text_plain":"[Editor Note: This MPEP section has limited applicability to applications subject to examination under the first inventor to file (FITF) provisions of the AIA as set forth in 35 U.S.C. 100 (note). Patents and applications that contain (or contained at any time) at least one claim with a pre-AIA effective filing date (before March 16, 2013) and at least one claim with a post-AIA effective filing date (on or after March 16, 2013) are subject to the patentability requirements in AIA 35 U.S.C. 102-103 and subject to pre-AIA 35 U.S.C. 102(g).See MPEP § 2159 et seq.]","provenance":{"source_file":"s2138.html","source_anchor":"ch2100_d222e6_19137_145","source_sha256":"26c7c2a3bdfe077ea7e4b30ae79c9a9fd0d208d7d91da6e74f7f3ce0e157610b"},"kind":"narrative","host_section_id":"se_ofsyoihz"},{"id":"pb_cgu2akvl","corpus_id":"mpep-e9r01-2024-html","opaque_url":"https://mpep.io/n/pb_cgu2akvl","effective_range":{"start_revision":"R-01.2024","end_revision":null},"node_type":"prose_block","rendered_text_html":"

    The diligence of pre-AIA 35 U.S.C. 102(g) relates to\n reasonable “attorney-diligence” and “engineering-diligence” (Keizer v.\n Bradley, 270 F.2d 396, 397, 123 USPQ 215, 216 (CCPA 1959)), which does not\n require that “an inventor or his attorney … drop all other work and concentrate on the\n particular invention involved….” Emery v. Ronden, 188 USPQ 264, 268\n (Bd. Pat. Inter. 1974). \n

    ","rendered_text_plain":"The diligence of pre-AIA 35 U.S.C. 102(g) relates to reasonable “attorney-diligence” and “engineering-diligence” (Keizer v. Bradley, 270 F.2d 396, 397, 123 USPQ 215, 216 (CCPA 1959)), which does not require that “an inventor or his attorney … drop all other work and concentrate on the particular invention involved….” Emery v. Ronden, 188 USPQ 264, 268 (Bd. Pat. Inter. 1974).","provenance":{"source_file":"s2138.html","source_anchor":"d0e207971","source_sha256":"26c7c2a3bdfe077ea7e4b30ae79c9a9fd0d208d7d91da6e74f7f3ce0e157610b"},"kind":"narrative","host_section_id":"se_ofsyoihz"},{"id":"cs_ukwpxgc5","corpus_id":"mpep-e9r01-2024-html","opaque_url":"https://mpep.io/n/cs_ukwpxgc5","effective_range":{"start_revision":"R-01.2024","end_revision":null},"node_type":"case","rendered_text_html":"","rendered_text_plain":"Keizer v. Bradley, 270 F.2d 396 (CCPA 1959)","provenance":{"source_file":"s2138.html","source_anchor":"","source_sha256":"26c7c2a3bdfe077ea7e4b30ae79c9a9fd0d208d7d91da6e74f7f3ce0e157610b"},"short_name":"Keizer v. Bradley","all_citations":["270 F.2d 396","123 USPQ 215"],"canonical_citation":"Keizer v. Bradley, 270 F.2d 396, 123 USPQ 215 (CCPA 1959)","decision_year":1959,"court":"CCPA"},{"id":"cs_4kpaazze","corpus_id":"mpep-e9r01-2024-html","opaque_url":"https://mpep.io/n/cs_4kpaazze","effective_range":{"start_revision":"R-01.2024","end_revision":null},"node_type":"case","rendered_text_html":"","rendered_text_plain":"Emery v. Ronden, 188 USPQ 264 (Bd. Pat. Inter. 1974)","provenance":{"source_file":"s2138.html","source_anchor":"","source_sha256":"26c7c2a3bdfe077ea7e4b30ae79c9a9fd0d208d7d91da6e74f7f3ce0e157610b"},"short_name":"Emery v. Ronden","all_citations":["188 USPQ 264"],"canonical_citation":"Emery v. Ronden, 188 USPQ 264 (Bd. Pat. Inter. 1974)","decision_year":1974,"court":"Bd. Pat. Inter."},{"id":"pb_cogdame5","corpus_id":"mpep-e9r01-2024-html","opaque_url":"https://mpep.io/n/pb_cogdame5","effective_range":{"start_revision":"R-01.2024","end_revision":null},"node_type":"prose_block","rendered_text_html":"I. CRITICAL PERIOD FOR ESTABLISHING DILIGENCE BETWEEN ONE WHO WAS FIRST TO CONCEIVE BUT LATER TO REDUCE TO PRACTICE","rendered_text_plain":"I. CRITICAL PERIOD FOR ESTABLISHING DILIGENCE BETWEEN ONE WHO WAS FIRST TO CONCEIVE BUT LATER TO REDUCE TO PRACTICE","provenance":{"source_file":"s2138.html","source_anchor":"d0e207967/b.0","source_sha256":"26c7c2a3bdfe077ea7e4b30ae79c9a9fd0d208d7d91da6e74f7f3ce0e157610b"},"kind":"informal_heading","host_section_id":"se_ofsyoihz","heading_level":2,"heading_text":"I. CRITICAL PERIOD FOR ESTABLISHING DILIGENCE BETWEEN ONE WHO WAS FIRST TO CONCEIVE BUT LATER TO REDUCE TO PRACTICE"},{"id":"pb_2pk7sdnu","corpus_id":"mpep-e9r01-2024-html","opaque_url":"https://mpep.io/n/pb_2pk7sdnu","effective_range":{"start_revision":"R-01.2024","end_revision":null},"node_type":"prose_block","rendered_text_html":"

    The critical period for diligence for a first conceiver but second\n reducer begins not at the time of conception of the first conceiver but just prior to\n the entry in the field of the party who was first to reduce to practice and continues\n until the first conceiver reduces to practice. Hull v. Davenport,\n 90 F.2d 103, 105, 33 USPQ 506, 508 (CCPA 1937) (“lack of diligence from the time of\n conception to the time immediately preceding the conception date of the second\n conceiver is not regarded as of importance except as it may have a bearing upon his\n subsequent acts”). What serves as the entry date into the field of a first reducer is\n dependent upon what is being relied on by the first reducer, e.g., conception plus\n reasonable diligence to reduction to practice (Fritsch v. Lin, 21\n USPQ2d 1731, 1734 (Bd. Pat. App. & Inter. 1991), Emery v.\n Ronden, 188 USPQ 264, 268 (Bd. Pat. Inter. 1974)); an actual reduction\n to practice or a constructive reduction to practice by the filing of either a U.S.\n application (Rebstock v. Flouret, 191 USPQ 342, 345 (Bd. Pat.\n Inter. 1975)) or reliance upon priority under 35 U.S.C. 119 of a foreign\n application (Justus v. Appenzeller, 177 USPQ 332, 339 (Bd. Pat.\n Inter. 1971) (chain of priorities under 35 U.S.C. 119 and\n 120, priority under 35 U.S.C. 119 denied for failure\n to supply certified copy of the foreign application during pendency of the\n application that was filed within the twelve month period prescribed by\n 35 U.S.C.\n 119)). \n

    ","rendered_text_plain":"The critical period for diligence for a first conceiver but second reducer begins not at the time of conception of the first conceiver but just prior to the entry in the field of the party who was first to reduce to practice and continues until the first conceiver reduces to practice. Hull v. Davenport, 90 F.2d 103, 105, 33 USPQ 506, 508 (CCPA 1937) (“lack of diligence from the time of conception to the time immediately preceding the conception date of the second conceiver is not regarded as of importance except as it may have a bearing upon his subsequent acts”). What serves as the entry date into the field of a first reducer is dependent upon what is being relied on by the first reducer, e.g., conception plus reasonable diligence to reduction to practice (Fritsch v. Lin, 21 USPQ2d 1731, 1734 (Bd. Pat. App. & Inter. 1991), Emery v. Ronden, 188 USPQ 264, 268 (Bd. Pat. Inter. 1974)); an actual reduction to practice or a constructive reduction to practice by the filing of either a U.S. application (Rebstock v. Flouret, 191 USPQ 342, 345 (Bd. Pat. Inter. 1975)) or reliance upon priority under 35 U.S.C. 119 of a foreign application (Justus v. Appenzeller, 177 USPQ 332, 339 (Bd. Pat. Inter. 1971) (chain of priorities under 35 U.S.C. 119 and 120, priority under 35 U.S.C. 119 denied for failure to supply certified copy of the foreign application during pendency of the application that was filed within the twelve month period prescribed by 35 U.S.C. 119)).","provenance":{"source_file":"s2138.html","source_anchor":"d0e207991","source_sha256":"26c7c2a3bdfe077ea7e4b30ae79c9a9fd0d208d7d91da6e74f7f3ce0e157610b"},"kind":"narrative","host_section_id":"se_ofsyoihz"},{"id":"cs_faxg4wg4","corpus_id":"mpep-e9r01-2024-html","opaque_url":"https://mpep.io/n/cs_faxg4wg4","effective_range":{"start_revision":"R-01.2024","end_revision":null},"node_type":"case","rendered_text_html":"","rendered_text_plain":"Fritsch v. Lin, 21 USPQ2d 1731 (BPAI 1991)","provenance":{"source_file":"s2138.html","source_anchor":"","source_sha256":"26c7c2a3bdfe077ea7e4b30ae79c9a9fd0d208d7d91da6e74f7f3ce0e157610b"},"short_name":"Fritsch v. Lin","all_citations":["21 USPQ2d 1731"],"canonical_citation":"Fritsch v. Lin, 21 USPQ2d 1731 (BPAI 1991)","decision_year":1991,"court":"BPAI"},{"id":"cs_rcggngs5","corpus_id":"mpep-e9r01-2024-html","opaque_url":"https://mpep.io/n/cs_rcggngs5","effective_range":{"start_revision":"R-01.2024","end_revision":null},"node_type":"case","rendered_text_html":"","rendered_text_plain":"Rebstock v. Flouret, 191 USPQ 342 (Bd. Pat. Inter. 1975)","provenance":{"source_file":"s2138.html","source_anchor":"","source_sha256":"26c7c2a3bdfe077ea7e4b30ae79c9a9fd0d208d7d91da6e74f7f3ce0e157610b"},"short_name":"Rebstock v. Flouret","all_citations":["191 USPQ 342"],"canonical_citation":"Rebstock v. Flouret, 191 USPQ 342 (Bd. Pat. Inter. 1975)","decision_year":1975,"court":"Bd. Pat. Inter."},{"id":"cs_wzihtcji","corpus_id":"mpep-e9r01-2024-html","opaque_url":"https://mpep.io/n/cs_wzihtcji","effective_range":{"start_revision":"R-01.2024","end_revision":null},"node_type":"case","rendered_text_html":"","rendered_text_plain":"Justus v. Appenzeller, 177 USPQ 332 (Bd. Pat. Inter. 1971)","provenance":{"source_file":"s2138.html","source_anchor":"","source_sha256":"26c7c2a3bdfe077ea7e4b30ae79c9a9fd0d208d7d91da6e74f7f3ce0e157610b"},"short_name":"Justus v. Appenzeller","all_citations":["177 USPQ 332"],"canonical_citation":"Justus v. Appenzeller, 177 USPQ 332 (Bd. Pat. Inter. 1971)","decision_year":1971,"court":"Bd. Pat. Inter."},{"id":"pb_gkddtlad","corpus_id":"mpep-e9r01-2024-html","opaque_url":"https://mpep.io/n/pb_gkddtlad","effective_range":{"start_revision":"R-01.2024","end_revision":null},"node_type":"prose_block","rendered_text_html":"II. THE ENTIRE PERIOD DURING WHICH DILIGENCE IS REQUIRED MUST BE ACCOUNTED FOR BY EITHER AFFIRMATIVE ACTS OR ACCEPTABLE EXCUSES","rendered_text_plain":"II. THE ENTIRE PERIOD DURING WHICH DILIGENCE IS REQUIRED MUST BE ACCOUNTED FOR BY EITHER AFFIRMATIVE ACTS OR ACCEPTABLE EXCUSES","provenance":{"source_file":"s2138.html","source_anchor":"d0e207967/b.2","source_sha256":"26c7c2a3bdfe077ea7e4b30ae79c9a9fd0d208d7d91da6e74f7f3ce0e157610b"},"kind":"informal_heading","host_section_id":"se_ofsyoihz","heading_level":2,"heading_text":"II. THE ENTIRE PERIOD DURING WHICH DILIGENCE IS REQUIRED MUST BE ACCOUNTED FOR BY EITHER AFFIRMATIVE ACTS OR ACCEPTABLE EXCUSES"},{"id":"pb_tgdaau7y","corpus_id":"mpep-e9r01-2024-html","opaque_url":"https://mpep.io/n/pb_tgdaau7y","effective_range":{"start_revision":"R-01.2024","end_revision":null},"node_type":"prose_block","rendered_text_html":"

    “A patent owner need not prove the inventor\n continuously exercised reasonable diligence throughout the\n critical period; it must show there was reasonably continuous\n diligence.” Perfect Surgical Techniques, Inc. v. Olympus Am.,\n Inc., 841 F.3d 1004, 1009, 120 USPQ2d 1605, 1609 (Fed. Cir. 2016)\n (emphasis in original) (citing Tyco Healthcare Grp. v. Ethicon EndoSurgery,\n Inc., 774 F.3d 968, 975, 112 USPQ2d 1979 (Fed. Cir. 2014) and\n Monsanto Co. v. Mycogen Plant Sci., Inc., 261 F.3d 1356, 1370,\n 59 USPQ2d 1930, 1939 (Fed. Cir. 2001)).\n

    ","rendered_text_plain":"“A patent owner need not prove the inventor continuously exercised reasonable diligence throughout the critical period; it must show there was reasonably continuous diligence.” Perfect Surgical Techniques, Inc. v. Olympus Am., Inc., 841 F.3d 1004, 1009, 120 USPQ2d 1605, 1609 (Fed. Cir. 2016) (emphasis in original) (citing Tyco Healthcare Grp. v. Ethicon EndoSurgery, Inc., 774 F.3d 968, 975, 112 USPQ2d 1979 (Fed. Cir. 2014) and Monsanto Co. v. Mycogen Plant Sci., Inc., 261 F.3d 1356, 1370, 59 USPQ2d 1930, 1939 (Fed. Cir. 2001)).","provenance":{"source_file":"s2138.html","source_anchor":"ch2100_p_299b6_2d1ec_aa","source_sha256":"26c7c2a3bdfe077ea7e4b30ae79c9a9fd0d208d7d91da6e74f7f3ce0e157610b"},"kind":"narrative","host_section_id":"se_ofsyoihz"},{"id":"cs_ipk5n2kq","corpus_id":"mpep-e9r01-2024-html","opaque_url":"https://mpep.io/n/cs_ipk5n2kq","effective_range":{"start_revision":"R-01.2024","end_revision":null},"node_type":"case","rendered_text_html":"","rendered_text_plain":"Perfect Surgical Techniques, Inc. v. Olympus Am., Inc., 841 F.3d 1004 (Fed. Cir. 2016)","provenance":{"source_file":"s2138.html","source_anchor":"","source_sha256":"26c7c2a3bdfe077ea7e4b30ae79c9a9fd0d208d7d91da6e74f7f3ce0e157610b"},"short_name":"Perfect Surgical Techniques, Inc. v. Olympus Am., Inc.","all_citations":["841 F.3d 1004","120 USPQ2d 1605"],"canonical_citation":"Perfect Surgical Techniques, Inc. v. Olympus Am., Inc., 841 F.3d 1004, 120 USPQ2d 1605 (Fed. Cir. 2016)","decision_year":2016,"court":"Fed. Cir."},{"id":"cs_3e2b7xq3","corpus_id":"mpep-e9r01-2024-html","opaque_url":"https://mpep.io/n/cs_3e2b7xq3","effective_range":{"start_revision":"R-01.2024","end_revision":null},"node_type":"case","rendered_text_html":"","rendered_text_plain":"Tyco Healthcare Grp. v. Ethicon EndoSurgery, Inc., 774 F.3d 968 (Fed. Cir. 2014)","provenance":{"source_file":"s2138.html","source_anchor":"","source_sha256":"26c7c2a3bdfe077ea7e4b30ae79c9a9fd0d208d7d91da6e74f7f3ce0e157610b"},"short_name":"Tyco Healthcare Grp. v. Ethicon EndoSurgery, Inc.","all_citations":["774 F.3d 968","112 USPQ2d 1979"],"canonical_citation":"Tyco Healthcare Grp. v. Ethicon EndoSurgery, Inc., 774 F.3d 968, 112 USPQ2d 1979 (Fed. Cir. 2014)","decision_year":2014,"court":"Fed. Cir."},{"id":"cs_upncytqv","corpus_id":"mpep-e9r01-2024-html","opaque_url":"https://mpep.io/n/cs_upncytqv","effective_range":{"start_revision":"R-01.2024","end_revision":null},"node_type":"case","rendered_text_html":"","rendered_text_plain":"Monsanto Co. v. Mycogen Plant Sci., Inc., 261 F.3d 1356 (Fed. Cir. 2001)","provenance":{"source_file":"s2138.html","source_anchor":"","source_sha256":"26c7c2a3bdfe077ea7e4b30ae79c9a9fd0d208d7d91da6e74f7f3ce0e157610b"},"short_name":"Monsanto Co. v. Mycogen Plant Sci., Inc.","all_citations":["261 F.3d 1356","59 USPQ2d 1930"],"canonical_citation":"Monsanto Co. v. Mycogen Plant Sci., Inc., 261 F.3d 1356, 59 USPQ2d 1930 (Fed. Cir. 2001)","decision_year":2001,"court":"Fed. Cir."},{"id":"pb_rnjxtret","corpus_id":"mpep-e9r01-2024-html","opaque_url":"https://mpep.io/n/pb_rnjxtret","effective_range":{"start_revision":"R-01.2024","end_revision":null},"node_type":"prose_block","rendered_text_html":"

    An inventor must account for the entire period during which\n diligence is required. Gould v. Schawlow, 363 F.2d 908, 919, 150\n USPQ 634, 643 (CCPA 1966) (Merely stating that there were no weeks or months that the\n invention was not worked on is not enough.); In re Harry, 333 F.2d\n 920, 923, 142 USPQ 164, 166 (CCPA 1964) (statement that the subject matter “was\n diligently reduced to practice” is not a showing but a mere pleading). A 2-day period\n lacking activity has been held to be fatal. In re Mulder, 716 F.2d\n 1542, 1545, 219 USPQ 189, 193 (Fed. Cir. 1983) (37 CFR\n 1.131 issue); Fitzgerald v. Arbib, 268 F.2d\n 763, 766, 122 USPQ 530, 532 (CCPA 1959) (Less than 1 month of inactivity during the\n critical period shows a lack of diligence. Efforts to exploit an invention\n commercially do not constitute diligence in reducing it to practice. An actual\n reduction to practice in the case of a design for a three-dimensional article\n requires that it should be embodied in some structure other than a mere drawing.);\n Kendall v. Searles, 173 F.2d 986, 993, 81 USPQ 363, 369 (CCPA\n 1949) (Evidence of diligence must be specific as to dates and facts.). \n

    ","rendered_text_plain":"An inventor must account for the entire period during which diligence is required. Gould v. Schawlow, 363 F.2d 908, 919, 150 USPQ 634, 643 (CCPA 1966) (Merely stating that there were no weeks or months that the invention was not worked on is not enough.); In re Harry, 333 F.2d 920, 923, 142 USPQ 164, 166 (CCPA 1964) (statement that the subject matter “was diligently reduced to practice” is not a showing but a mere pleading). A 2-day period lacking activity has been held to be fatal. In re Mulder, 716 F.2d 1542, 1545, 219 USPQ 189, 193 (Fed. Cir. 1983) (37 CFR 1.131 issue); Fitzgerald v. Arbib, 268 F.2d 763, 766, 122 USPQ 530, 532 (CCPA 1959) (Less than 1 month of inactivity during the critical period shows a lack of diligence. Efforts to exploit an invention commercially do not constitute diligence in reducing it to practice. An actual reduction to practice in the case of a design for a three-dimensional article requires that it should be embodied in some structure other than a mere drawing.); Kendall v. Searles, 173 F.2d 986, 993, 81 USPQ 363, 369 (CCPA 1949) (Evidence of diligence must be specific as to dates and facts.).","provenance":{"source_file":"s2138.html","source_anchor":"d0e208025","source_sha256":"26c7c2a3bdfe077ea7e4b30ae79c9a9fd0d208d7d91da6e74f7f3ce0e157610b"},"kind":"narrative","host_section_id":"se_ofsyoihz"},{"id":"cs_tdxznxan","corpus_id":"mpep-e9r01-2024-html","opaque_url":"https://mpep.io/n/cs_tdxznxan","effective_range":{"start_revision":"R-01.2024","end_revision":null},"node_type":"case","rendered_text_html":"","rendered_text_plain":"Gould v. Schawlow, 363 F.2d 908 (CCPA 1966)","provenance":{"source_file":"s2138.html","source_anchor":"","source_sha256":"26c7c2a3bdfe077ea7e4b30ae79c9a9fd0d208d7d91da6e74f7f3ce0e157610b"},"short_name":"Gould v. Schawlow","all_citations":["363 F.2d 908","150 USPQ 634"],"canonical_citation":"Gould v. Schawlow, 363 F.2d 908, 150 USPQ 634 (CCPA 1966)","decision_year":1966,"court":"CCPA"},{"id":"cs_wmgbud62","corpus_id":"mpep-e9r01-2024-html","opaque_url":"https://mpep.io/n/cs_wmgbud62","effective_range":{"start_revision":"R-01.2024","end_revision":null},"node_type":"case","rendered_text_html":"","rendered_text_plain":"In re Harry, 333 F.2d 920 (CCPA 1964)","provenance":{"source_file":"s2138.html","source_anchor":"","source_sha256":"26c7c2a3bdfe077ea7e4b30ae79c9a9fd0d208d7d91da6e74f7f3ce0e157610b"},"short_name":"In re Harry","all_citations":["333 F.2d 920","142 USPQ 164"],"canonical_citation":"In re Harry, 333 F.2d 920, 142 USPQ 164 (CCPA 1964)","decision_year":1964,"court":"CCPA"},{"id":"cs_d6rgso6u","corpus_id":"mpep-e9r01-2024-html","opaque_url":"https://mpep.io/n/cs_d6rgso6u","effective_range":{"start_revision":"R-01.2024","end_revision":null},"node_type":"case","rendered_text_html":"","rendered_text_plain":"In re Mulder, 716 F.2d 1542 (Fed. Cir. 1983)","provenance":{"source_file":"s2138.html","source_anchor":"","source_sha256":"26c7c2a3bdfe077ea7e4b30ae79c9a9fd0d208d7d91da6e74f7f3ce0e157610b"},"short_name":"In re Mulder","all_citations":["716 F.2d 1542","219 USPQ 189"],"canonical_citation":"In re Mulder, 716 F.2d 1542, 219 USPQ 189 (Fed. Cir. 1983)","decision_year":1983,"court":"Fed. Cir."},{"id":"cs_pwkgmctf","corpus_id":"mpep-e9r01-2024-html","opaque_url":"https://mpep.io/n/cs_pwkgmctf","effective_range":{"start_revision":"R-01.2024","end_revision":null},"node_type":"case","rendered_text_html":"","rendered_text_plain":"Kendall v. Searles, 173 F.2d 986 (CCPA 1949)","provenance":{"source_file":"s2138.html","source_anchor":"","source_sha256":"26c7c2a3bdfe077ea7e4b30ae79c9a9fd0d208d7d91da6e74f7f3ce0e157610b"},"short_name":"Kendall v. Searles","all_citations":["173 F.2d 986","81 USPQ 363"],"canonical_citation":"Kendall v. Searles, 173 F.2d 986, 81 USPQ 363 (CCPA 1949)","decision_year":1949,"court":"CCPA"},{"id":"pb_snfhuy26","corpus_id":"mpep-e9r01-2024-html","opaque_url":"https://mpep.io/n/pb_snfhuy26","effective_range":{"start_revision":"R-01.2024","end_revision":null},"node_type":"prose_block","rendered_text_html":"

    The period during which diligence is required must be accounted for\n by either affirmative acts or acceptable excuses. Rebstock v.\n Flouret, 191 USPQ 342, 345 (Bd. Pat. Inter. 1975); Rieser v.\n Williams, 255 F.2d 419, 423, 118 USPQ 96, 100 (CCPA 1958) (Being last to\n reduce to practice, party cannot prevail unless the party has shown that the party\n was first to conceive and that the party exercised reasonable diligence during the\n critical period from just prior to opponent’s entry into the field);\n Griffith v. Kanamaru, 816 F.2d 624, 2 USPQ2d 1361 (Fed. Cir.\n 1987) (Court generally reviewed cases on excuses for inactivity including vacation\n extended by ill health and daily job demands, and held lack of university funding and\n personnel are not acceptable excuses.); Litchfield v. Eigen, 535\n F.2d 72, 190 USPQ 113 (CCPA 1976) (budgetary limits and availability of animals for\n testing not sufficiently described); Morway v. Bondi, 203 F.2d\n 741, 749, 97 USPQ 318, 323 (CCPA 1953) (voluntarily laying aside inventive concept in\n pursuit of other projects is generally not an acceptable excuse although there may be\n circumstances creating exceptions); Anderson v. Crowther, 152 USPQ\n 504, 512 (Bd. Pat. Inter. 1965) (preparation of routine periodic reports covering all\n accomplishments of the laboratory insufficient to show diligence); Wu v.\n Jucker, 167 USPQ 467, 472-73 (Bd. Pat. Inter. 1968) (applicant\n improperly allowed test data sheets to accumulate to a sufficient amount to justify\n interfering with equipment then in use on another project); Tucker v.\n Natta, 171 USPQ 494, 498 (Bd. Pat. Inter. 1971) (“[a]ctivity directed\n toward the reduction to practice of a genus does not establish, prima\n facie, diligence toward the reduction to practice of a species embraced\n by said genus”); Justus v. Appenzeller, 177 USPQ 332, 340-1 (Bd.\n Pat. Inter. 1971) (Although it is possible that patentee could have reduced the\n invention to practice in a shorter time by relying on stock items rather than by\n designing a particular piece of hardware, patentee exercised reasonable diligence to\n secure the required hardware to actually reduce the invention to practice. “[I]n\n deciding the question of diligence it is immaterial that the inventor may not have\n taken the expeditious course….”).\n

    ","rendered_text_plain":"The period during which diligence is required must be accounted for by either affirmative acts or acceptable excuses. Rebstock v. Flouret, 191 USPQ 342, 345 (Bd. Pat. Inter. 1975); Rieser v. Williams, 255 F.2d 419, 423, 118 USPQ 96, 100 (CCPA 1958) (Being last to reduce to practice, party cannot prevail unless the party has shown that the party was first to conceive and that the party exercised reasonable diligence during the critical period from just prior to opponent’s entry into the field); Griffith v. Kanamaru, 816 F.2d 624, 2 USPQ2d 1361 (Fed. Cir. 1987) (Court generally reviewed cases on excuses for inactivity including vacation extended by ill health and daily job demands, and held lack of university funding and personnel are not acceptable excuses.); Litchfield v. Eigen, 535 F.2d 72, 190 USPQ 113 (CCPA 1976) (budgetary limits and availability of animals for testing not sufficiently described); Morway v. Bondi, 203 F.2d 741, 749, 97 USPQ 318, 323 (CCPA 1953) (voluntarily laying aside inventive concept in pursuit of other projects is generally not an acceptable excuse although there may be circumstances creating exceptions); Anderson v. Crowther, 152 USPQ 504, 512 (Bd. Pat. Inter. 1965) (preparation of routine periodic reports covering all accomplishments of the laboratory insufficient to show diligence); Wu v. Jucker, 167 USPQ 467, 472-73 (Bd. Pat. Inter. 1968) (applicant improperly allowed test data sheets to accumulate to a sufficient amount to justify interfering with equipment then in use on another project); Tucker v. Natta, 171 USPQ 494, 498 (Bd. Pat. Inter. 1971) (“[a]ctivity directed toward the reduction to practice of a genus does not establish, prima facie, diligence toward the reduction to practice of a species embraced by said genus”); Justus v. Appenzeller, 177 USPQ 332, 340-1 (Bd. Pat. Inter. 1971) (Although it is possible that patentee could have reduced the invention to practice in a shorter time by relying on stock items rather than by designing a particular piece of hardware, patentee exercised reasonable diligence to secure the required hardware to actually reduce the invention to practice. “[I]n deciding the question of diligence it is immaterial that the inventor may not have taken the expeditious course….”).","provenance":{"source_file":"s2138.html","source_anchor":"d0e208046","source_sha256":"26c7c2a3bdfe077ea7e4b30ae79c9a9fd0d208d7d91da6e74f7f3ce0e157610b"},"kind":"narrative","host_section_id":"se_ofsyoihz"},{"id":"cs_76kww2iv","corpus_id":"mpep-e9r01-2024-html","opaque_url":"https://mpep.io/n/cs_76kww2iv","effective_range":{"start_revision":"R-01.2024","end_revision":null},"node_type":"case","rendered_text_html":"","rendered_text_plain":"Rieser v. Williams, 255 F.2d 419 (CCPA 1958)","provenance":{"source_file":"s2138.html","source_anchor":"","source_sha256":"26c7c2a3bdfe077ea7e4b30ae79c9a9fd0d208d7d91da6e74f7f3ce0e157610b"},"short_name":"Rieser v. Williams","all_citations":["255 F.2d 419","118 USPQ 96"],"canonical_citation":"Rieser v. Williams, 255 F.2d 419, 118 USPQ 96 (CCPA 1958)","decision_year":1958,"court":"CCPA"},{"id":"cs_k7tddmpx","corpus_id":"mpep-e9r01-2024-html","opaque_url":"https://mpep.io/n/cs_k7tddmpx","effective_range":{"start_revision":"R-01.2024","end_revision":null},"node_type":"case","rendered_text_html":"","rendered_text_plain":"Griffith v. Kanamaru, 816 F.2d 624 (Fed. Cir. 1987)","provenance":{"source_file":"s2138.html","source_anchor":"","source_sha256":"26c7c2a3bdfe077ea7e4b30ae79c9a9fd0d208d7d91da6e74f7f3ce0e157610b"},"short_name":"Griffith v. Kanamaru","all_citations":["816 F.2d 624","2 USPQ2d 1361"],"canonical_citation":"Griffith v. Kanamaru, 816 F.2d 624, 2 USPQ2d 1361 (Fed. Cir. 1987)","decision_year":1987,"court":"Fed. Cir."},{"id":"cs_hsyhooqp","corpus_id":"mpep-e9r01-2024-html","opaque_url":"https://mpep.io/n/cs_hsyhooqp","effective_range":{"start_revision":"R-01.2024","end_revision":null},"node_type":"case","rendered_text_html":"","rendered_text_plain":"Litchfield v. Eigen, 535 F.2d 72 (CCPA 1976)","provenance":{"source_file":"s2138.html","source_anchor":"","source_sha256":"26c7c2a3bdfe077ea7e4b30ae79c9a9fd0d208d7d91da6e74f7f3ce0e157610b"},"short_name":"Litchfield v. Eigen","all_citations":["535 F.2d 72","190 USPQ 113"],"canonical_citation":"Litchfield v. Eigen, 535 F.2d 72, 190 USPQ 113 (CCPA 1976)","decision_year":1976,"court":"CCPA"},{"id":"cs_bq4za3di","corpus_id":"mpep-e9r01-2024-html","opaque_url":"https://mpep.io/n/cs_bq4za3di","effective_range":{"start_revision":"R-01.2024","end_revision":null},"node_type":"case","rendered_text_html":"","rendered_text_plain":"Morway v. Bondi, 203 F.2d 741 (CCPA 1953)","provenance":{"source_file":"s2138.html","source_anchor":"","source_sha256":"26c7c2a3bdfe077ea7e4b30ae79c9a9fd0d208d7d91da6e74f7f3ce0e157610b"},"short_name":"Morway v. Bondi","all_citations":["203 F.2d 741","97 USPQ 318"],"canonical_citation":"Morway v. Bondi, 203 F.2d 741, 97 USPQ 318 (CCPA 1953)","decision_year":1953,"court":"CCPA"},{"id":"cs_jowhevus","corpus_id":"mpep-e9r01-2024-html","opaque_url":"https://mpep.io/n/cs_jowhevus","effective_range":{"start_revision":"R-01.2024","end_revision":null},"node_type":"case","rendered_text_html":"","rendered_text_plain":"Anderson v. Crowther, 152 USPQ 504 (Bd. Pat. Inter. 1965)","provenance":{"source_file":"s2138.html","source_anchor":"","source_sha256":"26c7c2a3bdfe077ea7e4b30ae79c9a9fd0d208d7d91da6e74f7f3ce0e157610b"},"short_name":"Anderson v. Crowther","all_citations":["152 USPQ 504"],"canonical_citation":"Anderson v. Crowther, 152 USPQ 504 (Bd. Pat. Inter. 1965)","decision_year":1965,"court":"Bd. Pat. Inter."},{"id":"cs_chct6zbr","corpus_id":"mpep-e9r01-2024-html","opaque_url":"https://mpep.io/n/cs_chct6zbr","effective_range":{"start_revision":"R-01.2024","end_revision":null},"node_type":"case","rendered_text_html":"","rendered_text_plain":"Tucker v. Natta, 171 USPQ 494 (Bd. Pat. Inter. 1971)","provenance":{"source_file":"s2138.html","source_anchor":"","source_sha256":"26c7c2a3bdfe077ea7e4b30ae79c9a9fd0d208d7d91da6e74f7f3ce0e157610b"},"short_name":"Tucker v. Natta","all_citations":["171 USPQ 494"],"canonical_citation":"Tucker v. Natta, 171 USPQ 494 (Bd. Pat. Inter. 1971)","decision_year":1971,"court":"Bd. Pat. Inter."},{"id":"pb_fwqnqabm","corpus_id":"mpep-e9r01-2024-html","opaque_url":"https://mpep.io/n/pb_fwqnqabm","effective_range":{"start_revision":"R-01.2024","end_revision":null},"node_type":"prose_block","rendered_text_html":"

    Examiners should weigh the body of evidence to make\n the determination of whether there was reasonably continuous diligence for the entire\n critical period. This determination should be made with the purpose of the diligence\n requirement in mind, which “is to assure that, in light of the evidence as a whole,\n ‘the invention was not abandoned or unreasonably delayed.’” Perfect Surgical\n Techniques, Inc. v. Olympus Am., Inc. (Perfect\n Surgical), 841 F.3d 1004, 1009, 120 USPQ2d 1605, 1609 (Fed. Cir. 2016)\n (citations omitted). In Perfect Surgical, the Federal Circuit\n stated:\n

    ","rendered_text_plain":"Examiners should weigh the body of evidence to make the determination of whether there was reasonably continuous diligence for the entire critical period. This determination should be made with the purpose of the diligence requirement in mind, which “is to assure that, in light of the evidence as a whole, ‘the invention was not abandoned or unreasonably delayed.’” Perfect Surgical Techniques, Inc. v. Olympus Am., Inc. (Perfect Surgical), 841 F.3d 1004, 1009, 120 USPQ2d 1605, 1609 (Fed. Cir. 2016) (citations omitted). In Perfect Surgical, the Federal Circuit stated:","provenance":{"source_file":"s2138.html","source_anchor":"ch2100_p_299b6_2d387_3d4","source_sha256":"26c7c2a3bdfe077ea7e4b30ae79c9a9fd0d208d7d91da6e74f7f3ce0e157610b"},"kind":"narrative","host_section_id":"se_ofsyoihz"},{"id":"we_pf3tmtbx","corpus_id":"mpep-e9r01-2024-html","opaque_url":"https://mpep.io/n/we_pf3tmtbx","effective_range":{"start_revision":"R-01.2024","end_revision":null},"node_type":"worked_example","rendered_text_html":"
    \n
    \n

    Under this standard, an inventor is not\n required to work on reducing his invention to practice every day during the\n critical period. … And periods of inactivity within the critical period do not\n automatically vanquish a patent owner's claim of reasonable diligence…. In\n determining whether an invention antedates another, the point of the diligence\n analysis is not to scour the patent owner's corroborating evidence in search of\n intervals of time where the patent owner has failed to substantiate some sort\n of activity. It is to assure that, in light of the evidence as a whole, “the\n invention was not abandoned or unreasonably delayed.” ... That an inventor\n overseeing a study did not record its progress on a daily, weekly, or even\n monthly basis does not mean the inventor necessarily abandoned his invention or\n unreasonably delayed it. The same logic applies to the preparation of a patent\n application: the absence of evidence that an inventor and his attorney revised\n or discussed the application on a daily basis is alone insufficient to\n determine that the invention was abandoned or unreasonably delayed. One must\n weigh the collection of evidence over the entire critical period to make such a\n determination.\n

    \n
    \n

    \n
    \n

    Our decision in In re\n Mulder, 716 F.2d 1542, 1542-46 [219 USPQ 189] (Fed. Cir. 1983),\n does not instruct otherwise. The Board cites In re Mulder\n for the proposition that “[e]ven a short period of unexplained inactivity may\n be sufficient to defeat a claim of diligence.” …. In In re\n Mulder, a competing reference was published just days before the\n patent at issue was constructively reduced to practice. …. The patent owner was\n tasked with showing reasonable diligence during a critical period lasting only\n two days. ... But the patent owner did not produce any evidence of diligence\n during the critical period. ... Nor could it point to any activity during the\n months between the drafting of the application and the start of the critical\n period. ... Although the critical period spanned just two days, we declined to\n excuse the patent owner's complete lack of evidence. ... In re\n Mulder does not hold that an inventor's inactivity during a\n portion of the critical period can, without more, destroy a patent owner's\n claim of diligence.\n

    \n
    \n
    ","rendered_text_plain":"Under this standard, an inventor is not required to work on reducing his invention to practice every day during the critical period. … And periods of inactivity within the critical period do not automatically vanquish a patent owner's claim of reasonable diligence…. In determining whether an invention antedates another, the point of the diligence analysis is not to scour the patent owner's corroborating evidence in search of intervals of time where the patent owner has failed to substantiate some sort of activity. It is to assure that, in light of the evidence as a whole, “the invention was not abandoned or unreasonably delayed.” ... That an inventor overseeing a study did not record its progress on a daily, weekly, or even monthly basis does not mean the inventor necessarily abandoned his invention or unreasonably delayed it. The same logic applies to the preparation of a patent application: the absence of evidence that an inventor and his attorney revised or discussed the application on a daily basis is alone insufficient to determine that the invention was abandoned or unreasonably delayed. One must weigh the collection of evidence over the entire critical period to make such a determination. Our decision in In re Mulder, 716 F.2d 1542, 1542-46 [219 USPQ 189] (Fed. Cir. 1983), does not instruct otherwise. The Board cites In re Mulder for the proposition that “[e]ven a short period of unexplained inactivity may be sufficient to defeat a claim of diligence.” …. In In re Mulder, a competing reference was published just days before the patent at issue was constructively reduced to practice. …. The patent owner was tasked with showing reasonable diligence during a critical period lasting only two days. ... But the patent owner did not produce any evidence of diligence during the critical period. ... Nor could it point to any activity during the months between the drafting of the application and the start of the critical period. ... Although the critical period spanned just two days, we declined to excuse the patent owner's complete lack of evidence. ... In re Mulder does not hold that an inventor's inactivity during a portion of the critical period can, without more, destroy a patent owner's claim of diligence.","provenance":{"source_file":"s2138.html","source_anchor":"ch2100_d299b6_2d3f0_1d7","source_sha256":"26c7c2a3bdfe077ea7e4b30ae79c9a9fd0d208d7d91da6e74f7f3ce0e157610b"},"example_number":1,"example_type":"other","host_section_id":"se_ofsyoihz"},{"id":"pb_t7txtovh","corpus_id":"mpep-e9r01-2024-html","opaque_url":"https://mpep.io/n/pb_t7txtovh","effective_range":{"start_revision":"R-01.2024","end_revision":null},"node_type":"prose_block","rendered_text_html":"

    Perfect Surgical, 841 F.3d at 1009,\n 120 USPQ2d at 1609 (citations omitted).\n

    ","rendered_text_plain":"Perfect Surgical, 841 F.3d at 1009, 120 USPQ2d at 1609 (citations omitted).","provenance":{"source_file":"s2138.html","source_anchor":"ch2100_p_299b6_2d43e_ba","source_sha256":"26c7c2a3bdfe077ea7e4b30ae79c9a9fd0d208d7d91da6e74f7f3ce0e157610b"},"kind":"narrative","host_section_id":"se_ofsyoihz"},{"id":"pb_cov4cxyy","corpus_id":"mpep-e9r01-2024-html","opaque_url":"https://mpep.io/n/pb_cov4cxyy","effective_range":{"start_revision":"R-01.2024","end_revision":null},"node_type":"prose_block","rendered_text_html":"III. WORK RELIED UPON TO SHOW REASONABLE DILIGENCE MUST BE DIRECTLY RELATED TO THE REDUCTION TO PRACTICE","rendered_text_plain":"III. WORK RELIED UPON TO SHOW REASONABLE DILIGENCE MUST BE DIRECTLY RELATED TO THE REDUCTION TO PRACTICE","provenance":{"source_file":"s2138.html","source_anchor":"d0e207967/b.4","source_sha256":"26c7c2a3bdfe077ea7e4b30ae79c9a9fd0d208d7d91da6e74f7f3ce0e157610b"},"kind":"informal_heading","host_section_id":"se_ofsyoihz","heading_level":2,"heading_text":"III. WORK RELIED UPON TO SHOW REASONABLE DILIGENCE MUST BE DIRECTLY RELATED TO THE REDUCTION TO PRACTICE"},{"id":"pb_m25wmbol","corpus_id":"mpep-e9r01-2024-html","opaque_url":"https://mpep.io/n/pb_m25wmbol","effective_range":{"start_revision":"R-01.2024","end_revision":null},"node_type":"prose_block","rendered_text_html":"

    The work relied upon to show reasonable diligence must be directly\n related to the reduction to practice of the invention in issue. Naber v.\n Cricchi, 567 F.2d 382, 384, 196 USPQ 294, 296 (CCPA 1977),\n cert. denied, 439 U.S. 826 (1978). See also Scott v.\n Koyama, 281 F.3d 1243, 1248-49, 61 USPQ2d 1856, 1859 (Fed. Cir. 2002)\n (Activities directed at building a plant to practice the claimed process of producing\n tetrafluoroethane on a large scale constituted efforts toward actual reduction to\n practice, and thus were evidence of diligence. The court distinguished cases where\n diligence was not found because inventors either discontinued development or failed\n to complete the invention while pursuing financing or other commercial activity.);\n In re Jolley, 308 F.3d 1317, 1326-27, 64 USPQ2d 1901, 1908-09\n (Fed. Cir. 2002) (diligence found based on research and procurement activities\n related to the subject matter of the interference count). “[U]nder some circumstances\n an inventor should also be able to rely on work on closely related inventions as\n support for diligence toward the reduction to practice on an invention in issue.”\n Ginos v. Nedelec, 220 USPQ 831, 836 (Bd. Pat. Inter. 1983)\n (work on other closely related compounds that were considered to be part of the same\n invention and which were included as part of a grandparent application). “The work\n relied upon must be directed to attaining a reduction to practice of the subject\n matter of the counts. It is not sufficient that the activity relied on concerns\n related subject matter.” Gunn v. Bosch, 181 USPQ 758, 761 (Bd.\n Pat. Inter. 1973) (An actual reduction to practice of the invention at issue which\n occurred when the inventor was working on a different invention “was fortuitous, and\n not the result of a continuous intent or effort to reduce to practice the invention\n here in issue. Such fortuitousness is inconsistent with the exercise of diligence\n toward reduction to practice of that invention.” 181 USPQ at 761. Furthermore,\n evidence drawn towards work on improvement of samples or specimens generally already\n in use at the time of conception that are but one element of the oscillator circuit\n of the count does not show diligence towards the construction and testing of the\n overall combination.); Broos v. Barton, 142 F.2d 690, 691, 61 USPQ\n 447, 448 (CCPA 1944) (preparation of application in U.S. for foreign filing\n constitutes diligence); De Solms v. Schoenwald, 15 USPQ2d 1507\n (Bd. Pat. App. & Inter. 1990) (principles of diligence must be given to\n inventor’s circumstances including skill and time; requirement of corroboration\n applies only to testimony of inventor); Huelster v. Reiter, 168\n F.2d 542, 78 USPQ 82 (CCPA 1948) (an inventor who was not able to make an actual\n reduction to practice of the invention, must also show why constructive reduction to\n practice by filing an application was not possible).\n

    ","rendered_text_plain":"The work relied upon to show reasonable diligence must be directly related to the reduction to practice of the invention in issue. Naber v. Cricchi, 567 F.2d 382, 384, 196 USPQ 294, 296 (CCPA 1977), cert. denied, 439 U.S. 826 (1978). See also Scott v. Koyama, 281 F.3d 1243, 1248-49, 61 USPQ2d 1856, 1859 (Fed. Cir. 2002) (Activities directed at building a plant to practice the claimed process of producing tetrafluoroethane on a large scale constituted efforts toward actual reduction to practice, and thus were evidence of diligence. The court distinguished cases where diligence was not found because inventors either discontinued development or failed to complete the invention while pursuing financing or other commercial activity.); In re Jolley, 308 F.3d 1317, 1326-27, 64 USPQ2d 1901, 1908-09 (Fed. Cir. 2002) (diligence found based on research and procurement activities related to the subject matter of the interference count). “[U]nder some circumstances an inventor should also be able to rely on work on closely related inventions as support for diligence toward the reduction to practice on an invention in issue.” Ginos v. Nedelec, 220 USPQ 831, 836 (Bd. Pat. Inter. 1983) (work on other closely related compounds that were considered to be part of the same invention and which were included as part of a grandparent application). “The work relied upon must be directed to attaining a reduction to practice of the subject matter of the counts. It is not sufficient that the activity relied on concerns related subject matter.” Gunn v. Bosch, 181 USPQ 758, 761 (Bd. Pat. Inter. 1973) (An actual reduction to practice of the invention at issue which occurred when the inventor was working on a different invention “was fortuitous, and not the result of a continuous intent or effort to reduce to practice the invention here in issue. Such fortuitousness is inconsistent with the exercise of diligence toward reduction to practice of that invention.” 181 USPQ at 761. Furthermore, evidence drawn towards work on improvement of samples or specimens generally already in use at the time of conception that are but one element of the oscillator circuit of the count does not show diligence towards the construction and testing of the overall combination.); Broos v. Barton, 142 F.2d 690, 691, 61 USPQ 447, 448 (CCPA 1944) (preparation of application in U.S. for foreign filing constitutes diligence); De Solms v. Schoenwald, 15 USPQ2d 1507 (Bd. Pat. App. & Inter. 1990) (principles of diligence must be given to inventor’s circumstances including skill and time; requirement of corroboration applies only to testimony of inventor); Huelster v. Reiter, 168 F.2d 542, 78 USPQ 82 (CCPA 1948) (an inventor who was not able to make an actual reduction to practice of the invention, must also show why constructive reduction to practice by filing an application was not possible).","provenance":{"source_file":"s2138.html","source_anchor":"d0e208083","source_sha256":"26c7c2a3bdfe077ea7e4b30ae79c9a9fd0d208d7d91da6e74f7f3ce0e157610b"},"kind":"narrative","host_section_id":"se_ofsyoihz"},{"id":"cs_x4cahbdq","corpus_id":"mpep-e9r01-2024-html","opaque_url":"https://mpep.io/n/cs_x4cahbdq","effective_range":{"start_revision":"R-01.2024","end_revision":null},"node_type":"case","rendered_text_html":"","rendered_text_plain":"Naber v. Cricchi, 567 F.2d 382 (CCPA 1977)","provenance":{"source_file":"s2138.html","source_anchor":"","source_sha256":"26c7c2a3bdfe077ea7e4b30ae79c9a9fd0d208d7d91da6e74f7f3ce0e157610b"},"short_name":"Naber v. Cricchi","all_citations":["567 F.2d 382","196 USPQ 294"],"canonical_citation":"Naber v. Cricchi, 567 F.2d 382, 196 USPQ 294 (CCPA 1977)","decision_year":1977,"court":"CCPA"},{"id":"cs_3nq2jip7","corpus_id":"mpep-e9r01-2024-html","opaque_url":"https://mpep.io/n/cs_3nq2jip7","effective_range":{"start_revision":"R-01.2024","end_revision":null},"node_type":"case","rendered_text_html":"","rendered_text_plain":"Scott v. Koyama, 281 F.3d 1243 (Fed. Cir. 2002)","provenance":{"source_file":"s2138.html","source_anchor":"","source_sha256":"26c7c2a3bdfe077ea7e4b30ae79c9a9fd0d208d7d91da6e74f7f3ce0e157610b"},"short_name":"Scott v. Koyama","all_citations":["281 F.3d 1243","61 USPQ2d 1856"],"canonical_citation":"Scott v. Koyama, 281 F.3d 1243, 61 USPQ2d 1856 (Fed. Cir. 2002)","decision_year":2002,"court":"Fed. Cir."},{"id":"cs_rd5ad56p","corpus_id":"mpep-e9r01-2024-html","opaque_url":"https://mpep.io/n/cs_rd5ad56p","effective_range":{"start_revision":"R-01.2024","end_revision":null},"node_type":"case","rendered_text_html":"","rendered_text_plain":"Ginos v. Nedelec, 220 USPQ 831 (Bd. Pat. Inter. 1983)","provenance":{"source_file":"s2138.html","source_anchor":"","source_sha256":"26c7c2a3bdfe077ea7e4b30ae79c9a9fd0d208d7d91da6e74f7f3ce0e157610b"},"short_name":"Ginos v. Nedelec","all_citations":["220 USPQ 831"],"canonical_citation":"Ginos v. Nedelec, 220 USPQ 831 (Bd. Pat. Inter. 1983)","decision_year":1983,"court":"Bd. Pat. Inter."},{"id":"cs_rzdgatrw","corpus_id":"mpep-e9r01-2024-html","opaque_url":"https://mpep.io/n/cs_rzdgatrw","effective_range":{"start_revision":"R-01.2024","end_revision":null},"node_type":"case","rendered_text_html":"","rendered_text_plain":"Gunn v. Bosch, 181 USPQ 758 (Bd. Pat. Inter. 1973)","provenance":{"source_file":"s2138.html","source_anchor":"","source_sha256":"26c7c2a3bdfe077ea7e4b30ae79c9a9fd0d208d7d91da6e74f7f3ce0e157610b"},"short_name":"Gunn v. Bosch","all_citations":["181 USPQ 758"],"canonical_citation":"Gunn v. Bosch, 181 USPQ 758 (Bd. Pat. Inter. 1973)","decision_year":1973,"court":"Bd. Pat. Inter."},{"id":"cs_eeiiutun","corpus_id":"mpep-e9r01-2024-html","opaque_url":"https://mpep.io/n/cs_eeiiutun","effective_range":{"start_revision":"R-01.2024","end_revision":null},"node_type":"case","rendered_text_html":"","rendered_text_plain":"Broos v. Barton, 142 F.2d 690 (CCPA 1944)","provenance":{"source_file":"s2138.html","source_anchor":"","source_sha256":"26c7c2a3bdfe077ea7e4b30ae79c9a9fd0d208d7d91da6e74f7f3ce0e157610b"},"short_name":"Broos v. Barton","all_citations":["142 F.2d 690","61 USPQ 447"],"canonical_citation":"Broos v. Barton, 142 F.2d 690, 61 USPQ 447 (CCPA 1944)","decision_year":1944,"court":"CCPA"},{"id":"cs_5nr22z6n","corpus_id":"mpep-e9r01-2024-html","opaque_url":"https://mpep.io/n/cs_5nr22z6n","effective_range":{"start_revision":"R-01.2024","end_revision":null},"node_type":"case","rendered_text_html":"","rendered_text_plain":"De Solms v. Schoenwald, 15 USPQ2d 1507 (BPAI 1990)","provenance":{"source_file":"s2138.html","source_anchor":"","source_sha256":"26c7c2a3bdfe077ea7e4b30ae79c9a9fd0d208d7d91da6e74f7f3ce0e157610b"},"short_name":"De Solms v. Schoenwald","all_citations":["15 USPQ2d 1507"],"canonical_citation":"De Solms v. Schoenwald, 15 USPQ2d 1507 (BPAI 1990)","decision_year":1990,"court":"BPAI"},{"id":"cs_nldspnxi","corpus_id":"mpep-e9r01-2024-html","opaque_url":"https://mpep.io/n/cs_nldspnxi","effective_range":{"start_revision":"R-01.2024","end_revision":null},"node_type":"case","rendered_text_html":"","rendered_text_plain":"Huelster v. Reiter, 168 F.2d 542 (CCPA 1948)","provenance":{"source_file":"s2138.html","source_anchor":"","source_sha256":"26c7c2a3bdfe077ea7e4b30ae79c9a9fd0d208d7d91da6e74f7f3ce0e157610b"},"short_name":"Huelster v. Reiter","all_citations":["168 F.2d 542","78 USPQ 82"],"canonical_citation":"Huelster v. Reiter, 168 F.2d 542, 78 USPQ 82 (CCPA 1948)","decision_year":1948,"court":"CCPA"},{"id":"pb_s3df3v7b","corpus_id":"mpep-e9r01-2024-html","opaque_url":"https://mpep.io/n/pb_s3df3v7b","effective_range":{"start_revision":"R-01.2024","end_revision":null},"node_type":"prose_block","rendered_text_html":"IV. DILIGENCE REQUIRED IN PREPARING AND FILING PATENT APPLICATION","rendered_text_plain":"IV. DILIGENCE REQUIRED IN PREPARING AND FILING PATENT APPLICATION","provenance":{"source_file":"s2138.html","source_anchor":"d0e207967/b.6","source_sha256":"26c7c2a3bdfe077ea7e4b30ae79c9a9fd0d208d7d91da6e74f7f3ce0e157610b"},"kind":"informal_heading","host_section_id":"se_ofsyoihz","heading_level":2,"heading_text":"IV. DILIGENCE REQUIRED IN PREPARING AND FILING PATENT APPLICATION"},{"id":"pb_kypwelbj","corpus_id":"mpep-e9r01-2024-html","opaque_url":"https://mpep.io/n/pb_kypwelbj","effective_range":{"start_revision":"R-01.2024","end_revision":null},"node_type":"prose_block","rendered_text_html":"

    The diligence of an attorney in preparing and filing patent\n application inures to the benefit of the inventor. Conception was established at\n least as early as the date a draft of a patent application was finished by a patent\n attorney on behalf of the inventor. Conception is less a matter of signature than it\n is one of disclosure. An attorney does not prepare a patent application on behalf of\n particular named persons, but on behalf of the true inventive entity. Six days to\n execute and file application is acceptable. Haskell v. Coleburne,\n 671 F.2d 1362, 213 USPQ 192, 195 (CCPA 1982). See also Bey v.\n Kollonitsch, 806 F.2d 1024, 231 USPQ 967 (Fed. Cir. 1986) (Reasonable\n diligence is all that is required of the attorney. Reasonable diligence is\n established if the attorney worked reasonably hard on the application during the\n continuous critical period. If the attorney has a reasonable backlog of unrelated\n cases which the attorney takes up in chronological order and carries out\n expeditiously, that is sufficient. Work on a related case(s) that contributed\n substantially to the ultimate preparation of an application can be credited as\n diligence.). In “the preparation\" of a patent application, \"the absence of evidence\n that an inventor and his attorney revised or discussed the application on a daily\n basis is alone insufficient to determine that the invention was abandoned or\n unreasonably delayed.\" Perfect Surgical Techniques, Inc. v. Olympus Am.,\n Inc., 841 F.3d 1004, 1009, 120 USPQ2d 1605, 1609 (Fed. Cir. 2016). \n

    ","rendered_text_plain":"The diligence of an attorney in preparing and filing patent application inures to the benefit of the inventor. Conception was established at least as early as the date a draft of a patent application was finished by a patent attorney on behalf of the inventor. Conception is less a matter of signature than it is one of disclosure. An attorney does not prepare a patent application on behalf of particular named persons, but on behalf of the true inventive entity. Six days to execute and file application is acceptable. Haskell v. Coleburne, 671 F.2d 1362, 213 USPQ 192, 195 (CCPA 1982). See also Bey v. Kollonitsch, 806 F.2d 1024, 231 USPQ 967 (Fed. Cir. 1986) (Reasonable diligence is all that is required of the attorney. Reasonable diligence is established if the attorney worked reasonably hard on the application during the continuous critical period. If the attorney has a reasonable backlog of unrelated cases which the attorney takes up in chronological order and carries out expeditiously, that is sufficient. Work on a related case(s) that contributed substantially to the ultimate preparation of an application can be credited as diligence.). In “the preparation\" of a patent application, \"the absence of evidence that an inventor and his attorney revised or discussed the application on a daily basis is alone insufficient to determine that the invention was abandoned or unreasonably delayed.\" Perfect Surgical Techniques, Inc. v. Olympus Am., Inc., 841 F.3d 1004, 1009, 120 USPQ2d 1605, 1609 (Fed. Cir. 2016).","provenance":{"source_file":"s2138.html","source_anchor":"d0e208124","source_sha256":"26c7c2a3bdfe077ea7e4b30ae79c9a9fd0d208d7d91da6e74f7f3ce0e157610b"},"kind":"narrative","host_section_id":"se_ofsyoihz"},{"id":"cs_gkkcnjfp","corpus_id":"mpep-e9r01-2024-html","opaque_url":"https://mpep.io/n/cs_gkkcnjfp","effective_range":{"start_revision":"R-01.2024","end_revision":null},"node_type":"case","rendered_text_html":"","rendered_text_plain":"Haskell v. Coleburne, 671 F.2d 1362 (CCPA 1982)","provenance":{"source_file":"s2138.html","source_anchor":"","source_sha256":"26c7c2a3bdfe077ea7e4b30ae79c9a9fd0d208d7d91da6e74f7f3ce0e157610b"},"short_name":"Haskell v. Coleburne","all_citations":["671 F.2d 1362","213 USPQ 192"],"canonical_citation":"Haskell v. Coleburne, 671 F.2d 1362, 213 USPQ 192 (CCPA 1982)","decision_year":1982,"court":"CCPA"},{"id":"cs_mydtffku","corpus_id":"mpep-e9r01-2024-html","opaque_url":"https://mpep.io/n/cs_mydtffku","effective_range":{"start_revision":"R-01.2024","end_revision":null},"node_type":"case","rendered_text_html":"","rendered_text_plain":"Bey v. Kollonitsch, 806 F.2d 1024 (Fed. Cir. 1986)","provenance":{"source_file":"s2138.html","source_anchor":"","source_sha256":"26c7c2a3bdfe077ea7e4b30ae79c9a9fd0d208d7d91da6e74f7f3ce0e157610b"},"short_name":"Bey v. Kollonitsch","all_citations":["806 F.2d 1024","231 USPQ 967"],"canonical_citation":"Bey v. Kollonitsch, 806 F.2d 1024, 231 USPQ 967 (Fed. Cir. 1986)","decision_year":1986,"court":"Fed. Cir."},{"id":"pb_wrztumir","corpus_id":"mpep-e9r01-2024-html","opaque_url":"https://mpep.io/n/pb_wrztumir","effective_range":{"start_revision":"R-01.2024","end_revision":null},"node_type":"prose_block","rendered_text_html":"V. END OF DILIGENCE PERIOD IS MARKED BY EITHER ACTUAL OR CONSTRUCTIVE REDUCTION TO PRACTICE","rendered_text_plain":"V. END OF DILIGENCE PERIOD IS MARKED BY EITHER ACTUAL OR CONSTRUCTIVE REDUCTION TO PRACTICE","provenance":{"source_file":"s2138.html","source_anchor":"d0e207967/b.8","source_sha256":"26c7c2a3bdfe077ea7e4b30ae79c9a9fd0d208d7d91da6e74f7f3ce0e157610b"},"kind":"informal_heading","host_section_id":"se_ofsyoihz","heading_level":2,"heading_text":"V. END OF DILIGENCE PERIOD IS MARKED BY EITHER ACTUAL OR CONSTRUCTIVE REDUCTION TO PRACTICE"},{"id":"pb_62vvmemr","corpus_id":"mpep-e9r01-2024-html","opaque_url":"https://mpep.io/n/pb_62vvmemr","effective_range":{"start_revision":"R-01.2024","end_revision":null},"node_type":"prose_block","rendered_text_html":"

    “[I]t is of no moment that the end of that period [for diligence] is\n fixed by a constructive, rather than an actual, reduction to practice.”\n Justus v. Appenzeller, 177 USPQ 332, 340-41 (Bd. Pat. Inter.\n 1971).\n

    ","rendered_text_plain":"“[I]t is of no moment that the end of that period [for diligence] is fixed by a constructive, rather than an actual, reduction to practice.” Justus v. Appenzeller, 177 USPQ 332, 340-41 (Bd. Pat. 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