{"section":{"filename":"s2141.html","chapter":"2100","section_number":"2141","title":"Examination Guidelines for Determining Obviousness Under 35 U.S.C. 103","revision_tag":"R-01.2024","bytes":178527,"sha256":"c18335410b948734844afa0950712df37f56fb7b8d25ca661deb44a79ef5e658","subsection_count":4,"max_depth":2,"subsections":[{"number":"2141.01","title":"Scope and Content of the Prior Art","revision_tag":"R-01.2024","depth":1},{"number":"2141.01(a)","title":"Analogous and Nonanalogous Art","revision_tag":"R-01.2024","depth":2},{"number":"2141.02","title":"Differences Between Prior Art and Claimed Invention","revision_tag":"R-01.2024","depth":1},{"number":"2141.03","title":"Level of Ordinary Skill in the Art","revision_tag":"R-01.2024","depth":1}]},"quality":"structured","cited_authorities":{"file_section":"2141","cases":[{"key":"case:550u.s.398","slug":"ksr-intl-co-v-teleflex-inc","short_name":"KSR Int'l Co. v. Teleflex Inc.","canonical_citation":"KSR Int'l Co. v. Teleflex Inc., 550 U.S. 398, 82 USPQ2d 1385 (2007)","decision_year":2007,"court":"SCOTUS","holding_summary":"Obviousness requires an explicit, flexible analysis that may draw on common sense rather than rigid rules; predictable uses of prior art elements according to their established functions, and choosing among a finite number of identified, predictable solutions with reasonable expectation of success, support obviousness.","holding_confidence":"high","mentions":5,"propositions":[]},{"key":"case:713f.2d693","slug":"environmental-designs-ltd-v-union-oil-co","short_name":"Environmental Designs, Ltd. v. Union Oil Co.","canonical_citation":"Environmental Designs, Ltd. v. Union Oil Co., 713 F.2d 693, 218 USPQ 865 (Fed. Cir. 1983)","decision_year":1983,"court":"Fed. Cir.","holding_summary":"The level of ordinary skill in the art is resolved by weighing factors such as the types of problems encountered, prior art solutions, rapidity of innovation, sophistication of the technology, and workers' educational level; not every factor need be present in a given case.","holding_confidence":"medium","mentions":3,"propositions":[]},{"key":"case:721f.2d1540","slug":"w-l-gore-assoc-inc-v-garlock-inc","short_name":"W.L. Gore & Assoc., Inc. v. Garlock, Inc.","canonical_citation":"W.L. Gore & Assoc., Inc. v. Garlock, Inc., 721 F.2d 1540, 220 USPQ 303 (Fed. Cir. 1983)","decision_year":1983,"court":"Fed. Cir.","holding_summary":"The obviousness decisionmaker must cast the mind back to the time of invention and avoid hindsight; distilling an invention to its 'gist' or 'thrust' violates the requirement to consider the claimed subject matter as a whole. The sale of a product before the critical date can trigger the on-sale bar, and best mode is not violated where an undisclosed mode would be used by those of ordinary skill.","holding_confidence":"high","mentions":3,"propositions":[]},{"key":"case:587f.3d1324","slug":"perfect-web-technologies-inc-v-infousa-inc","short_name":"Perfect Web Technologies, Inc. v. InfoUSA, Inc.","canonical_citation":"Perfect Web Technologies, Inc. v. InfoUSA, Inc., 587 F.3d 1324, 92 USPQ2d 1849 (Fed. Cir. 2009)","decision_year":2009,"court":"Fed. Cir.","holding_summary":"Common sense may be invoked in an obviousness analysis without a specific hint or suggestion in a particular reference, provided the examiner supplies a reasoned explanation that avoids conclusory generalizations.","holding_confidence":"high","mentions":2,"propositions":[]},{"key":"case:832f.3d1355","slug":"arendi-v-apple","short_name":"Arendi v. Apple","canonical_citation":"Arendi v. Apple, 832 F.3d 1355, 119 USPQ2d 1822 (Fed. Cir. 2016)","decision_year":2016,"court":"Fed. Cir.","holding_summary":"Common sense may be invoked in an obviousness analysis, even to supply a missing claim limitation, only when supported by evidence and a reasoned explanation, particularly where the missing limitation goes to the heart of the invention.","holding_confidence":"high","mentions":2,"propositions":[]},{"key":"case:383u.s.1","slug":"graham-v-john-deere-co","short_name":"Graham v. John Deere Co.","canonical_citation":"Graham v. John Deere, 383 U.S. 1, 148 USPQ 459 (1966)","decision_year":1966,"court":"SCOTUS","holding_summary":"Obviousness is resolved through factual inquiries: the scope and content of the prior art, the differences between the prior art and the claims, the level of ordinary skill in the art, and secondary considerations such as commercial success, long-felt need, and failure of others.","holding_confidence":"high","mentions":2,"propositions":[]},{"key":"case:425u.s.219","slug":"dann-v-johnston","short_name":"Dann v. Johnston","canonical_citation":"Dann v. Johnston, 425 U.S. 219, 189 USPQ 257 (1976)","decision_year":1976,"court":"SCOTUS","holding_summary":"The mere existence of differences between the prior art and an invention does not establish nonobviousness; the gap must be great enough to render the claim nonobvious to one reasonably skilled in the art, applying the Graham factors.","holding_confidence":"high","mentions":2,"propositions":[]},{"key":"case:57f.3d1573","slug":"in-re-gpac","short_name":"In re GPAC","canonical_citation":"In re GPAC, 57 F.3d 1573, 35 USPQ2d 1116 (Fed. Cir. 1995)","decision_year":1995,"court":"Fed. Cir.","holding_summary":"The level of ordinary skill in the art is determined by factors including the types of problems encountered, prior art solutions, rapidity of innovation, sophistication of the technology, and educational level of active workers; not every factor need be present, and evidence of copying by others may rebut obviousness.","holding_confidence":"high","mentions":2,"propositions":[]},{"key":"case:807f.2d955","slug":"custom-accessories-inc-v-jeffrey-allan-indust-inc","short_name":"Custom Accessories, Inc. v. Jeffrey-Allan Indust., Inc.","canonical_citation":"Custom Accessories, Inc. v. Jeffrey-Allan Indust., Inc., 807 F.2d 955, 1 USPQ2d 1196 (Fed. Cir. 1986)","decision_year":1986,"court":"Fed. Cir.","holding_summary":"The level of ordinary skill in the art is determined from factors such as the types of problems encountered, prior art solutions, the rapidity of innovation, the sophistication of the technology, and the educational level of active workers; not every factor need be present, and one or more may predominate.","holding_confidence":"high","mentions":2,"propositions":[]},{"key":"case:381f.3d1320","slug":"in-re-bigio","short_name":"In re Bigio","canonical_citation":"In re Bigio, 381 F.3d 1320, 72 USPQ2d 1209 (Fed. Cir. 2004)","decision_year":2004,"court":"Fed. Cir.","holding_summary":"A reference must be analogous art to support an obviousness rejection: either from the same field of endeavor as the claimed invention or reasonably pertinent to the inventor's problem. Broad claim terms should not be limited solely on the basis of specification passages.","holding_confidence":"high","mentions":2,"propositions":[]},{"key":"case:979f.3d1353","slug":"donner-technology-llc-v-pro-stage-gear-llc","short_name":"Donner Technology, LLC v. Pro Stage Gear, LLC","canonical_citation":"Donner Technology, LLC v. Pro Stage Gear, LLC, 979 F.3d 1353, 2020 USPQ2d 11335 (Fed. Cir. 2020)","decision_year":2020,"court":"Fed. Cir.","holding_summary":"When assessing whether a reference is analogous art under a reasonable-pertinence theory, the problems addressed by the reference and the claimed invention must be identified and compared, with factual reasons explaining why the inventor would have looked to the reference.","holding_confidence":"high","mentions":2,"propositions":[]},{"key":"case:713f.2d1530","slug":"stratoflex-inc-v-aeroquip-corp","short_name":"Stratoflex, Inc. v. Aeroquip Corp.","canonical_citation":"Stratoflex, Inc. v. Aeroquip Corp., 713 F.2d 1530, 218 USPQ 871 (Fed. Cir. 1983)","decision_year":1983,"court":"Fed. Cir.","holding_summary":"Prior art from a different but related field (rubber hose art) is analogous where practitioners face the same problem, such as electrostatic buildup from fuel flow; and the obviousness question is not whether the differences from the prior art would have been obvious, but whether the claimed invention as a whole would have been obvious.","holding_confidence":"high","mentions":2,"propositions":[]},{"key":"case:596f.2d1019","slug":"in-re-wiseman","short_name":"In re Wiseman","canonical_citation":"In re Wiseman, 596 F.2d 1019, 201 USPQ 658 (CCPA 1979)","decision_year":1979,"court":"CCPA","holding_summary":"Mere recognition of latent properties in the prior art does not render an otherwise known invention nonobvious, and a solution is obvious when the prior art contains the same solution for a similar problem; allegations that the inventor discovered the source of a problem require substantiating evidence.","holding_confidence":"high","mentions":2,"propositions":[]},{"key":"case:277f.3d1338","slug":"in-re-lee-2002","short_name":"In re Lee","canonical_citation":"In re Lee, 277 F.3d 1338, 61 USPQ2d 1430 (Fed. Cir. 2002)","decision_year":2002,"court":"Fed. Cir.","holding_summary":"An obviousness rejection formerly required record evidence of an express teaching, suggestion, or motivation to combine references, a strict requirement later overruled by KSR's more flexible approach.","holding_confidence":"high","mentions":1,"propositions":[]},{"key":"case:464f.3d1356","slug":"dystar-textilfarben-gmbh-v-c-h-patrick-co","short_name":"DyStar Textilfarben GmbH v. C.H. Patrick Co.","canonical_citation":"DyStar Textilfarben GmbH v. C.H. Patrick Co., 464 F.3d 1356 (Fed. Cir. 2006)","decision_year":2006,"court":"Fed. Cir.","holding_summary":"Obviousness may rest on a showing that a person of ordinary skill would have been motivated to combine the prior art with a reasonable expectation of success; common sense may supply the motivation without a specific hint or suggestion in a particular reference, provided the explanation is reasoned and avoids conclusory generalizations.","holding_confidence":"high","mentions":1,"propositions":[]},{"key":"case:923f.3d1051","slug":"novartis-pharms-corp-v-west-ward-pharms-intl-ltd","short_name":"Novartis Pharms. Corp. v. West-Ward Pharms. Int'l Ltd.","canonical_citation":"Novartis Pharms. Corp. v. West-Ward Pharms. Int'l Ltd., 923 F.3d 1051, 2019 USPQ2d 171676 (Fed. Cir. 2019)","decision_year":2019,"court":"Fed. Cir.","holding_summary":"Obviousness analysis follows the flexible framework of KSR, including its treatment of obvious-to-try reasoning and its caution against rigid rules that overemphasize hindsight bias and deny factfinders recourse to common sense.","holding_confidence":"medium","mentions":1,"propositions":[]},{"key":"case:839f.3d1034","slug":"apple-inc-v-samsung-elecs-co","short_name":"Apple Inc. v. Samsung Elecs. Co.","canonical_citation":"Apple Inc. v. Samsung Elecs. Co., 839 F.3d 1034, 120 USPQ2d 1400 (Fed. Cir. 2016)","decision_year":2016,"court":"Fed. Cir.","holding_summary":"Applies the flexible obviousness framework of KSR, cautioning against rigid preventative rules that deny factfinders recourse to common sense while guarding against hindsight bias in combining prior art elements.","holding_confidence":"medium","mentions":1,"propositions":[]},{"key":"case:675f.3d1324","slug":"aventis-pharma-s-a-v-hospira-inc","short_name":"Aventis Pharma S.A. v. Hospira, Inc.","canonical_citation":"Aventis Pharma S.A. v. Hospira, Inc., 675 F.3d 1324, 102 USPQ2d 1445 (Fed. Cir. 2012)","decision_year":2012,"court":"Fed. Cir.","holding_summary":"Obviousness analysis must heed KSR's caution against hindsight bias while avoiding rigid preventative rules that deny factfinders recourse to common sense when evaluating combinations of prior art elements.","holding_confidence":"medium","mentions":1,"propositions":[]},{"key":"case:396u.s.57","slug":"andersons-black-rock-inc-v-pavement-salvage-co","short_name":"Anderson’s-Black Rock, Inc. v. Pavement Salvage Co.","canonical_citation":"Anderson’s-Black Rock, Inc. v. Pavement Salvage Co., 396 U.S. 57, 163 USPQ 673 (1969)","decision_year":1969,"court":"SCOTUS","holding_summary":"A combination of old elements is obvious where the elements are combined by known methods with no change in their respective functions and yield only predictable results—mere convenience of uniting elements in one machine produces no new or different function.","holding_confidence":"high","mentions":1,"propositions":[]},{"key":"case:415f.3d1303","slug":"phillips-v-awh-corp","short_name":"Phillips v. AWH Corp.","canonical_citation":"Phillips v. AWH Corp., 415 F.3d 1303, 75 USPQ2d 1321 (Fed. Cir. 2005)","decision_year":2005,"court":"Fed. Cir.","holding_summary":"Claim terms are construed in light of the specification as understood by one of ordinary skill in the art; the USPTO's broadest reasonable interpretation standard is expressly recognized, and judges may freely consult dictionaries and treatises so long as they do not contradict the patent documents.","holding_confidence":"high","mentions":1,"propositions":[]},{"key":"case:919f.2d688","slug":"in-re-dillon","short_name":"In re Dillon","canonical_citation":"In re Dillon, 919 F.2d 688, 16 USPQ2d 1897 (Fed. Cir. 1990)","decision_year":1990,"court":"Fed. Cir.","holding_summary":"A prima facie case of obviousness for a structurally similar compound or composition does not require both structural similarity and a prior art suggestion that it will have the same newly discovered utility as the applicant's; the prima facie case may then be rebutted by evidence and argument.","holding_confidence":"high","mentions":1,"propositions":[]},{"key":"case:458f.2d1013","slug":"in-re-lintner","short_name":"In re Lintner","canonical_citation":"In re Lintner, 458 F.2d 1013, 173 USPQ 560 (CCPA 1972)","decision_year":1972,"court":"CCPA","holding_summary":"That an applicant uses a known ingredient for a different purpose does not alter the conclusion that its use in a prior art composition would be prima facie obvious from the purpose disclosed in the references; prima facie obviousness allocates the burden of going forward during examination.","holding_confidence":"high","mentions":1,"propositions":[]},{"key":"case:320f.3d1310","slug":"in-re-berg-2003","short_name":"In re Berg","canonical_citation":"In re Berg, 320 F.3d 1310, 65 USPQ2d 2003 (Fed. Cir. 2003)","decision_year":2003,"court":"Fed. Cir.","holding_summary":"Examiners and administrative patent judges are persons of scientific competence in the fields in which they work, and their findings as to the meaning of prior art references to skilled artisans are informed by their scientific knowledge.","holding_confidence":"high","mentions":1,"propositions":[]},{"key":"case:522f.3d1299","slug":"poweroasis-inc-v-t-mobile-usa-inc","short_name":"PowerOasis, Inc. v. T-Mobile USA, Inc.","canonical_citation":"PowerOasis, Inc. v. T-Mobile USA, Inc., 522 F.3d 1299, 86 USPQ2d 1385 (Fed. Cir. 2008)","decision_year":2008,"court":"Fed. Cir.","holding_summary":"Patent examiners are assumed to have expertise in interpreting prior art references and to be familiar, from their work, with the level of ordinary skill in the art.","holding_confidence":"high","mentions":1,"propositions":[]},{"key":"case:725f.2d1350","slug":"am-hoist-derrick-co-v-sowa-sons","short_name":"Am. Hoist & Derrick Co. v. Sowa & Sons","canonical_citation":"Am. Hoist & Derrick Co. v. Sowa & Sons, 725 F.2d 1350, 220 USPQ 763 (Fed. Cir. 1984)","decision_year":1984,"court":"Fed. Cir.","holding_summary":"Examiners are assumed to have expertise in interpreting references and familiarity with the level of ordinary skill in the art; and an applicant has no duty to conduct a prior art search as a prerequisite to filing a patent application.","holding_confidence":"high","mentions":1,"propositions":[]},{"key":"case:292f.2d955","slug":"in-re-bergel","short_name":"In re Bergel","canonical_citation":"In re Bergel, 292 F.2d 955, 130 USPQ 206 (1961)","decision_year":1961,"court":null,"holding_summary":"The teaching-suggestion-motivation approach to obviousness captures a helpful insight: identifying a reason to combine known elements guards against hindsight, a principle consistent with the Graham analysis though not to be applied rigidly.","holding_confidence":"medium","mentions":1,"propositions":[]},{"key":"case:21f.4th784","slug":"intel-corp-v-qualcomm-inc","short_name":"Intel Corp. v. Qualcomm Inc.","canonical_citation":"Intel Corp. v. Qualcomm Inc., 21 F.4th 784, 2021 USPQ2d 1259 (Fed. Cir. 2021)","decision_year":2021,"court":"Fed. Cir.","holding_summary":"The obviousness inquiry is not confined by a formalistic reading of teaching, suggestion, and motivation, but follows the expansive and flexible approach of Graham and KSR.","holding_confidence":"high","mentions":1,"propositions":[]},{"key":"case:844f.3d1344","slug":"in-re-ethicon-inc","short_name":"In re Ethicon, Inc.","canonical_citation":"In re Ethicon, Inc., 844 F.3d 1344, 121 USPQ2d 1139 (Fed. Cir. 2017)","decision_year":2017,"court":"Fed. Cir.","holding_summary":"The obviousness analysis requires an expansive and flexible approach and is not confined by a formalistic conception of the words teaching, suggestion, and motivation.","holding_confidence":"high","mentions":1,"propositions":[]},{"key":"case:25f.4th1354","slug":"adapt-pharma-operations-ltd-v-teva-pharms-usa-inc","short_name":"Adapt Pharma Operations Ltd. v. Teva Pharms. USA, Inc.","canonical_citation":"Adapt Pharma Operations Ltd. v. Teva Pharms. USA, Inc., 25 F.4th 1354, 2022 USPQ2d 144 (Fed. Cir. 2022)","decision_year":2022,"court":"Fed. Cir.","holding_summary":"A determination of obviousness requires identifying a reason that would have prompted a skilled artisan to combine the prior-art elements in the way the claimed invention does.","holding_confidence":"high","mentions":1,"propositions":[]},{"key":"case:745f.2d1468","slug":"in-re-piasecki","short_name":"In re Piasecki","canonical_citation":"In re Piasecki, 745 F.2d 1468, 223 USPQ 785 (Fed. Cir. 1984)","decision_year":1984,"court":"Fed. Cir.","holding_summary":"Once the examiner establishes a prima facie case and the applicant presents rebuttal evidence, the obviousness determination must be reconsidered on the entire record; rebuttal evidence may relate to any of the Graham factors, including secondary considerations, and declarations on the need for the invention may not be improperly discounted.","holding_confidence":"high","mentions":1,"propositions":[]},{"key":"case:902f.2d943","slug":"in-re-eli-lilly-co","short_name":"In re Eli Lilly & Co.","canonical_citation":"In re Eli Lilly & Co., 902 F.2d 943, 14 USPQ2d 1741 (Fed. Cir. 1990)","decision_year":1990,"court":"Fed. Cir.","holding_summary":"Once rebuttal evidence is presented, obviousness must be redetermined on the totality of the evidence; facts established by rebuttal evidence are weighed with the facts underlying the prima facie case, not against the conclusion itself, and a suggestion to combine may rest on legal precedent.","holding_confidence":"high","mentions":1,"propositions":[]},{"key":"case:481u.s.1052","slug":"panduit-corp-v-dennison-mfg-co","short_name":"Panduit Corp. v. Dennison Mfg. Co.","canonical_citation":"Panduit Corp. v. Dennison Mfg. Co., 481 U.S. 1052 (1987)","decision_year":1987,"court":"SCOTUS","holding_summary":"Before conducting the obviousness content inquiry, it must be established whether a patent or publication qualifies as prior art under 35 U.S.C. 102; subject matter that is prior art under section 102 can support a rejection under section 103.","holding_confidence":"medium","mentions":1,"propositions":[]},{"key":"case:212uspq100","slug":"ex-parte-andresen","short_name":"Ex parte Andresen","canonical_citation":"Ex parte Andresen, 212 USPQ 100 (Bd. App. 1981)","decision_year":1981,"court":"BPAI","holding_summary":"Prior art under pre-AIA 35 U.S.C. 102(f) is available to support a rejection under 35 U.S.C. 103; derivation is not limited to public knowledge derived from another, and the site of derivation need not be in this country to bar the deriver from patenting.","holding_confidence":"high","mentions":1,"propositions":[]},{"key":"case:646f.2d527","slug":"in-re-wertheim-1981","short_name":"In re Wertheim","canonical_citation":"In re Wertheim, 646 F.2d 527, 209 USPQ 554 (CCPA 1981)","decision_year":1981,"court":"CCPA","holding_summary":"The term \"prior art\" in 35 U.S.C. 103 refers at least to the statutory prior art material named in 35 U.S.C. 102, so subject matter qualifying under section 102 can support an obviousness rejection.","holding_confidence":"high","mentions":1,"propositions":[]},{"key":"case:399f.2d269","slug":"in-re-hoeksema","short_name":"In re Hoeksema","canonical_citation":"In re Hoeksema, 399 F.2d 269, 158 USPQ 596 (CCPA 1968)","decision_year":1968,"court":"CCPA","holding_summary":"The mere naming of a compound in a reference, without an available process for making it, cannot constitute a description of the compound; prior art must enable a skilled artisan to make or synthesize the compound to anticipate or render it obvious.","holding_confidence":"high","mentions":1,"propositions":[]},{"key":"case:324f.3d1346","slug":"riverwood-intl-corp-v-r-a-jones-co","short_name":"Riverwood Int’l Corp. v. R.A. Jones & Co.","canonical_citation":"Riverwood Int’l Corp. v. R.A. Jones & Co., 324 F.3d 1346, 66 USPQ2d 1331 (Fed. Cir. 2003)","decision_year":2003,"court":"Fed. Cir.","holding_summary":"An applicant's statement identifying the work of another as \"prior art\" is a binding admission usable for anticipation and obviousness regardless of whether it qualifies under 35 U.S.C. 102, but merely listing a reference in an information disclosure statement is not such an admission.","holding_confidence":"high","mentions":1,"propositions":[]},{"key":"case:848f.2d1560","slug":"constant-v-advanced-micro-devices-inc","short_name":"Constant v. Advanced Micro-Devices Inc.","canonical_citation":"Constant v. Advanced Micro-Devices Inc., 848 F.2d 1560, 7 USPQ2d 1057 (Fed. Cir. 1988)","decision_year":1988,"court":"Fed. Cir.","holding_summary":"A statement by an applicant identifying the work of another as prior art is an admission that may be relied upon for both anticipation and obviousness determinations, regardless of whether the admitted material otherwise qualifies as prior art under the statutory categories.","holding_confidence":"high","mentions":1,"propositions":[]},{"key":"case:66f.4th1373","slug":"sanofi-aventis-deutschland-gmbh-v-mylan-pharms-inc","short_name":"Sanofi-Aventis Deutschland GMbH v. Mylan Pharms. Inc.","canonical_citation":"Sanofi-Aventis Deutschland GMbH v. Mylan Pharms. Inc., 66 F.4th 1373, 2023 USPQ2d 552 (Fed. Cir. 2023)","decision_year":2023,"court":"Fed. Cir.","holding_summary":"When multiple prior art references form the basis of an obviousness rejection, each reference must be analogous art to the claimed invention, but the references need not be analogous art to each other.","holding_confidence":"high","mentions":1,"propositions":[]},{"key":"case:84f.4th990","slug":"corephotonics-ltd-v-apple-inc","short_name":"Corephotonics, Ltd. v. Apple Inc.","canonical_citation":"Corephotonics, Ltd. v. Apple Inc., 84 F.4th 990, 2023 USPQ2d 1202 (Fed. Cir. 2023)","decision_year":2023,"court":"Fed. Cir.","holding_summary":"When multiple prior art references are combined in an obviousness rejection, each reference must be analogous art to the claimed invention, but the references need not be analogous art to each other.","holding_confidence":"high","mentions":1,"propositions":[]},{"key":"case:128f.3d1473","slug":"in-re-schreiber","short_name":"In re Schreiber","canonical_citation":"In re Schreiber, 128 F.3d 1473, 44 USPQ2d 1429 (Fed. Cir. 1997)","decision_year":1997,"court":"Fed. Cir.","holding_summary":"A prior art structure capable of performing a claimed intended use anticipates the claim; a spout disclosed for dispensing oil inherently performed the popcorn-dispensing function recited in the claim, given the structural similarity between the prior art spout and the claimed dispensing top.","holding_confidence":"high","mentions":1,"propositions":[]},{"key":"case:941f.3d1374","slug":"airbus-s-a-s-v-firepass-corp","short_name":"Airbus S.A.S. v. Firepass Corp.","canonical_citation":"Airbus S.A.S. v. Firepass Corp., 941 F.3d 1374, 2019 USPQ2d 430083 (Fed. Cir. 2019)","decision_year":2019,"court":"Fed. Cir.","holding_summary":"In applying the same-field-of-endeavor test for analogous art, the examiner considers explanations of the invention's subject matter in the application, including the embodiments, function, and structure of the claimed invention, with the primary focus on what the reference discloses in view of the reality of the circumstances.","holding_confidence":"high","mentions":1,"propositions":[]},{"key":"case:80f.4th1352","slug":"netflix-inc-v-divx-llc","short_name":"Netflix, Inc. v. DivX, LLC","canonical_citation":"Netflix, Inc. v. DivX, LLC, 80 F.4th 1352, 2023 USPQ2d 1057 (Fed. Cir. 2023)","decision_year":2023,"court":"Fed. Cir.","holding_summary":"For analogous art purposes, the field of endeavor is not limited to the specific point of novelty, the narrowest possible conception of the field, or the particular focus within a given field.","holding_confidence":"high","mentions":1,"propositions":[]},{"key":"case:841f.3d995","slug":"unwired-planet-llc-v-google-inc","short_name":"Unwired Planet, LLC v. Google Inc.","canonical_citation":"Unwired Planet, LLC v. Google Inc., 841 F.3d 995, 120 USPQ2d 1593 (Fed. Cir. 2016)","decision_year":2016,"court":"Fed. Cir.","holding_summary":"For the analogous art inquiry, the field of endeavor is not limited to the specific point of novelty, the narrowest possible conception of the field, or the particular focus within a given field.","holding_confidence":"high","mentions":1,"propositions":[]},{"key":"case:496f.3d1374","slug":"in-re-icon-health-and-fitness-inc","short_name":"In re ICON Health and Fitness, Inc.","canonical_citation":"In re ICON Health and Fitness, Inc., 496 F.3d 1374 (Fed. Cir. 2007)","decision_year":2007,"court":"Fed. Cir.","holding_summary":"A reference outside the inventor's field of endeavor is analogous art if it is reasonably pertinent to the inventor's problem, meaning it logically would have commended itself to the inventor's attention; on that basis a folding-bed gas spring could render a folding treadmill obvious.","holding_confidence":"high","mentions":1,"propositions":[]},{"key":"case:966f.2d656","slug":"in-re-clay","short_name":"In re Clay","canonical_citation":"In re Clay, 966 F.2d 656, 23 USPQ2d 1058 (Fed. Cir. 1992)","decision_year":1992,"court":"Fed. Cir.","holding_summary":"A reference is reasonably pertinent to the inventor's problem, and thus analogous art, only if it logically would have commended itself to an inventor's attention in considering the problem, as reflected in the specification.","holding_confidence":"high","mentions":1,"propositions":[]},{"key":"case:647f.3d1343","slug":"in-re-klein","short_name":"In re Klein","canonical_citation":"In re Klein, 647 F.3d 1343, 98 USPQ2d 1991 (Fed. Cir. 2011)","decision_year":2011,"court":"Fed. Cir.","holding_summary":"A reference is reasonably pertinent, and thus analogous art, only if it logically would have commended itself to the inventor's attention in considering the problem the inventor was trying to solve.","holding_confidence":"medium","mentions":1,"propositions":[]},{"key":"case:616f.3d1231","slug":"wyers-v-master-lock-co","short_name":"Wyers v. Master Lock Co.","canonical_citation":"Wyers v. Master Lock Co., 616 F.3d 1231, 95 USPQ2d 1525 (Fed. Cir. 2010)","decision_year":2010,"court":"Fed. Cir.","holding_summary":"Following KSR, the scope of analogous art is construed broadly because familiar items may have obvious uses beyond their primary purposes. Evidence of copying requires proof of efforts to replicate a specific product, such as internal documents, disassembly of a prototype, or access plus substantial similarity.","holding_confidence":"high","mentions":1,"propositions":[]},{"key":"case:476f.2d1370","slug":"in-re-ellis","short_name":"In re Ellis","canonical_citation":"In re Ellis, 476 F.2d 1370, 177 USPQ 526 (CCPA 1973)","decision_year":1973,"court":"CCPA","holding_summary":"In assessing analogous art, similarities and differences in structure and function of the inventions carry far greater weight than Patent Office classification; structural similarity and functional overlap made structural gratings reasonably pertinent to pedestrian floor gratings.","holding_confidence":"high","mentions":1,"propositions":[]},{"key":"case:3uspq2d1103","slug":"ex-parte-bland","short_name":"Ex parte Bland","canonical_citation":"Ex parte Bland, 3 USPQ2d 1103 (Bd. Pat App. & Inter. 1986)","decision_year":1986,"court":"B.P.A.I.","holding_summary":"In the chemical arts, references are analogous when directed to the same underlying problem: references all concerned with absorbing biologically active materials on carriers were pertinent to each other's problems and to claims for a preservative composition of propionic acid absorbed on verxite.","holding_confidence":"high","mentions":1,"propositions":[]},{"key":"case:676f.2d666","slug":"in-re-mlot-fijalkowski","short_name":"In re Mlot-Fijalkowski","canonical_citation":"In re Mlot-Fijalkowski, 676 F.2d 666, 213 USPQ 713 (CCPA 1982)","decision_year":1982,"court":"CCPA","holding_summary":"References are analogous art when they address the inventor's actual problem; because the problem faced was one of dye chemistry, references teaching dyes and finely divided developer materials in the duplicating paper art were properly relied upon.","holding_confidence":"high","mentions":1,"propositions":[]},{"key":"case:612f.2d546","slug":"stevenson-v-intl-trade-comm","short_name":"Stevenson v. Int'l Trade Comm.","canonical_citation":"Stevenson v. Int'l Trade Comm., 612 F.2d 546, 204 USPQ 276 (CCPA 1979)","decision_year":1979,"court":"CCPA","holding_summary":"For a simple mechanical invention, a broad spectrum of prior art must be explored, and it is reasonable to permit inquiry into other areas where one of ordinary skill would be aware that similar problems exist.","holding_confidence":"high","mentions":1,"propositions":[]},{"key":"case:796f.2d436","slug":"in-re-deminski","short_name":"In re Deminski","canonical_citation":"In re Deminski, 796 F.2d 436, 230 USPQ 313 (Fed. Cir. 1986)","decision_year":1986,"court":"Fed. Cir.","holding_summary":"Under the field-of-endeavor test for analogous art, prior art references having essentially the same function and structure as the claimed invention—such as double-acting piston pumps and compressors—fall within the inventor's field of endeavor.","holding_confidence":"high","mentions":1,"propositions":[]},{"key":"case:776f.2d309","slug":"pentec-inc-v-graphic-controls-corp","short_name":"Pentec, Inc. v. Graphic Controls Corp.","canonical_citation":"Pentec, Inc. v. Graphic Controls Corp., 776 F.2d 309, 227 USPQ 766 (Fed. Cir. 1985)","decision_year":1985,"court":"Fed. Cir.","holding_summary":"Prior art is analogous when it addresses the problem confronting the inventor, such as hinge and fastener art for a pen-holding means; commercial success may be attributable to extensive advertising and pre-existing market leadership rather than the claimed invention.","holding_confidence":"high","mentions":1,"propositions":[]},{"key":"case:230uspq357","slug":"ex-parte-goodyear-tire-rubber-co","short_name":"Ex parte Goodyear Tire & Rubber Co.","canonical_citation":"Ex parte Goodyear Tire & Rubber Co., 230 USPQ 357 (Bd. Pat. App. & Inter. 1985)","decision_year":1985,"court":"B.P.A.I.","holding_summary":"A reference in the clutch art is reasonably pertinent, and thus analogous, to an inventor's friction problem in a braking material because clutches and brakes both use interfacing materials to accomplish their purposes.","holding_confidence":"high","mentions":1,"propositions":[]},{"key":"case:721f.2d1563","slug":"medtronic-inc-v-cardiac-pacemakers","short_name":"Medtronic, Inc. v. Cardiac Pacemakers","canonical_citation":"Medtronic, Inc. v. Cardiac Pacemakers, 721 F.2d 1563, 220 USPQ 97 (Fed. Cir. 1983)","decision_year":1983,"court":"Fed. Cir.","holding_summary":"In the electrical arts, references from high-power, high-frequency pulse-circuit fields were analogous art to cardiac pacemaker claims because a pacemaker designer facing the runaway-pulse problem would look to circuits that inhibit pulse runaway.","holding_confidence":"high","mentions":1,"propositions":[]},{"key":"case:713f.2d782","slug":"schenck-v-nortron-corp","short_name":"Schenck v. Nortron Corp.","canonical_citation":"Schenck v. Nortron Corp., 713 F.2d 782, 218 USPQ 698 (Fed. Cir. 1983)","decision_year":1983,"court":"Fed. Cir.","holding_summary":"Obviousness must be assessed on the claimed invention as a whole rather than on isolated structural differences; claims to a wheel balancer formed as a single integral, gaplessly continuous piece were patentable over an argument that the invention merely made integral what had been four bolted pieces.","holding_confidence":"high","mentions":1,"propositions":[]},{"key":"case:535f.2d67","slug":"in-re-hirao","short_name":"In re Hirao","canonical_citation":"In re Hirao, 535 F.2d 67, 190 USPQ 15 (CCPA 1976)","decision_year":1976,"court":"CCPA","holding_summary":"The obviousness inquiry must treat the claimed invention as a whole, including consideration of the preamble; a multi-step process incorporating nonobvious steps is not obvious merely because its final step, viewed alone, is obvious.","holding_confidence":"medium","mentions":1,"propositions":[]},{"key":"case:796f.2d443","slug":"bausch-lomb-v-barnes-hind-hydrocurve-inc","short_name":"Bausch & Lomb v. Barnes-Hind/Hydrocurve, Inc.","canonical_citation":"Bausch & Lomb v. Barnes-Hind/Hydrocurve, Inc., 796 F.2d 443, 230 USPQ 416 (Fed. Cir. 1986)","decision_year":1986,"court":"Fed. Cir.","holding_summary":"In evaluating obviousness, the claimed invention must be considered as a whole rather than distilled down to a gist or core concept that ignores claim limitations.","holding_confidence":"low","mentions":1,"propositions":[]},{"key":"case:727f.2d1524","slug":"jones-v-hardy","short_name":"Jones v. Hardy","canonical_citation":"Jones v. Hardy, 727 F.2d 1524, 220 USPQ 1021 (Fed. Cir. 1984)","decision_year":1984,"court":"Fed. Cir.","holding_summary":"Treating the advantage of an invention as the invention itself disregards the statutory requirement that the claimed invention be considered as a whole in the obviousness analysis.","holding_confidence":"high","mentions":1,"propositions":[]},{"key":"case:810f.2d1561","slug":"panduit-corp-v-dennison-mfg-co-1987","short_name":"Panduit Corp. v. Dennison Mfg. Co.","canonical_citation":"Panduit Corp. v. Dennison Mfg. Co., 810 F.2d 1561, 1 USPQ2d 1593 (Fed. Cir. 1987)","decision_year":1987,"court":"Fed. Cir.","holding_summary":"The claimed invention must be considered as a whole rather than distilled down to a one-word solution to a problem, and before conducting the Graham content-of-the-prior-art inquiry it must be established that a patent or publication qualifies as prior art under 35 U.S.C. 102.","holding_confidence":"high","mentions":1,"propositions":[]},{"key":"case:405f.2d578","slug":"in-re-sponnoble","short_name":"In re Sponnoble","canonical_citation":"In re Sponnoble, 405 F.2d 578, 160 USPQ 237 (CCPA 1969)","decision_year":1969,"court":"CCPA","holding_summary":"A patentable invention may lie in the discovery of the source of a problem even though the remedy may be obvious once the source is identified; that discovery is part of the \"subject matter as a whole\" considered in determining obviousness.","holding_confidence":"high","mentions":1,"propositions":[]},{"key":"case:707f.2d1366","slug":"in-re-kaslow","short_name":"In re Kaslow","canonical_citation":"In re Kaslow, 707 F.2d 1366, 217 USPQ 1089 (Fed. Cir. 1983)","decision_year":1983,"court":"Fed. Cir.","holding_summary":"The written description requirement ensures the inventor had possession of the later-claimed subject matter as of the filing date, however the specification accomplishes that; applicants alleging discovery of the source of a problem must substantiate the allegation with evidence.","holding_confidence":"high","mentions":1,"propositions":[]},{"key":"case:559f.2d618","slug":"in-re-antonie","short_name":"In re Antonie","canonical_citation":"In re Antonie, 559 F.2d 618, 195 USPQ 6 (CCPA 1977)","decision_year":1977,"court":"CCPA","holding_summary":"Obviousness must be assessed on the invention as a whole, including inherent properties; optimization of a parameter is routine experimentation only after the parameter is recognized in the art as a result-effective variable.","holding_confidence":"high","mentions":1,"propositions":[]},{"key":"case:315f.2d381","slug":"in-re-papesch","short_name":"In re Papesch","canonical_citation":"In re Papesch, 315 F.2d 381, 137 USPQ 43 (CCPA 1963)","decision_year":1963,"court":"CCPA","holding_summary":"From the standpoint of patent law, a compound and all of its properties are inseparable, and the nonobviousness requirement of section 103 applies to chemical cases no differently than to other categories of invention.","holding_confidence":"high","mentions":1,"propositions":[]},{"key":"case:9f.3d1531","slug":"in-re-rijckaert","short_name":"In re Rijckaert","canonical_citation":"In re Rijckaert, 9 F.3d 1531, 28 USPQ2d 1955 (Fed. Cir. 1993)","decision_year":1993,"court":"Fed. Cir.","holding_summary":"Inherency cannot rest on what would result from optimization of conditions rather than what is necessarily present in the prior art; the possibility that a result may occur is insufficient, and obviousness cannot be predicated on an inherent feature unknown at the relevant time.","holding_confidence":"high","mentions":1,"propositions":[]},{"key":"case:825f.3d1373","slug":"allied-erecting-v-genesis-attachments","short_name":"Allied Erecting v. Genesis Attachments","canonical_citation":"Allied Erecting v. Genesis Attachments, 825 F.3d 1373, 119 USPQ2d 1132 (Fed. Cir. 2016)","decision_year":2016,"court":"Fed. Cir.","holding_summary":"A given course of action often has simultaneous advantages and disadvantages, and this does not necessarily obviate motivation to combine prior art references, even where a proposed modification would impede a feature disclosed by one reference.","holding_confidence":"high","mentions":1,"propositions":[]},{"key":"case:437f.3d1157","slug":"medichem-s-a-v-rolabo-s-l","short_name":"Medichem, S.A. v. Rolabo, S.L.","canonical_citation":"Medichem, S.A. v. Rolabo, S.L., 437 F.3d 1157, 77 USPQ2d 1865 (Fed Cir. 2006)","decision_year":2006,"court":"Fed. Cir.","holding_summary":"A given course of action often has simultaneous advantages and disadvantages, and the existence of disadvantages does not necessarily obviate the motivation to combine prior art references.","holding_confidence":"high","mentions":1,"propositions":[]},{"key":"case:391f.3d1195","slug":"in-re-fulton","short_name":"In re Fulton","canonical_citation":"In re Fulton, 391 F.3d 1195, 73 USPQ2d 1141 (Fed. Cir. 2004)","decision_year":2004,"court":"Fed. Cir.","holding_summary":"The prior art's mere disclosure of more than one alternative does not constitute a teaching away from any of those alternatives unless the disclosure criticizes, discredits, or otherwise discourages the claimed solution; disclosure of desirable alternatives does not negate a suggestion to modify.","holding_confidence":"high","mentions":1,"propositions":[]},{"key":"case:957f.3d1334","slug":"uber-techs-inc-v-x-one-inc","short_name":"Uber Techs., Inc. v. X One, Inc.","canonical_citation":"Uber Techs., Inc. v. X One, Inc., 957 F.3d 1334, 2020 USPQ2d 10476 (Fed. Cir. 2020)","decision_year":2020,"court":"Fed. Cir.","holding_summary":"A specification's silence on how a step is achieved may suggest that accomplishing it was within the ordinary skill in the art; combining two predictable, known solutions in the art is not impermissible hindsight for obviousness purposes.","holding_confidence":"high","mentions":1,"propositions":[]},{"key":"case:10uspq2d1393","slug":"ex-parte-hiyamizu","short_name":"Ex parte Hiyamizu","canonical_citation":"Ex parte Hiyamizu, 10 USPQ2d 1393 (Bd. Pat. App. & Inter. 1988)","decision_year":1988,"court":"B.P.A.I.","holding_summary":"The hypothetical person of ordinary skill in the art necessarily can understand the scientific and engineering principles applicable to the pertinent art and is not definable by way of credentials such as a doctorate.","holding_confidence":"high","mentions":1,"propositions":[]},{"key":"case:800f.2d1091","slug":"in-re-merck-co-inc","short_name":"In re Merck & Co., Inc.","canonical_citation":"In re Merck & Co., Inc., 800 F.2d 1091, 231 USPQ 375 (Fed. Cir. 1986)","decision_year":1986,"court":"Fed. Cir.","holding_summary":"A claimed compound or method may be prima facie obvious where structurally similar prior art compounds would have been expected to have similar activity, such as a known bioisosteric replacement; evidence of contemporaneous invention is probative of the level of knowledge in the art.","holding_confidence":"high","mentions":1,"propositions":[]},{"key":"case:713f.2d714","slug":"in-re-farrenkopf","short_name":"In re Farrenkopf","canonical_citation":"In re Farrenkopf, 713 F.2d 714, 219 USPQ 1 (Fed. Cir. 1983)","decision_year":1983,"court":"Fed. Cir.","holding_summary":"That a combination would not be made by businessmen for economic reasons does not show a person of ordinary skill would not make it; added expense, such as the cost of adding inhibitors, does not discourage a skilled artisan from an otherwise expected combination. Contemporaneous invention is probative of the level of knowledge in the art.","holding_confidence":"high","mentions":1,"propositions":[]},{"key":"case:227f.3d1361","slug":"ecolochem-inc-v-s-california-edison-co","short_name":"Ecolochem, Inc. v. S. California Edison Co.","canonical_citation":"Ecolochem, Inc. v. S. California Edison Co., 227 F.3d 1361, 56 USPQ2d 1065 (Fed. Cir. 2000)","decision_year":2000,"court":"Fed. Cir.","holding_summary":"Near-simultaneous or contemporaneous invention by others, while not determinative of obviousness, is strong evidence of the level of ordinary skill in the art.","holding_confidence":"high","mentions":1,"propositions":[]},{"key":"case:408f.2d395","slug":"the-intl-glass-co-v-united-states","short_name":"The Int’l Glass Co. v. United States","canonical_citation":"The Int’l Glass Co. v. United States, 408 F.2d 395, 159 USPQ 434 (Ct. Cl. 1969)","decision_year":1969,"court":"Ct. 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[Editor Note: This MPEP section is applicable regardless of whether an application\n is examined under the AIA or under pre-AIA law. For applications subject to the first\n inventor to file (FITF) provisions of the AIA, the relevant time is \"before the\n effective filing date of the claimed invention\". For applications subject to\n pre-AIA 35 U.S.C.\n 102, the relevant time is \"at the time of the invention\". See\n MPEP §\n 2150 et seq. Many of the court decisions discussed in this\n section involved applications or patents subject to pre-AIA 35 U.S.C. 102. These court\n decisions may be applicable to applications and patents subject to AIA 35 U.S.C.\n 102 but the relevant time is before the effective filing date of\n the claimed invention and not at the time of the invention.]

","rendered_text_plain":"[Editor Note: This MPEP section is applicable regardless of whether an application is examined under the AIA or under pre-AIA law. For applications subject to the first inventor to file (FITF) provisions of the AIA, the relevant time is \"before the effective filing date of the claimed invention\". For applications subject to pre-AIA 35 U.S.C. 102, the relevant time is \"at the time of the invention\". See MPEP § 2150 et seq. Many of the court decisions discussed in this section involved applications or patents subject to pre-AIA 35 U.S.C. 102. These court decisions may be applicable to applications and patents subject to AIA 35 U.S.C. 102 but the relevant time is before the effective filing date of the claimed invention and not at the time of the invention.]","provenance":{"source_file":"s2141.html","source_anchor":"ch2100_d223b3_2308c_105","source_sha256":"c18335410b948734844afa0950712df37f56fb7b8d25ca661deb44a79ef5e658"},"kind":"narrative","host_section_id":"se_thj3rw3j"},{"id":"st_ys2aipqe","node_type":"statute","corpus_id":"mpep-e9r01-2024-html","opaque_url":"https://mpep.io/n/st_ys2aipqe","effective_range":{"start_revision":"R-01.2024","end_revision":null},"rendered_text_html":"","rendered_text_plain":"","provenance":{"source_file":"s2141.html","source_anchor":"","source_sha256":"c18335410b948734844afa0950712df37f56fb7b8d25ca661deb44a79ef5e658"},"authority":"us_usc","authority_title_num":"35","authority_section_num":"102","subsection_path":[],"canonical_citation":"35 U.S.C. 102"},{"id":"sb_4c7d4ega","node_type":"statutory_block","corpus_id":"mpep-e9r01-2024-html","opaque_url":"https://mpep.io/n/sb_4c7d4ega","effective_range":{"start_revision":"R-01.2024","end_revision":null},"rendered_text_html":"","rendered_text_plain":"","provenance":{"source_file":"s2141.html","source_anchor":"ch2100_d2002e_1d723_19c","source_sha256":"c18335410b948734844afa0950712df37f56fb7b8d25ca661deb44a79ef5e658"},"authority":"us_usc","authority_title_num":"35","authority_section_num":"103","citation_title_text":"35 U.S.C. 103","heading":"Conditions for patentability; non-obvious subject matter.","body_list_id":"ls_yqtb7jw4","host_section_id":"se_thj3rw3j"},{"id":"ls_yqtb7jw4","node_type":"list","corpus_id":"mpep-e9r01-2024-html","opaque_url":"https://mpep.io/n/ls_yqtb7jw4","effective_range":{"start_revision":"R-01.2024","end_revision":null},"rendered_text_html":"","rendered_text_plain":"","provenance":{"source_file":"s2141.html","source_anchor":"ch2100_d2002e_1d85b_1c7","source_sha256":"c18335410b948734844afa0950712df37f56fb7b8d25ca661deb44a79ef5e658"},"enumerator_style":"no_enumerator","nesting_depth":1,"parent_list_item_id":null,"host_section_id":"se_thj3rw3j","item_ids":["li_zavl7asw"]},{"id":"li_zavl7asw","node_type":"list_item","corpus_id":"mpep-e9r01-2024-html","opaque_url":"https://mpep.io/n/li_zavl7asw","effective_range":{"start_revision":"R-01.2024","end_revision":null},"rendered_text_html":"

A patent for a claimed invention may not be obtained,\n notwithstanding that the claimed invention is not identically disclosed as set forth in\n section\n 102, if the differences between the claimed invention and the\n prior art are such that the claimed invention as a whole would have been obvious before\n the effective filing date of the claimed invention to a person having ordinary skill in\n the art to which the claimed invention pertains. Patentability shall not be negated by\n the manner in which the invention was made.\n

","rendered_text_plain":"A patent for a claimed invention may not be obtained, notwithstanding that the claimed invention is not identically disclosed as set forth in section 102, if the differences between the claimed invention and the prior art are such that the claimed invention as a whole would have been obvious before the effective filing date of the claimed invention to a person having ordinary skill in the art to which the claimed invention pertains. Patentability shall not be negated by the manner in which the invention was made.","provenance":{"source_file":"s2141.html","source_anchor":"ch2100_d2002e_1d85b_1c7","source_sha256":"c18335410b948734844afa0950712df37f56fb7b8d25ca661deb44a79ef5e658"},"enumerator_label":"","enumerator_ordinal":0,"parent_list_id":"ls_yqtb7jw4","child_ids":null},{"id":"sb_rcbhqj4h","node_type":"statutory_block","corpus_id":"mpep-e9r01-2024-html","opaque_url":"https://mpep.io/n/sb_rcbhqj4h","effective_range":{"start_revision":"R-01.2024","end_revision":null},"rendered_text_html":"","rendered_text_plain":"","provenance":{"source_file":"s2141.html","source_anchor":"ch2100_d2002e_1d8cc_3d9","source_sha256":"c18335410b948734844afa0950712df37f56fb7b8d25ca661deb44a79ef5e658"},"authority":"us_usc","authority_title_num":"35","authority_section_num":"103","citation_title_text":"Pre-AIA 35 U.S.C. 103","heading":"Conditions for patentability; nonobvious subject matter.","body_list_id":"ls_xa6cgulu","host_section_id":"se_thj3rw3j"},{"id":"ls_xa6cgulu","node_type":"list","corpus_id":"mpep-e9r01-2024-html","opaque_url":"https://mpep.io/n/ls_xa6cgulu","effective_range":{"start_revision":"R-01.2024","end_revision":null},"rendered_text_html":"","rendered_text_plain":"","provenance":{"source_file":"s2141.html","source_anchor":"ch2100_d2002e_1d93e_f1","source_sha256":"c18335410b948734844afa0950712df37f56fb7b8d25ca661deb44a79ef5e658"},"enumerator_style":"alpha_lower","nesting_depth":1,"parent_list_item_id":null,"host_section_id":"se_thj3rw3j","item_ids":["li_ijj7o7bw"]},{"id":"li_ijj7o7bw","node_type":"list_item","corpus_id":"mpep-e9r01-2024-html","opaque_url":"https://mpep.io/n/li_ijj7o7bw","effective_range":{"start_revision":"R-01.2024","end_revision":null},"rendered_text_html":"
  • (a) A patent may not be obtained though the invention\n is not identically disclosed or described as set forth in section 102,\n if the differences between the subject matter sought to be patented and the prior\n art are such that the subject matter as a whole would have been obvious at the\n time the invention was made to a person having ordinary skill in the art to which\n said subject matter pertains. Patentability shall not be negatived by the manner\n in which the invention was made. \n
    • ","rendered_text_plain":"(a) A patent may not be obtained though the invention is not identically disclosed or described as set forth in section 102, if the differences between the subject matter sought to be patented and the prior art are such that the subject matter as a whole would have been obvious at the time the invention was made to a person having ordinary skill in the art to which said subject matter pertains. Patentability shall not be negatived by the manner in which the invention was made.","provenance":{"source_file":"s2141.html","source_anchor":"ch2100_d2002e_1d93e_f1","source_sha256":"c18335410b948734844afa0950712df37f56fb7b8d25ca661deb44a79ef5e658"},"enumerator_label":"(a)","enumerator_ordinal":0,"parent_list_id":"ls_xa6cgulu","child_ids":null},{"id":"pb_7n6hovzv","node_type":"prose_block","corpus_id":"mpep-e9r01-2024-html","opaque_url":"https://mpep.io/n/pb_7n6hovzv","effective_range":{"start_revision":"R-01.2024","end_revision":null},"rendered_text_html":"

    *****

    ","rendered_text_plain":"*****","provenance":{"source_file":"s2141.html","source_anchor":"ch2100_d2002e_1d8cc_3d9/p.0","source_sha256":"c18335410b948734844afa0950712df37f56fb7b8d25ca661deb44a79ef5e658"},"kind":"excluded_text","host_section_id":"se_thj3rw3j","tags":["edit_history:excluded"]},{"id":"pb_dbw5izcp","node_type":"prose_block","corpus_id":"mpep-e9r01-2024-html","opaque_url":"https://mpep.io/n/pb_dbw5izcp","effective_range":{"start_revision":"R-01.2024","end_revision":null},"rendered_text_html":"EXAMINATION GUIDELINES FOR DETERMINING OBVIOUSNESS UNDER 35 U.S.C. 103","rendered_text_plain":"EXAMINATION GUIDELINES FOR DETERMINING OBVIOUSNESS UNDER 35 U.S.C. 103","provenance":{"source_file":"s2141.html","source_anchor":"d0e208143/b.0","source_sha256":"c18335410b948734844afa0950712df37f56fb7b8d25ca661deb44a79ef5e658"},"kind":"informal_heading","host_section_id":"se_thj3rw3j","heading_level":2,"heading_text":"EXAMINATION GUIDELINES FOR DETERMINING OBVIOUSNESS UNDER 35 U.S.C. 103"},{"id":"pb_5kchckdi","node_type":"prose_block","corpus_id":"mpep-e9r01-2024-html","opaque_url":"https://mpep.io/n/pb_5kchckdi","effective_range":{"start_revision":"R-01.2024","end_revision":null},"rendered_text_html":"

    These guidelines are intended to assist Office personnel to make a\n proper determination of obviousness under 35 U.S.C. 103, and to provide an\n appropriate supporting rationale in view of the decision by the Supreme Court in\n KSR International Co. v. Teleflex Inc. (KSR), 550 U.S. 398, 82\n USPQ2d 1385 (2007). The guidelines are based on the Office’s current understanding of\n the law, and are believed to be fully consistent with the binding precedent of the\n Supreme Court. The KSR decision reinforced earlier decisions that\n validated a more flexible approach to providing reasons for obviousness. However, the\n Supreme Court’s pronouncement in KSR overruled cases such as\n In re Lee, 277 F.3d 1338, 61 USPQ2d 1430 (Fed. Cir. 2002), insofar\n as those cases require record evidence of an express reason to modify the prior art. As\n the Federal Circuit has explained:\n

    ","rendered_text_plain":"These guidelines are intended to assist Office personnel to make a proper determination of obviousness under 35 U.S.C. 103, and to provide an appropriate supporting rationale in view of the decision by the Supreme Court in KSR International Co. v. Teleflex Inc. (KSR), 550 U.S. 398, 82 USPQ2d 1385 (2007). The guidelines are based on the Office’s current understanding of the law, and are believed to be fully consistent with the binding precedent of the Supreme Court. The KSR decision reinforced earlier decisions that validated a more flexible approach to providing reasons for obviousness. However, the Supreme Court’s pronouncement in KSR overruled cases such as In re Lee, 277 F.3d 1338, 61 USPQ2d 1430 (Fed. Cir. 2002), insofar as those cases require record evidence of an express reason to modify the prior art. As the Federal Circuit has explained:","provenance":{"source_file":"s2141.html","source_anchor":"d0e208261","source_sha256":"c18335410b948734844afa0950712df37f56fb7b8d25ca661deb44a79ef5e658"},"kind":"narrative","host_section_id":"se_thj3rw3j"},{"id":"cs_r5723jx5","node_type":"case","corpus_id":"mpep-e9r01-2024-html","opaque_url":"https://mpep.io/n/cs_r5723jx5","effective_range":{"start_revision":"R-01.2024","end_revision":null},"rendered_text_html":"","rendered_text_plain":"KSR International Co. v. Teleflex Inc., 550 U.S. 398, 82 USPQ2d 1385 (2007)","provenance":{"source_file":"s2141.html","source_anchor":"","source_sha256":"c18335410b948734844afa0950712df37f56fb7b8d25ca661deb44a79ef5e658"},"short_name":"KSR International Co. v. Teleflex Inc.","all_citations":["550 U.S. 398","82 USPQ2d 1385"],"canonical_citation":"KSR International Co. v. Teleflex Inc., 550 U.S. 398, 82 USPQ2d 1385 (2007)","decision_year":2007,"court":"SCOTUS"},{"id":"cs_5tn4wh6g","node_type":"case","corpus_id":"mpep-e9r01-2024-html","opaque_url":"https://mpep.io/n/cs_5tn4wh6g","effective_range":{"start_revision":"R-01.2024","end_revision":null},"rendered_text_html":"","rendered_text_plain":"In re Lee, 277 F.3d 1338, 61 USPQ2d 1430 (Fed. Cir. 2002)","provenance":{"source_file":"s2141.html","source_anchor":"","source_sha256":"c18335410b948734844afa0950712df37f56fb7b8d25ca661deb44a79ef5e658"},"short_name":"In re Lee","all_citations":["277 F.3d 1338","61 USPQ2d 1430"],"canonical_citation":"In re Lee, 277 F.3d 1338, 61 USPQ2d 1430 (Fed. Cir. 2002)","decision_year":2002,"court":"Fed. Cir."},{"id":"st_dopzrsui","node_type":"statute","corpus_id":"mpep-e9r01-2024-html","opaque_url":"https://mpep.io/n/st_dopzrsui","effective_range":{"start_revision":"R-01.2024","end_revision":null},"rendered_text_html":"","rendered_text_plain":"","provenance":{"source_file":"s2141.html","source_anchor":"","source_sha256":"c18335410b948734844afa0950712df37f56fb7b8d25ca661deb44a79ef5e658"},"authority":"us_usc","authority_title_num":"35","authority_section_num":"103","subsection_path":[],"canonical_citation":"35 U.S.C. 103"},{"id":"nq_i3kb5apu","node_type":"narrative_quote","corpus_id":"mpep-e9r01-2024-html","opaque_url":"https://mpep.io/n/nq_i3kb5apu","effective_range":{"start_revision":"R-01.2024","end_revision":null},"rendered_text_html":"
    \n

    At the time [of the decision in In re\n Lee], we required the PTO to identify record evidence of a teaching,\n suggestion, or motivation to combine references because “[o]mission of a relevant\n factor required by precedent is both legal error and arbitrary agency action.”\n However, this did not preclude examiners from employing common sense. More recently\n [in DyStar Textilfarben GmbH v. C.H. Patrick Co., 464 F.3d 1356,\n 1366 (Fed. Cir. 2006)], we explained that use of common sense does not require a\n “specific hint or suggestion in a particular reference,” only a reasoned explanation\n that avoids conclusory generalizations.\n

    \n
    ","rendered_text_plain":"At the time [of the decision in In re Lee], we required the PTO to identify record evidence of a teaching, suggestion, or motivation to combine references because “[o]mission of a relevant factor required by precedent is both legal error and arbitrary agency action.” However, this did not preclude examiners from employing common sense. More recently [in DyStar Textilfarben GmbH v. C.H. Patrick Co., 464 F.3d 1356, 1366 (Fed. Cir. 2006)], we explained that use of common sense does not require a “specific hint or suggestion in a particular reference,” only a reasoned explanation that avoids conclusory generalizations.","provenance":{"source_file":"s2141.html","source_anchor":"ch2100_d24bfd_16fa9_30","source_sha256":"c18335410b948734844afa0950712df37f56fb7b8d25ca661deb44a79ef5e658"},"source_anchor":"ch2100_d24bfd_16fa9_30","host_section_id":"se_thj3rw3j","source_case_id":"cs_ra25xaew"},{"id":"cs_37wy4owf","node_type":"case","corpus_id":"mpep-e9r01-2024-html","opaque_url":"https://mpep.io/n/cs_37wy4owf","effective_range":{"start_revision":"R-01.2024","end_revision":null},"rendered_text_html":"","rendered_text_plain":"DyStar Textilfarben GmbH v. C.H. Patrick Co., 464 F.3d 1356 (Fed. Cir. 2006)","provenance":{"source_file":"s2141.html","source_anchor":"","source_sha256":"c18335410b948734844afa0950712df37f56fb7b8d25ca661deb44a79ef5e658"},"short_name":"DyStar Textilfarben GmbH v. C.H. Patrick Co.","all_citations":["464 F.3d 1356"],"canonical_citation":"DyStar Textilfarben GmbH v. C.H. Patrick Co., 464 F.3d 1356 (Fed. Cir. 2006)","decision_year":2006,"court":"Fed. Cir."},{"id":"pb_4jlksdcx","node_type":"prose_block","corpus_id":"mpep-e9r01-2024-html","opaque_url":"https://mpep.io/n/pb_4jlksdcx","effective_range":{"start_revision":"R-01.2024","end_revision":null},"rendered_text_html":"

    Perfect Web Technologies, Inc. v. InfoUSA,\n Inc., 587 F.3d 1324, 1329, 92 USPQ2d 1849, 1854 (Fed. Cir. 2009) (citations\n omitted). \n

    ","rendered_text_plain":"Perfect Web Technologies, Inc. v. InfoUSA, Inc., 587 F.3d 1324, 1329, 92 USPQ2d 1849, 1854 (Fed. Cir. 2009) (citations omitted).","provenance":{"source_file":"s2141.html","source_anchor":"ch2100_d24bfd_16fb2_149","source_sha256":"c18335410b948734844afa0950712df37f56fb7b8d25ca661deb44a79ef5e658"},"kind":"narrative","host_section_id":"se_thj3rw3j"},{"id":"cs_ra25xaew","node_type":"case","corpus_id":"mpep-e9r01-2024-html","opaque_url":"https://mpep.io/n/cs_ra25xaew","effective_range":{"start_revision":"R-01.2024","end_revision":null},"rendered_text_html":"","rendered_text_plain":"Perfect Web Technologies, Inc. v. InfoUSA, Inc., 587 F.3d 1324, 92 USPQ2d 1849 (Fed. Cir. 2009)","provenance":{"source_file":"s2141.html","source_anchor":"","source_sha256":"c18335410b948734844afa0950712df37f56fb7b8d25ca661deb44a79ef5e658"},"short_name":"Perfect Web Technologies, Inc. v. InfoUSA, Inc.","all_citations":["587 F.3d 1324","92 USPQ2d 1849"],"canonical_citation":"Perfect Web Technologies, Inc. v. InfoUSA, Inc., 587 F.3d 1324, 92 USPQ2d 1849 (Fed. Cir. 2009)","decision_year":2009,"court":"Fed. Cir."},{"id":"pb_zoumhirm","node_type":"prose_block","corpus_id":"mpep-e9r01-2024-html","opaque_url":"https://mpep.io/n/pb_zoumhirm","effective_range":{"start_revision":"R-01.2024","end_revision":null},"rendered_text_html":"

    In another case, the Federal Circuit also stated\n that:\n

    ","rendered_text_plain":"In another case, the Federal Circuit also stated that:","provenance":{"source_file":"s2141.html","source_anchor":"ch2100_p_299b6_2d56b_1cc","source_sha256":"c18335410b948734844afa0950712df37f56fb7b8d25ca661deb44a79ef5e658"},"kind":"narrative","host_section_id":"se_thj3rw3j"},{"id":"nq_6apycjoz","node_type":"narrative_quote","corpus_id":"mpep-e9r01-2024-html","opaque_url":"https://mpep.io/n/nq_6apycjoz","effective_range":{"start_revision":"R-01.2024","end_revision":null},"rendered_text_html":"
    \n

    “… we conclude that while ‘common sense’ can be\n invoked, even potentially to supply a limitation missing from the prior art, it must\n still be supported by evidence and a reasoned explanation....[T]his is particularly\n true where the missing limitation goes to the heart of an invention.”\n

    \n
    ","rendered_text_plain":"“… we conclude that while ‘common sense’ can be invoked, even potentially to supply a limitation missing from the prior art, it must still be supported by evidence and a reasoned explanation....[T]his is particularly true where the missing limitation goes to the heart of an invention.”","provenance":{"source_file":"s2141.html","source_anchor":"ch2100_d299b6_2d581_39","source_sha256":"c18335410b948734844afa0950712df37f56fb7b8d25ca661deb44a79ef5e658"},"source_anchor":"ch2100_d299b6_2d581_39","host_section_id":"se_thj3rw3j","source_case_id":"cs_ricymj7l"},{"id":"pb_ywxu2p44","node_type":"prose_block","corpus_id":"mpep-e9r01-2024-html","opaque_url":"https://mpep.io/n/pb_ywxu2p44","effective_range":{"start_revision":"R-01.2024","end_revision":null},"rendered_text_html":"

    Arendi v. Apple, 832 F.3d 1355, 1363,\n 119 USPQ2d 1822, 1827 (Fed. Cir. 2016).\n

    ","rendered_text_plain":"Arendi v. Apple, 832 F.3d 1355, 1363, 119 USPQ2d 1822, 1827 (Fed. Cir. 2016).","provenance":{"source_file":"s2141.html","source_anchor":"ch2100_p_299b6_2d596_2d0","source_sha256":"c18335410b948734844afa0950712df37f56fb7b8d25ca661deb44a79ef5e658"},"kind":"narrative","host_section_id":"se_thj3rw3j"},{"id":"cs_ricymj7l","node_type":"case","corpus_id":"mpep-e9r01-2024-html","opaque_url":"https://mpep.io/n/cs_ricymj7l","effective_range":{"start_revision":"R-01.2024","end_revision":null},"rendered_text_html":"","rendered_text_plain":"Arendi v. Apple, 832 F.3d 1355, 119 USPQ2d 1822 (Fed. Cir. 2016)","provenance":{"source_file":"s2141.html","source_anchor":"","source_sha256":"c18335410b948734844afa0950712df37f56fb7b8d25ca661deb44a79ef5e658"},"short_name":"Arendi v. Apple","all_citations":["832 F.3d 1355","119 USPQ2d 1822"],"canonical_citation":"Arendi v. Apple, 832 F.3d 1355, 119 USPQ2d 1822 (Fed. Cir. 2016)","decision_year":2016,"court":"Fed. Cir."},{"id":"pb_qfbzod4s","node_type":"prose_block","corpus_id":"mpep-e9r01-2024-html","opaque_url":"https://mpep.io/n/pb_qfbzod4s","effective_range":{"start_revision":"R-01.2024","end_revision":null},"rendered_text_html":"

    These guidelines do not constitute substantive rule making and hence do\n not have the force and effect of law. They have been developed as a matter of internal\n Office management and are not intended to create any right or benefit, substantive or\n procedural, enforceable by any party against the Office. Rejections continue to be based\n upon the substantive law, and it is these rejections that are appealable. Consequently,\n any failure by Office personnel to follow the guidelines is neither appealable nor\n petitionable.\n

    ","rendered_text_plain":"These guidelines do not constitute substantive rule making and hence do not have the force and effect of law. They have been developed as a matter of internal Office management and are not intended to create any right or benefit, substantive or procedural, enforceable by any party against the Office. Rejections continue to be based upon the substantive law, and it is these rejections that are appealable. Consequently, any failure by Office personnel to follow the guidelines is neither appealable nor petitionable.","provenance":{"source_file":"s2141.html","source_anchor":"d0e208273","source_sha256":"c18335410b948734844afa0950712df37f56fb7b8d25ca661deb44a79ef5e658"},"kind":"narrative","host_section_id":"se_thj3rw3j"},{"id":"pb_yyqz2xij","node_type":"prose_block","corpus_id":"mpep-e9r01-2024-html","opaque_url":"https://mpep.io/n/pb_yyqz2xij","effective_range":{"start_revision":"R-01.2024","end_revision":null},"rendered_text_html":"I. THE KSR DECISION AND PRINCIPLES OF THE LAW OF\n OBVIOUSNESS","rendered_text_plain":"I. THE KSR DECISION AND PRINCIPLES OF THE LAW OF OBVIOUSNESS","provenance":{"source_file":"s2141.html","source_anchor":"d0e208143/b.1","source_sha256":"c18335410b948734844afa0950712df37f56fb7b8d25ca661deb44a79ef5e658"},"kind":"informal_heading","host_section_id":"se_thj3rw3j","heading_level":2,"heading_text":"I. THE KSR DECISION AND PRINCIPLES OF THE LAW OF OBVIOUSNESS"},{"id":"pb_adv44oin","node_type":"prose_block","corpus_id":"mpep-e9r01-2024-html","opaque_url":"https://mpep.io/n/pb_adv44oin","effective_range":{"start_revision":"R-01.2024","end_revision":null},"rendered_text_html":"

    The Supreme Court in KSR reaffirmed the familiar\n framework for determining obviousness as set forth in Graham v. John Deere\n Co., 383 U.S. 1, 148 USPQ 459 (1966), but stated that the Federal\n Circuit had erred by applying the teaching-suggestion-motivation (TSM) test in an\n overly rigid and formalistic way. KSR, 550 U.S. at 404, 82 USPQ2d\n at 1391. Specifically, the Supreme Court stated that the Federal Circuit had erred in\n four ways: (1) “by holding that courts and patent examiners should look only to the\n problem the patentee was trying to solve ” (Id. at 420, 82 USPQ2d\n at 1397); (2) by assuming “that a person of ordinary skill attempting to solve a\n problem will be led only to those elements of prior art designed to solve the same\n problem” (Id.); (3) by concluding “that a patent claim cannot be\n proved obvious merely by showing that the combination of elements was ‘obvious to\n try’” (Id. at 421, USPQ2d at 1397); and (4) by overemphasizing\n “the risk of courts and patent examiners falling prey to hindsight bias” and as a\n result applying “[r]igid preventative rules that deny factfinders recourse to common\n sense” (Id.). See also Novartis Pharms. Corp. v.\n West-Ward Pharms. Int'l Ltd., 923 F.3d 1051, 1059, 2019 USPQ2d 171676\n (Fed. Cir. 2019); Apple Inc. v. Samsung Elecs. Co., 839 F.3d 1034,\n 1047-48, 120 USPQ2d 1400, 1410 (Fed. Cir. 2016); and Aventis Pharma S.A. v.\n Hospira, Inc., 675 F.3d 1324, 1332, 102 USPQ2d 1445, 1449 (Fed. Cir.\n 2012).\n

    ","rendered_text_plain":"The Supreme Court in KSR reaffirmed the familiar framework for determining obviousness as set forth in Graham v. John Deere Co., 383 U.S. 1, 148 USPQ 459 (1966), but stated that the Federal Circuit had erred by applying the teaching-suggestion-motivation (TSM) test in an overly rigid and formalistic way. KSR, 550 U.S. at 404, 82 USPQ2d at 1391. Specifically, the Supreme Court stated that the Federal Circuit had erred in four ways: (1) “by holding that courts and patent examiners should look only to the problem the patentee was trying to solve ” (Id. at 420, 82 USPQ2d at 1397); (2) by assuming “that a person of ordinary skill attempting to solve a problem will be led only to those elements of prior art designed to solve the same problem” (Id.); (3) by concluding “that a patent claim cannot be proved obvious merely by showing that the combination of elements was ‘obvious to try’” (Id. at 421, USPQ2d at 1397); and (4) by overemphasizing “the risk of courts and patent examiners falling prey to hindsight bias” and as a result applying “[r]igid preventative rules that deny factfinders recourse to common sense” (Id.). See also Novartis Pharms. Corp. v. West-Ward Pharms. Int'l Ltd., 923 F.3d 1051, 1059, 2019 USPQ2d 171676 (Fed. Cir. 2019); Apple Inc. v. Samsung Elecs. Co., 839 F.3d 1034, 1047-48, 120 USPQ2d 1400, 1410 (Fed. Cir. 2016); and Aventis Pharma S.A. v. Hospira, Inc., 675 F.3d 1324, 1332, 102 USPQ2d 1445, 1449 (Fed. Cir. 2012).","provenance":{"source_file":"s2141.html","source_anchor":"d0e208281","source_sha256":"c18335410b948734844afa0950712df37f56fb7b8d25ca661deb44a79ef5e658"},"kind":"narrative","host_section_id":"se_thj3rw3j"},{"id":"cs_ny2altbs","node_type":"case","corpus_id":"mpep-e9r01-2024-html","opaque_url":"https://mpep.io/n/cs_ny2altbs","effective_range":{"start_revision":"R-01.2024","end_revision":null},"rendered_text_html":"","rendered_text_plain":"Graham v. John Deere Co., 383 U.S. 1, 148 USPQ 459 (1966)","provenance":{"source_file":"s2141.html","source_anchor":"","source_sha256":"c18335410b948734844afa0950712df37f56fb7b8d25ca661deb44a79ef5e658"},"short_name":"Graham v. John Deere Co.","all_citations":["383 U.S. 1","148 USPQ 459"],"canonical_citation":"Graham v. John Deere Co., 383 U.S. 1, 148 USPQ 459 (1966)","decision_year":1966,"court":"SCOTUS"},{"id":"cs_ddec5vkt","node_type":"case","corpus_id":"mpep-e9r01-2024-html","opaque_url":"https://mpep.io/n/cs_ddec5vkt","effective_range":{"start_revision":"R-01.2024","end_revision":null},"rendered_text_html":"","rendered_text_plain":"Novartis Pharms. Corp. v. West-Ward Pharms. Int'l Ltd., 923 F.3d 1051, 2019 USPQ2d 171676 (Fed. Cir. 2019)","provenance":{"source_file":"s2141.html","source_anchor":"","source_sha256":"c18335410b948734844afa0950712df37f56fb7b8d25ca661deb44a79ef5e658"},"short_name":"Novartis Pharms. Corp. v. West-Ward Pharms. Int'l Ltd.","all_citations":["923 F.3d 1051","2019 USPQ2d 171676"],"canonical_citation":"Novartis Pharms. Corp. v. West-Ward Pharms. Int'l Ltd., 923 F.3d 1051, 2019 USPQ2d 171676 (Fed. Cir. 2019)","decision_year":2019,"court":"Fed. Cir."},{"id":"cs_pbsjdrv2","node_type":"case","corpus_id":"mpep-e9r01-2024-html","opaque_url":"https://mpep.io/n/cs_pbsjdrv2","effective_range":{"start_revision":"R-01.2024","end_revision":null},"rendered_text_html":"","rendered_text_plain":"Apple Inc. v. Samsung Elecs. Co., 839 F.3d 1034, 120 USPQ2d 1400 (Fed. Cir. 2016)","provenance":{"source_file":"s2141.html","source_anchor":"","source_sha256":"c18335410b948734844afa0950712df37f56fb7b8d25ca661deb44a79ef5e658"},"short_name":"Apple Inc. v. Samsung Elecs. Co.","all_citations":["839 F.3d 1034","120 USPQ2d 1400"],"canonical_citation":"Apple Inc. v. Samsung Elecs. Co., 839 F.3d 1034, 120 USPQ2d 1400 (Fed. Cir. 2016)","decision_year":2016,"court":"Fed. Cir."},{"id":"cs_tj5ddjsy","node_type":"case","corpus_id":"mpep-e9r01-2024-html","opaque_url":"https://mpep.io/n/cs_tj5ddjsy","effective_range":{"start_revision":"R-01.2024","end_revision":null},"rendered_text_html":"","rendered_text_plain":"Aventis Pharma S.A. v. Hospira, Inc., 675 F.3d 1324, 102 USPQ2d 1445 (Fed. Cir. 2012)","provenance":{"source_file":"s2141.html","source_anchor":"","source_sha256":"c18335410b948734844afa0950712df37f56fb7b8d25ca661deb44a79ef5e658"},"short_name":"Aventis Pharma S.A. v. Hospira, Inc.","all_citations":["675 F.3d 1324","102 USPQ2d 1445"],"canonical_citation":"Aventis Pharma S.A. v. Hospira, Inc., 675 F.3d 1324, 102 USPQ2d 1445 (Fed. Cir. 2012)","decision_year":2012,"court":"Fed. Cir."},{"id":"pb_6po2pchn","node_type":"prose_block","corpus_id":"mpep-e9r01-2024-html","opaque_url":"https://mpep.io/n/pb_6po2pchn","effective_range":{"start_revision":"R-01.2024","end_revision":null},"rendered_text_html":"

    In KSR, the Supreme Court particularly\n emphasized “the need for caution in granting a patent based on the combination of\n elements found in the prior art,”Id. at 415, 82 USPQ2d at 1395,\n and discussed circumstances in which a patent might be determined to be obvious.\n Importantly, the Supreme Court reaffirmed principles based on its precedent that\n “[t]he combination of familiar elements according to known methods is likely to be\n obvious when it does no more than yield predictable results.”Id.\n at 415-16, 82 USPQ2d at 1395. The Supreme Court stated that there are “[t]hree cases\n decided after Graham [that] illustrate this doctrine.”\n Id.  at 416, 82 USPQ2d at 1395. (1) “In United States\n v. Adams, . . . [t]he Court recognized that when a patent claims a\n structure already known in the prior art that is altered by the mere substitution of\n one element for another known in the field, the combination must do more than yield a\n predictable result.” Id. (2) “In Anderson’s-Black Rock,\n Inc. v. Pavement Salvage Co., . . . [t]he two [pre-existing elements] in\n combination did no more than they would in separate, sequential operation.”\n Id.  at 416-17, 82 USPQ2d at 1395. (3) “[I]n Sakraida\n v. AG Pro, Inc., the Court derived . . . the conclusion that when a\n patent simply arranges old elements with each performing the same function it had\n been known to perform and yields no more than one would expect from such an\n arrangement, the combination is obvious.” Id. at 417, 82 USPQ2d at\n 1395-96 (Internal quotations omitted.). The principles underlining these cases are\n instructive when the question is whether a patent application claiming the\n combination of elements of prior art would have been obvious. The Supreme Court\n further stated that:\n

    ","rendered_text_plain":"In KSR, the Supreme Court particularly emphasized “the need for caution in granting a patent based on the combination of elements found in the prior art,”Id. at 415, 82 USPQ2d at 1395, and discussed circumstances in which a patent might be determined to be obvious. Importantly, the Supreme Court reaffirmed principles based on its precedent that “[t]he combination of familiar elements according to known methods is likely to be obvious when it does no more than yield predictable results.”Id. at 415-16, 82 USPQ2d at 1395. The Supreme Court stated that there are “[t]hree cases decided after Graham [that] illustrate this doctrine.” Id. at 416, 82 USPQ2d at 1395. (1) “In United States v. Adams, . . . [t]he Court recognized that when a patent claims a structure already known in the prior art that is altered by the mere substitution of one element for another known in the field, the combination must do more than yield a predictable result.” Id. (2) “In Anderson’s-Black Rock, Inc. v. Pavement Salvage Co., . . . [t]he two [pre-existing elements] in combination did no more than they would in separate, sequential operation.” Id. at 416-17, 82 USPQ2d at 1395. (3) “[I]n Sakraida v. AG Pro, Inc., the Court derived . . . the conclusion that when a patent simply arranges old elements with each performing the same function it had been known to perform and yields no more than one would expect from such an arrangement, the combination is obvious.” Id. at 417, 82 USPQ2d at 1395-96 (Internal quotations omitted.). The principles underlining these cases are instructive when the question is whether a patent application claiming the combination of elements of prior art would have been obvious. The Supreme Court further stated that:","provenance":{"source_file":"s2141.html","source_anchor":"d0e208305","source_sha256":"c18335410b948734844afa0950712df37f56fb7b8d25ca661deb44a79ef5e658"},"kind":"narrative","host_section_id":"se_thj3rw3j"},{"id":"nq_pellrvj6","node_type":"narrative_quote","corpus_id":"mpep-e9r01-2024-html","opaque_url":"https://mpep.io/n/nq_pellrvj6","effective_range":{"start_revision":"R-01.2024","end_revision":null},"rendered_text_html":"
    \n

    When a work is available in one field of endeavor, design\n incentives and other market forces can prompt variations of it, either in the same\n field or a different one. If a person of ordinary skill can implement a\n predictable variation, § 103 likely bars its\n patentability. For the same reason, if a technique has been used to improve one\n device, and a person of ordinary skill in the art would recognize that it would\n improve similar devices in the same way, using the technique is obvious unless its\n actual application is beyond his or her skill. Id. at 417, 82\n USPQ2d at 1396.\n

    \n
    ","rendered_text_plain":"When a work is available in one field of endeavor, design incentives and other market forces can prompt variations of it, either in the same field or a different one. If a person of ordinary skill can implement a predictable variation, § 103 likely bars its patentability. For the same reason, if a technique has been used to improve one device, and a person of ordinary skill in the art would recognize that it would improve similar devices in the same way, using the technique is obvious unless its actual application is beyond his or her skill. Id. at 417, 82 USPQ2d at 1396.","provenance":{"source_file":"s2141.html","source_anchor":"d0e208332","source_sha256":"c18335410b948734844afa0950712df37f56fb7b8d25ca661deb44a79ef5e658"},"source_anchor":"d0e208332","host_section_id":"se_thj3rw3j","source_case_id":"cs_r5723jx5"},{"id":"pb_paa4zqn3","node_type":"prose_block","corpus_id":"mpep-e9r01-2024-html","opaque_url":"https://mpep.io/n/pb_paa4zqn3","effective_range":{"start_revision":"R-01.2024","end_revision":null},"rendered_text_html":"

    When considering obviousness of a combination of known elements,\n the operative question is thus “whether the improvement is more than the predictable\n use of prior art elements according to their established functions.”\n Id.

    ","rendered_text_plain":"When considering obviousness of a combination of known elements, the operative question is thus “whether the improvement is more than the predictable use of prior art elements according to their established functions.” Id.","provenance":{"source_file":"s2141.html","source_anchor":"d0e208339","source_sha256":"c18335410b948734844afa0950712df37f56fb7b8d25ca661deb44a79ef5e658"},"kind":"narrative","host_section_id":"se_thj3rw3j"},{"id":"pb_xjjwml7o","node_type":"prose_block","corpus_id":"mpep-e9r01-2024-html","opaque_url":"https://mpep.io/n/pb_xjjwml7o","effective_range":{"start_revision":"R-01.2024","end_revision":null},"rendered_text_html":"

    The Supreme Court’s flexible approach to the\n obviousness inquiry is reflected in numerous pre-KSR decisions;\n see MPEP §\n 2144. That section provides many lines of reasoning to\n support a determination of obviousness based upon earlier legal precedent that had\n condoned the use of particular examples of what may be considered common sense or\n ordinary routine practice (e.g., making integral, changes in shape, making\n adjustable). Thus, the type of reasoning sanctioned by the opinion in KSR has long\n been part of the patent examination process. \n

    ","rendered_text_plain":"The Supreme Court’s flexible approach to the obviousness inquiry is reflected in numerous pre-KSR decisions; see MPEP § 2144. That section provides many lines of reasoning to support a determination of obviousness based upon earlier legal precedent that had condoned the use of particular examples of what may be considered common sense or ordinary routine practice (e.g., making integral, changes in shape, making adjustable). Thus, the type of reasoning sanctioned by the opinion in KSR has long been part of the patent examination process.","provenance":{"source_file":"s2141.html","source_anchor":"ch2100_d24bfd_1766e_33e","source_sha256":"c18335410b948734844afa0950712df37f56fb7b8d25ca661deb44a79ef5e658"},"kind":"narrative","host_section_id":"se_thj3rw3j"},{"id":"pb_nds5gwct","node_type":"prose_block","corpus_id":"mpep-e9r01-2024-html","opaque_url":"https://mpep.io/n/pb_nds5gwct","effective_range":{"start_revision":"R-01.2024","end_revision":null},"rendered_text_html":"II. THE BASIC FACTUAL INQUIRIES OF GRAHAM v. JOHN DEERE CO.","rendered_text_plain":"II. THE BASIC FACTUAL INQUIRIES OF GRAHAM v. JOHN DEERE CO.","provenance":{"source_file":"s2141.html","source_anchor":"d0e208143/b.3","source_sha256":"c18335410b948734844afa0950712df37f56fb7b8d25ca661deb44a79ef5e658"},"kind":"informal_heading","host_section_id":"se_thj3rw3j","heading_level":2,"heading_text":"II. THE BASIC FACTUAL INQUIRIES OF GRAHAM v. JOHN DEERE CO."},{"id":"pb_3zru2tsx","node_type":"prose_block","corpus_id":"mpep-e9r01-2024-html","opaque_url":"https://mpep.io/n/pb_3zru2tsx","effective_range":{"start_revision":"R-01.2024","end_revision":null},"rendered_text_html":"

    An invention that would have been obvious to a person of ordinary\n skill at the relevant time is not patentable. See 35 U.S.C.\n 103 or pre-AIA 35 U.S.C. 103(a).  As\n reiterated by the Supreme Court in KSR, the framework for the\n objective analysis for determining obviousness under 35 U.S.C. 103\n is stated in Graham v. John Deere Co., 383 U.S. 1, 148 USPQ 459\n (1966). Obviousness is a question of law based on underlying factual inquiries. The\n factual inquiries enunciated by the Court are as follows:\n

    ","rendered_text_plain":"An invention that would have been obvious to a person of ordinary skill at the relevant time is not patentable. See 35 U.S.C. 103 or pre-AIA 35 U.S.C. 103(a). As reiterated by the Supreme Court in KSR, the framework for the objective analysis for determining obviousness under 35 U.S.C. 103 is stated in Graham v. John Deere Co., 383 U.S. 1, 148 USPQ 459 (1966). Obviousness is a question of law based on underlying factual inquiries. The factual inquiries enunciated by the Court are as follows:","provenance":{"source_file":"s2141.html","source_anchor":"d0e208352","source_sha256":"c18335410b948734844afa0950712df37f56fb7b8d25ca661deb44a79ef5e658"},"kind":"narrative","host_section_id":"se_thj3rw3j"},{"id":"st_nqkrgfwh","node_type":"statute","corpus_id":"mpep-e9r01-2024-html","opaque_url":"https://mpep.io/n/st_nqkrgfwh","effective_range":{"start_revision":"R-01.2024","end_revision":null},"rendered_text_html":"","rendered_text_plain":"","provenance":{"source_file":"s2141.html","source_anchor":"","source_sha256":"c18335410b948734844afa0950712df37f56fb7b8d25ca661deb44a79ef5e658"},"authority":"us_usc","authority_title_num":"35","authority_section_num":"103","subsection_path":["a"],"canonical_citation":"35 U.S.C. 103(a)"},{"id":"ls_fohcbgmb","node_type":"list","corpus_id":"mpep-e9r01-2024-html","opaque_url":"https://mpep.io/n/ls_fohcbgmb","effective_range":{"start_revision":"R-01.2024","end_revision":null},"rendered_text_html":"","rendered_text_plain":"","provenance":{"source_file":"s2141.html","source_anchor":"d0e208368","source_sha256":"c18335410b948734844afa0950712df37f56fb7b8d25ca661deb44a79ef5e658"},"enumerator_style":"alpha_upper","nesting_depth":1,"parent_list_item_id":null,"host_section_id":"se_thj3rw3j","item_ids":["li_nkcjaojq","li_shue67gi","li_hfsvb6yz"]},{"id":"li_nkcjaojq","node_type":"list_item","corpus_id":"mpep-e9r01-2024-html","opaque_url":"https://mpep.io/n/li_nkcjaojq","effective_range":{"start_revision":"R-01.2024","end_revision":null},"rendered_text_html":"
  • (A) Determining the scope and content of the prior art;
    • ","rendered_text_plain":"(A) Determining the scope and content of the prior art;","provenance":{"source_file":"s2141.html","source_anchor":"d0e208368","source_sha256":"c18335410b948734844afa0950712df37f56fb7b8d25ca661deb44a79ef5e658"},"enumerator_label":"(A)","enumerator_ordinal":0,"parent_list_id":"ls_fohcbgmb","child_ids":null},{"id":"li_shue67gi","node_type":"list_item","corpus_id":"mpep-e9r01-2024-html","opaque_url":"https://mpep.io/n/li_shue67gi","effective_range":{"start_revision":"R-01.2024","end_revision":null},"rendered_text_html":"
  • (B) Ascertaining the differences between the claimed invention and\n the prior art; and \n
    • ","rendered_text_plain":"(B) Ascertaining the differences between the claimed invention and the prior art; and","provenance":{"source_file":"s2141.html","source_anchor":"d0e208372","source_sha256":"c18335410b948734844afa0950712df37f56fb7b8d25ca661deb44a79ef5e658"},"enumerator_label":"(B)","enumerator_ordinal":1,"parent_list_id":"ls_fohcbgmb","child_ids":null},{"id":"li_hfsvb6yz","node_type":"list_item","corpus_id":"mpep-e9r01-2024-html","opaque_url":"https://mpep.io/n/li_hfsvb6yz","effective_range":{"start_revision":"R-01.2024","end_revision":null},"rendered_text_html":"
  • (C) Resolving the level of ordinary skill in the pertinent\n art.\n
    • ","rendered_text_plain":"(C) Resolving the level of ordinary skill in the pertinent art.","provenance":{"source_file":"s2141.html","source_anchor":"d0e208376","source_sha256":"c18335410b948734844afa0950712df37f56fb7b8d25ca661deb44a79ef5e658"},"enumerator_label":"(C)","enumerator_ordinal":2,"parent_list_id":"ls_fohcbgmb","child_ids":null},{"id":"pb_hkdgu3tx","node_type":"prose_block","corpus_id":"mpep-e9r01-2024-html","opaque_url":"https://mpep.io/n/pb_hkdgu3tx","effective_range":{"start_revision":"R-01.2024","end_revision":null},"rendered_text_html":"

    Objective evidence relevant to the issue of obviousness must be\n evaluated by Office personnel. Id. at 17-18, 148 USPQ at 467. Such\n evidence, sometimes referred to as “secondary considerations,” may include evidence\n of commercial success, long-felt but unsolved needs, failure of others, and\n unexpected results. The evidence may be included in the specification as filed,\n accompany the application on filing, or be provided in a timely manner at some other\n point during the prosecution. The weight to be given any objective evidence is\n determined on a case-by-case basis. The mere fact that an applicant has presented\n evidence does not mean that the evidence is dispositive of the issue of\n obviousness.\n

    ","rendered_text_plain":"Objective evidence relevant to the issue of obviousness must be evaluated by Office personnel. Id. at 17-18, 148 USPQ at 467. Such evidence, sometimes referred to as “secondary considerations,” may include evidence of commercial success, long-felt but unsolved needs, failure of others, and unexpected results. The evidence may be included in the specification as filed, accompany the application on filing, or be provided in a timely manner at some other point during the prosecution. The weight to be given any objective evidence is determined on a case-by-case basis. The mere fact that an applicant has presented evidence does not mean that the evidence is dispositive of the issue of obviousness.","provenance":{"source_file":"s2141.html","source_anchor":"d0e208380","source_sha256":"c18335410b948734844afa0950712df37f56fb7b8d25ca661deb44a79ef5e658"},"kind":"narrative","host_section_id":"se_thj3rw3j"},{"id":"pb_en2img4b","node_type":"prose_block","corpus_id":"mpep-e9r01-2024-html","opaque_url":"https://mpep.io/n/pb_en2img4b","effective_range":{"start_revision":"R-01.2024","end_revision":null},"rendered_text_html":"

    The question of obviousness must be resolved on the basis of the\n factual inquiries set forth above. While each case is different and must be decided\n on its own facts, these factual inquiries, as well as secondary considerations when\n present, must be analyzed. The Graham factors were reaffirmed and\n relied upon by the Supreme Court in its consideration and determination of\n obviousness in the fact situation presented in KSR, 550 U.S. at\n 406-07, 82 USPQ2d at 1391 (2007). The Supreme Court has utilized the\n Graham factors in each of its obviousness decisions since\n Graham. See Sakraida v. Ag Pro, Inc., 425\n U.S. 273, 189 USPQ 449, reh’g denied, 426 U.S. 955 (1976);\n Dann v. Johnston, 425 U.S. 219, 189 USPQ 257 (1976); and\n Anderson’s-Black Rock, Inc. v. Pavement Salvage Co., 396 U.S.\n 57, 163 USPQ 673 (1969). As stated by the Supreme Court in KSR,\n “While the sequence of these questions might be reordered in any particular case, the\n [Graham] factors continue to define the inquiry that\n controls.”KSR, 550 U.S. at 407, 82 USPQ2d at 1391. \n

    ","rendered_text_plain":"The question of obviousness must be resolved on the basis of the factual inquiries set forth above. While each case is different and must be decided on its own facts, these factual inquiries, as well as secondary considerations when present, must be analyzed. The Graham factors were reaffirmed and relied upon by the Supreme Court in its consideration and determination of obviousness in the fact situation presented in KSR, 550 U.S. at 406-07, 82 USPQ2d at 1391 (2007). The Supreme Court has utilized the Graham factors in each of its obviousness decisions since Graham. See Sakraida v. Ag Pro, Inc., 425 U.S. 273, 189 USPQ 449, reh’g denied, 426 U.S. 955 (1976); Dann v. Johnston, 425 U.S. 219, 189 USPQ 257 (1976); and Anderson’s-Black Rock, Inc. v. Pavement Salvage Co., 396 U.S. 57, 163 USPQ 673 (1969). As stated by the Supreme Court in KSR, “While the sequence of these questions might be reordered in any particular case, the [Graham] factors continue to define the inquiry that controls.”KSR, 550 U.S. at 407, 82 USPQ2d at 1391.","provenance":{"source_file":"s2141.html","source_anchor":"d0e208387","source_sha256":"c18335410b948734844afa0950712df37f56fb7b8d25ca661deb44a79ef5e658"},"kind":"narrative","host_section_id":"se_thj3rw3j"},{"id":"cs_dhpulzt5","node_type":"case","corpus_id":"mpep-e9r01-2024-html","opaque_url":"https://mpep.io/n/cs_dhpulzt5","effective_range":{"start_revision":"R-01.2024","end_revision":null},"rendered_text_html":"","rendered_text_plain":"Dann v. Johnston, 425 U.S. 219, 189 USPQ 257 (1976)","provenance":{"source_file":"s2141.html","source_anchor":"","source_sha256":"c18335410b948734844afa0950712df37f56fb7b8d25ca661deb44a79ef5e658"},"short_name":"Dann v. Johnston","all_citations":["425 U.S. 219","189 USPQ 257"],"canonical_citation":"Dann v. Johnston, 425 U.S. 219, 189 USPQ 257 (1976)","decision_year":1976,"court":"SCOTUS"},{"id":"cs_bravh7of","node_type":"case","corpus_id":"mpep-e9r01-2024-html","opaque_url":"https://mpep.io/n/cs_bravh7of","effective_range":{"start_revision":"R-01.2024","end_revision":null},"rendered_text_html":"","rendered_text_plain":"Anderson’s-Black Rock, Inc. v. Pavement Salvage Co., 396 U.S. 57, 163 USPQ 673 (1969)","provenance":{"source_file":"s2141.html","source_anchor":"","source_sha256":"c18335410b948734844afa0950712df37f56fb7b8d25ca661deb44a79ef5e658"},"short_name":"Anderson’s-Black Rock, Inc. v. Pavement Salvage Co.","all_citations":["396 U.S. 57","163 USPQ 673"],"canonical_citation":"Anderson’s-Black Rock, Inc. v. Pavement Salvage Co., 396 U.S. 57, 163 USPQ 673 (1969)","decision_year":1969,"court":"SCOTUS"},{"id":"pb_vke5scui","node_type":"prose_block","corpus_id":"mpep-e9r01-2024-html","opaque_url":"https://mpep.io/n/pb_vke5scui","effective_range":{"start_revision":"R-01.2024","end_revision":null},"rendered_text_html":"Office Personnel As Factfinders","rendered_text_plain":"Office Personnel As Factfinders","provenance":{"source_file":"s2141.html","source_anchor":"d0e208143/b.5","source_sha256":"c18335410b948734844afa0950712df37f56fb7b8d25ca661deb44a79ef5e658"},"kind":"informal_heading","host_section_id":"se_thj3rw3j","heading_level":3,"heading_text":"Office Personnel As Factfinders"},{"id":"pb_rjbygwwb","node_type":"prose_block","corpus_id":"mpep-e9r01-2024-html","opaque_url":"https://mpep.io/n/pb_rjbygwwb","effective_range":{"start_revision":"R-01.2024","end_revision":null},"rendered_text_html":"

    Office personnel fulfill the critical role of factfinder when\n resolving the Graham inquiries. It must be remembered that\n while the ultimate determination of obviousness is a legal conclusion, the\n underlying Graham inquiries are factual. When making an\n obviousness rejection, Office personnel must therefore ensure that the written\n record includes findings of fact concerning the state of the art and the teachings\n of the references applied. In certain circumstances, it may also be important to\n include explicit findings as to how a person of ordinary skill would have\n understood prior art teachings, or what a person of ordinary skill would have\n known or could have done. Factual findings made by Office personnel are the\n necessary underpinnings to establish obviousness. \n

    ","rendered_text_plain":"Office personnel fulfill the critical role of factfinder when resolving the Graham inquiries. It must be remembered that while the ultimate determination of obviousness is a legal conclusion, the underlying Graham inquiries are factual. When making an obviousness rejection, Office personnel must therefore ensure that the written record includes findings of fact concerning the state of the art and the teachings of the references applied. In certain circumstances, it may also be important to include explicit findings as to how a person of ordinary skill would have understood prior art teachings, or what a person of ordinary skill would have known or could have done. Factual findings made by Office personnel are the necessary underpinnings to establish obviousness.","provenance":{"source_file":"s2141.html","source_anchor":"d0e208430","source_sha256":"c18335410b948734844afa0950712df37f56fb7b8d25ca661deb44a79ef5e658"},"kind":"narrative","host_section_id":"se_thj3rw3j"},{"id":"pb_pzlhzilu","node_type":"prose_block","corpus_id":"mpep-e9r01-2024-html","opaque_url":"https://mpep.io/n/pb_pzlhzilu","effective_range":{"start_revision":"R-01.2024","end_revision":null},"rendered_text_html":"

    Once the findings of fact are articulated, Office personnel must\n provide an explanation to support an obviousness rejection under 35 U.S.C.\n 103. 35 U.S.C. 132 requires that\n the applicant be notified of the reasons for the rejection of the claim so that\n the applicant can decide how best to proceed. Clearly setting forth findings of\n fact and the rationale(s) to support a rejection in an Office action leads to the\n prompt resolution of issues pertinent to patentability. \n

    ","rendered_text_plain":"Once the findings of fact are articulated, Office personnel must provide an explanation to support an obviousness rejection under 35 U.S.C. 103. 35 U.S.C. 132 requires that the applicant be notified of the reasons for the rejection of the claim so that the applicant can decide how best to proceed. Clearly setting forth findings of fact and the rationale(s) to support a rejection in an Office action leads to the prompt resolution of issues pertinent to patentability.","provenance":{"source_file":"s2141.html","source_anchor":"d0e208439","source_sha256":"c18335410b948734844afa0950712df37f56fb7b8d25ca661deb44a79ef5e658"},"kind":"narrative","host_section_id":"se_thj3rw3j"},{"id":"st_kgtgjvbl","node_type":"statute","corpus_id":"mpep-e9r01-2024-html","opaque_url":"https://mpep.io/n/st_kgtgjvbl","effective_range":{"start_revision":"R-01.2024","end_revision":null},"rendered_text_html":"","rendered_text_plain":"","provenance":{"source_file":"s2141.html","source_anchor":"","source_sha256":"c18335410b948734844afa0950712df37f56fb7b8d25ca661deb44a79ef5e658"},"authority":"us_usc","authority_title_num":"35","authority_section_num":"132","subsection_path":[],"canonical_citation":"35 U.S.C. 132"},{"id":"pb_t43n2jkq","node_type":"prose_block","corpus_id":"mpep-e9r01-2024-html","opaque_url":"https://mpep.io/n/pb_t43n2jkq","effective_range":{"start_revision":"R-01.2024","end_revision":null},"rendered_text_html":"

    In short, the focus when making a determination of obviousness\n should be on what a person of ordinary skill in the pertinent art would have known\n at the relevant time, and on what such a person would have reasonably expected to\n have been able to do in view of that knowledge. This is so regardless of whether\n the source of that knowledge and ability was documentary prior art, general\n knowledge in the art, or common sense. What follows is a discussion of the\n Graham factual inquiries. \n

    ","rendered_text_plain":"In short, the focus when making a determination of obviousness should be on what a person of ordinary skill in the pertinent art would have known at the relevant time, and on what such a person would have reasonably expected to have been able to do in view of that knowledge. This is so regardless of whether the source of that knowledge and ability was documentary prior art, general knowledge in the art, or common sense. What follows is a discussion of the Graham factual inquiries.","provenance":{"source_file":"s2141.html","source_anchor":"d0e208448","source_sha256":"c18335410b948734844afa0950712df37f56fb7b8d25ca661deb44a79ef5e658"},"kind":"narrative","host_section_id":"se_thj3rw3j"},{"id":"pb_oc7qovat","node_type":"prose_block","corpus_id":"mpep-e9r01-2024-html","opaque_url":"https://mpep.io/n/pb_oc7qovat","effective_range":{"start_revision":"R-01.2024","end_revision":null},"rendered_text_html":"A.Determining the Scope and Content of the Prior Art","rendered_text_plain":"A.Determining the Scope and Content of the Prior Art","provenance":{"source_file":"s2141.html","source_anchor":"d0e208143/b.6","source_sha256":"c18335410b948734844afa0950712df37f56fb7b8d25ca661deb44a79ef5e658"},"kind":"informal_heading","host_section_id":"se_thj3rw3j","heading_level":3,"heading_text":"A.Determining the Scope and Content of the Prior Art"},{"id":"pb_y7ntyt5l","node_type":"prose_block","corpus_id":"mpep-e9r01-2024-html","opaque_url":"https://mpep.io/n/pb_y7ntyt5l","effective_range":{"start_revision":"R-01.2024","end_revision":null},"rendered_text_html":"

    In determining the scope and content of the prior art, Office\n personnel must first obtain a thorough understanding of the invention disclosed\n and claimed in the application under examination by reading the specification,\n including the claims, to understand what has been invented. See\n MPEP §\n 904. The scope of the claimed invention must be\n clearly determined by giving the claims the “broadest reasonable interpretation\n consistent with the specification.” See Phillips v. AWH\n Corp., 415 F.3d 1303, 1316, 75 USPQ2d 1321, 1329 (Fed. Cir. 2005)\n and MPEP\n § 2111. Once the scope of the claimed invention is\n determined, Office personnel must then determine what to search for and where\n to search.\n

    ","rendered_text_plain":"In determining the scope and content of the prior art, Office personnel must first obtain a thorough understanding of the invention disclosed and claimed in the application under examination by reading the specification, including the claims, to understand what has been invented. See MPEP § 904. The scope of the claimed invention must be clearly determined by giving the claims the “broadest reasonable interpretation consistent with the specification.” See Phillips v. AWH Corp., 415 F.3d 1303, 1316, 75 USPQ2d 1321, 1329 (Fed. Cir. 2005) and MPEP § 2111. Once the scope of the claimed invention is determined, Office personnel must then determine what to search for and where to search.","provenance":{"source_file":"s2141.html","source_anchor":"d0e208458","source_sha256":"c18335410b948734844afa0950712df37f56fb7b8d25ca661deb44a79ef5e658"},"kind":"narrative","host_section_id":"se_thj3rw3j"},{"id":"cs_wwgix7vx","node_type":"case","corpus_id":"mpep-e9r01-2024-html","opaque_url":"https://mpep.io/n/cs_wwgix7vx","effective_range":{"start_revision":"R-01.2024","end_revision":null},"rendered_text_html":"","rendered_text_plain":"Phillips v. AWH Corp., 415 F.3d 1303, 75 USPQ2d 1321 (Fed. Cir. 2005)","provenance":{"source_file":"s2141.html","source_anchor":"","source_sha256":"c18335410b948734844afa0950712df37f56fb7b8d25ca661deb44a79ef5e658"},"short_name":"Phillips v. AWH Corp.","all_citations":["415 F.3d 1303","75 USPQ2d 1321"],"canonical_citation":"Phillips v. AWH Corp., 415 F.3d 1303, 75 USPQ2d 1321 (Fed. Cir. 2005)","decision_year":2005,"court":"Fed. Cir."},{"id":"pb_kq2sagn7","node_type":"prose_block","corpus_id":"mpep-e9r01-2024-html","opaque_url":"https://mpep.io/n/pb_kq2sagn7","effective_range":{"start_revision":"R-01.2024","end_revision":null},"rendered_text_html":"1. What To Search For:","rendered_text_plain":"1. What To Search For:","provenance":{"source_file":"s2141.html","source_anchor":"d0e208143/b.8","source_sha256":"c18335410b948734844afa0950712df37f56fb7b8d25ca661deb44a79ef5e658"},"kind":"informal_heading","host_section_id":"se_thj3rw3j","heading_level":4,"heading_text":"1. What To Search For:"},{"id":"pb_ggnb5g2d","node_type":"prose_block","corpus_id":"mpep-e9r01-2024-html","opaque_url":"https://mpep.io/n/pb_ggnb5g2d","effective_range":{"start_revision":"R-01.2024","end_revision":null},"rendered_text_html":"

    The search should cover the claimed subject matter and\n should also cover the disclosed features which might reasonably be expected\n to be claimed. See MPEP § 904.02. Although a\n rejection need not be based on a teaching or suggestion to combine, a\n preferred search will be directed to finding references that provide such a\n teaching or suggestion if they exist.\n

    ","rendered_text_plain":"The search should cover the claimed subject matter and should also cover the disclosed features which might reasonably be expected to be claimed. See MPEP § 904.02. Although a rejection need not be based on a teaching or suggestion to combine, a preferred search will be directed to finding references that provide such a teaching or suggestion if they exist.","provenance":{"source_file":"s2141.html","source_anchor":"d0e208474","source_sha256":"c18335410b948734844afa0950712df37f56fb7b8d25ca661deb44a79ef5e658"},"kind":"narrative","host_section_id":"se_thj3rw3j"},{"id":"pb_4jlxa3pl","node_type":"prose_block","corpus_id":"mpep-e9r01-2024-html","opaque_url":"https://mpep.io/n/pb_4jlxa3pl","effective_range":{"start_revision":"R-01.2024","end_revision":null},"rendered_text_html":"2. Where To Search:","rendered_text_plain":"2. Where To Search:","provenance":{"source_file":"s2141.html","source_anchor":"d0e208143/b.10","source_sha256":"c18335410b948734844afa0950712df37f56fb7b8d25ca661deb44a79ef5e658"},"kind":"informal_heading","host_section_id":"se_thj3rw3j","heading_level":4,"heading_text":"2. Where To Search:"},{"id":"pb_dccdw2ie","node_type":"prose_block","corpus_id":"mpep-e9r01-2024-html","opaque_url":"https://mpep.io/n/pb_dccdw2ie","effective_range":{"start_revision":"R-01.2024","end_revision":null},"rendered_text_html":"

    Office personnel should continue to follow the general\n search guidelines set forth in MPEP § 904 to\n § 904.03 regarding search of the prior art.\n Office personnel are reminded that, for purposes of 35 U.S.C.\n 103, prior art can be either in the field of the\n inventor’s endeavor or be reasonably pertinent to the particular problem\n with which the inventor was concerned. See MPEP §\n 2141.01(a) for a discussion of analogous art and\n MPEP §\n 1504.03 for a discussion of analogous art for\n design applications. Furthermore, prior art that is in a field of endeavor\n other than that of the inventor (as noted by the Court in\n KSR, “[w]hen a work is available in one field of\n endeavor, design incentives and other market forces can prompt variations of\n it, either in the same field or a different one,” 550\n U.S. at 417, 82 USPQ2d at 1396 (emphasis added)), or solves a problem which\n is different from that which the inventor was trying to solve, may also be\n considered for the purposes of 35 U.S.C. 103. (The\n Court in KSR stated that “[t]he first error…in this case\n was…holding that courts and patent examiners should look only to the problem\n the patentee was trying to solve. The Court of Appeals failed to recognize\n that the problem motivating the patentee may be only one of many addressed\n by the patent’s subject matter…The second error [was]…that a person of\n ordinary skill attempting to solve a problem will be led only to those\n elements of prior art designed to solve the same problem.” 550 U.S. at 420,\n 82 USPQ2d at 1397. Federal Circuit case law prior to the Supreme Court’s\n decision in KSR is generally in accord with these\n statements by the KSR Court. See e.g., In re\n Dillon, 919 F.2d 688, 693, 16 USPQ2d 1897, 1902 (Fed. Cir.\n 1990) (en banc) (“[I]t is not necessary in order to\n establish a prima facie case of obviousness that both a\n structural similarity between a claimed and prior art compound (or a key\n component of a composition) be shown and that there be a suggestion in or\n expectation from the prior art that the claimed compound or\n composition will have the same or a similar utility as one newly\n discovered by applicant”) (emphasis added); In re\n Lintner, 458 F.2d 1013, 1016, 173 USPQ 560, 562 (CCPA 1972)\n (“The fact that appellant uses sugar for a different purpose does not alter\n the conclusion that its use in a prior art composition would be\n prima facie obvious from the purpose disclosed in the\n references.”). \n

    ","rendered_text_plain":"Office personnel should continue to follow the general search guidelines set forth in MPEP § 904 to § 904.03 regarding search of the prior art. Office personnel are reminded that, for purposes of 35 U.S.C. 103, prior art can be either in the field of the inventor’s endeavor or be reasonably pertinent to the particular problem with which the inventor was concerned. See MPEP § 2141.01(a) for a discussion of analogous art and MPEP § 1504.03 for a discussion of analogous art for design applications. Furthermore, prior art that is in a field of endeavor other than that of the inventor (as noted by the Court in KSR, “[w]hen a work is available in one field of endeavor, design incentives and other market forces can prompt variations of it, either in the same field or a different one,” 550 U.S. at 417, 82 USPQ2d at 1396 (emphasis added)), or solves a problem which is different from that which the inventor was trying to solve, may also be considered for the purposes of 35 U.S.C. 103. (The Court in KSR stated that “[t]he first error…in this case was…holding that courts and patent examiners should look only to the problem the patentee was trying to solve. The Court of Appeals failed to recognize that the problem motivating the patentee may be only one of many addressed by the patent’s subject matter…The second error [was]…that a person of ordinary skill attempting to solve a problem will be led only to those elements of prior art designed to solve the same problem.” 550 U.S. at 420, 82 USPQ2d at 1397. Federal Circuit case law prior to the Supreme Court’s decision in KSR is generally in accord with these statements by the KSR Court. See e.g., In re Dillon, 919 F.2d 688, 693, 16 USPQ2d 1897, 1902 (Fed. Cir. 1990) (en banc) (“[I]t is not necessary in order to establish a prima facie case of obviousness that both a structural similarity between a claimed and prior art compound (or a key component of a composition) be shown and that there be a suggestion in or expectation from the prior art that the claimed compound or composition will have the same or a similar utility as one newly discovered by applicant”) (emphasis added); In re Lintner, 458 F.2d 1013, 1016, 173 USPQ 560, 562 (CCPA 1972) (“The fact that appellant uses sugar for a different purpose does not alter the conclusion that its use in a prior art composition would be prima facie obvious from the purpose disclosed in the references.”).","provenance":{"source_file":"s2141.html","source_anchor":"d0e208484","source_sha256":"c18335410b948734844afa0950712df37f56fb7b8d25ca661deb44a79ef5e658"},"kind":"narrative","host_section_id":"se_thj3rw3j"},{"id":"cs_uzyghmi6","node_type":"case","corpus_id":"mpep-e9r01-2024-html","opaque_url":"https://mpep.io/n/cs_uzyghmi6","effective_range":{"start_revision":"R-01.2024","end_revision":null},"rendered_text_html":"","rendered_text_plain":"In re Dillon, 919 F.2d 688, 16 USPQ2d 1897 (Fed. Cir. 1990)","provenance":{"source_file":"s2141.html","source_anchor":"","source_sha256":"c18335410b948734844afa0950712df37f56fb7b8d25ca661deb44a79ef5e658"},"short_name":"In re Dillon","all_citations":["919 F.2d 688","16 USPQ2d 1897"],"canonical_citation":"In re Dillon, 919 F.2d 688, 16 USPQ2d 1897 (Fed. Cir. 1990)","decision_year":1990,"court":"Fed. Cir."},{"id":"cs_js2cbqbe","node_type":"case","corpus_id":"mpep-e9r01-2024-html","opaque_url":"https://mpep.io/n/cs_js2cbqbe","effective_range":{"start_revision":"R-01.2024","end_revision":null},"rendered_text_html":"","rendered_text_plain":"In re Lintner, 458 F.2d 1013, 173 USPQ 560 (CCPA 1972)","provenance":{"source_file":"s2141.html","source_anchor":"","source_sha256":"c18335410b948734844afa0950712df37f56fb7b8d25ca661deb44a79ef5e658"},"short_name":"In re Lintner","all_citations":["458 F.2d 1013","173 USPQ 560"],"canonical_citation":"In re Lintner, 458 F.2d 1013, 173 USPQ 560 (CCPA 1972)","decision_year":1972,"court":"CCPA"},{"id":"pb_vjuvpvhh","node_type":"prose_block","corpus_id":"mpep-e9r01-2024-html","opaque_url":"https://mpep.io/n/pb_vjuvpvhh","effective_range":{"start_revision":"R-01.2024","end_revision":null},"rendered_text_html":"

    For a discussion of what constitutes prior art, see\n MPEP §\n 901 to § 901.06(d) and\n §\n 2121 to § 2129. See\n MPEP §\n 2141.01(a) for a discussion of analogous art and\n MPEP §\n 1504.03 for a discussion of analogous art for\n design applications.\n

    ","rendered_text_plain":"For a discussion of what constitutes prior art, see MPEP § 901 to § 901.06(d) and § 2121 to § 2129. See MPEP § 2141.01(a) for a discussion of analogous art and MPEP § 1504.03 for a discussion of analogous art for design applications.","provenance":{"source_file":"s2141.html","source_anchor":"d0e208537","source_sha256":"c18335410b948734844afa0950712df37f56fb7b8d25ca661deb44a79ef5e658"},"kind":"narrative","host_section_id":"se_thj3rw3j"},{"id":"pb_nk52d3zz","node_type":"prose_block","corpus_id":"mpep-e9r01-2024-html","opaque_url":"https://mpep.io/n/pb_nk52d3zz","effective_range":{"start_revision":"R-01.2024","end_revision":null},"rendered_text_html":"B.Ascertaining the Differences Between the Claimed Invention and the\n Prior Art","rendered_text_plain":"B.Ascertaining the Differences Between the Claimed Invention and the Prior Art","provenance":{"source_file":"s2141.html","source_anchor":"d0e208143/b.12","source_sha256":"c18335410b948734844afa0950712df37f56fb7b8d25ca661deb44a79ef5e658"},"kind":"informal_heading","host_section_id":"se_thj3rw3j","heading_level":3,"heading_text":"B.Ascertaining the Differences Between the Claimed Invention and the Prior Art"},{"id":"pb_ugijp3n5","node_type":"prose_block","corpus_id":"mpep-e9r01-2024-html","opaque_url":"https://mpep.io/n/pb_ugijp3n5","effective_range":{"start_revision":"R-01.2024","end_revision":null},"rendered_text_html":"

    Ascertaining the differences between the claimed invention\n and the prior art requires interpreting the claim language, see\n MPEP §\n 2111, and considering both the invention and the\n prior art as a whole. See MPEP § 2141.02. \n

    ","rendered_text_plain":"Ascertaining the differences between the claimed invention and the prior art requires interpreting the claim language, see MPEP § 2111, and considering both the invention and the prior art as a whole. See MPEP § 2141.02.","provenance":{"source_file":"s2141.html","source_anchor":"d0e208556","source_sha256":"c18335410b948734844afa0950712df37f56fb7b8d25ca661deb44a79ef5e658"},"kind":"narrative","host_section_id":"se_thj3rw3j"},{"id":"pb_i2ifu5cp","node_type":"prose_block","corpus_id":"mpep-e9r01-2024-html","opaque_url":"https://mpep.io/n/pb_i2ifu5cp","effective_range":{"start_revision":"R-01.2024","end_revision":null},"rendered_text_html":"C.Resolving the Level of Ordinary Skill in the Art","rendered_text_plain":"C.Resolving the Level of Ordinary Skill in the Art","provenance":{"source_file":"s2141.html","source_anchor":"d0e208143/b.14","source_sha256":"c18335410b948734844afa0950712df37f56fb7b8d25ca661deb44a79ef5e658"},"kind":"informal_heading","host_section_id":"se_thj3rw3j","heading_level":3,"heading_text":"C.Resolving the Level of Ordinary Skill in the Art"},{"id":"pb_b6e7lng4","node_type":"prose_block","corpus_id":"mpep-e9r01-2024-html","opaque_url":"https://mpep.io/n/pb_b6e7lng4","effective_range":{"start_revision":"R-01.2024","end_revision":null},"rendered_text_html":"

    Any obviousness rejection should include, either explicitly\n or implicitly in view of the prior art applied, an indication of the level of\n ordinary skill. See MPEP § 2141.03, subsection II,\n regarding implicit indication of the level of ordinary skill. A finding as to\n the level of ordinary skill may be used as a partial basis for a resolution of\n the issue of obviousness.\n

    ","rendered_text_plain":"Any obviousness rejection should include, either explicitly or implicitly in view of the prior art applied, an indication of the level of ordinary skill. See MPEP § 2141.03, subsection II, regarding implicit indication of the level of ordinary skill. A finding as to the level of ordinary skill may be used as a partial basis for a resolution of the issue of obviousness.","provenance":{"source_file":"s2141.html","source_anchor":"d0e208569","source_sha256":"c18335410b948734844afa0950712df37f56fb7b8d25ca661deb44a79ef5e658"},"kind":"narrative","host_section_id":"se_thj3rw3j"},{"id":"pb_ee3gnkrh","node_type":"prose_block","corpus_id":"mpep-e9r01-2024-html","opaque_url":"https://mpep.io/n/pb_ee3gnkrh","effective_range":{"start_revision":"R-01.2024","end_revision":null},"rendered_text_html":"

    The person of ordinary skill in the art is a hypothetical\n person who is presumed to have known the relevant art at the relevant time.\n Factors that may be considered in determining the level of ordinary skill in\n the art may include: (1) “type of problems encountered in the art;” (2) “prior\n art solutions to those problems;” (3) “rapidity with which innovations are\n made;” (4) “sophistication of the technology; and” (5) “educational level of\n active workers in the field.” In re GPAC, 57 F.3d 1573,\n 1579, 35 USPQ2d 1116, 1121 (Fed. Cir. 1995). “In a given case, every factor may\n not be present, and one or more factors may predominate.”\n Id. See also Custom Accessories, Inc. v.\n Jeffrey-Allan Indust., Inc., 807 F.2d 955, 962, 1 USPQ2d 1196,\n 1201 (Fed. Cir. 1986); Environmental Designs, Ltd. v. Union Oil\n Co., 713 F.2d 693, 696, 218 USPQ 865, 868 (Fed. Cir. 1983). \n

    ","rendered_text_plain":"The person of ordinary skill in the art is a hypothetical person who is presumed to have known the relevant art at the relevant time. Factors that may be considered in determining the level of ordinary skill in the art may include: (1) “type of problems encountered in the art;” (2) “prior art solutions to those problems;” (3) “rapidity with which innovations are made;” (4) “sophistication of the technology; and” (5) “educational level of active workers in the field.” In re GPAC, 57 F.3d 1573, 1579, 35 USPQ2d 1116, 1121 (Fed. Cir. 1995). “In a given case, every factor may not be present, and one or more factors may predominate.” Id. See also Custom Accessories, Inc. v. Jeffrey-Allan Indust., Inc., 807 F.2d 955, 962, 1 USPQ2d 1196, 1201 (Fed. Cir. 1986); Environmental Designs, Ltd. v. Union Oil Co., 713 F.2d 693, 696, 218 USPQ 865, 868 (Fed. Cir. 1983).","provenance":{"source_file":"s2141.html","source_anchor":"d0e208572","source_sha256":"c18335410b948734844afa0950712df37f56fb7b8d25ca661deb44a79ef5e658"},"kind":"narrative","host_section_id":"se_thj3rw3j"},{"id":"cs_njjyg5gk","node_type":"case","corpus_id":"mpep-e9r01-2024-html","opaque_url":"https://mpep.io/n/cs_njjyg5gk","effective_range":{"start_revision":"R-01.2024","end_revision":null},"rendered_text_html":"","rendered_text_plain":"In re GPAC, 57 F.3d 1573, 35 USPQ2d 1116 (Fed. Cir. 1995)","provenance":{"source_file":"s2141.html","source_anchor":"","source_sha256":"c18335410b948734844afa0950712df37f56fb7b8d25ca661deb44a79ef5e658"},"short_name":"In re GPAC","all_citations":["57 F.3d 1573","35 USPQ2d 1116"],"canonical_citation":"In re GPAC, 57 F.3d 1573, 35 USPQ2d 1116 (Fed. Cir. 1995)","decision_year":1995,"court":"Fed. Cir."},{"id":"cs_6otbastz","node_type":"case","corpus_id":"mpep-e9r01-2024-html","opaque_url":"https://mpep.io/n/cs_6otbastz","effective_range":{"start_revision":"R-01.2024","end_revision":null},"rendered_text_html":"","rendered_text_plain":"Custom Accessories, Inc. v. Jeffrey-Allan Indust., Inc., 807 F.2d 955, 1 USPQ2d 1196 (Fed. Cir. 1986)","provenance":{"source_file":"s2141.html","source_anchor":"","source_sha256":"c18335410b948734844afa0950712df37f56fb7b8d25ca661deb44a79ef5e658"},"short_name":"Custom Accessories, Inc. v. Jeffrey-Allan Indust., Inc.","all_citations":["807 F.2d 955","1 USPQ2d 1196"],"canonical_citation":"Custom Accessories, Inc. v. Jeffrey-Allan Indust., Inc., 807 F.2d 955, 1 USPQ2d 1196 (Fed. Cir. 1986)","decision_year":1986,"court":"Fed. Cir."},{"id":"cs_wkttxtu4","node_type":"case","corpus_id":"mpep-e9r01-2024-html","opaque_url":"https://mpep.io/n/cs_wkttxtu4","effective_range":{"start_revision":"R-01.2024","end_revision":null},"rendered_text_html":"","rendered_text_plain":"Environmental Designs, Ltd. v. Union Oil Co., 713 F.2d 693, 218 USPQ 865 (Fed. Cir. 1983)","provenance":{"source_file":"s2141.html","source_anchor":"","source_sha256":"c18335410b948734844afa0950712df37f56fb7b8d25ca661deb44a79ef5e658"},"short_name":"Environmental Designs, Ltd. v. Union Oil Co.","all_citations":["713 F.2d 693","218 USPQ 865"],"canonical_citation":"Environmental Designs, Ltd. v. Union Oil Co., 713 F.2d 693, 218 USPQ 865 (Fed. Cir. 1983)","decision_year":1983,"court":"Fed. Cir."},{"id":"pb_atijcub2","node_type":"prose_block","corpus_id":"mpep-e9r01-2024-html","opaque_url":"https://mpep.io/n/pb_atijcub2","effective_range":{"start_revision":"R-01.2024","end_revision":null},"rendered_text_html":"

    “A person of ordinary skill in the art is also a person of\n ordinary creativity, not an automaton.”KSR, 550 U.S. at 421,\n 82 USPQ2d at 1397. “[I]n many cases a person of ordinary skill will be able to\n fit the teachings of multiple patents together like pieces of a\n puzzle.”Id. at 420, 82 USPQ2d at 1397. Office personnel\n may also take into account “the inferences and creative steps that a person of\n ordinary skill in the art would employ.”Id. at 418, 82\n USPQ2d at 1396. \n

    ","rendered_text_plain":"“A person of ordinary skill in the art is also a person of ordinary creativity, not an automaton.”KSR, 550 U.S. at 421, 82 USPQ2d at 1397. “[I]n many cases a person of ordinary skill will be able to fit the teachings of multiple patents together like pieces of a puzzle.”Id. at 420, 82 USPQ2d at 1397. Office personnel may also take into account “the inferences and creative steps that a person of ordinary skill in the art would employ.”Id. at 418, 82 USPQ2d at 1396.","provenance":{"source_file":"s2141.html","source_anchor":"d0e208585","source_sha256":"c18335410b948734844afa0950712df37f56fb7b8d25ca661deb44a79ef5e658"},"kind":"narrative","host_section_id":"se_thj3rw3j"},{"id":"pb_mi56c37g","node_type":"prose_block","corpus_id":"mpep-e9r01-2024-html","opaque_url":"https://mpep.io/n/pb_mi56c37g","effective_range":{"start_revision":"R-01.2024","end_revision":null},"rendered_text_html":"

    In addition to the factors above, Office personnel may rely\n on their own technical expertise to describe the knowledge and skills of a\n person of ordinary skill in the art. The Federal Circuit has stated that\n examiners and administrative patent judges on the Board are “persons of\n scientific competence in the fields in which they work” and that their findings\n are “informed by their scientific knowledge, as to the meaning of prior art\n references to persons of ordinary skill in the art.” In re\n Berg, 320 F.3d 1310, 1315, 65 USPQ2d 2003, 2007 (Fed. Cir. 2003).\n In addition, examiners “are assumed to have some expertise in interpreting the\n references and to be familiar from their work with the level of skill in the\n art .” PowerOasis, Inc. v. T-Mobile USA, Inc., 522 F.3d\n 1299, 86 USPQ2d 1385 (Fed. Cir. 2008) (quoting Am. Hoist & Derrick\n Co. v. Sowa & Sons, 725 F.2d 1350, 1360, 220 USPQ 763, 770\n (Fed. Cir. 1984). See MPEP § 2141.03 for a\n discussion of the level of ordinary skill. \n

    ","rendered_text_plain":"In addition to the factors above, Office personnel may rely on their own technical expertise to describe the knowledge and skills of a person of ordinary skill in the art. The Federal Circuit has stated that examiners and administrative patent judges on the Board are “persons of scientific competence in the fields in which they work” and that their findings are “informed by their scientific knowledge, as to the meaning of prior art references to persons of ordinary skill in the art.” In re Berg, 320 F.3d 1310, 1315, 65 USPQ2d 2003, 2007 (Fed. Cir. 2003). In addition, examiners “are assumed to have some expertise in interpreting the references and to be familiar from their work with the level of skill in the art .” PowerOasis, Inc. v. T-Mobile USA, Inc., 522 F.3d 1299, 86 USPQ2d 1385 (Fed. Cir. 2008) (quoting Am. Hoist & Derrick Co. v. Sowa & Sons, 725 F.2d 1350, 1360, 220 USPQ 763, 770 (Fed. Cir. 1984). See MPEP § 2141.03 for a discussion of the level of ordinary skill.","provenance":{"source_file":"s2141.html","source_anchor":"d0e208597","source_sha256":"c18335410b948734844afa0950712df37f56fb7b8d25ca661deb44a79ef5e658"},"kind":"narrative","host_section_id":"se_thj3rw3j"},{"id":"cs_x4sc27z4","node_type":"case","corpus_id":"mpep-e9r01-2024-html","opaque_url":"https://mpep.io/n/cs_x4sc27z4","effective_range":{"start_revision":"R-01.2024","end_revision":null},"rendered_text_html":"","rendered_text_plain":"In re Berg, 320 F.3d 1310, 65 USPQ2d 2003 (Fed. Cir. 2003)","provenance":{"source_file":"s2141.html","source_anchor":"","source_sha256":"c18335410b948734844afa0950712df37f56fb7b8d25ca661deb44a79ef5e658"},"short_name":"In re Berg","all_citations":["320 F.3d 1310","65 USPQ2d 2003"],"canonical_citation":"In re Berg, 320 F.3d 1310, 65 USPQ2d 2003 (Fed. Cir. 2003)","decision_year":2003,"court":"Fed. Cir."},{"id":"cs_qa7ehv3w","node_type":"case","corpus_id":"mpep-e9r01-2024-html","opaque_url":"https://mpep.io/n/cs_qa7ehv3w","effective_range":{"start_revision":"R-01.2024","end_revision":null},"rendered_text_html":"","rendered_text_plain":"PowerOasis, Inc. v. T-Mobile USA, Inc., 522 F.3d 1299, 86 USPQ2d 1385 (Fed. Cir. 2008)","provenance":{"source_file":"s2141.html","source_anchor":"","source_sha256":"c18335410b948734844afa0950712df37f56fb7b8d25ca661deb44a79ef5e658"},"short_name":"PowerOasis, Inc. v. T-Mobile USA, Inc.","all_citations":["522 F.3d 1299","86 USPQ2d 1385"],"canonical_citation":"PowerOasis, Inc. v. T-Mobile USA, Inc., 522 F.3d 1299, 86 USPQ2d 1385 (Fed. Cir. 2008)","decision_year":2008,"court":"Fed. Cir."},{"id":"cs_xn6pkrlw","node_type":"case","corpus_id":"mpep-e9r01-2024-html","opaque_url":"https://mpep.io/n/cs_xn6pkrlw","effective_range":{"start_revision":"R-01.2024","end_revision":null},"rendered_text_html":"","rendered_text_plain":"Am. Hoist & Derrick Co. v. Sowa & Sons, 725 F.2d 1350, 220 USPQ 763 (Fed. Cir. 1984)","provenance":{"source_file":"s2141.html","source_anchor":"","source_sha256":"c18335410b948734844afa0950712df37f56fb7b8d25ca661deb44a79ef5e658"},"short_name":"Am. Hoist & Derrick Co. v. Sowa & Sons","all_citations":["725 F.2d 1350","220 USPQ 763"],"canonical_citation":"Am. Hoist & Derrick Co. v. Sowa & Sons, 725 F.2d 1350, 220 USPQ 763 (Fed. Cir. 1984)","decision_year":1984,"court":"Fed. Cir."},{"id":"pb_yvpvppen","node_type":"prose_block","corpus_id":"mpep-e9r01-2024-html","opaque_url":"https://mpep.io/n/pb_yvpvppen","effective_range":{"start_revision":"R-01.2024","end_revision":null},"rendered_text_html":"III. RATIONALES TO SUPPORT REJECTIONS UNDER 35 U.S.C. 103 ","rendered_text_plain":"III. RATIONALES TO SUPPORT REJECTIONS UNDER 35 U.S.C. 103","provenance":{"source_file":"s2141.html","source_anchor":"d0e208143/b.16","source_sha256":"c18335410b948734844afa0950712df37f56fb7b8d25ca661deb44a79ef5e658"},"kind":"informal_heading","host_section_id":"se_thj3rw3j","heading_level":2,"heading_text":"III. RATIONALES TO SUPPORT REJECTIONS UNDER 35 U.S.C. 103"},{"id":"pb_qktftmbu","node_type":"prose_block","corpus_id":"mpep-e9r01-2024-html","opaque_url":"https://mpep.io/n/pb_qktftmbu","effective_range":{"start_revision":"R-01.2024","end_revision":null},"rendered_text_html":"

    Once the Graham factual inquiries are resolved,\n Office personnel must determine whether the claimed invention would have been obvious as\n of the relevant time to one of ordinary skill in the art. \n

    ","rendered_text_plain":"Once the Graham factual inquiries are resolved, Office personnel must determine whether the claimed invention would have been obvious as of the relevant time to one of ordinary skill in the art.","provenance":{"source_file":"s2141.html","source_anchor":"d0e208610","source_sha256":"c18335410b948734844afa0950712df37f56fb7b8d25ca661deb44a79ef5e658"},"kind":"narrative","host_section_id":"se_thj3rw3j"},{"id":"nq_wcte3biz","node_type":"narrative_quote","corpus_id":"mpep-e9r01-2024-html","opaque_url":"https://mpep.io/n/nq_wcte3biz","effective_range":{"start_revision":"R-01.2024","end_revision":null},"rendered_text_html":"
    \n

    The obviousness analysis cannot be confined by . . . overemphasis on\n the importance of published articles and the explicit content of issued\n patents. . . . . In many fields it may be that there is little discussion of obvious\n techniques or combinations, and it often may be the case that market demand, rather\n than scientific literature, will drive design trends.KSR, 550 U.S.\n at 419, 82 USPQ2d at 1396. \n

    \n
    ","rendered_text_plain":"The obviousness analysis cannot be confined by . . . overemphasis on the importance of published articles and the explicit content of issued patents. . . . . In many fields it may be that there is little discussion of obvious techniques or combinations, and it often may be the case that market demand, rather than scientific literature, will drive design trends.KSR, 550 U.S. at 419, 82 USPQ2d at 1396.","provenance":{"source_file":"s2141.html","source_anchor":"d0e208616","source_sha256":"c18335410b948734844afa0950712df37f56fb7b8d25ca661deb44a79ef5e658"},"source_anchor":"d0e208616","host_section_id":"se_thj3rw3j","source_case_id":"cs_r5723jx5"},{"id":"pb_wembbiwu","node_type":"prose_block","corpus_id":"mpep-e9r01-2024-html","opaque_url":"https://mpep.io/n/pb_wembbiwu","effective_range":{"start_revision":"R-01.2024","end_revision":null},"rendered_text_html":"

    Prior art is not limited just to the references being applied, but\n includes the understanding of one of ordinary skill in the art. The prior art reference\n (or references when combined) need not teach or suggest all the claim limitations.\n However, Office personnel must explain why the difference(s) between the prior art and\n the claimed invention would have been obvious to one of ordinary skill in the art. The\n “mere existence of differences between the prior art and an invention does not establish\n the invention’s nonobviousness.” Dann v. Johnston, 425 U.S. 219, 230,\n 189 USPQ 257, 261 (1976). The gap between the prior art and the claimed invention may\n not be “so great as to render the [claim] nonobvious to one reasonably skilled in the\n art.” Id. In determining obviousness, neither the particular\n motivation to make the claimed invention nor the problem the inventor is solving\n controls. The proper analysis is whether the claimed invention would have been obvious\n as of the relevant time to one of ordinary skill in the art after consideration of all\n the facts. See 35 U.S.C. 103 or pre-AIA 35 U.S.C.\n 103(a). Factors other than the disclosures of the cited prior art\n may provide a basis for concluding that it would have been obvious to one of ordinary\n skill in the art to bridge the gap. The rationales discussed below outline reasoning\n that may be applied to find obviousness in such cases.\n

    ","rendered_text_plain":"Prior art is not limited just to the references being applied, but includes the understanding of one of ordinary skill in the art. The prior art reference (or references when combined) need not teach or suggest all the claim limitations. However, Office personnel must explain why the difference(s) between the prior art and the claimed invention would have been obvious to one of ordinary skill in the art. The “mere existence of differences between the prior art and an invention does not establish the invention’s nonobviousness.” Dann v. Johnston, 425 U.S. 219, 230, 189 USPQ 257, 261 (1976). The gap between the prior art and the claimed invention may not be “so great as to render the [claim] nonobvious to one reasonably skilled in the art.” Id. In determining obviousness, neither the particular motivation to make the claimed invention nor the problem the inventor is solving controls. The proper analysis is whether the claimed invention would have been obvious as of the relevant time to one of ordinary skill in the art after consideration of all the facts. See 35 U.S.C. 103 or pre-AIA 35 U.S.C. 103(a). Factors other than the disclosures of the cited prior art may provide a basis for concluding that it would have been obvious to one of ordinary skill in the art to bridge the gap. The rationales discussed below outline reasoning that may be applied to find obviousness in such cases.","provenance":{"source_file":"s2141.html","source_anchor":"d0e208623","source_sha256":"c18335410b948734844afa0950712df37f56fb7b8d25ca661deb44a79ef5e658"},"kind":"narrative","host_section_id":"se_thj3rw3j"},{"id":"pb_mpfdik54","node_type":"prose_block","corpus_id":"mpep-e9r01-2024-html","opaque_url":"https://mpep.io/n/pb_mpfdik54","effective_range":{"start_revision":"R-01.2024","end_revision":null},"rendered_text_html":"

    If the search of the prior art and the resolution of the\n Graham factual inquiries reveal that an obviousness rejection may\n be made using the familiar teaching-suggestion-motivation (TSM) rationale, then such a\n rejection is appropriate. Although the Supreme Court in KSR cautioned\n against an overly rigid application of TSM, it also recognized that TSM was one of a\n number of valid rationales that could be used to determine obviousness. (According to\n the Supreme Court, establishment of the TSM approach to the question of obviousness\n “captured a helpful insight.” 550 U.S. at 418, 82 USPQ2d at 1396 (citing In re\n Bergel, 292 F.2d 955, 956-57, 130 USPQ 206, 207-208 (1961)). Furthermore,\n the Court explained that “[t]here is no necessary inconsistency between the idea\n underlying the TSM test and the Graham analysis.” 550 U.S. at 419, 82\n USPQ2d at 1396. The Supreme Court also commented that the Federal Circuit “no doubt has\n applied the test in accord with these principles [set forth in KSR]\n in many cases.” Id. Office personnel should also consider whether one\n or more of the other rationales set forth below supports a conclusion of obviousness.\n The Court in KSR identified a number of rationales to support a\n conclusion of obviousness which are consistent with the proper “functional approach” to\n the determination of obviousness as laid down in Graham.\n KSR, 550 U.S. at 415-21, 82 USPQ2d at 1395-97. Note that the list\n of rationales provided below is not intended to be an all-inclusive list. Other\n rationales to support a conclusion of obviousness may be relied upon by Office\n personnel. Consistent with KSR, the Federal Circuit stated that the\n obviousness analysis is not “confined by a formalistic conception of the words teaching,\n suggestion, and motivation.” Intel Corp. v. Qualcomm Inc., 21 F.4th\n 784, 795, 2021 USPQ2d 1259 (Fed. Cir. 2021) (quoting KSR, 550 U.S. at\n 419, 82 USPQ2d at 1396). See also In re Ethicon, Inc., 844 F.3d 1344,\n 1350, 121 USPQ2d 1139, 1143 (Fed. Cir. 2017) (recalling that the Supreme Court has\n instructed decisionmakers to “apply ‘an expansive and flexible approach’ to\n obviousness”) (quoting KSR, 550 U.S. at 415, 82 USPQ2d at 1395). \n

    ","rendered_text_plain":"If the search of the prior art and the resolution of the Graham factual inquiries reveal that an obviousness rejection may be made using the familiar teaching-suggestion-motivation (TSM) rationale, then such a rejection is appropriate. Although the Supreme Court in KSR cautioned against an overly rigid application of TSM, it also recognized that TSM was one of a number of valid rationales that could be used to determine obviousness. (According to the Supreme Court, establishment of the TSM approach to the question of obviousness “captured a helpful insight.” 550 U.S. at 418, 82 USPQ2d at 1396 (citing In re Bergel, 292 F.2d 955, 956-57, 130 USPQ 206, 207-208 (1961)). Furthermore, the Court explained that “[t]here is no necessary inconsistency between the idea underlying the TSM test and the Graham analysis.” 550 U.S. at 419, 82 USPQ2d at 1396. The Supreme Court also commented that the Federal Circuit “no doubt has applied the test in accord with these principles [set forth in KSR] in many cases.” Id. Office personnel should also consider whether one or more of the other rationales set forth below supports a conclusion of obviousness. The Court in KSR identified a number of rationales to support a conclusion of obviousness which are consistent with the proper “functional approach” to the determination of obviousness as laid down in Graham. KSR, 550 U.S. at 415-21, 82 USPQ2d at 1395-97. Note that the list of rationales provided below is not intended to be an all-inclusive list. Other rationales to support a conclusion of obviousness may be relied upon by Office personnel. Consistent with KSR, the Federal Circuit stated that the obviousness analysis is not “confined by a formalistic conception of the words teaching, suggestion, and motivation.” Intel Corp. v. Qualcomm Inc., 21 F.4th 784, 795, 2021 USPQ2d 1259 (Fed. Cir. 2021) (quoting KSR, 550 U.S. at 419, 82 USPQ2d at 1396). See also In re Ethicon, Inc., 844 F.3d 1344, 1350, 121 USPQ2d 1139, 1143 (Fed. Cir. 2017) (recalling that the Supreme Court has instructed decisionmakers to “apply ‘an expansive and flexible approach’ to obviousness”) (quoting KSR, 550 U.S. at 415, 82 USPQ2d at 1395).","provenance":{"source_file":"s2141.html","source_anchor":"d0e208637","source_sha256":"c18335410b948734844afa0950712df37f56fb7b8d25ca661deb44a79ef5e658"},"kind":"narrative","host_section_id":"se_thj3rw3j"},{"id":"cs_mx2olrpu","node_type":"case","corpus_id":"mpep-e9r01-2024-html","opaque_url":"https://mpep.io/n/cs_mx2olrpu","effective_range":{"start_revision":"R-01.2024","end_revision":null},"rendered_text_html":"","rendered_text_plain":"In re Bergel, 292 F.2d 955, 130 USPQ 206 (1961)","provenance":{"source_file":"s2141.html","source_anchor":"","source_sha256":"c18335410b948734844afa0950712df37f56fb7b8d25ca661deb44a79ef5e658"},"short_name":"In re Bergel","all_citations":["292 F.2d 955","130 USPQ 206"],"canonical_citation":"In re Bergel, 292 F.2d 955, 130 USPQ 206 (1961)","decision_year":1961},{"id":"cs_it6tzpba","node_type":"case","corpus_id":"mpep-e9r01-2024-html","opaque_url":"https://mpep.io/n/cs_it6tzpba","effective_range":{"start_revision":"R-01.2024","end_revision":null},"rendered_text_html":"","rendered_text_plain":"Intel Corp. v. Qualcomm Inc., 21 F.4th 784, 2021 USPQ2d 1259 (Fed. Cir. 2021)","provenance":{"source_file":"s2141.html","source_anchor":"","source_sha256":"c18335410b948734844afa0950712df37f56fb7b8d25ca661deb44a79ef5e658"},"short_name":"Intel Corp. v. Qualcomm Inc.","all_citations":["21 F.4th 784","2021 USPQ2d 1259"],"canonical_citation":"Intel Corp. v. Qualcomm Inc., 21 F.4th 784, 2021 USPQ2d 1259 (Fed. Cir. 2021)","decision_year":2021,"court":"Fed. Cir."},{"id":"cs_fzpthymz","node_type":"case","corpus_id":"mpep-e9r01-2024-html","opaque_url":"https://mpep.io/n/cs_fzpthymz","effective_range":{"start_revision":"R-01.2024","end_revision":null},"rendered_text_html":"","rendered_text_plain":"In re Ethicon, Inc., 844 F.3d 1344, 121 USPQ2d 1139 (Fed. Cir. 2017)","provenance":{"source_file":"s2141.html","source_anchor":"","source_sha256":"c18335410b948734844afa0950712df37f56fb7b8d25ca661deb44a79ef5e658"},"short_name":"In re Ethicon, Inc.","all_citations":["844 F.3d 1344","121 USPQ2d 1139"],"canonical_citation":"In re Ethicon, Inc., 844 F.3d 1344, 121 USPQ2d 1139 (Fed. Cir. 2017)","decision_year":2017,"court":"Fed. Cir."},{"id":"pb_p2ynieuk","node_type":"prose_block","corpus_id":"mpep-e9r01-2024-html","opaque_url":"https://mpep.io/n/pb_p2ynieuk","effective_range":{"start_revision":"R-01.2024","end_revision":null},"rendered_text_html":"

    The key to supporting any rejection under 35 U.S.C. 103 is\n the clear articulation of the reason(s) why the claimed invention would have been\n obvious. The Supreme Court in KSR noted that the analysis supporting\n a rejection under 35\n U.S.C. 103 should be made explicit. The Court quoting In\n re Kahn, 441 F.3d 977, 988, 78 USPQ2d 1329, 1336 (Fed. Cir. 2006), stated\n that “‘[R]ejections on obviousness cannot be sustained by mere conclusory statements;\n instead, there must be some articulated reasoning with some rational underpinning to\n support the legal conclusion of obviousness.’” KSR, 550 U.S. at 418,\n 82 USPQ2d at 1396. See also Adapt Pharma Operations Ltd. v. Teva Pharms. USA,\n Inc., 25 F.4th 1354, 1365, 2022 USPQ2d 144 (Fed. Cir. 2022) (stating that a\n determination of obviousness “requires ‘identify[ing] a reason that would have prompted\n a person of ordinary skill in the relevant field to combine the elements in the way the\n claimed new invention does’” (quoting KSR, 550 U.S. at 418, 82 USPQ2d\n at 1395). Examples of rationales that may support a conclusion of obviousness include: \n

    ","rendered_text_plain":"The key to supporting any rejection under 35 U.S.C. 103 is the clear articulation of the reason(s) why the claimed invention would have been obvious. The Supreme Court in KSR noted that the analysis supporting a rejection under 35 U.S.C. 103 should be made explicit. The Court quoting In re Kahn, 441 F.3d 977, 988, 78 USPQ2d 1329, 1336 (Fed. Cir. 2006), stated that “‘[R]ejections on obviousness cannot be sustained by mere conclusory statements; instead, there must be some articulated reasoning with some rational underpinning to support the legal conclusion of obviousness.’” KSR, 550 U.S. at 418, 82 USPQ2d at 1396. See also Adapt Pharma Operations Ltd. v. Teva Pharms. USA, Inc., 25 F.4th 1354, 1365, 2022 USPQ2d 144 (Fed. Cir. 2022) (stating that a determination of obviousness “requires ‘identify[ing] a reason that would have prompted a person of ordinary skill in the relevant field to combine the elements in the way the claimed new invention does’” (quoting KSR, 550 U.S. at 418, 82 USPQ2d at 1395). Examples of rationales that may support a conclusion of obviousness include:","provenance":{"source_file":"s2141.html","source_anchor":"d0e208661","source_sha256":"c18335410b948734844afa0950712df37f56fb7b8d25ca661deb44a79ef5e658"},"kind":"narrative","host_section_id":"se_thj3rw3j"},{"id":"cs_arqvby6o","node_type":"case","corpus_id":"mpep-e9r01-2024-html","opaque_url":"https://mpep.io/n/cs_arqvby6o","effective_range":{"start_revision":"R-01.2024","end_revision":null},"rendered_text_html":"","rendered_text_plain":"Adapt Pharma Operations Ltd. v. Teva Pharms. USA, Inc., 25 F.4th 1354, 2022 USPQ2d 144 (Fed. Cir. 2022)","provenance":{"source_file":"s2141.html","source_anchor":"","source_sha256":"c18335410b948734844afa0950712df37f56fb7b8d25ca661deb44a79ef5e658"},"short_name":"Adapt Pharma Operations Ltd. v. Teva Pharms. USA, Inc.","all_citations":["25 F.4th 1354","2022 USPQ2d 144"],"canonical_citation":"Adapt Pharma Operations Ltd. v. Teva Pharms. USA, Inc., 25 F.4th 1354, 2022 USPQ2d 144 (Fed. Cir. 2022)","decision_year":2022,"court":"Fed. Cir."},{"id":"ls_e7iykggh","node_type":"list","corpus_id":"mpep-e9r01-2024-html","opaque_url":"https://mpep.io/n/ls_e7iykggh","effective_range":{"start_revision":"R-01.2024","end_revision":null},"rendered_text_html":"","rendered_text_plain":"","provenance":{"source_file":"s2141.html","source_anchor":"d0e208682","source_sha256":"c18335410b948734844afa0950712df37f56fb7b8d25ca661deb44a79ef5e658"},"enumerator_style":"alpha_upper","nesting_depth":1,"parent_list_item_id":null,"host_section_id":"se_thj3rw3j","item_ids":["li_rcj4fhrl","li_nonhyv6g","li_6sfmsla2","li_m54fsndv","li_m2fwjs5q","li_xxmt7u4g","li_rohfzh6t"]},{"id":"li_rcj4fhrl","node_type":"list_item","corpus_id":"mpep-e9r01-2024-html","opaque_url":"https://mpep.io/n/li_rcj4fhrl","effective_range":{"start_revision":"R-01.2024","end_revision":null},"rendered_text_html":"
  • (A) Combining prior art elements according to known methods to yield\n predictable results;\n
    • ","rendered_text_plain":"(A) Combining prior art elements according to known methods to yield predictable results;","provenance":{"source_file":"s2141.html","source_anchor":"d0e208682","source_sha256":"c18335410b948734844afa0950712df37f56fb7b8d25ca661deb44a79ef5e658"},"enumerator_label":"(A)","enumerator_ordinal":0,"parent_list_id":"ls_e7iykggh","child_ids":null},{"id":"li_nonhyv6g","node_type":"list_item","corpus_id":"mpep-e9r01-2024-html","opaque_url":"https://mpep.io/n/li_nonhyv6g","effective_range":{"start_revision":"R-01.2024","end_revision":null},"rendered_text_html":"
  • (B) Simple substitution of one known element for another to obtain\n predictable results;\n
    • ","rendered_text_plain":"(B) Simple substitution of one known element for another to obtain predictable results;","provenance":{"source_file":"s2141.html","source_anchor":"d0e208686","source_sha256":"c18335410b948734844afa0950712df37f56fb7b8d25ca661deb44a79ef5e658"},"enumerator_label":"(B)","enumerator_ordinal":1,"parent_list_id":"ls_e7iykggh","child_ids":null},{"id":"li_6sfmsla2","node_type":"list_item","corpus_id":"mpep-e9r01-2024-html","opaque_url":"https://mpep.io/n/li_6sfmsla2","effective_range":{"start_revision":"R-01.2024","end_revision":null},"rendered_text_html":"
  • (C) Use of known technique to improve similar devices (methods, or\n products) in the same way;\n
    • ","rendered_text_plain":"(C) Use of known technique to improve similar devices (methods, or products) in the same way;","provenance":{"source_file":"s2141.html","source_anchor":"d0e208690","source_sha256":"c18335410b948734844afa0950712df37f56fb7b8d25ca661deb44a79ef5e658"},"enumerator_label":"(C)","enumerator_ordinal":2,"parent_list_id":"ls_e7iykggh","child_ids":null},{"id":"li_m54fsndv","node_type":"list_item","corpus_id":"mpep-e9r01-2024-html","opaque_url":"https://mpep.io/n/li_m54fsndv","effective_range":{"start_revision":"R-01.2024","end_revision":null},"rendered_text_html":"
  • (D) Applying a known technique to a known device (method, or product)\n ready for improvement to yield predictable results;\n
    • ","rendered_text_plain":"(D) Applying a known technique to a known device (method, or product) ready for improvement to yield predictable results;","provenance":{"source_file":"s2141.html","source_anchor":"d0e208694","source_sha256":"c18335410b948734844afa0950712df37f56fb7b8d25ca661deb44a79ef5e658"},"enumerator_label":"(D)","enumerator_ordinal":3,"parent_list_id":"ls_e7iykggh","child_ids":null},{"id":"li_m2fwjs5q","node_type":"list_item","corpus_id":"mpep-e9r01-2024-html","opaque_url":"https://mpep.io/n/li_m2fwjs5q","effective_range":{"start_revision":"R-01.2024","end_revision":null},"rendered_text_html":"
  • (E) “Obvious to try” – choosing from a finite number of identified,\n predictable solutions, with a reasonable expectation of success;\n
    • ","rendered_text_plain":"(E) “Obvious to try” – choosing from a finite number of identified, predictable solutions, with a reasonable expectation of success;","provenance":{"source_file":"s2141.html","source_anchor":"d0e208698","source_sha256":"c18335410b948734844afa0950712df37f56fb7b8d25ca661deb44a79ef5e658"},"enumerator_label":"(E)","enumerator_ordinal":4,"parent_list_id":"ls_e7iykggh","child_ids":null},{"id":"li_xxmt7u4g","node_type":"list_item","corpus_id":"mpep-e9r01-2024-html","opaque_url":"https://mpep.io/n/li_xxmt7u4g","effective_range":{"start_revision":"R-01.2024","end_revision":null},"rendered_text_html":"
  • (F) Known work in one field of endeavor may prompt variations of it\n for use in either the same field or a different one based on design incentives or\n other market forces if the variations are predictable to one of ordinary skill in\n the art;\n
    • ","rendered_text_plain":"(F) Known work in one field of endeavor may prompt variations of it for use in either the same field or a different one based on design incentives or other market forces if the variations are predictable to one of ordinary skill in the art;","provenance":{"source_file":"s2141.html","source_anchor":"d0e208702","source_sha256":"c18335410b948734844afa0950712df37f56fb7b8d25ca661deb44a79ef5e658"},"enumerator_label":"(F)","enumerator_ordinal":5,"parent_list_id":"ls_e7iykggh","child_ids":null},{"id":"li_rohfzh6t","node_type":"list_item","corpus_id":"mpep-e9r01-2024-html","opaque_url":"https://mpep.io/n/li_rohfzh6t","effective_range":{"start_revision":"R-01.2024","end_revision":null},"rendered_text_html":"
  • (G) Some teaching, suggestion, or motivation in the prior art that\n would have led one of ordinary skill to modify the prior art reference or to\n combine prior art reference teachings to arrive at the claimed invention.\n
    • ","rendered_text_plain":"(G) Some teaching, suggestion, or motivation in the prior art that would have led one of ordinary skill to modify the prior art reference or to combine prior art reference teachings to arrive at the claimed invention.","provenance":{"source_file":"s2141.html","source_anchor":"d0e208706","source_sha256":"c18335410b948734844afa0950712df37f56fb7b8d25ca661deb44a79ef5e658"},"enumerator_label":"(G)","enumerator_ordinal":6,"parent_list_id":"ls_e7iykggh","child_ids":null},{"id":"pb_v2cmanjc","node_type":"prose_block","corpus_id":"mpep-e9r01-2024-html","opaque_url":"https://mpep.io/n/pb_v2cmanjc","effective_range":{"start_revision":"R-01.2024","end_revision":null},"rendered_text_html":"

    See MPEP § 2143 for a discussion of the rationales listed above\n along with examples illustrating how the cited rationales may be used to support a\n finding of obviousness. See also MPEP § 2144 - § 2144.09 for\n additional guidance regarding support for obviousness determinations.\n

    ","rendered_text_plain":"See MPEP § 2143 for a discussion of the rationales listed above along with examples illustrating how the cited rationales may be used to support a finding of obviousness. See also MPEP § 2144 - § 2144.09 for additional guidance regarding support for obviousness determinations.","provenance":{"source_file":"s2141.html","source_anchor":"d0e208710","source_sha256":"c18335410b948734844afa0950712df37f56fb7b8d25ca661deb44a79ef5e658"},"kind":"narrative","host_section_id":"se_thj3rw3j"},{"id":"pb_q2pr2xzs","node_type":"prose_block","corpus_id":"mpep-e9r01-2024-html","opaque_url":"https://mpep.io/n/pb_q2pr2xzs","effective_range":{"start_revision":"R-01.2024","end_revision":null},"rendered_text_html":"IV. APPLICANT’S REPLY","rendered_text_plain":"IV. APPLICANT’S REPLY","provenance":{"source_file":"s2141.html","source_anchor":"d0e208143/b.18","source_sha256":"c18335410b948734844afa0950712df37f56fb7b8d25ca661deb44a79ef5e658"},"kind":"informal_heading","host_section_id":"se_thj3rw3j","heading_level":2,"heading_text":"IV. APPLICANT’S REPLY"},{"id":"pb_rakahvnt","node_type":"prose_block","corpus_id":"mpep-e9r01-2024-html","opaque_url":"https://mpep.io/n/pb_rakahvnt","effective_range":{"start_revision":"R-01.2024","end_revision":null},"rendered_text_html":"

    Once Office personnel have issued a rejection that establishes the\n Graham factual findings and concludes, in view of the relevant\n evidence of record at that time, that the claimed invention would have been obvious as\n of the relevant time, the burden then shifts to the applicant to (A) show that the\n Office erred in these findings or (B) provide other evidence to show that the claimed\n subject matter would have been nonobvious. 37 CFR 1.111(b) requires applicant\n to distinctly and specifically point out the supposed errors in the Office’s action and\n reply to every ground of objection and rejection in the Office action. The reply must\n present arguments pointing out the specific distinction believed to render the claims\n patentable over any applied references. \n

    ","rendered_text_plain":"Once Office personnel have issued a rejection that establishes the Graham factual findings and concludes, in view of the relevant evidence of record at that time, that the claimed invention would have been obvious as of the relevant time, the burden then shifts to the applicant to (A) show that the Office erred in these findings or (B) provide other evidence to show that the claimed subject matter would have been nonobvious. 37 CFR 1.111(b) requires applicant to distinctly and specifically point out the supposed errors in the Office’s action and reply to every ground of objection and rejection in the Office action. The reply must present arguments pointing out the specific distinction believed to render the claims patentable over any applied references.","provenance":{"source_file":"s2141.html","source_anchor":"d0e208726","source_sha256":"c18335410b948734844afa0950712df37f56fb7b8d25ca661deb44a79ef5e658"},"kind":"narrative","host_section_id":"se_thj3rw3j"},{"id":"st_t3zond3i","node_type":"statute","corpus_id":"mpep-e9r01-2024-html","opaque_url":"https://mpep.io/n/st_t3zond3i","effective_range":{"start_revision":"R-01.2024","end_revision":null},"rendered_text_html":"","rendered_text_plain":"","provenance":{"source_file":"s2141.html","source_anchor":"","source_sha256":"c18335410b948734844afa0950712df37f56fb7b8d25ca661deb44a79ef5e658"},"authority":"us_cfr","authority_title_num":"37","authority_section_num":"1.111","subsection_path":["b"],"canonical_citation":"37 CFR 1.111(b)"},{"id":"pb_6qo6yyhi","node_type":"prose_block","corpus_id":"mpep-e9r01-2024-html","opaque_url":"https://mpep.io/n/pb_6qo6yyhi","effective_range":{"start_revision":"R-01.2024","end_revision":null},"rendered_text_html":"

    If an applicant disagrees with any factual findings by the Office, an\n effective traverse of a rejection based wholly or partially on such findings must\n include a reasoned statement explaining why the applicant believes the Office has erred\n substantively as to the factual findings. A mere statement or argument that the Office\n has not established a prima facie case of obviousness or that the\n Office’s reliance on common knowledge is unsupported by documentary evidence will not be\n considered substantively adequate to rebut the rejection or an effective traverse of the\n rejection under 37 CFR\n 1.111(b). Office personnel addressing this situation may repeat\n the rejection made in the prior Office action and make the next Office action final. See\n MPEP §\n 706.07(a).\n

    ","rendered_text_plain":"If an applicant disagrees with any factual findings by the Office, an effective traverse of a rejection based wholly or partially on such findings must include a reasoned statement explaining why the applicant believes the Office has erred substantively as to the factual findings. A mere statement or argument that the Office has not established a prima facie case of obviousness or that the Office’s reliance on common knowledge is unsupported by documentary evidence will not be considered substantively adequate to rebut the rejection or an effective traverse of the rejection under 37 CFR 1.111(b). Office personnel addressing this situation may repeat the rejection made in the prior Office action and make the next Office action final. See MPEP § 706.07(a).","provenance":{"source_file":"s2141.html","source_anchor":"d0e208735","source_sha256":"c18335410b948734844afa0950712df37f56fb7b8d25ca661deb44a79ef5e658"},"kind":"narrative","host_section_id":"se_thj3rw3j"},{"id":"pb_jcvevteq","node_type":"prose_block","corpus_id":"mpep-e9r01-2024-html","opaque_url":"https://mpep.io/n/pb_jcvevteq","effective_range":{"start_revision":"R-01.2024","end_revision":null},"rendered_text_html":"

    An applicant’s reply could also establish that a\n disclosure relied on in an obviousness rejection is not in fact prior art in view of a\n 35 U.S.C.\n 102(b) exception, or that subject matter, although prior art, is\n disqualified for use in an obviousness rejection in view of pre-AIA 35 U.S.C.\n 103(c). See MPEP §§ 2146, 2153.01\n and 2154.02. See also MPEP §\n 2155 regarding affidavits or declarations under\n 37 CFR\n 1.130 to overcome prior art rejections.\n

    ","rendered_text_plain":"An applicant’s reply could also establish that a disclosure relied on in an obviousness rejection is not in fact prior art in view of a 35 U.S.C. 102(b) exception, or that subject matter, although prior art, is disqualified for use in an obviousness rejection in view of pre-AIA 35 U.S.C. 103(c). See MPEP §§ 2146, 2153.01 and 2154.02. See also MPEP § 2155 regarding affidavits or declarations under 37 CFR 1.130 to overcome prior art rejections.","provenance":{"source_file":"s2141.html","source_anchor":"ch2100_p_3ab82_12266_2df","source_sha256":"c18335410b948734844afa0950712df37f56fb7b8d25ca661deb44a79ef5e658"},"kind":"narrative","host_section_id":"se_thj3rw3j"},{"id":"st_vfglwfey","node_type":"statute","corpus_id":"mpep-e9r01-2024-html","opaque_url":"https://mpep.io/n/st_vfglwfey","effective_range":{"start_revision":"R-01.2024","end_revision":null},"rendered_text_html":"","rendered_text_plain":"","provenance":{"source_file":"s2141.html","source_anchor":"","source_sha256":"c18335410b948734844afa0950712df37f56fb7b8d25ca661deb44a79ef5e658"},"authority":"us_usc","authority_title_num":"35","authority_section_num":"102","subsection_path":["b"],"canonical_citation":"35 U.S.C. 102(b)"},{"id":"st_ych5oafa","node_type":"statute","corpus_id":"mpep-e9r01-2024-html","opaque_url":"https://mpep.io/n/st_ych5oafa","effective_range":{"start_revision":"R-01.2024","end_revision":null},"rendered_text_html":"","rendered_text_plain":"","provenance":{"source_file":"s2141.html","source_anchor":"","source_sha256":"c18335410b948734844afa0950712df37f56fb7b8d25ca661deb44a79ef5e658"},"authority":"us_usc","authority_title_num":"35","authority_section_num":"103","subsection_path":["c"],"canonical_citation":"35 U.S.C. 103(c)"},{"id":"st_5mdnnbnq","node_type":"statute","corpus_id":"mpep-e9r01-2024-html","opaque_url":"https://mpep.io/n/st_5mdnnbnq","effective_range":{"start_revision":"R-01.2024","end_revision":null},"rendered_text_html":"","rendered_text_plain":"","provenance":{"source_file":"s2141.html","source_anchor":"","source_sha256":"c18335410b948734844afa0950712df37f56fb7b8d25ca661deb44a79ef5e658"},"authority":"us_cfr","authority_title_num":"37","authority_section_num":"1.130","subsection_path":[],"canonical_citation":"37 CFR 1.130"},{"id":"pb_tzm7pw65","node_type":"prose_block","corpus_id":"mpep-e9r01-2024-html","opaque_url":"https://mpep.io/n/pb_tzm7pw65","effective_range":{"start_revision":"R-01.2024","end_revision":null},"rendered_text_html":"V. CONSIDERATION OF APPLICANT’S REBUTTAL EVIDENCE ","rendered_text_plain":"V. CONSIDERATION OF APPLICANT’S REBUTTAL EVIDENCE","provenance":{"source_file":"s2141.html","source_anchor":"d0e208143/b.20","source_sha256":"c18335410b948734844afa0950712df37f56fb7b8d25ca661deb44a79ef5e658"},"kind":"informal_heading","host_section_id":"se_thj3rw3j","heading_level":2,"heading_text":"V. CONSIDERATION OF APPLICANT’S REBUTTAL EVIDENCE"},{"id":"pb_coixfoni","node_type":"prose_block","corpus_id":"mpep-e9r01-2024-html","opaque_url":"https://mpep.io/n/pb_coixfoni","effective_range":{"start_revision":"R-01.2024","end_revision":null},"rendered_text_html":"

    Office personnel should consider all rebuttal evidence that is timely\n presented by the applicants when reevaluating any obviousness determination. Rebuttal\n evidence may include evidence of “secondary considerations,” such as “commercial\n success, long felt but unsolved needs, [and] failure of others” (Graham v. John\n Deere Co., 383 U.S. at 17, 148 USPQ at 467), and may also include evidence\n of unexpected results. As set forth above, Office personnel must articulate findings of\n fact that support the rationale relied upon in an obviousness rejection. As a result,\n applicants are likely to submit evidence to rebut the fact finding made by Office\n personnel. For example, in the case of a claim to a combination, applicants may submit\n evidence or argument to demonstrate that: \n

    ","rendered_text_plain":"Office personnel should consider all rebuttal evidence that is timely presented by the applicants when reevaluating any obviousness determination. Rebuttal evidence may include evidence of “secondary considerations,” such as “commercial success, long felt but unsolved needs, [and] failure of others” (Graham v. John Deere Co., 383 U.S. at 17, 148 USPQ at 467), and may also include evidence of unexpected results. As set forth above, Office personnel must articulate findings of fact that support the rationale relied upon in an obviousness rejection. As a result, applicants are likely to submit evidence to rebut the fact finding made by Office personnel. For example, in the case of a claim to a combination, applicants may submit evidence or argument to demonstrate that:","provenance":{"source_file":"s2141.html","source_anchor":"d0e208754","source_sha256":"c18335410b948734844afa0950712df37f56fb7b8d25ca661deb44a79ef5e658"},"kind":"narrative","host_section_id":"se_thj3rw3j"},{"id":"ls_xj3rirpa","node_type":"list","corpus_id":"mpep-e9r01-2024-html","opaque_url":"https://mpep.io/n/ls_xj3rirpa","effective_range":{"start_revision":"R-01.2024","end_revision":null},"rendered_text_html":"","rendered_text_plain":"","provenance":{"source_file":"s2141.html","source_anchor":"d0e208762","source_sha256":"c18335410b948734844afa0950712df37f56fb7b8d25ca661deb44a79ef5e658"},"enumerator_style":"alpha_upper","nesting_depth":1,"parent_list_item_id":null,"host_section_id":"se_thj3rw3j","item_ids":["li_bqquyeix","li_x3brdgct","li_jmpjv3mk"]},{"id":"li_bqquyeix","node_type":"list_item","corpus_id":"mpep-e9r01-2024-html","opaque_url":"https://mpep.io/n/li_bqquyeix","effective_range":{"start_revision":"R-01.2024","end_revision":null},"rendered_text_html":"
  • (A) one of ordinary skill in the art could not have combined the\n claimed elements by known methods (e.g., due to technological difficulties);\n
    • ","rendered_text_plain":"(A) one of ordinary skill in the art could not have combined the claimed elements by known methods (e.g., due to technological difficulties);","provenance":{"source_file":"s2141.html","source_anchor":"d0e208762","source_sha256":"c18335410b948734844afa0950712df37f56fb7b8d25ca661deb44a79ef5e658"},"enumerator_label":"(A)","enumerator_ordinal":0,"parent_list_id":"ls_xj3rirpa","child_ids":null},{"id":"li_x3brdgct","node_type":"list_item","corpus_id":"mpep-e9r01-2024-html","opaque_url":"https://mpep.io/n/li_x3brdgct","effective_range":{"start_revision":"R-01.2024","end_revision":null},"rendered_text_html":"
  • (B) the elements in combination do not merely perform the function\n that each element performs separately; or\n
    • ","rendered_text_plain":"(B) the elements in combination do not merely perform the function that each element performs separately; or","provenance":{"source_file":"s2141.html","source_anchor":"d0e208766","source_sha256":"c18335410b948734844afa0950712df37f56fb7b8d25ca661deb44a79ef5e658"},"enumerator_label":"(B)","enumerator_ordinal":1,"parent_list_id":"ls_xj3rirpa","child_ids":null},{"id":"li_jmpjv3mk","node_type":"list_item","corpus_id":"mpep-e9r01-2024-html","opaque_url":"https://mpep.io/n/li_jmpjv3mk","effective_range":{"start_revision":"R-01.2024","end_revision":null},"rendered_text_html":"
  • (C) the results of the claimed combination were unexpected.
    • ","rendered_text_plain":"(C) the results of the claimed combination were unexpected.","provenance":{"source_file":"s2141.html","source_anchor":"d0e208770","source_sha256":"c18335410b948734844afa0950712df37f56fb7b8d25ca661deb44a79ef5e658"},"enumerator_label":"(C)","enumerator_ordinal":2,"parent_list_id":"ls_xj3rirpa","child_ids":null},{"id":"pb_q322jzi5","node_type":"prose_block","corpus_id":"mpep-e9r01-2024-html","opaque_url":"https://mpep.io/n/pb_q322jzi5","effective_range":{"start_revision":"R-01.2024","end_revision":null},"rendered_text_html":"

    Once the applicant has presented rebuttal evidence, Office personnel\n should reconsider any initial obviousness determination in view of the entire record.\n See, e.g., In re Piasecki, 745 F.2d 1468, 1472, 223 USPQ 785, 788\n (Fed. Cir. 1984); In re Eli Lilly & Co., 902 F.2d 943, 945, 14\n USPQ2d 1741, 1743 (Fed. Cir. 1990). All the rejections of record and proposed rejections\n and their bases should be reviewed to confirm their continued viability. The Office\n action should clearly communicate the Office’s findings and conclusions, articulating\n how the conclusions are supported by the findings. The procedures set forth in\n MPEP §\n 706.07(a) are to be followed in determining whether an action\n may be made final. \n

    ","rendered_text_plain":"Once the applicant has presented rebuttal evidence, Office personnel should reconsider any initial obviousness determination in view of the entire record. See, e.g., In re Piasecki, 745 F.2d 1468, 1472, 223 USPQ 785, 788 (Fed. Cir. 1984); In re Eli Lilly & Co., 902 F.2d 943, 945, 14 USPQ2d 1741, 1743 (Fed. Cir. 1990). All the rejections of record and proposed rejections and their bases should be reviewed to confirm their continued viability. The Office action should clearly communicate the Office’s findings and conclusions, articulating how the conclusions are supported by the findings. The procedures set forth in MPEP § 706.07(a) are to be followed in determining whether an action may be made final.","provenance":{"source_file":"s2141.html","source_anchor":"d0e208774","source_sha256":"c18335410b948734844afa0950712df37f56fb7b8d25ca661deb44a79ef5e658"},"kind":"narrative","host_section_id":"se_thj3rw3j"},{"id":"cs_ksdzhm6k","node_type":"case","corpus_id":"mpep-e9r01-2024-html","opaque_url":"https://mpep.io/n/cs_ksdzhm6k","effective_range":{"start_revision":"R-01.2024","end_revision":null},"rendered_text_html":"","rendered_text_plain":"In re Piasecki, 745 F.2d 1468, 223 USPQ 785 (Fed. Cir. 1984)","provenance":{"source_file":"s2141.html","source_anchor":"","source_sha256":"c18335410b948734844afa0950712df37f56fb7b8d25ca661deb44a79ef5e658"},"short_name":"In re Piasecki","all_citations":["745 F.2d 1468","223 USPQ 785"],"canonical_citation":"In re Piasecki, 745 F.2d 1468, 223 USPQ 785 (Fed. Cir. 1984)","decision_year":1984,"court":"Fed. Cir."},{"id":"cs_subdklxc","node_type":"case","corpus_id":"mpep-e9r01-2024-html","opaque_url":"https://mpep.io/n/cs_subdklxc","effective_range":{"start_revision":"R-01.2024","end_revision":null},"rendered_text_html":"","rendered_text_plain":"In re Eli Lilly & Co., 902 F.2d 943, 14 USPQ2d 1741 (Fed. Cir. 1990)","provenance":{"source_file":"s2141.html","source_anchor":"","source_sha256":"c18335410b948734844afa0950712df37f56fb7b8d25ca661deb44a79ef5e658"},"short_name":"In re Eli Lilly & Co.","all_citations":["902 F.2d 943","14 USPQ2d 1741"],"canonical_citation":"In re Eli Lilly & Co., 902 F.2d 943, 14 USPQ2d 1741 (Fed. Cir. 1990)","decision_year":1990,"court":"Fed. Cir."},{"id":"pb_ielnzxkr","node_type":"prose_block","corpus_id":"mpep-e9r01-2024-html","opaque_url":"https://mpep.io/n/pb_ielnzxkr","effective_range":{"start_revision":"R-01.2024","end_revision":null},"rendered_text_html":"

    See MPEP\n § 2145 concerning consideration of applicant’s rebuttal\n evidence. See also MPEP §\n 716 to § 716.10 regarding affidavits or\n declarations filed under 37 CFR 1.132 for purposes of\n traversing grounds of rejection. \n

    ","rendered_text_plain":"See MPEP § 2145 concerning consideration of applicant’s rebuttal evidence. See also MPEP § 716 to § 716.10 regarding affidavits or declarations filed under 37 CFR 1.132 for purposes of traversing grounds of rejection.","provenance":{"source_file":"s2141.html","source_anchor":"d0e208788","source_sha256":"c18335410b948734844afa0950712df37f56fb7b8d25ca661deb44a79ef5e658"},"kind":"narrative","host_section_id":"se_thj3rw3j"},{"id":"st_shketnqg","node_type":"statute","corpus_id":"mpep-e9r01-2024-html","opaque_url":"https://mpep.io/n/st_shketnqg","effective_range":{"start_revision":"R-01.2024","end_revision":null},"rendered_text_html":"","rendered_text_plain":"","provenance":{"source_file":"s2141.html","source_anchor":"","source_sha256":"c18335410b948734844afa0950712df37f56fb7b8d25ca661deb44a79ef5e658"},"authority":"us_cfr","authority_title_num":"37","authority_section_num":"1.132","subsection_path":[],"canonical_citation":"37 CFR 1.132"},{"id":"pb_qdyvqevw","node_type":"prose_block","corpus_id":"mpep-e9r01-2024-html","opaque_url":"https://mpep.io/n/pb_qdyvqevw","effective_range":{"start_revision":"R-01.2024","end_revision":null},"rendered_text_html":"

    [Editor Note: This MPEP section is applicable regardless of whether an\n application is examined under the AIA or under pre-AIA law. For applications subject\n to the first inventor to file (FITF) provisions of the AIA, the relevant time is\n \"before the effective filing date of the claimed invention\". For applications subject\n to pre-AIA 35\n U.S.C. 102, the relevant time is \"at the time of the\n invention\". See MPEP § 2150 et seq. Many of the\n court decisions discussed in this section involved applications or patents subject to\n pre-AIA 35\n U.S.C. 102. These court decisions may be applicable to\n applications and patents subject to AIA 35 U.S.C. 102 but the\n relevant time is before the effective filing date of the claimed invention and not at\n the time of the invention.]

    ","rendered_text_plain":"[Editor Note: This MPEP section is applicable regardless of whether an application is examined under the AIA or under pre-AIA law. For applications subject to the first inventor to file (FITF) provisions of the AIA, the relevant time is \"before the effective filing date of the claimed invention\". For applications subject to pre-AIA 35 U.S.C. 102, the relevant time is \"at the time of the invention\". See MPEP § 2150 et seq. Many of the court decisions discussed in this section involved applications or patents subject to pre-AIA 35 U.S.C. 102. These court decisions may be applicable to applications and patents subject to AIA 35 U.S.C. 102 but the relevant time is before the effective filing date of the claimed invention and not at the time of the invention.]","provenance":{"source_file":"s2141.html","source_anchor":"ch2100_d223b3_2368a_165","source_sha256":"c18335410b948734844afa0950712df37f56fb7b8d25ca661deb44a79ef5e658"},"kind":"narrative","host_section_id":"se_ivzea5ns"},{"id":"pb_emhbzrxl","node_type":"prose_block","corpus_id":"mpep-e9r01-2024-html","opaque_url":"https://mpep.io/n/pb_emhbzrxl","effective_range":{"start_revision":"R-01.2024","end_revision":null},"rendered_text_html":"I. PRIOR ART AVAILABLE UNDER 35 U.S.C. 102 IS AVAILABLE UNDER 35 U.S.C.\n 103","rendered_text_plain":"I. PRIOR ART AVAILABLE UNDER 35 U.S.C. 102 IS AVAILABLE UNDER 35 U.S.C. 103","provenance":{"source_file":"s2141.html","source_anchor":"d0e208803/b.0","source_sha256":"c18335410b948734844afa0950712df37f56fb7b8d25ca661deb44a79ef5e658"},"kind":"informal_heading","host_section_id":"se_ivzea5ns","heading_level":2,"heading_text":"I. PRIOR ART AVAILABLE UNDER 35 U.S.C. 102 IS AVAILABLE UNDER 35 U.S.C. 103"},{"id":"pb_hp4wyvei","node_type":"prose_block","corpus_id":"mpep-e9r01-2024-html","opaque_url":"https://mpep.io/n/pb_hp4wyvei","effective_range":{"start_revision":"R-01.2024","end_revision":null},"rendered_text_html":"

    “Before answering Graham’s ‘content’ inquiry, it\n must be known whether a patent or publication is in the prior art under\n 35 U.S.C. §\n 102.” Panduit Corp. v. Dennison Mfg. Co.,\n 810 F.2d 1561, 1568, 1 USPQ2d 1593, 1597 (Fed. Cir.), cert.\n denied, 481 U.S. 1052 (1987). Subject matter that is prior art under\n 35 U.S.C.\n 102 can be used to support a rejection under section\n 103. Ex parte Andresen, 212 USPQ 100, 102\n (Bd. Pat. App. & Inter. 1981) (“it appears to us that the commentator [of 35\n U.S.C.A.] and the [congressional] committee viewed section 103 as\n including all of the various bars to a patent as set forth in section 102.”).\n See also In re Wertheim, 646 F.2d 527, 532, 209 USPQ 554, 560\n (CCPA 1981) (“Commensurate with the Senate Report and Mr. Federico's commentary, we\n have held that the term ‘prior art’ refers ‘to at least the statutory prior art\n material named in §\n 102.’”); and In re Hoeksema, 399 F.2d 269,\n 273, 158 USPQ 596, 600 (CCPA 1968) (“[w]hile 35 U.S.C. 102 is not directly\n involved in the issue on review, the conditions for patentability, novelty and loss\n of right to patent, there stated, may have relevance as to the disclosure which must\n be found in the prior art to find obviousness of an invention under section\n 103.”). \n

    ","rendered_text_plain":"“Before answering Graham’s ‘content’ inquiry, it must be known whether a patent or publication is in the prior art under 35 U.S.C. § 102.” Panduit Corp. v. Dennison Mfg. Co., 810 F.2d 1561, 1568, 1 USPQ2d 1593, 1597 (Fed. Cir.), cert. denied, 481 U.S. 1052 (1987). Subject matter that is prior art under 35 U.S.C. 102 can be used to support a rejection under section 103. Ex parte Andresen, 212 USPQ 100, 102 (Bd. Pat. App. & Inter. 1981) (“it appears to us that the commentator [of 35 U.S.C.A.] and the [congressional] committee viewed section 103 as including all of the various bars to a patent as set forth in section 102.”). See also In re Wertheim, 646 F.2d 527, 532, 209 USPQ 554, 560 (CCPA 1981) (“Commensurate with the Senate Report and Mr. Federico's commentary, we have held that the term ‘prior art’ refers ‘to at least the statutory prior art material named in § 102.’”); and In re Hoeksema, 399 F.2d 269, 273, 158 USPQ 596, 600 (CCPA 1968) (“[w]hile 35 U.S.C. 102 is not directly involved in the issue on review, the conditions for patentability, novelty and loss of right to patent, there stated, may have relevance as to the disclosure which must be found in the prior art to find obviousness of an invention under section 103.”).","provenance":{"source_file":"s2141.html","source_anchor":"d0e208811","source_sha256":"c18335410b948734844afa0950712df37f56fb7b8d25ca661deb44a79ef5e658"},"kind":"narrative","host_section_id":"se_ivzea5ns"},{"id":"cs_j6fxp33f","node_type":"case","corpus_id":"mpep-e9r01-2024-html","opaque_url":"https://mpep.io/n/cs_j6fxp33f","effective_range":{"start_revision":"R-01.2024","end_revision":null},"rendered_text_html":"","rendered_text_plain":"Panduit Corp. v. Dennison Mfg. Co., 481 U.S. 1052 (1987)","provenance":{"source_file":"s2141.html","source_anchor":"","source_sha256":"c18335410b948734844afa0950712df37f56fb7b8d25ca661deb44a79ef5e658"},"short_name":"Panduit Corp. v. Dennison Mfg. Co.","all_citations":["481 U.S. 1052"],"canonical_citation":"Panduit Corp. v. Dennison Mfg. Co., 481 U.S. 1052 (1987)","decision_year":1987,"court":"SCOTUS"},{"id":"cs_bdktrqrv","node_type":"case","corpus_id":"mpep-e9r01-2024-html","opaque_url":"https://mpep.io/n/cs_bdktrqrv","effective_range":{"start_revision":"R-01.2024","end_revision":null},"rendered_text_html":"","rendered_text_plain":"Ex parte Andresen, 212 USPQ 100 (Bd. Pat. App. & Inter. 1981)","provenance":{"source_file":"s2141.html","source_anchor":"","source_sha256":"c18335410b948734844afa0950712df37f56fb7b8d25ca661deb44a79ef5e658"},"short_name":"Ex parte Andresen","all_citations":["212 USPQ 100"],"canonical_citation":"Ex parte Andresen, 212 USPQ 100 (Bd. Pat. App. & Inter. 1981)","decision_year":1981,"court":"B.P.A.I."},{"id":"cs_qx7meudb","node_type":"case","corpus_id":"mpep-e9r01-2024-html","opaque_url":"https://mpep.io/n/cs_qx7meudb","effective_range":{"start_revision":"R-01.2024","end_revision":null},"rendered_text_html":"","rendered_text_plain":"In re Wertheim, 646 F.2d 527, 209 USPQ 554 (CCPA 1981)","provenance":{"source_file":"s2141.html","source_anchor":"","source_sha256":"c18335410b948734844afa0950712df37f56fb7b8d25ca661deb44a79ef5e658"},"short_name":"In re Wertheim","all_citations":["646 F.2d 527","209 USPQ 554"],"canonical_citation":"In re Wertheim, 646 F.2d 527, 209 USPQ 554 (CCPA 1981)","decision_year":1981,"court":"CCPA"},{"id":"cs_ap3kelx7","node_type":"case","corpus_id":"mpep-e9r01-2024-html","opaque_url":"https://mpep.io/n/cs_ap3kelx7","effective_range":{"start_revision":"R-01.2024","end_revision":null},"rendered_text_html":"","rendered_text_plain":"In re Hoeksema, 399 F.2d 269, 158 USPQ 596 (CCPA 1968)","provenance":{"source_file":"s2141.html","source_anchor":"","source_sha256":"c18335410b948734844afa0950712df37f56fb7b8d25ca661deb44a79ef5e658"},"short_name":"In re Hoeksema","all_citations":["399 F.2d 269","158 USPQ 596"],"canonical_citation":"In re Hoeksema, 399 F.2d 269, 158 USPQ 596 (CCPA 1968)","decision_year":1968,"court":"CCPA"},{"id":"pb_2ckuzrkz","node_type":"prose_block","corpus_id":"mpep-e9r01-2024-html","opaque_url":"https://mpep.io/n/pb_2ckuzrkz","effective_range":{"start_revision":"R-01.2024","end_revision":null},"rendered_text_html":"

    Furthermore, admitted prior art can be relied upon for both\n anticipation and obviousness determinations, regardless of whether the admitted prior\n art would otherwise qualify as prior art under the statutory categories of\n 35 U.S.C.\n 102. Riverwood Int’l Corp. v. R.A. Jones &\n Co., 324 F.3d 1346, 1354, 66 USPQ2d 1331, 1337 (Fed. Cir. 2003);\n Constant v. Advanced Micro-Devices Inc., 848 F.2d 1560, 1570, 7\n USPQ2d 1057, 1063 (Fed. Cir. 1988). See MPEP § 2129 for discussion of\n admissions as prior art.\n

    ","rendered_text_plain":"Furthermore, admitted prior art can be relied upon for both anticipation and obviousness determinations, regardless of whether the admitted prior art would otherwise qualify as prior art under the statutory categories of 35 U.S.C. 102. Riverwood Int’l Corp. v. R.A. Jones & Co., 324 F.3d 1346, 1354, 66 USPQ2d 1331, 1337 (Fed. Cir. 2003); Constant v. Advanced Micro-Devices Inc., 848 F.2d 1560, 1570, 7 USPQ2d 1057, 1063 (Fed. Cir. 1988). See MPEP § 2129 for discussion of admissions as prior art.","provenance":{"source_file":"s2141.html","source_anchor":"d0e208829","source_sha256":"c18335410b948734844afa0950712df37f56fb7b8d25ca661deb44a79ef5e658"},"kind":"narrative","host_section_id":"se_ivzea5ns"},{"id":"cs_zfyf44ll","node_type":"case","corpus_id":"mpep-e9r01-2024-html","opaque_url":"https://mpep.io/n/cs_zfyf44ll","effective_range":{"start_revision":"R-01.2024","end_revision":null},"rendered_text_html":"","rendered_text_plain":"Riverwood Int’l Corp. v. R.A. Jones & Co., 324 F.3d 1346, 66 USPQ2d 1331 (Fed. Cir. 2003)","provenance":{"source_file":"s2141.html","source_anchor":"","source_sha256":"c18335410b948734844afa0950712df37f56fb7b8d25ca661deb44a79ef5e658"},"short_name":"Riverwood Int’l Corp. v. R.A. Jones & Co.","all_citations":["324 F.3d 1346","66 USPQ2d 1331"],"canonical_citation":"Riverwood Int’l Corp. v. R.A. Jones & Co., 324 F.3d 1346, 66 USPQ2d 1331 (Fed. Cir. 2003)","decision_year":2003,"court":"Fed. Cir."},{"id":"cs_p2tfgr4b","node_type":"case","corpus_id":"mpep-e9r01-2024-html","opaque_url":"https://mpep.io/n/cs_p2tfgr4b","effective_range":{"start_revision":"R-01.2024","end_revision":null},"rendered_text_html":"","rendered_text_plain":"Constant v. Advanced Micro-Devices Inc., 848 F.2d 1560, 7 USPQ2d 1057 (Fed. Cir. 1988)","provenance":{"source_file":"s2141.html","source_anchor":"","source_sha256":"c18335410b948734844afa0950712df37f56fb7b8d25ca661deb44a79ef5e658"},"short_name":"Constant v. Advanced Micro-Devices Inc.","all_citations":["848 F.2d 1560","7 USPQ2d 1057"],"canonical_citation":"Constant v. Advanced Micro-Devices Inc., 848 F.2d 1560, 7 USPQ2d 1057 (Fed. Cir. 1988)","decision_year":1988,"court":"Fed. Cir."},{"id":"pb_mqh726e6","node_type":"prose_block","corpus_id":"mpep-e9r01-2024-html","opaque_url":"https://mpep.io/n/pb_mqh726e6","effective_range":{"start_revision":"R-01.2024","end_revision":null},"rendered_text_html":"

    An obviousness rejection is ordinarily based on a disclosure that\n qualifies as prior art under 35 U.S.C. 102 or\n pre-AIA 35\n U.S.C. 102. If it is established that a disclosure does not\n qualify as prior art under an appropriate section of 35 U.S.C.\n 102, then the disclosure is also not prior art that can be used\n in an obviousness rejection. For instance, for a claimed invention subject to\n 35\n U.S.C. 102, a 35 U.S.C. 102(a)(2) reference\n used in an anticipation rejection but overcome by submitting a declaration under\n 37 CFR\n 1.130(a) cannot be used in an obviousness rejection. Likewise,\n for a claimed invention subject to pre-AIA 35 U.S.C. 102, a\n pre-AIA 35\n U.S.C. 102(a) reference used in an anticipation rejection but\n overcome by submitting a declaration under 37 CFR 1.131 cannot be used in an\n obviousness rejection.\n

    ","rendered_text_plain":"An obviousness rejection is ordinarily based on a disclosure that qualifies as prior art under 35 U.S.C. 102 or pre-AIA 35 U.S.C. 102. If it is established that a disclosure does not qualify as prior art under an appropriate section of 35 U.S.C. 102, then the disclosure is also not prior art that can be used in an obviousness rejection. For instance, for a claimed invention subject to 35 U.S.C. 102, a 35 U.S.C. 102(a)(2) reference used in an anticipation rejection but overcome by submitting a declaration under 37 CFR 1.130(a) cannot be used in an obviousness rejection. Likewise, for a claimed invention subject to pre-AIA 35 U.S.C. 102, a pre-AIA 35 U.S.C. 102(a) reference used in an anticipation rejection but overcome by submitting a declaration under 37 CFR 1.131 cannot be used in an obviousness rejection.","provenance":{"source_file":"s2141.html","source_anchor":"d0e208846","source_sha256":"c18335410b948734844afa0950712df37f56fb7b8d25ca661deb44a79ef5e658"},"kind":"narrative","host_section_id":"se_ivzea5ns"},{"id":"st_4dycr6vk","node_type":"statute","corpus_id":"mpep-e9r01-2024-html","opaque_url":"https://mpep.io/n/st_4dycr6vk","effective_range":{"start_revision":"R-01.2024","end_revision":null},"rendered_text_html":"","rendered_text_plain":"","provenance":{"source_file":"s2141.html","source_anchor":"","source_sha256":"c18335410b948734844afa0950712df37f56fb7b8d25ca661deb44a79ef5e658"},"authority":"us_usc","authority_title_num":"35","authority_section_num":"102","subsection_path":["a","2"],"canonical_citation":"35 U.S.C. 102(a)(2)"},{"id":"st_63uxyj23","node_type":"statute","corpus_id":"mpep-e9r01-2024-html","opaque_url":"https://mpep.io/n/st_63uxyj23","effective_range":{"start_revision":"R-01.2024","end_revision":null},"rendered_text_html":"","rendered_text_plain":"","provenance":{"source_file":"s2141.html","source_anchor":"","source_sha256":"c18335410b948734844afa0950712df37f56fb7b8d25ca661deb44a79ef5e658"},"authority":"us_cfr","authority_title_num":"37","authority_section_num":"1.130","subsection_path":["a"],"canonical_citation":"37 CFR 1.130(a)"},{"id":"st_y2hyqexd","node_type":"statute","corpus_id":"mpep-e9r01-2024-html","opaque_url":"https://mpep.io/n/st_y2hyqexd","effective_range":{"start_revision":"R-01.2024","end_revision":null},"rendered_text_html":"","rendered_text_plain":"","provenance":{"source_file":"s2141.html","source_anchor":"","source_sha256":"c18335410b948734844afa0950712df37f56fb7b8d25ca661deb44a79ef5e658"},"authority":"us_usc","authority_title_num":"35","authority_section_num":"102","subsection_path":["a"],"canonical_citation":"35 U.S.C. 102(a)"},{"id":"st_5cd7zuab","node_type":"statute","corpus_id":"mpep-e9r01-2024-html","opaque_url":"https://mpep.io/n/st_5cd7zuab","effective_range":{"start_revision":"R-01.2024","end_revision":null},"rendered_text_html":"","rendered_text_plain":"","provenance":{"source_file":"s2141.html","source_anchor":"","source_sha256":"c18335410b948734844afa0950712df37f56fb7b8d25ca661deb44a79ef5e658"},"authority":"us_cfr","authority_title_num":"37","authority_section_num":"1.131","subsection_path":[],"canonical_citation":"37 CFR 1.131"},{"id":"pb_kd4mdwas","node_type":"prose_block","corpus_id":"mpep-e9r01-2024-html","opaque_url":"https://mpep.io/n/pb_kd4mdwas","effective_range":{"start_revision":"R-01.2024","end_revision":null},"rendered_text_html":"

    For an overview of what constitutes prior art under\n 35 U.S.C.\n 102, see MPEP § 901 - § 901.06(d),\n § 2121 - § 2129 and §\n 2151 - § 2155.\n

    ","rendered_text_plain":"For an overview of what constitutes prior art under 35 U.S.C. 102, see MPEP § 901 - § 901.06(d), § 2121 - § 2129 and § 2151 - § 2155.","provenance":{"source_file":"s2141.html","source_anchor":"d0e208858","source_sha256":"c18335410b948734844afa0950712df37f56fb7b8d25ca661deb44a79ef5e658"},"kind":"narrative","host_section_id":"se_ivzea5ns"},{"id":"pb_mnurebd7","node_type":"prose_block","corpus_id":"mpep-e9r01-2024-html","opaque_url":"https://mpep.io/n/pb_mnurebd7","effective_range":{"start_revision":"R-01.2024","end_revision":null},"rendered_text_html":"II. SUBSTANTIVE CONTENT OF THE PRIOR ART","rendered_text_plain":"II. SUBSTANTIVE CONTENT OF THE PRIOR ART","provenance":{"source_file":"s2141.html","source_anchor":"d0e208803/b.2","source_sha256":"c18335410b948734844afa0950712df37f56fb7b8d25ca661deb44a79ef5e658"},"kind":"informal_heading","host_section_id":"se_ivzea5ns","heading_level":2,"heading_text":"II. SUBSTANTIVE CONTENT OF THE PRIOR ART"},{"id":"pb_2k6ehmc2","node_type":"prose_block","corpus_id":"mpep-e9r01-2024-html","opaque_url":"https://mpep.io/n/pb_2k6ehmc2","effective_range":{"start_revision":"R-01.2024","end_revision":null},"rendered_text_html":"

    See MPEP § 2121 - § 2129 for case law relating to the\n substantive content of the prior art (e.g., availability of inoperative devices,\n extent to which prior art must be enabling, broad disclosure rather than preferred\n embodiments, admissions, etc.).\n

    ","rendered_text_plain":"See MPEP § 2121 - § 2129 for case law relating to the substantive content of the prior art (e.g., availability of inoperative devices, extent to which prior art must be enabling, broad disclosure rather than preferred embodiments, admissions, etc.).","provenance":{"source_file":"s2141.html","source_anchor":"d0e208880","source_sha256":"c18335410b948734844afa0950712df37f56fb7b8d25ca661deb44a79ef5e658"},"kind":"narrative","host_section_id":"se_ivzea5ns"},{"id":"pb_2wezvz33","node_type":"prose_block","corpus_id":"mpep-e9r01-2024-html","opaque_url":"https://mpep.io/n/pb_2wezvz33","effective_range":{"start_revision":"R-01.2024","end_revision":null},"rendered_text_html":"III. CONTENT OF THE PRIOR ART IS DETERMINED AT THE RELEVANT TIME TO AVOID\n HINDSIGHT","rendered_text_plain":"III. CONTENT OF THE PRIOR ART IS DETERMINED AT THE RELEVANT TIME TO AVOID HINDSIGHT","provenance":{"source_file":"s2141.html","source_anchor":"d0e208803/b.4","source_sha256":"c18335410b948734844afa0950712df37f56fb7b8d25ca661deb44a79ef5e658"},"kind":"informal_heading","host_section_id":"se_ivzea5ns","heading_level":2,"heading_text":"III. CONTENT OF THE PRIOR ART IS DETERMINED AT THE RELEVANT TIME TO AVOID HINDSIGHT"},{"id":"pb_a2fzufei","node_type":"prose_block","corpus_id":"mpep-e9r01-2024-html","opaque_url":"https://mpep.io/n/pb_a2fzufei","effective_range":{"start_revision":"R-01.2024","end_revision":null},"rendered_text_html":"

    The purpose of the pre-AIA 35 U.S.C. 103(a)\n requirement “at the time the invention was made” is to avoid impermissible hindsight.\n Likewise, the AIA 35 U.S.C. 103 requirement\n “before the effective filing date of the claimed invention” serves the same purpose.\n See MPEP §\n 2145, subsection X.A. for a discussion of rebutting\n applicants’ arguments that a rejection is based on hindsight.\n

    ","rendered_text_plain":"The purpose of the pre-AIA 35 U.S.C. 103(a) requirement “at the time the invention was made” is to avoid impermissible hindsight. Likewise, the AIA 35 U.S.C. 103 requirement “before the effective filing date of the claimed invention” serves the same purpose. See MPEP § 2145, subsection X.A. for a discussion of rebutting applicants’ arguments that a rejection is based on hindsight.","provenance":{"source_file":"s2141.html","source_anchor":"d0e208893","source_sha256":"c18335410b948734844afa0950712df37f56fb7b8d25ca661deb44a79ef5e658"},"kind":"narrative","host_section_id":"se_ivzea5ns"},{"id":"pb_akz4tnra","node_type":"prose_block","corpus_id":"mpep-e9r01-2024-html","opaque_url":"https://mpep.io/n/pb_akz4tnra","effective_range":{"start_revision":"R-01.2024","end_revision":null},"rendered_text_html":"

    In the pre-AIA context, the Federal Circuit stated, “[i]t is\n difficult but necessary that the decisionmaker forget what he or she has been taught\n . . . about the claimed invention and cast the mind back to the time the invention\n was made (often as here many years), to occupy the mind of one skilled in the art.\n ...” W.L. Gore & Associates, Inc. v. Garlock, Inc., 721 F.2d\n 1540, 1553, 220 USPQ 303, 313 (Fed. Cir. 1983), cert. denied, 469\n U.S. 851 (1984). Although the AIA has changed the relevant time focus to “before the\n effective filing date of the claimed invention,” the observation expressed by the\n Federal Circuit otherwise continues to apply. \n

    ","rendered_text_plain":"In the pre-AIA context, the Federal Circuit stated, “[i]t is difficult but necessary that the decisionmaker forget what he or she has been taught . . . about the claimed invention and cast the mind back to the time the invention was made (often as here many years), to occupy the mind of one skilled in the art. ...” W.L. Gore & Associates, Inc. v. Garlock, Inc., 721 F.2d 1540, 1553, 220 USPQ 303, 313 (Fed. Cir. 1983), cert. denied, 469 U.S. 851 (1984). Although the AIA has changed the relevant time focus to “before the effective filing date of the claimed invention,” the observation expressed by the Federal Circuit otherwise continues to apply.","provenance":{"source_file":"s2141.html","source_anchor":"d0e208899","source_sha256":"c18335410b948734844afa0950712df37f56fb7b8d25ca661deb44a79ef5e658"},"kind":"narrative","host_section_id":"se_ivzea5ns"},{"id":"cs_pgheeuzd","node_type":"case","corpus_id":"mpep-e9r01-2024-html","opaque_url":"https://mpep.io/n/cs_pgheeuzd","effective_range":{"start_revision":"R-01.2024","end_revision":null},"rendered_text_html":"","rendered_text_plain":"W.L. Gore & Associates, Inc. v. Garlock, Inc., 721 F.2d 1540, 220 USPQ 303 (Fed. Cir. 1983)","provenance":{"source_file":"s2141.html","source_anchor":"","source_sha256":"c18335410b948734844afa0950712df37f56fb7b8d25ca661deb44a79ef5e658"},"short_name":"W.L. Gore & Associates, Inc. v. Garlock, Inc.","all_citations":["721 F.2d 1540","220 USPQ 303"],"canonical_citation":"W.L. Gore & Associates, Inc. v. Garlock, Inc., 721 F.2d 1540, 220 USPQ 303 (Fed. Cir. 1983)","decision_year":1983,"court":"Fed. Cir."},{"id":"pb_b5bawf7w","node_type":"prose_block","corpus_id":"mpep-e9r01-2024-html","opaque_url":"https://mpep.io/n/pb_b5bawf7w","effective_range":{"start_revision":"R-01.2024","end_revision":null},"rendered_text_html":"IV. PRE-AIA 35 U.S.C. 103(c) COMMON OWNERSHIP— REQUIRED FOR THE CONDITIONS OF\n PRE-AIA 35 U.S.C. 103(c) ","rendered_text_plain":"IV. PRE-AIA 35 U.S.C. 103(c) COMMON OWNERSHIP— REQUIRED FOR THE CONDITIONS OF PRE-AIA 35 U.S.C. 103(c)","provenance":{"source_file":"s2141.html","source_anchor":"d0e208803/b.6","source_sha256":"c18335410b948734844afa0950712df37f56fb7b8d25ca661deb44a79ef5e658"},"kind":"informal_heading","host_section_id":"se_ivzea5ns","heading_level":2,"heading_text":"IV. PRE-AIA 35 U.S.C. 103(c) COMMON OWNERSHIP— REQUIRED FOR THE CONDITIONS OF PRE-AIA 35 U.S.C. 103(c)"},{"id":"pb_szey7hoc","node_type":"prose_block","corpus_id":"mpep-e9r01-2024-html","opaque_url":"https://mpep.io/n/pb_szey7hoc","effective_range":{"start_revision":"R-01.2024","end_revision":null},"rendered_text_html":"

    An applicant subject to pre-AIA 35 U.S.C. 102 who wants\n to rely on pre-AIA\n 35 U.S.C. 103(c) to overcome an obviousness rejection has the\n burden of establishing that subject matter which only qualifies as prior art under\n subsection (e), (f) or (g) of\n pre-AIA 35\n U.S.C. 102 used in a rejection under pre-AIA 35 U.S.C.\n 103(a) and the claimed invention were, at the time the\n invention was made, owned by the same person or subject to an obligation of\n assignment to the same person. Likewise, an applicant who wants to rely on the joint\n research provisions of pre-AIA 35 U.S.C. 103(c) (for\n applications pending on or after December 10, 2004) has the burden of establishing\n that:\n

    ","rendered_text_plain":"An applicant subject to pre-AIA 35 U.S.C. 102 who wants to rely on pre-AIA 35 U.S.C. 103(c) to overcome an obviousness rejection has the burden of establishing that subject matter which only qualifies as prior art under subsection (e), (f) or (g) of pre-AIA 35 U.S.C. 102 used in a rejection under pre-AIA 35 U.S.C. 103(a) and the claimed invention were, at the time the invention was made, owned by the same person or subject to an obligation of assignment to the same person. Likewise, an applicant who wants to rely on the joint research provisions of pre-AIA 35 U.S.C. 103(c) (for applications pending on or after December 10, 2004) has the burden of establishing that:","provenance":{"source_file":"s2141.html","source_anchor":"d0e208918","source_sha256":"c18335410b948734844afa0950712df37f56fb7b8d25ca661deb44a79ef5e658"},"kind":"narrative","host_section_id":"se_ivzea5ns"},{"id":"ls_unr3m4q3","node_type":"list","corpus_id":"mpep-e9r01-2024-html","opaque_url":"https://mpep.io/n/ls_unr3m4q3","effective_range":{"start_revision":"R-01.2024","end_revision":null},"rendered_text_html":"","rendered_text_plain":"","provenance":{"source_file":"s2141.html","source_anchor":"d0e208937","source_sha256":"c18335410b948734844afa0950712df37f56fb7b8d25ca661deb44a79ef5e658"},"enumerator_style":"alpha_upper","nesting_depth":1,"parent_list_item_id":null,"host_section_id":"se_ivzea5ns","item_ids":["li_wwmq5umo","li_xrwhnlrk","li_eawf7prg"]},{"id":"li_wwmq5umo","node_type":"list_item","corpus_id":"mpep-e9r01-2024-html","opaque_url":"https://mpep.io/n/li_wwmq5umo","effective_range":{"start_revision":"R-01.2024","end_revision":null},"rendered_text_html":"
  • (A) the claimed invention was made by or on behalf of parties to a\n joint research agreement that was in effect on or before the date the claimed\n invention was made;\n
    • ","rendered_text_plain":"(A) the claimed invention was made by or on behalf of parties to a joint research agreement that was in effect on or before the date the claimed invention was made;","provenance":{"source_file":"s2141.html","source_anchor":"d0e208937","source_sha256":"c18335410b948734844afa0950712df37f56fb7b8d25ca661deb44a79ef5e658"},"enumerator_label":"(A)","enumerator_ordinal":0,"parent_list_id":"ls_unr3m4q3","child_ids":null},{"id":"li_xrwhnlrk","node_type":"list_item","corpus_id":"mpep-e9r01-2024-html","opaque_url":"https://mpep.io/n/li_xrwhnlrk","effective_range":{"start_revision":"R-01.2024","end_revision":null},"rendered_text_html":"
  • (B) the claimed invention was made as a result of activities\n undertaken within the scope of the joint research agreement; and\n
    • ","rendered_text_plain":"(B) the claimed invention was made as a result of activities undertaken within the scope of the joint research agreement; and","provenance":{"source_file":"s2141.html","source_anchor":"d0e208941","source_sha256":"c18335410b948734844afa0950712df37f56fb7b8d25ca661deb44a79ef5e658"},"enumerator_label":"(B)","enumerator_ordinal":1,"parent_list_id":"ls_unr3m4q3","child_ids":null},{"id":"li_eawf7prg","node_type":"list_item","corpus_id":"mpep-e9r01-2024-html","opaque_url":"https://mpep.io/n/li_eawf7prg","effective_range":{"start_revision":"R-01.2024","end_revision":null},"rendered_text_html":"
  • (C) the application for patent for the claimed invention discloses\n or is amended to disclose the names of the parties to the joint research\n agreement. \n
    • ","rendered_text_plain":"(C) the application for patent for the claimed invention discloses or is amended to disclose the names of the parties to the joint research agreement.","provenance":{"source_file":"s2141.html","source_anchor":"d0e208945","source_sha256":"c18335410b948734844afa0950712df37f56fb7b8d25ca661deb44a79ef5e658"},"enumerator_label":"(C)","enumerator_ordinal":2,"parent_list_id":"ls_unr3m4q3","child_ids":null},{"id":"pb_urhkntlv","node_type":"prose_block","corpus_id":"mpep-e9r01-2024-html","opaque_url":"https://mpep.io/n/pb_urhkntlv","effective_range":{"start_revision":"R-01.2024","end_revision":null},"rendered_text_html":"

    These prior art disqualifications under pre-AIA 35 U.S.C\n 103(c) are only applicable for subject matter which only\n qualifies as prior art under subsection (e), (f) or\n (g) of pre-AIA 35 U.S.C. 102 and is used\n in a rejection under pre-AIA 35 U.S.C. 103(a).\n

    ","rendered_text_plain":"These prior art disqualifications under pre-AIA 35 U.S.C 103(c) are only applicable for subject matter which only qualifies as prior art under subsection (e), (f) or (g) of pre-AIA 35 U.S.C. 102 and is used in a rejection under pre-AIA 35 U.S.C. 103(a).","provenance":{"source_file":"s2141.html","source_anchor":"d0e208949","source_sha256":"c18335410b948734844afa0950712df37f56fb7b8d25ca661deb44a79ef5e658"},"kind":"narrative","host_section_id":"se_ivzea5ns"},{"id":"pb_m6xrzxhh","node_type":"prose_block","corpus_id":"mpep-e9r01-2024-html","opaque_url":"https://mpep.io/n/pb_m6xrzxhh","effective_range":{"start_revision":"R-01.2024","end_revision":null},"rendered_text_html":"

    Note that for applications filed prior to November 29, 1999, and\n granted as patents prior to December 10, 2004,\n pre-AIA 35\n U.S.C. 103(c) is limited on its face to subject matter\n developed by another person which qualifies as prior art only under subsection\n (f) or (g) of pre-AIA 35 U.S.C.\n 102. See MPEP § 2146.01. See also In\n re Bartfeld, 925 F.2d 1450, 1453-54, 17 USPQ2d 1885, 1888 (Fed. Cir.\n 1991) (Applicant attempted to overcome a pre-AIA 35 U.S.C.\n 102(e)/103 rejection with a terminal\n disclaimer by alleging that the public policy intent of pre-AIA 35 U.S.C\n 103(c) was to prohibit the use of “secret” prior art in\n obviousness determinations. The court rejected this argument, holding “We may not\n disregard the unambiguous exclusion of § 102(e) from the statute’s\n purview.”).\n

    ","rendered_text_plain":"Note that for applications filed prior to November 29, 1999, and granted as patents prior to December 10, 2004, pre-AIA 35 U.S.C. 103(c) is limited on its face to subject matter developed by another person which qualifies as prior art only under subsection (f) or (g) of pre-AIA 35 U.S.C. 102. See MPEP § 2146.01. See also In re Bartfeld, 925 F.2d 1450, 1453-54, 17 USPQ2d 1885, 1888 (Fed. Cir. 1991) (Applicant attempted to overcome a pre-AIA 35 U.S.C. 102(e)/103 rejection with a terminal disclaimer by alleging that the public policy intent of pre-AIA 35 U.S.C 103(c) was to prohibit the use of “secret” prior art in obviousness determinations. The court rejected this argument, holding “We may not disregard the unambiguous exclusion of § 102(e) from the statute’s purview.”).","provenance":{"source_file":"s2141.html","source_anchor":"d0e208958","source_sha256":"c18335410b948734844afa0950712df37f56fb7b8d25ca661deb44a79ef5e658"},"kind":"narrative","host_section_id":"se_ivzea5ns"},{"id":"st_dlzbccmo","node_type":"statute","corpus_id":"mpep-e9r01-2024-html","opaque_url":"https://mpep.io/n/st_dlzbccmo","effective_range":{"start_revision":"R-01.2024","end_revision":null},"rendered_text_html":"","rendered_text_plain":"","provenance":{"source_file":"s2141.html","source_anchor":"","source_sha256":"c18335410b948734844afa0950712df37f56fb7b8d25ca661deb44a79ef5e658"},"authority":"us_usc","authority_title_num":"35","authority_section_num":"102","subsection_path":["e"],"canonical_citation":"35 U.S.C. 102(e)"},{"id":"pb_wa5brvwz","node_type":"prose_block","corpus_id":"mpep-e9r01-2024-html","opaque_url":"https://mpep.io/n/pb_wa5brvwz","effective_range":{"start_revision":"R-01.2024","end_revision":null},"rendered_text_html":"

    See MPEP § 2146.02 for the requirements\n which must be met to establish common ownership or a joint research agreement.\n

    ","rendered_text_plain":"See MPEP § 2146.02 for the requirements which must be met to establish common ownership or a joint research agreement.","provenance":{"source_file":"s2141.html","source_anchor":"d0e208979","source_sha256":"c18335410b948734844afa0950712df37f56fb7b8d25ca661deb44a79ef5e658"},"kind":"narrative","host_section_id":"se_ivzea5ns"},{"id":"pb_tnsjjkcj","node_type":"prose_block","corpus_id":"mpep-e9r01-2024-html","opaque_url":"https://mpep.io/n/pb_tnsjjkcj","effective_range":{"start_revision":"R-01.2024","end_revision":null},"rendered_text_html":"

    [Editor Note: This MPEP section is applicable regardless of whether an\n application is examined under the AIA or under pre-AIA law. For applications\n subject to the first inventor to file (FITF) provisions of the AIA, the relevant\n time is \"before the effective filing date of the claimed invention\". For\n applications subject to pre-AIA 35 U.S.C. 102, the\n relevant time is \"at the time of the invention\". See MPEP §\n 2150 et seq. Many of the court decisions discussed in\n this section involved applications or patents subject to pre-AIA 35 U.S.C.\n 102. These court decisions may be applicable to applications\n and patents subject to AIA 35 U.S.C. 102 but the\n relevant time is before the effective filing date of the claimed invention and not\n at the time of the invention.]

    ","rendered_text_plain":"[Editor Note: This MPEP section is applicable regardless of whether an application is examined under the AIA or under pre-AIA law. For applications subject to the first inventor to file (FITF) provisions of the AIA, the relevant time is \"before the effective filing date of the claimed invention\". For applications subject to pre-AIA 35 U.S.C. 102, the relevant time is \"at the time of the invention\". See MPEP § 2150 et seq. Many of the court decisions discussed in this section involved applications or patents subject to pre-AIA 35 U.S.C. 102. These court decisions may be applicable to applications and patents subject to AIA 35 U.S.C. 102 but the relevant time is before the effective filing date of the claimed invention and not at the time of the invention.]","provenance":{"source_file":"s2141.html","source_anchor":"ch2100_d223b3_230c3_1a9","source_sha256":"c18335410b948734844afa0950712df37f56fb7b8d25ca661deb44a79ef5e658"},"kind":"narrative","host_section_id":"se_zmtckktk"},{"id":"pb_mfjyij3r","node_type":"prose_block","corpus_id":"mpep-e9r01-2024-html","opaque_url":"https://mpep.io/n/pb_mfjyij3r","effective_range":{"start_revision":"R-01.2024","end_revision":null},"rendered_text_html":"I. TO RELY ON A REFERENCE UNDER 35 U.S.C. 103, IT MUST BE ANALOGOUS ART TO THE\n CLAIMED INVENTION","rendered_text_plain":"I. TO RELY ON A REFERENCE UNDER 35 U.S.C. 103, IT MUST BE ANALOGOUS ART TO THE CLAIMED INVENTION","provenance":{"source_file":"s2141.html","source_anchor":"d0e208985/b.0","source_sha256":"c18335410b948734844afa0950712df37f56fb7b8d25ca661deb44a79ef5e658"},"kind":"informal_heading","host_section_id":"se_zmtckktk","heading_level":2,"heading_text":"I. TO RELY ON A REFERENCE UNDER 35 U.S.C. 103, IT MUST BE ANALOGOUS ART TO THE CLAIMED INVENTION"},{"id":"pb_5xqlzcsb","node_type":"prose_block","corpus_id":"mpep-e9r01-2024-html","opaque_url":"https://mpep.io/n/pb_5xqlzcsb","effective_range":{"start_revision":"R-01.2024","end_revision":null},"rendered_text_html":"

    In order for a reference to be proper for use in an obviousness\n rejection under 35 U.S.C. 103 , the reference must be analogous art to the\n claimed invention. In re Bigio, 381 F.3d 1320, 1325, 72 USPQ2d\n 1209, 1212 (Fed. Cir. 2004). A reference is analogous art to the claimed invention\n if: (1) the reference is from the same field of endeavor as the claimed invention\n (even if it addresses a different problem); or (2) the reference is reasonably\n pertinent to the problem faced by the inventor (even if it is not in the same\n field of endeavor as the claimed invention). Note that “same field of endeavor”\n and “reasonably pertinent” are two separate tests for establishing analogous art;\n it is not necessary for a reference to fulfill both tests in order to qualify as\n analogous art. See Bigio, 381 F.3d at 1325, 72 USPQ2d at 1212.\n The examiner must determine whether a reference is analogous art to the claimed\n invention when analyzing the obviousness of the subject matter under examination.\n When more than one prior art reference is used as the basis of an obviousness\n rejection, it is not required that the references be analogous art to each other.\n See Sanofi-Aventis Deutschland GMbH v. Mylan Pharms. Inc., 66\n F.4th 1373, 1380, 2023 USPQ2d 552 (Fed. Cir. 2023) and Corephotonics,\n Ltd. v. Apple Inc., 84 F.4th 990, 1007, 2023 USPQ2d 1202 (Fed. Cir.\n 2023). If a reference is not analogous art to the claimed invention, it may not be\n used in an obviousness rejection under 35 U.S.C. 103. However, there\n is no analogous art requirement for a reference being applied in an anticipation\n rejection under 35 U.S.C. 102. In re\n Schreiber, 128 F.3d 1473, 1478, 44 USPQ2d 1429, 1432 (Fed. Cir.\n 1997).\n

    ","rendered_text_plain":"In order for a reference to be proper for use in an obviousness rejection under 35 U.S.C. 103 , the reference must be analogous art to the claimed invention. In re Bigio, 381 F.3d 1320, 1325, 72 USPQ2d 1209, 1212 (Fed. Cir. 2004). A reference is analogous art to the claimed invention if: (1) the reference is from the same field of endeavor as the claimed invention (even if it addresses a different problem); or (2) the reference is reasonably pertinent to the problem faced by the inventor (even if it is not in the same field of endeavor as the claimed invention). Note that “same field of endeavor” and “reasonably pertinent” are two separate tests for establishing analogous art; it is not necessary for a reference to fulfill both tests in order to qualify as analogous art. See Bigio, 381 F.3d at 1325, 72 USPQ2d at 1212. The examiner must determine whether a reference is analogous art to the claimed invention when analyzing the obviousness of the subject matter under examination. When more than one prior art reference is used as the basis of an obviousness rejection, it is not required that the references be analogous art to each other. See Sanofi-Aventis Deutschland GMbH v. Mylan Pharms. Inc., 66 F.4th 1373, 1380, 2023 USPQ2d 552 (Fed. Cir. 2023) and Corephotonics, Ltd. v. Apple Inc., 84 F.4th 990, 1007, 2023 USPQ2d 1202 (Fed. Cir. 2023). If a reference is not analogous art to the claimed invention, it may not be used in an obviousness rejection under 35 U.S.C. 103. However, there is no analogous art requirement for a reference being applied in an anticipation rejection under 35 U.S.C. 102. In re Schreiber, 128 F.3d 1473, 1478, 44 USPQ2d 1429, 1432 (Fed. Cir. 1997).","provenance":{"source_file":"s2141.html","source_anchor":"d0e208993","source_sha256":"c18335410b948734844afa0950712df37f56fb7b8d25ca661deb44a79ef5e658"},"kind":"narrative","host_section_id":"se_zmtckktk"},{"id":"cs_ha4rrbuf","node_type":"case","corpus_id":"mpep-e9r01-2024-html","opaque_url":"https://mpep.io/n/cs_ha4rrbuf","effective_range":{"start_revision":"R-01.2024","end_revision":null},"rendered_text_html":"","rendered_text_plain":"In re Bigio, 381 F.3d 1320, 72 USPQ2d 1209 (Fed. Cir. 2004)","provenance":{"source_file":"s2141.html","source_anchor":"","source_sha256":"c18335410b948734844afa0950712df37f56fb7b8d25ca661deb44a79ef5e658"},"short_name":"In re Bigio","all_citations":["381 F.3d 1320","72 USPQ2d 1209"],"canonical_citation":"In re Bigio, 381 F.3d 1320, 72 USPQ2d 1209 (Fed. Cir. 2004)","decision_year":2004,"court":"Fed. Cir."},{"id":"cs_h6xl7t6y","node_type":"case","corpus_id":"mpep-e9r01-2024-html","opaque_url":"https://mpep.io/n/cs_h6xl7t6y","effective_range":{"start_revision":"R-01.2024","end_revision":null},"rendered_text_html":"","rendered_text_plain":"Sanofi-Aventis Deutschland GMbH v. Mylan Pharms. Inc., 66 F.4th 1373, 2023 USPQ2d 552 (Fed. Cir. 2023)","provenance":{"source_file":"s2141.html","source_anchor":"","source_sha256":"c18335410b948734844afa0950712df37f56fb7b8d25ca661deb44a79ef5e658"},"short_name":"Sanofi-Aventis Deutschland GMbH v. Mylan Pharms. Inc.","all_citations":["66 F.4th 1373","2023 USPQ2d 552"],"canonical_citation":"Sanofi-Aventis Deutschland GMbH v. Mylan Pharms. Inc., 66 F.4th 1373, 2023 USPQ2d 552 (Fed. Cir. 2023)","decision_year":2023,"court":"Fed. Cir."},{"id":"cs_quptmujf","node_type":"case","corpus_id":"mpep-e9r01-2024-html","opaque_url":"https://mpep.io/n/cs_quptmujf","effective_range":{"start_revision":"R-01.2024","end_revision":null},"rendered_text_html":"","rendered_text_plain":"Corephotonics, Ltd. v. Apple Inc., 84 F.4th 990, 2023 USPQ2d 1202 (Fed. Cir. 2023)","provenance":{"source_file":"s2141.html","source_anchor":"","source_sha256":"c18335410b948734844afa0950712df37f56fb7b8d25ca661deb44a79ef5e658"},"short_name":"Corephotonics, Ltd. v. Apple Inc.","all_citations":["84 F.4th 990","2023 USPQ2d 1202"],"canonical_citation":"Corephotonics, Ltd. v. Apple Inc., 84 F.4th 990, 2023 USPQ2d 1202 (Fed. Cir. 2023)","decision_year":2023,"court":"Fed. Cir."},{"id":"cs_ixtqbpmf","node_type":"case","corpus_id":"mpep-e9r01-2024-html","opaque_url":"https://mpep.io/n/cs_ixtqbpmf","effective_range":{"start_revision":"R-01.2024","end_revision":null},"rendered_text_html":"","rendered_text_plain":"In re Schreiber, 128 F.3d 1473, 44 USPQ2d 1429 (Fed. Cir. 1997)","provenance":{"source_file":"s2141.html","source_anchor":"","source_sha256":"c18335410b948734844afa0950712df37f56fb7b8d25ca661deb44a79ef5e658"},"short_name":"In re Schreiber","all_citations":["128 F.3d 1473","44 USPQ2d 1429"],"canonical_citation":"In re Schreiber, 128 F.3d 1473, 44 USPQ2d 1429 (Fed. Cir. 1997)","decision_year":1997,"court":"Fed. Cir."},{"id":"pb_klrqrbo4","node_type":"prose_block","corpus_id":"mpep-e9r01-2024-html","opaque_url":"https://mpep.io/n/pb_klrqrbo4","effective_range":{"start_revision":"R-01.2024","end_revision":null},"rendered_text_html":"

    When determining whether the “relevant field of\n endeavor” test is met, the examiner should consider “explanations of the\n invention’s subject matter in the patent application, including the embodiments,\n function, and structure of the claimed invention.” Airbus S.A.S. v.\n Firepass Corp., 941 F.3d 1374, 1380, 2019 USPQ2d 430083 (Fed. Cir.\n 2019) (quoting Bigio, 381 F.3d at 1325, 72 USPQ2d at 1212).\n When determining whether a prior art reference meets the “same field of endeavor”\n test for the analogous art, the primary focus is on what the reference discloses.\n Airbus, 41 F.3d at 1380. The examiner must consider the\n disclosure of each reference “in view of the ‘the reality of the circumstances.’”\n Airbus, 41 F.3d at 1380 (quoting Bigio,\n 381 F.3d at 1326, 72 USPQ2d at 1212). These circumstances are to be weighed “from\n the vantage point of the common sense likely to be exerted by one of ordinary\n skill in the art in assessing the scope of the endeavor.”\n Airbus, 41 F.3d at 1380. See also Donner\n Technology, LLC v. Pro Stage Gear, LLC, 979 F.3d 1353, 2020 USPQ2d\n 11335 (Fed. Cir. 2020); Sanofi-Aventis, 66 F.4th at 1378; and\n Netflix, Inc. v. DivX, LLC, 80 F.4th 1352, 1358-59, 2023\n USPQ2d 1057 (Fed. Cir. 2023) (“The field of endeavor is ‘not limited to the\n specific point of novelty, the narrowest possible conception of the field, or the\n particular focus within a given field.’”) (quoting Unwired Planet, LLC v.\n Google Inc., 841 F.3d 995, 1001, 120 USPQ2d 1593, 1597 (Fed. Cir.\n 2016)).\n

    ","rendered_text_plain":"When determining whether the “relevant field of endeavor” test is met, the examiner should consider “explanations of the invention’s subject matter in the patent application, including the embodiments, function, and structure of the claimed invention.” Airbus S.A.S. v. Firepass Corp., 941 F.3d 1374, 1380, 2019 USPQ2d 430083 (Fed. Cir. 2019) (quoting Bigio, 381 F.3d at 1325, 72 USPQ2d at 1212). When determining whether a prior art reference meets the “same field of endeavor” test for the analogous art, the primary focus is on what the reference discloses. Airbus, 41 F.3d at 1380. The examiner must consider the disclosure of each reference “in view of the ‘the reality of the circumstances.’” Airbus, 41 F.3d at 1380 (quoting Bigio, 381 F.3d at 1326, 72 USPQ2d at 1212). These circumstances are to be weighed “from the vantage point of the common sense likely to be exerted by one of ordinary skill in the art in assessing the scope of the endeavor.” Airbus, 41 F.3d at 1380. See also Donner Technology, LLC v. Pro Stage Gear, LLC, 979 F.3d 1353, 2020 USPQ2d 11335 (Fed. Cir. 2020); Sanofi-Aventis, 66 F.4th at 1378; and Netflix, Inc. v. DivX, LLC, 80 F.4th 1352, 1358-59, 2023 USPQ2d 1057 (Fed. Cir. 2023) (“The field of endeavor is ‘not limited to the specific point of novelty, the narrowest possible conception of the field, or the particular focus within a given field.’”) (quoting Unwired Planet, LLC v. Google Inc., 841 F.3d 995, 1001, 120 USPQ2d 1593, 1597 (Fed. Cir. 2016)).","provenance":{"source_file":"s2141.html","source_anchor":"ch2100_p_35bcf_14981_14d","source_sha256":"c18335410b948734844afa0950712df37f56fb7b8d25ca661deb44a79ef5e658"},"kind":"narrative","host_section_id":"se_zmtckktk"},{"id":"cs_3uqveob2","node_type":"case","corpus_id":"mpep-e9r01-2024-html","opaque_url":"https://mpep.io/n/cs_3uqveob2","effective_range":{"start_revision":"R-01.2024","end_revision":null},"rendered_text_html":"","rendered_text_plain":"Airbus S.A.S. v. Firepass Corp., 941 F.3d 1374, 2019 USPQ2d 430083 (Fed. Cir. 2019)","provenance":{"source_file":"s2141.html","source_anchor":"","source_sha256":"c18335410b948734844afa0950712df37f56fb7b8d25ca661deb44a79ef5e658"},"short_name":"Airbus S.A.S. v. Firepass Corp.","all_citations":["941 F.3d 1374","2019 USPQ2d 430083"],"canonical_citation":"Airbus S.A.S. v. Firepass Corp., 941 F.3d 1374, 2019 USPQ2d 430083 (Fed. Cir. 2019)","decision_year":2019,"court":"Fed. Cir."},{"id":"cs_ixawjvrn","node_type":"case","corpus_id":"mpep-e9r01-2024-html","opaque_url":"https://mpep.io/n/cs_ixawjvrn","effective_range":{"start_revision":"R-01.2024","end_revision":null},"rendered_text_html":"","rendered_text_plain":"Donner Technology, LLC v. Pro Stage Gear, LLC, 979 F.3d 1353, 2020 USPQ2d 11335 (Fed. Cir. 2020)","provenance":{"source_file":"s2141.html","source_anchor":"","source_sha256":"c18335410b948734844afa0950712df37f56fb7b8d25ca661deb44a79ef5e658"},"short_name":"Donner Technology, LLC v. Pro Stage Gear, LLC","all_citations":["979 F.3d 1353","2020 USPQ2d 11335"],"canonical_citation":"Donner Technology, LLC v. Pro Stage Gear, LLC, 979 F.3d 1353, 2020 USPQ2d 11335 (Fed. Cir. 2020)","decision_year":2020,"court":"Fed. Cir."},{"id":"cs_omiaimvo","node_type":"case","corpus_id":"mpep-e9r01-2024-html","opaque_url":"https://mpep.io/n/cs_omiaimvo","effective_range":{"start_revision":"R-01.2024","end_revision":null},"rendered_text_html":"","rendered_text_plain":"Netflix, Inc. v. DivX, LLC, 80 F.4th 1352, 2023 USPQ2d 1057 (Fed. Cir. 2023)","provenance":{"source_file":"s2141.html","source_anchor":"","source_sha256":"c18335410b948734844afa0950712df37f56fb7b8d25ca661deb44a79ef5e658"},"short_name":"Netflix, Inc. v. DivX, LLC","all_citations":["80 F.4th 1352","2023 USPQ2d 1057"],"canonical_citation":"Netflix, Inc. v. DivX, LLC, 80 F.4th 1352, 2023 USPQ2d 1057 (Fed. Cir. 2023)","decision_year":2023,"court":"Fed. Cir."},{"id":"cs_wdzevjev","node_type":"case","corpus_id":"mpep-e9r01-2024-html","opaque_url":"https://mpep.io/n/cs_wdzevjev","effective_range":{"start_revision":"R-01.2024","end_revision":null},"rendered_text_html":"","rendered_text_plain":"Unwired Planet, LLC v. Google Inc., 841 F.3d 995, 120 USPQ2d 1593 (Fed. Cir. 2016)","provenance":{"source_file":"s2141.html","source_anchor":"","source_sha256":"c18335410b948734844afa0950712df37f56fb7b8d25ca661deb44a79ef5e658"},"short_name":"Unwired Planet, LLC v. Google Inc.","all_citations":["841 F.3d 995","120 USPQ2d 1593"],"canonical_citation":"Unwired Planet, LLC v. Google Inc., 841 F.3d 995, 120 USPQ2d 1593 (Fed. Cir. 2016)","decision_year":2016,"court":"Fed. Cir."},{"id":"pb_t43pwaqm","node_type":"prose_block","corpus_id":"mpep-e9r01-2024-html","opaque_url":"https://mpep.io/n/pb_t43pwaqm","effective_range":{"start_revision":"R-01.2024","end_revision":null},"rendered_text_html":"

    As for the “reasonably pertinent” test, the examiner\n should consider the problem faced by the inventor, as reflected - either\n explicitly or implicitly - in the specification. In order for a reference to be\n \"reasonably pertinent\" to the problem, it must \"logically [] have commended itself\n to an inventor's attention in considering his problem.\" In re ICON Health\n and Fitness, Inc., 496 F.3d 1374, 1379-80 (Fed. Cir. 2007) (quoting\n In re Clay, 966 F.2d 656,658, 23 USPQ2d 1058, 1061 (Fed.\n Cir. 1992)). See also In re Klein, 647 F.3d 1343, 1348, 98\n USPQ2d 1991, 1993 (Fed. Cir. 2011) An inventor is not expected to have been aware\n of all prior art outside of the field of endeavor. Airbus, 41\n F.3d at 1380-82. A reference outside of the field of endeavor is reasonably\n pertinent if a person of ordinary skill would have consulted it and applied its\n teachings when faced with the problem that the inventor was trying to solve.\n Airbus, 41 F.3d at 1380-82. In order to support a\n determination that a reference is reasonably pertinent, it may be appropriate to\n include a statement of the examiner's understanding of the problem. The question\n of whether a reference is reasonably pertinent often turns on how the problem to\n be solved is perceived. If the problem to be solved is viewed in a narrow or\n constrained way, and such a view is not consistent with the specification, the\n scope of available prior art may be inappropriately limited. It may be necessary\n for the examiner to explain why an inventor seeking to solve the identified\n problem would have looked to the reference in an attempt to find a solution to the\n problem, i.e., factual reasons why the prior art is pertinent to the identified\n problem. See Donner Tech., LLC v. Pro Stage Gear, LLC, 979 F.3d\n 1353, 1359, 2020 USPQ2d 11335 (Fed. Cir. 2020) (“Thus, when addressing whether a\n reference is analogous art with respect to the claimed invention under a\n reasonable-pertinence theory, the problems to which both relate must be identified\n and compared.”). \n

    ","rendered_text_plain":"As for the “reasonably pertinent” test, the examiner should consider the problem faced by the inventor, as reflected - either explicitly or implicitly - in the specification. In order for a reference to be \"reasonably pertinent\" to the problem, it must \"logically [] have commended itself to an inventor's attention in considering his problem.\" In re ICON Health and Fitness, Inc., 496 F.3d 1374, 1379-80 (Fed. Cir. 2007) (quoting In re Clay, 966 F.2d 656,658, 23 USPQ2d 1058, 1061 (Fed. Cir. 1992)). See also In re Klein, 647 F.3d 1343, 1348, 98 USPQ2d 1991, 1993 (Fed. Cir. 2011) An inventor is not expected to have been aware of all prior art outside of the field of endeavor. Airbus, 41 F.3d at 1380-82. A reference outside of the field of endeavor is reasonably pertinent if a person of ordinary skill would have consulted it and applied its teachings when faced with the problem that the inventor was trying to solve. Airbus, 41 F.3d at 1380-82. In order to support a determination that a reference is reasonably pertinent, it may be appropriate to include a statement of the examiner's understanding of the problem. The question of whether a reference is reasonably pertinent often turns on how the problem to be solved is perceived. If the problem to be solved is viewed in a narrow or constrained way, and such a view is not consistent with the specification, the scope of available prior art may be inappropriately limited. It may be necessary for the examiner to explain why an inventor seeking to solve the identified problem would have looked to the reference in an attempt to find a solution to the problem, i.e., factual reasons why the prior art is pertinent to the identified problem. See Donner Tech., LLC v. Pro Stage Gear, LLC, 979 F.3d 1353, 1359, 2020 USPQ2d 11335 (Fed. Cir. 2020) (“Thus, when addressing whether a reference is analogous art with respect to the claimed invention under a reasonable-pertinence theory, the problems to which both relate must be identified and compared.”).","provenance":{"source_file":"s2141.html","source_anchor":"ch2100_d1b074_1deb0","source_sha256":"c18335410b948734844afa0950712df37f56fb7b8d25ca661deb44a79ef5e658"},"kind":"narrative","host_section_id":"se_zmtckktk"},{"id":"cs_b7dfqe5e","node_type":"case","corpus_id":"mpep-e9r01-2024-html","opaque_url":"https://mpep.io/n/cs_b7dfqe5e","effective_range":{"start_revision":"R-01.2024","end_revision":null},"rendered_text_html":"","rendered_text_plain":"In re ICON Health and Fitness, Inc., 496 F.3d 1374 (Fed. Cir. 2007)","provenance":{"source_file":"s2141.html","source_anchor":"","source_sha256":"c18335410b948734844afa0950712df37f56fb7b8d25ca661deb44a79ef5e658"},"short_name":"In re ICON Health and Fitness, Inc.","all_citations":["496 F.3d 1374"],"canonical_citation":"In re ICON Health and Fitness, Inc., 496 F.3d 1374 (Fed. Cir. 2007)","decision_year":2007,"court":"Fed. Cir."},{"id":"cs_452mhxkb","node_type":"case","corpus_id":"mpep-e9r01-2024-html","opaque_url":"https://mpep.io/n/cs_452mhxkb","effective_range":{"start_revision":"R-01.2024","end_revision":null},"rendered_text_html":"","rendered_text_plain":"In re Clay, 966 F.2d 656, 23 USPQ2d 1058 (Fed. Cir. 1992)","provenance":{"source_file":"s2141.html","source_anchor":"","source_sha256":"c18335410b948734844afa0950712df37f56fb7b8d25ca661deb44a79ef5e658"},"short_name":"In re Clay","all_citations":["966 F.2d 656","23 USPQ2d 1058"],"canonical_citation":"In re Clay, 966 F.2d 656, 23 USPQ2d 1058 (Fed. Cir. 1992)","decision_year":1992,"court":"Fed. Cir."},{"id":"cs_jrtcj2ld","node_type":"case","corpus_id":"mpep-e9r01-2024-html","opaque_url":"https://mpep.io/n/cs_jrtcj2ld","effective_range":{"start_revision":"R-01.2024","end_revision":null},"rendered_text_html":"","rendered_text_plain":"In re Klein, 647 F.3d 1343, 98 USPQ2d 1991 (Fed. Cir. 2011)","provenance":{"source_file":"s2141.html","source_anchor":"","source_sha256":"c18335410b948734844afa0950712df37f56fb7b8d25ca661deb44a79ef5e658"},"short_name":"In re Klein","all_citations":["647 F.3d 1343","98 USPQ2d 1991"],"canonical_citation":"In re Klein, 647 F.3d 1343, 98 USPQ2d 1991 (Fed. Cir. 2011)","decision_year":2011,"court":"Fed. Cir."},{"id":"cs_rdyfkiss","node_type":"case","corpus_id":"mpep-e9r01-2024-html","opaque_url":"https://mpep.io/n/cs_rdyfkiss","effective_range":{"start_revision":"R-01.2024","end_revision":null},"rendered_text_html":"","rendered_text_plain":"Donner Tech., LLC v. Pro Stage Gear, LLC, 979 F.3d 1353, 2020 USPQ2d 11335 (Fed. Cir. 2020)","provenance":{"source_file":"s2141.html","source_anchor":"","source_sha256":"c18335410b948734844afa0950712df37f56fb7b8d25ca661deb44a79ef5e658"},"short_name":"Donner Tech., LLC v. Pro Stage Gear, LLC","all_citations":["979 F.3d 1353","2020 USPQ2d 11335"],"canonical_citation":"Donner Tech., LLC v. Pro Stage Gear, LLC, 979 F.3d 1353, 2020 USPQ2d 11335 (Fed. Cir. 2020)","decision_year":2020,"court":"Fed. Cir."},{"id":"pb_ccobi4ox","node_type":"prose_block","corpus_id":"mpep-e9r01-2024-html","opaque_url":"https://mpep.io/n/pb_ccobi4ox","effective_range":{"start_revision":"R-01.2024","end_revision":null},"rendered_text_html":"

    The Supreme Court’s decision in KSR Int'l\n Co. v. Teleflex Inc., 550 U.S. 398, 82 USPQ2d 1385 (2007), did not\n change the test for analogous art as stated in Bigio. Under\n Bigio, a reference need not be from the same field of\n endeavor as the claimed invention in order to be analogous art.\n Bigio, 381 F.3d at 1325, 72 USPQ2d at 1212. This is\n consistent with the Supreme Court's instruction in KSR that\n \"[w]hen a work is available in one field of endeavor, design incentives and other\n market forces can prompt variations of it, either in the same field or a different\n one.\" KSR, 550 U.S. at 417, 82 USPQ2d at 1396. The Federal\n Circuit reads KSR as “direct[ing] us to construe the scope of\n analogous art broadly” because “familiar items may have obvious uses\n beyond their primary purposes, and a person of ordinary skill often\n will be able to fit the teachings of multiple patents together like pieces of a\n puzzle.” Wyers v. Master Lock Co., 616 F.3d 1231, 1238, 95\n USPQ2d 1525, 1530 (Fed. Cir. 2010) (quoting KSR, 550 U.S. at\n 402, 127 S. Ct. at 1727).\n

    ","rendered_text_plain":"The Supreme Court’s decision in KSR Int'l Co. v. Teleflex Inc., 550 U.S. 398, 82 USPQ2d 1385 (2007), did not change the test for analogous art as stated in Bigio. Under Bigio, a reference need not be from the same field of endeavor as the claimed invention in order to be analogous art. Bigio, 381 F.3d at 1325, 72 USPQ2d at 1212. This is consistent with the Supreme Court's instruction in KSR that \"[w]hen a work is available in one field of endeavor, design incentives and other market forces can prompt variations of it, either in the same field or a different one.\" KSR, 550 U.S. at 417, 82 USPQ2d at 1396. The Federal Circuit reads KSR as “direct[ing] us to construe the scope of analogous art broadly” because “familiar items may have obvious uses beyond their primary purposes, and a person of ordinary skill often will be able to fit the teachings of multiple patents together like pieces of a puzzle.” Wyers v. Master Lock Co., 616 F.3d 1231, 1238, 95 USPQ2d 1525, 1530 (Fed. Cir. 2010) (quoting KSR, 550 U.S. at 402, 127 S. Ct. at 1727).","provenance":{"source_file":"s2141.html","source_anchor":"ch2100_p_35bcf_14bbc_f2","source_sha256":"c18335410b948734844afa0950712df37f56fb7b8d25ca661deb44a79ef5e658"},"kind":"narrative","host_section_id":"se_zmtckktk"},{"id":"cs_ots6hs5y","node_type":"case","corpus_id":"mpep-e9r01-2024-html","opaque_url":"https://mpep.io/n/cs_ots6hs5y","effective_range":{"start_revision":"R-01.2024","end_revision":null},"rendered_text_html":"","rendered_text_plain":"KSR Int'l Co. v. Teleflex Inc., 550 U.S. 398, 82 USPQ2d 1385 (2007)","provenance":{"source_file":"s2141.html","source_anchor":"","source_sha256":"c18335410b948734844afa0950712df37f56fb7b8d25ca661deb44a79ef5e658"},"short_name":"KSR Int'l Co. v. Teleflex Inc.","all_citations":["550 U.S. 398","82 USPQ2d 1385"],"canonical_citation":"KSR Int'l Co. v. Teleflex Inc., 550 U.S. 398, 82 USPQ2d 1385 (2007)","decision_year":2007,"court":"SCOTUS"},{"id":"cs_ermvsolq","node_type":"case","corpus_id":"mpep-e9r01-2024-html","opaque_url":"https://mpep.io/n/cs_ermvsolq","effective_range":{"start_revision":"R-01.2024","end_revision":null},"rendered_text_html":"","rendered_text_plain":"Wyers v. Master Lock Co., 616 F.3d 1231, 95 USPQ2d 1525 (Fed. Cir. 2010)","provenance":{"source_file":"s2141.html","source_anchor":"","source_sha256":"c18335410b948734844afa0950712df37f56fb7b8d25ca661deb44a79ef5e658"},"short_name":"Wyers v. Master Lock Co.","all_citations":["616 F.3d 1231","95 USPQ2d 1525"],"canonical_citation":"Wyers v. Master Lock Co., 616 F.3d 1231, 95 USPQ2d 1525 (Fed. Cir. 2010)","decision_year":2010,"court":"Fed. Cir."},{"id":"pb_raijapul","node_type":"prose_block","corpus_id":"mpep-e9r01-2024-html","opaque_url":"https://mpep.io/n/pb_raijapul","effective_range":{"start_revision":"R-01.2024","end_revision":null},"rendered_text_html":"

    Any argument by the applicant that the examiner has\n misconstrued the problem to be solved, and as a result has improperly relied on\n nonanalogous art, should be fully considered in light of the specification. In\n evaluating the applicant's argument, the examiner should look to the teachings of\n the specification and the inferences that would reasonably have been drawn from\n the specification by a person of ordinary skill in the art as a guide to\n understanding the problem to be solved. A prior art reference not in the same\n field of endeavor as the claimed invention must be reasonably pertinent to the\n problem to be solved in order to qualify as analogous art and be applied in an\n obviousness rejection.\n

    ","rendered_text_plain":"Any argument by the applicant that the examiner has misconstrued the problem to be solved, and as a result has improperly relied on nonanalogous art, should be fully considered in light of the specification. In evaluating the applicant's argument, the examiner should look to the teachings of the specification and the inferences that would reasonably have been drawn from the specification by a person of ordinary skill in the art as a guide to understanding the problem to be solved. A prior art reference not in the same field of endeavor as the claimed invention must be reasonably pertinent to the problem to be solved in order to qualify as analogous art and be applied in an obviousness rejection.","provenance":{"source_file":"s2141.html","source_anchor":"ch2100_d1b074_1df7c","source_sha256":"c18335410b948734844afa0950712df37f56fb7b8d25ca661deb44a79ef5e658"},"kind":"narrative","host_section_id":"se_zmtckktk"},{"id":"pb_gduvkhs2","node_type":"prose_block","corpus_id":"mpep-e9r01-2024-html","opaque_url":"https://mpep.io/n/pb_gduvkhs2","effective_range":{"start_revision":"R-01.2024","end_revision":null},"rendered_text_html":"II. CONSIDER SIMILARITIES AND DIFFERENCES IN STRUCTURE AND FUNCTION ","rendered_text_plain":"II. CONSIDER SIMILARITIES AND DIFFERENCES IN STRUCTURE AND FUNCTION","provenance":{"source_file":"s2141.html","source_anchor":"d0e208985/b.2","source_sha256":"c18335410b948734844afa0950712df37f56fb7b8d25ca661deb44a79ef5e658"},"kind":"informal_heading","host_section_id":"se_zmtckktk","heading_level":2,"heading_text":"II. CONSIDER SIMILARITIES AND DIFFERENCES IN STRUCTURE AND FUNCTION"},{"id":"pb_p6yvhyq6","node_type":"prose_block","corpus_id":"mpep-e9r01-2024-html","opaque_url":"https://mpep.io/n/pb_p6yvhyq6","effective_range":{"start_revision":"R-01.2024","end_revision":null},"rendered_text_html":"

    While Patent Office classification of references and the\n cross-references in the official search notes of the class definitions are some\n evidence of “nonanalogy” or “analogy” respectively, the court has found “the\n similarities and differences in structure and function of the inventions disclosed\n in the references to carry far greater weight.” In re Ellis,\n 476 F.2d 1370, 1372, 177 USPQ 526, 527 (CCPA 1973) (The structural similarities\n and functional overlap between the structural gratings shown by one reference and\n the shoe scrapers of the type shown by another reference were readily apparent,\n and therefore the arts to which the reference patents belonged were reasonably\n pertinent to the art with which appellant’s invention dealt (pedestrian floor\n gratings).).\n

    ","rendered_text_plain":"While Patent Office classification of references and the cross-references in the official search notes of the class definitions are some evidence of “nonanalogy” or “analogy” respectively, the court has found “the similarities and differences in structure and function of the inventions disclosed in the references to carry far greater weight.” In re Ellis, 476 F.2d 1370, 1372, 177 USPQ 526, 527 (CCPA 1973) (The structural similarities and functional overlap between the structural gratings shown by one reference and the shoe scrapers of the type shown by another reference were readily apparent, and therefore the arts to which the reference patents belonged were reasonably pertinent to the art with which appellant’s invention dealt (pedestrian floor gratings).).","provenance":{"source_file":"s2141.html","source_anchor":"d0e209013","source_sha256":"c18335410b948734844afa0950712df37f56fb7b8d25ca661deb44a79ef5e658"},"kind":"narrative","host_section_id":"se_zmtckktk"},{"id":"cs_oiazmwyw","node_type":"case","corpus_id":"mpep-e9r01-2024-html","opaque_url":"https://mpep.io/n/cs_oiazmwyw","effective_range":{"start_revision":"R-01.2024","end_revision":null},"rendered_text_html":"","rendered_text_plain":"In re Ellis, 476 F.2d 1370, 177 USPQ 526 (CCPA 1973)","provenance":{"source_file":"s2141.html","source_anchor":"","source_sha256":"c18335410b948734844afa0950712df37f56fb7b8d25ca661deb44a79ef5e658"},"short_name":"In re Ellis","all_citations":["476 F.2d 1370","177 USPQ 526"],"canonical_citation":"In re Ellis, 476 F.2d 1370, 177 USPQ 526 (CCPA 1973)","decision_year":1973,"court":"CCPA"},{"id":"pb_faalpcnz","node_type":"prose_block","corpus_id":"mpep-e9r01-2024-html","opaque_url":"https://mpep.io/n/pb_faalpcnz","effective_range":{"start_revision":"R-01.2024","end_revision":null},"rendered_text_html":"III. ANALOGY IN THE CHEMICAL ARTS","rendered_text_plain":"III. ANALOGY IN THE CHEMICAL ARTS","provenance":{"source_file":"s2141.html","source_anchor":"d0e208985/b.4","source_sha256":"c18335410b948734844afa0950712df37f56fb7b8d25ca661deb44a79ef5e658"},"kind":"informal_heading","host_section_id":"se_zmtckktk","heading_level":2,"heading_text":"III. ANALOGY IN THE CHEMICAL ARTS"},{"id":"pb_zsjk7bmp","node_type":"prose_block","corpus_id":"mpep-e9r01-2024-html","opaque_url":"https://mpep.io/n/pb_zsjk7bmp","effective_range":{"start_revision":"R-01.2024","end_revision":null},"rendered_text_html":"

    Examples of analogous art in the chemical arts include:\n Ex parte Bland, 3 USPQ2d 1103 (Bd. Pat App. & Inter.\n 1986) (Claims were drawn to a particulate composition useful as a preservative for\n an animal foodstuff (or a method of inhibiting fungus growth in an animal\n foodstuff therewith) comprising verxite having absorbed thereon propionic acid.\n All references were concerned with absorbing biologically active materials on\n carriers, and therefore the teachings in each of the various references would have\n been pertinent to the problems in the other references and the invention at\n hand.); Stratoflex, Inc. v. Aeroquip Corp., 713 F.2d 1530, 218\n USPQ 871 (Fed. Cir. 1983) (Problem confronting inventor was preventing\n electrostatic buildup in PTFE tubing caused by hydrocarbon fuel flow while\n precluding leakage of fuel. Two prior art references relied upon were in the\n rubber hose art, both referencing the problem of electrostatic buildup caused by\n fuel flow. The court found that because PTFE and rubber are used by the same hose\n manufacturers and experience the same and similar problems, a solution found for a\n problem experienced with either PTFE or rubber hosing would be looked to when\n facing a problem with the other.); In re Mlot-Fijalkowski, 676\n F.2d 666, 213 USPQ 713 (CCPA 1982) (Problem faced by inventor was enhancement and\n immobilization of dye penetrant indications. References which taught the use of\n dyes and finely divided developer materials to produce colored images preferably\n in, but not limited to, the duplicating paper art were properly relied upon\n because the court found that inventor's problem was one of dye chemistry, and a\n search for its solution would include the dye arts in general.).\n

    ","rendered_text_plain":"Examples of analogous art in the chemical arts include: Ex parte Bland, 3 USPQ2d 1103 (Bd. Pat App. & Inter. 1986) (Claims were drawn to a particulate composition useful as a preservative for an animal foodstuff (or a method of inhibiting fungus growth in an animal foodstuff therewith) comprising verxite having absorbed thereon propionic acid. All references were concerned with absorbing biologically active materials on carriers, and therefore the teachings in each of the various references would have been pertinent to the problems in the other references and the invention at hand.); Stratoflex, Inc. v. Aeroquip Corp., 713 F.2d 1530, 218 USPQ 871 (Fed. Cir. 1983) (Problem confronting inventor was preventing electrostatic buildup in PTFE tubing caused by hydrocarbon fuel flow while precluding leakage of fuel. Two prior art references relied upon were in the rubber hose art, both referencing the problem of electrostatic buildup caused by fuel flow. The court found that because PTFE and rubber are used by the same hose manufacturers and experience the same and similar problems, a solution found for a problem experienced with either PTFE or rubber hosing would be looked to when facing a problem with the other.); In re Mlot-Fijalkowski, 676 F.2d 666, 213 USPQ 713 (CCPA 1982) (Problem faced by inventor was enhancement and immobilization of dye penetrant indications. References which taught the use of dyes and finely divided developer materials to produce colored images preferably in, but not limited to, the duplicating paper art were properly relied upon because the court found that inventor's problem was one of dye chemistry, and a search for its solution would include the dye arts in general.).","provenance":{"source_file":"s2141.html","source_anchor":"d0e209024","source_sha256":"c18335410b948734844afa0950712df37f56fb7b8d25ca661deb44a79ef5e658"},"kind":"narrative","host_section_id":"se_zmtckktk"},{"id":"cs_axkq62xj","node_type":"case","corpus_id":"mpep-e9r01-2024-html","opaque_url":"https://mpep.io/n/cs_axkq62xj","effective_range":{"start_revision":"R-01.2024","end_revision":null},"rendered_text_html":"","rendered_text_plain":"Ex parte Bland, 3 USPQ2d 1103 (Bd. Pat App. & Inter. 1986)","provenance":{"source_file":"s2141.html","source_anchor":"","source_sha256":"c18335410b948734844afa0950712df37f56fb7b8d25ca661deb44a79ef5e658"},"short_name":"Ex parte Bland","all_citations":["3 USPQ2d 1103"],"canonical_citation":"Ex parte Bland, 3 USPQ2d 1103 (Bd. Pat App. & Inter. 1986)","decision_year":1986,"court":"B.P.A.I."},{"id":"cs_l3kmjhoc","node_type":"case","corpus_id":"mpep-e9r01-2024-html","opaque_url":"https://mpep.io/n/cs_l3kmjhoc","effective_range":{"start_revision":"R-01.2024","end_revision":null},"rendered_text_html":"","rendered_text_plain":"Stratoflex, Inc. v. Aeroquip Corp., 713 F.2d 1530, 218 USPQ 871 (Fed. Cir. 1983)","provenance":{"source_file":"s2141.html","source_anchor":"","source_sha256":"c18335410b948734844afa0950712df37f56fb7b8d25ca661deb44a79ef5e658"},"short_name":"Stratoflex, Inc. v. Aeroquip Corp.","all_citations":["713 F.2d 1530","218 USPQ 871"],"canonical_citation":"Stratoflex, Inc. v. Aeroquip Corp., 713 F.2d 1530, 218 USPQ 871 (Fed. Cir. 1983)","decision_year":1983,"court":"Fed. Cir."},{"id":"cs_4u336huz","node_type":"case","corpus_id":"mpep-e9r01-2024-html","opaque_url":"https://mpep.io/n/cs_4u336huz","effective_range":{"start_revision":"R-01.2024","end_revision":null},"rendered_text_html":"","rendered_text_plain":"In re Mlot-Fijalkowski, 676 F.2d 666, 213 USPQ 713 (CCPA 1982)","provenance":{"source_file":"s2141.html","source_anchor":"","source_sha256":"c18335410b948734844afa0950712df37f56fb7b8d25ca661deb44a79ef5e658"},"short_name":"In re Mlot-Fijalkowski","all_citations":["676 F.2d 666","213 USPQ 713"],"canonical_citation":"In re Mlot-Fijalkowski, 676 F.2d 666, 213 USPQ 713 (CCPA 1982)","decision_year":1982,"court":"CCPA"},{"id":"pb_arcca6fc","node_type":"prose_block","corpus_id":"mpep-e9r01-2024-html","opaque_url":"https://mpep.io/n/pb_arcca6fc","effective_range":{"start_revision":"R-01.2024","end_revision":null},"rendered_text_html":"IV. ANALOGY IN THE MECHANICAL ARTS","rendered_text_plain":"IV. ANALOGY IN THE MECHANICAL ARTS","provenance":{"source_file":"s2141.html","source_anchor":"d0e208985/b.6","source_sha256":"c18335410b948734844afa0950712df37f56fb7b8d25ca661deb44a79ef5e658"},"kind":"informal_heading","host_section_id":"se_zmtckktk","heading_level":2,"heading_text":"IV. ANALOGY IN THE MECHANICAL ARTS"},{"id":"pb_ynfednly","node_type":"prose_block","corpus_id":"mpep-e9r01-2024-html","opaque_url":"https://mpep.io/n/pb_ynfednly","effective_range":{"start_revision":"R-01.2024","end_revision":null},"rendered_text_html":"

    Examples of analogous art in the mechanical arts include:\n Stevenson v. Int'l Trade Comm., 612 F.2d 546, 550, 204 USPQ\n 276, 280 (CCPA 1979) (“In a simple mechanical invention a broad spectrum of prior\n art must be explored and it is reasonable to permit inquiry into other areas where\n one of ordinary skill in the art would be aware that similar problems exist.”).\n See also In re Bigio, 381 F.3d 1320, 1325-26, 72 USPQ2d 1209,\n 1211-12 (Fed. Cir. 2004). The patent application claimed a \"hair brush\" having a\n specific bristle configuration. The Board affirmed the examiner’s rejection of the\n claims as being obvious in view of prior art patents disclosing toothbrushes.\n Id. at 1323, 72 USPQ2d at 1210. The appellant disputed that\n the patent references constituted analogous art. On appeal, the court upheld the\n Board’s interpretation of the claim term “hair brush” to encompass any brush that\n may be used for any bodily hair, including facial hair. Id. at\n 1323-24, 72 USPQ2d at 1211. With this claim interpretation, the court applied the\n “field of endeavor test” for analogous art and determined that the references were\n within the field of the inventor’s endeavor and hence were analogous art because\n toothbrushes are structurally similar to small brushes for hair, and a toothbrush\n could be used to brush facial hair. Id. at 1326, 72 USPQ2d at\n 1212.\n

    ","rendered_text_plain":"Examples of analogous art in the mechanical arts include: Stevenson v. Int'l Trade Comm., 612 F.2d 546, 550, 204 USPQ 276, 280 (CCPA 1979) (“In a simple mechanical invention a broad spectrum of prior art must be explored and it is reasonable to permit inquiry into other areas where one of ordinary skill in the art would be aware that similar problems exist.”). See also In re Bigio, 381 F.3d 1320, 1325-26, 72 USPQ2d 1209, 1211-12 (Fed. Cir. 2004). The patent application claimed a \"hair brush\" having a specific bristle configuration. The Board affirmed the examiner’s rejection of the claims as being obvious in view of prior art patents disclosing toothbrushes. Id. at 1323, 72 USPQ2d at 1210. The appellant disputed that the patent references constituted analogous art. On appeal, the court upheld the Board’s interpretation of the claim term “hair brush” to encompass any brush that may be used for any bodily hair, including facial hair. Id. at 1323-24, 72 USPQ2d at 1211. With this claim interpretation, the court applied the “field of endeavor test” for analogous art and determined that the references were within the field of the inventor’s endeavor and hence were analogous art because toothbrushes are structurally similar to small brushes for hair, and a toothbrush could be used to brush facial hair. Id. at 1326, 72 USPQ2d at 1212.","provenance":{"source_file":"s2141.html","source_anchor":"d0e209040","source_sha256":"c18335410b948734844afa0950712df37f56fb7b8d25ca661deb44a79ef5e658"},"kind":"narrative","host_section_id":"se_zmtckktk"},{"id":"cs_mfafge3c","node_type":"case","corpus_id":"mpep-e9r01-2024-html","opaque_url":"https://mpep.io/n/cs_mfafge3c","effective_range":{"start_revision":"R-01.2024","end_revision":null},"rendered_text_html":"","rendered_text_plain":"Stevenson v. Int'l Trade Comm., 612 F.2d 546, 204 USPQ 276 (CCPA 1979)","provenance":{"source_file":"s2141.html","source_anchor":"","source_sha256":"c18335410b948734844afa0950712df37f56fb7b8d25ca661deb44a79ef5e658"},"short_name":"Stevenson v. Int'l Trade Comm.","all_citations":["612 F.2d 546","204 USPQ 276"],"canonical_citation":"Stevenson v. Int'l Trade Comm., 612 F.2d 546, 204 USPQ 276 (CCPA 1979)","decision_year":1979,"court":"CCPA"},{"id":"pb_5wybpr4m","node_type":"prose_block","corpus_id":"mpep-e9r01-2024-html","opaque_url":"https://mpep.io/n/pb_5wybpr4m","effective_range":{"start_revision":"R-01.2024","end_revision":null},"rendered_text_html":"

    Also see In re Deminski, 796 F.2d 436, 230\n USPQ 313 (Fed. Cir. 1986) (Appellent's claims related to double-acting high\n pressure gas transmission line compressors in which the valves could be removed\n easily for replacement. The Board relied upon references which taught either a\n double-acting piston pump or a double-acting piston compressor. The court agreed\n that since the cited pumps and compressors have essentially the same function and\n structure, the field of endeavor includes both types of double-action piston\n devices for moving fluids.); Pentec, Inc. v. Graphic Controls\n Corp., 776 F.2d 309, 227 USPQ 766 (Fed. Cir. 1985) (Claims at issue\n were directed to an instrument marker pen body, the improvement comprising a pen\n arm holding means having an integrally molded hinged member for folding over\n against the pen body. Although the patent owners argued the hinge and fastener art\n was nonanalogous, the court held that the problem confronting the inventor was the\n need for a simple holding means to enable frequent, secure attachment and easy\n removal of a marker pen to and from a pen arm, and one skilled in the pen art\n trying to solve that problem would have looked to the fastener and hinge art.);\n and Ex parte Goodyear Tire & Rubber Co., 230 USPQ 357 (Bd.\n Pat. App. & Inter. 1985) (A reference in the clutch art was held reasonably\n pertinent to the friction problem faced by the inventor, whose claims were\n directed to a braking material, because brakes and clutches utilize interfacing\n materials to accomplish their respective purposes.).\n

    ","rendered_text_plain":"Also see In re Deminski, 796 F.2d 436, 230 USPQ 313 (Fed. Cir. 1986) (Appellent's claims related to double-acting high pressure gas transmission line compressors in which the valves could be removed easily for replacement. The Board relied upon references which taught either a double-acting piston pump or a double-acting piston compressor. The court agreed that since the cited pumps and compressors have essentially the same function and structure, the field of endeavor includes both types of double-action piston devices for moving fluids.); Pentec, Inc. v. Graphic Controls Corp., 776 F.2d 309, 227 USPQ 766 (Fed. Cir. 1985) (Claims at issue were directed to an instrument marker pen body, the improvement comprising a pen arm holding means having an integrally molded hinged member for folding over against the pen body. Although the patent owners argued the hinge and fastener art was nonanalogous, the court held that the problem confronting the inventor was the need for a simple holding means to enable frequent, secure attachment and easy removal of a marker pen to and from a pen arm, and one skilled in the pen art trying to solve that problem would have looked to the fastener and hinge art.); and Ex parte Goodyear Tire & Rubber Co., 230 USPQ 357 (Bd. Pat. App. & Inter. 1985) (A reference in the clutch art was held reasonably pertinent to the friction problem faced by the inventor, whose claims were directed to a braking material, because brakes and clutches utilize interfacing materials to accomplish their respective purposes.).","provenance":{"source_file":"s2141.html","source_anchor":"d0e209054","source_sha256":"c18335410b948734844afa0950712df37f56fb7b8d25ca661deb44a79ef5e658"},"kind":"narrative","host_section_id":"se_zmtckktk"},{"id":"cs_5b36bj3c","node_type":"case","corpus_id":"mpep-e9r01-2024-html","opaque_url":"https://mpep.io/n/cs_5b36bj3c","effective_range":{"start_revision":"R-01.2024","end_revision":null},"rendered_text_html":"","rendered_text_plain":"In re Deminski, 796 F.2d 436, 230 USPQ 313 (Fed. Cir. 1986)","provenance":{"source_file":"s2141.html","source_anchor":"","source_sha256":"c18335410b948734844afa0950712df37f56fb7b8d25ca661deb44a79ef5e658"},"short_name":"In re Deminski","all_citations":["796 F.2d 436","230 USPQ 313"],"canonical_citation":"In re Deminski, 796 F.2d 436, 230 USPQ 313 (Fed. Cir. 1986)","decision_year":1986,"court":"Fed. Cir."},{"id":"cs_zgmmydd3","node_type":"case","corpus_id":"mpep-e9r01-2024-html","opaque_url":"https://mpep.io/n/cs_zgmmydd3","effective_range":{"start_revision":"R-01.2024","end_revision":null},"rendered_text_html":"","rendered_text_plain":"Pentec, Inc. v. Graphic Controls Corp., 776 F.2d 309, 227 USPQ 766 (Fed. Cir. 1985)","provenance":{"source_file":"s2141.html","source_anchor":"","source_sha256":"c18335410b948734844afa0950712df37f56fb7b8d25ca661deb44a79ef5e658"},"short_name":"Pentec, Inc. v. Graphic Controls Corp.","all_citations":["776 F.2d 309","227 USPQ 766"],"canonical_citation":"Pentec, Inc. v. Graphic Controls Corp., 776 F.2d 309, 227 USPQ 766 (Fed. Cir. 1985)","decision_year":1985,"court":"Fed. Cir."},{"id":"cs_64aimaek","node_type":"case","corpus_id":"mpep-e9r01-2024-html","opaque_url":"https://mpep.io/n/cs_64aimaek","effective_range":{"start_revision":"R-01.2024","end_revision":null},"rendered_text_html":"","rendered_text_plain":"Ex parte Goodyear Tire & Rubber Co., 230 USPQ 357 (Bd. Pat. App. & Inter. 1985)","provenance":{"source_file":"s2141.html","source_anchor":"","source_sha256":"c18335410b948734844afa0950712df37f56fb7b8d25ca661deb44a79ef5e658"},"short_name":"Ex parte Goodyear Tire & Rubber Co.","all_citations":["230 USPQ 357"],"canonical_citation":"Ex parte Goodyear Tire & Rubber Co., 230 USPQ 357 (Bd. Pat. App. & Inter. 1985)","decision_year":1985,"court":"B.P.A.I."},{"id":"pb_vybf26ie","node_type":"prose_block","corpus_id":"mpep-e9r01-2024-html","opaque_url":"https://mpep.io/n/pb_vybf26ie","effective_range":{"start_revision":"R-01.2024","end_revision":null},"rendered_text_html":"V. ANALOGY IN THE ELECTRICAL ARTS","rendered_text_plain":"V. ANALOGY IN THE ELECTRICAL ARTS","provenance":{"source_file":"s2141.html","source_anchor":"d0e208985/b.8","source_sha256":"c18335410b948734844afa0950712df37f56fb7b8d25ca661deb44a79ef5e658"},"kind":"informal_heading","host_section_id":"se_zmtckktk","heading_level":2,"heading_text":"V. ANALOGY IN THE ELECTRICAL ARTS"},{"id":"pb_xha3daut","node_type":"prose_block","corpus_id":"mpep-e9r01-2024-html","opaque_url":"https://mpep.io/n/pb_xha3daut","effective_range":{"start_revision":"R-01.2024","end_revision":null},"rendered_text_html":"

    See, for example, Medtronic, Inc. v. Cardiac\n Pacemakers, 721 F.2d 1563, 220 USPQ 97 (Fed. Cir. 1983) (Patent\n claims were drawn to a cardiac pacemaker which comprised, among other components,\n a runaway inhibitor means for preventing a pacemaker malfunction from causing\n pulses to be applied at too high a frequency. Two references disclosed circuits\n used in high power, high frequency devices which inhibited the runaway of pulses\n from a pulse source. The court held that one of ordinary skill in the pacemaker\n designer art faced with a rate-limiting problem would look to the solutions of\n others faced with rate limiting problems, and therefore the references were in an\n analogous art.).\n

    ","rendered_text_plain":"See, for example, Medtronic, Inc. v. Cardiac Pacemakers, 721 F.2d 1563, 220 USPQ 97 (Fed. Cir. 1983) (Patent claims were drawn to a cardiac pacemaker which comprised, among other components, a runaway inhibitor means for preventing a pacemaker malfunction from causing pulses to be applied at too high a frequency. Two references disclosed circuits used in high power, high frequency devices which inhibited the runaway of pulses from a pulse source. The court held that one of ordinary skill in the pacemaker designer art faced with a rate-limiting problem would look to the solutions of others faced with rate limiting problems, and therefore the references were in an analogous art.).","provenance":{"source_file":"s2141.html","source_anchor":"d0e209070","source_sha256":"c18335410b948734844afa0950712df37f56fb7b8d25ca661deb44a79ef5e658"},"kind":"narrative","host_section_id":"se_zmtckktk"},{"id":"cs_5uboign5","node_type":"case","corpus_id":"mpep-e9r01-2024-html","opaque_url":"https://mpep.io/n/cs_5uboign5","effective_range":{"start_revision":"R-01.2024","end_revision":null},"rendered_text_html":"","rendered_text_plain":"Medtronic, Inc. v. Cardiac Pacemakers, 721 F.2d 1563, 220 USPQ 97 (Fed. Cir. 1983)","provenance":{"source_file":"s2141.html","source_anchor":"","source_sha256":"c18335410b948734844afa0950712df37f56fb7b8d25ca661deb44a79ef5e658"},"short_name":"Medtronic, Inc. v. Cardiac Pacemakers","all_citations":["721 F.2d 1563","220 USPQ 97"],"canonical_citation":"Medtronic, Inc. v. Cardiac Pacemakers, 721 F.2d 1563, 220 USPQ 97 (Fed. Cir. 1983)","decision_year":1983,"court":"Fed. Cir."},{"id":"pb_xbesyqdm","node_type":"prose_block","corpus_id":"mpep-e9r01-2024-html","opaque_url":"https://mpep.io/n/pb_xbesyqdm","effective_range":{"start_revision":"R-01.2024","end_revision":null},"rendered_text_html":"VI. EXAMPLES OF ANALOGY IN THE DESIGN ARTS","rendered_text_plain":"VI. EXAMPLES OF ANALOGY IN THE DESIGN ARTS","provenance":{"source_file":"s2141.html","source_anchor":"d0e208985/b.10","source_sha256":"c18335410b948734844afa0950712df37f56fb7b8d25ca661deb44a79ef5e658"},"kind":"informal_heading","host_section_id":"se_zmtckktk","heading_level":2,"heading_text":"VI. EXAMPLES OF ANALOGY IN THE DESIGN ARTS"},{"id":"pb_yxjdzwqh","node_type":"prose_block","corpus_id":"mpep-e9r01-2024-html","opaque_url":"https://mpep.io/n/pb_yxjdzwqh","effective_range":{"start_revision":"R-01.2024","end_revision":null},"rendered_text_html":"

    See MPEP § 1504.03 for a discussion\n of the relevant case law setting forth the general requirements for analogous art\n in design applications.\n

    ","rendered_text_plain":"See MPEP § 1504.03 for a discussion of the relevant case law setting forth the general requirements for analogous art in design applications.","provenance":{"source_file":"s2141.html","source_anchor":"d0e209082","source_sha256":"c18335410b948734844afa0950712df37f56fb7b8d25ca661deb44a79ef5e658"},"kind":"narrative","host_section_id":"se_zmtckktk"},{"id":"se_zmtckktk","node_type":"section","corpus_id":"mpep-e9r01-2024-html","opaque_url":"https://mpep.io/n/se_zmtckktk","effective_range":{"start_revision":"R-01.2024","end_revision":null},"rendered_text_html":"","rendered_text_plain":"","provenance":{"source_file":"s2141.html","source_anchor":"d0e208985","source_sha256":"c18335410b948734844afa0950712df37f56fb7b8d25ca661deb44a79ef5e658"},"akn_urn":"/akn/us/statement/manual/uspto/2024/mpep/eng@2024-02-29!sec_2141_01_a","canonical_url":"https://mpep.io/akn/us/statement/manual/uspto/2024/mpep/eng@2024-02-29!sec_2141_01_a","section_number":"2141.01(a)","chapter":"2100","depth":2,"title":"Analogous and Nonanalogous Art","children_ids":["pb_tnsjjkcj","pb_mfjyij3r","pb_5xqlzcsb","pb_klrqrbo4","pb_t43pwaqm","pb_ccobi4ox","pb_raijapul","pb_gduvkhs2","pb_p6yvhyq6","pb_faalpcnz","pb_zsjk7bmp","pb_arcca6fc","pb_ynfednly","pb_5wybpr4m","pb_vybf26ie","pb_xha3daut","pb_xbesyqdm","pb_yxjdzwqh"],"revision_tag":"R-01.2024","parent_section_id":"se_ivzea5ns"},{"id":"se_ivzea5ns","node_type":"section","corpus_id":"mpep-e9r01-2024-html","opaque_url":"https://mpep.io/n/se_ivzea5ns","effective_range":{"start_revision":"R-01.2024","end_revision":null},"rendered_text_html":"","rendered_text_plain":"","provenance":{"source_file":"s2141.html","source_anchor":"d0e208803","source_sha256":"c18335410b948734844afa0950712df37f56fb7b8d25ca661deb44a79ef5e658"},"akn_urn":"/akn/us/statement/manual/uspto/2024/mpep/eng@2024-02-29!sec_2141_01","canonical_url":"https://mpep.io/akn/us/statement/manual/uspto/2024/mpep/eng@2024-02-29!sec_2141_01","section_number":"2141.01","chapter":"2100","depth":1,"title":"Scope and Content of the Prior Art","children_ids":["pb_qdyvqevw","pb_emhbzrxl","pb_hp4wyvei","pb_2ckuzrkz","pb_mqh726e6","pb_kd4mdwas","pb_mnurebd7","pb_2k6ehmc2","pb_2wezvz33","pb_a2fzufei","pb_akz4tnra","pb_b5bawf7w","pb_szey7hoc","ls_unr3m4q3","pb_urhkntlv","pb_m6xrzxhh","pb_wa5brvwz","se_zmtckktk"],"revision_tag":"R-01.2024","parent_section_id":"se_thj3rw3j"},{"id":"pb_yupsbdkq","node_type":"prose_block","corpus_id":"mpep-e9r01-2024-html","opaque_url":"https://mpep.io/n/pb_yupsbdkq","effective_range":{"start_revision":"R-01.2024","end_revision":null},"rendered_text_html":"

    [Editor Note: This MPEP section is applicable regardless of whether an\n application is examined under the AIA or under pre-AIA law. For applications subject\n to the first inventor to file (FITF) provisions of the AIA, the relevant time is\n \"before the effective filing date of the claimed invention\". For applications subject\n to pre-AIA 35\n U.S.C. 102, the relevant time is \"at the time of the\n invention\". See MPEP § 2150 et seq. Many of the\n court decisions discussed in this section involved applications or patents subject to\n pre-AIA 35\n U.S.C. 102. These court decisions may be applicable to\n applications and patents subject to AIA 35 U.S.C. 102 but the\n relevant time is before the effective filing date of the claimed invention and not at\n the time of the invention.]

    ","rendered_text_plain":"[Editor Note: This MPEP section is applicable regardless of whether an application is examined under the AIA or under pre-AIA law. For applications subject to the first inventor to file (FITF) provisions of the AIA, the relevant time is \"before the effective filing date of the claimed invention\". For applications subject to pre-AIA 35 U.S.C. 102, the relevant time is \"at the time of the invention\". See MPEP § 2150 et seq. Many of the court decisions discussed in this section involved applications or patents subject to pre-AIA 35 U.S.C. 102. These court decisions may be applicable to applications and patents subject to AIA 35 U.S.C. 102 but the relevant time is before the effective filing date of the claimed invention and not at the time of the invention.]","provenance":{"source_file":"s2141.html","source_anchor":"ch2100_d223b3_23700_3ac","source_sha256":"c18335410b948734844afa0950712df37f56fb7b8d25ca661deb44a79ef5e658"},"kind":"narrative","host_section_id":"se_7euchp5v"},{"id":"pb_zk4gz3hn","node_type":"prose_block","corpus_id":"mpep-e9r01-2024-html","opaque_url":"https://mpep.io/n/pb_zk4gz3hn","effective_range":{"start_revision":"R-01.2024","end_revision":null},"rendered_text_html":"

    Ascertaining the differences between the prior art and the claims at\n issue requires interpreting the claim language, and considering both the invention and\n the prior art references as a whole. See MPEP § 2111 - § 2116.01 for case\n law pertaining to claim interpretation. See also MPEP § 2143.03 for examples of types of\n claim language that may raise a question as to its limiting effect.\n

    ","rendered_text_plain":"Ascertaining the differences between the prior art and the claims at issue requires interpreting the claim language, and considering both the invention and the prior art references as a whole. See MPEP § 2111 - § 2116.01 for case law pertaining to claim interpretation. See also MPEP § 2143.03 for examples of types of claim language that may raise a question as to its limiting effect.","provenance":{"source_file":"s2141.html","source_anchor":"d0e209114","source_sha256":"c18335410b948734844afa0950712df37f56fb7b8d25ca661deb44a79ef5e658"},"kind":"narrative","host_section_id":"se_7euchp5v"},{"id":"pb_rmqcdzet","node_type":"prose_block","corpus_id":"mpep-e9r01-2024-html","opaque_url":"https://mpep.io/n/pb_rmqcdzet","effective_range":{"start_revision":"R-01.2024","end_revision":null},"rendered_text_html":"I. THE CLAIMED INVENTION AS A WHOLE MUST BE CONSIDERED","rendered_text_plain":"I. THE CLAIMED INVENTION AS A WHOLE MUST BE CONSIDERED","provenance":{"source_file":"s2141.html","source_anchor":"d0e209106/b.0","source_sha256":"c18335410b948734844afa0950712df37f56fb7b8d25ca661deb44a79ef5e658"},"kind":"informal_heading","host_section_id":"se_7euchp5v","heading_level":2,"heading_text":"I. THE CLAIMED INVENTION AS A WHOLE MUST BE CONSIDERED"},{"id":"pb_cu5dqjiu","node_type":"prose_block","corpus_id":"mpep-e9r01-2024-html","opaque_url":"https://mpep.io/n/pb_cu5dqjiu","effective_range":{"start_revision":"R-01.2024","end_revision":null},"rendered_text_html":"

    In determining the differences between the prior art and the claims,\n the question under 35 U.S.C. 103 is not whether the differences\n themselves would have been obvious, but whether the claimed\n invention as a whole would have been obvious.\n Stratoflex, Inc. v. Aeroquip Corp., 713 F.2d 1530, 218 USPQ 871\n (Fed. Cir. 1983); Schenck v. Nortron Corp., 713 F.2d 782, 218 USPQ\n 698 (Fed. Cir. 1983) (Claims were directed to a vibratory testing machine (a\n hard-bearing wheel balancer) comprising a holding structure, a base structure, and a\n supporting means which form “a single integral and gaplessly continuous piece.”\n Nortron argued the invention is just making integral what had\n been made in four bolted pieces, improperly limiting the focus to a structural\n difference from the prior art and failing to consider the invention as a whole. The\n prior art perceived a need for mechanisms to dampen resonance, whereas the inventor\n eliminated the need for dampening via the one-piece gapless support structure.\n “Because that insight was contrary to the understandings and expectations of the art,\n the structure effectuating it would not have been obvious to those skilled in the\n art.” 713 F.2d at 785, 218 USPQ at 700 (citations omitted).).\n

    ","rendered_text_plain":"In determining the differences between the prior art and the claims, the question under 35 U.S.C. 103 is not whether the differences themselves would have been obvious, but whether the claimed invention as a whole would have been obvious. Stratoflex, Inc. v. Aeroquip Corp., 713 F.2d 1530, 218 USPQ 871 (Fed. Cir. 1983); Schenck v. Nortron Corp., 713 F.2d 782, 218 USPQ 698 (Fed. Cir. 1983) (Claims were directed to a vibratory testing machine (a hard-bearing wheel balancer) comprising a holding structure, a base structure, and a supporting means which form “a single integral and gaplessly continuous piece.” Nortron argued the invention is just making integral what had been made in four bolted pieces, improperly limiting the focus to a structural difference from the prior art and failing to consider the invention as a whole. The prior art perceived a need for mechanisms to dampen resonance, whereas the inventor eliminated the need for dampening via the one-piece gapless support structure. “Because that insight was contrary to the understandings and expectations of the art, the structure effectuating it would not have been obvious to those skilled in the art.” 713 F.2d at 785, 218 USPQ at 700 (citations omitted).).","provenance":{"source_file":"s2141.html","source_anchor":"d0e209127","source_sha256":"c18335410b948734844afa0950712df37f56fb7b8d25ca661deb44a79ef5e658"},"kind":"narrative","host_section_id":"se_7euchp5v"},{"id":"cs_bfihw7ye","node_type":"case","corpus_id":"mpep-e9r01-2024-html","opaque_url":"https://mpep.io/n/cs_bfihw7ye","effective_range":{"start_revision":"R-01.2024","end_revision":null},"rendered_text_html":"","rendered_text_plain":"Schenck v. Nortron Corp., 713 F.2d 782, 218 USPQ 698 (Fed. Cir. 1983)","provenance":{"source_file":"s2141.html","source_anchor":"","source_sha256":"c18335410b948734844afa0950712df37f56fb7b8d25ca661deb44a79ef5e658"},"short_name":"Schenck v. Nortron Corp.","all_citations":["713 F.2d 782","218 USPQ 698"],"canonical_citation":"Schenck v. Nortron Corp., 713 F.2d 782, 218 USPQ 698 (Fed. Cir. 1983)","decision_year":1983,"court":"Fed. Cir."},{"id":"pb_fdmmrj75","node_type":"prose_block","corpus_id":"mpep-e9r01-2024-html","opaque_url":"https://mpep.io/n/pb_fdmmrj75","effective_range":{"start_revision":"R-01.2024","end_revision":null},"rendered_text_html":"

    See also In re Hirao, 535 F.2d 67, 190 USPQ 15\n (CCPA 1976) (Claims were directed to a three step process for preparing sweetened\n foods and drinks. The first two steps were directed to a process of producing high\n purity maltose (the sweetener), and the third was directed to adding the maltose to\n foods and drinks. The parties agreed that the first two steps were nonobvious but\n formed a known product and the third step was obvious. The Solicitor argued the\n preamble was directed to a process for preparing foods and drinks sweetened mildly\n and thus the specific method of making the high purity maltose (the first two steps\n in the claimed process) should not be given weight, analogizing with\n product-by-process claims. The court disagreed and held “due to the admitted\n unobviousness of the first two steps of the claimed combination of steps, the subject\n matter as a whole would not have been obvious to one of\n ordinary skill in the art at the time the invention was made.” 535 F.2d at 69, 190\n USPQ at 17 (emphasis in original). The preamble only recited the purpose of the\n process and did not limit the body of the claim. Therefore, the claimed process was a\n three-step process, not the product formed by two steps of the process or the third\n step of using that product.). \n

    ","rendered_text_plain":"See also In re Hirao, 535 F.2d 67, 190 USPQ 15 (CCPA 1976) (Claims were directed to a three step process for preparing sweetened foods and drinks. The first two steps were directed to a process of producing high purity maltose (the sweetener), and the third was directed to adding the maltose to foods and drinks. The parties agreed that the first two steps were nonobvious but formed a known product and the third step was obvious. The Solicitor argued the preamble was directed to a process for preparing foods and drinks sweetened mildly and thus the specific method of making the high purity maltose (the first two steps in the claimed process) should not be given weight, analogizing with product-by-process claims. The court disagreed and held “due to the admitted unobviousness of the first two steps of the claimed combination of steps, the subject matter as a whole would not have been obvious to one of ordinary skill in the art at the time the invention was made.” 535 F.2d at 69, 190 USPQ at 17 (emphasis in original). The preamble only recited the purpose of the process and did not limit the body of the claim. Therefore, the claimed process was a three-step process, not the product formed by two steps of the process or the third step of using that product.).","provenance":{"source_file":"s2141.html","source_anchor":"d0e209148","source_sha256":"c18335410b948734844afa0950712df37f56fb7b8d25ca661deb44a79ef5e658"},"kind":"narrative","host_section_id":"se_7euchp5v"},{"id":"cs_efquln4w","node_type":"case","corpus_id":"mpep-e9r01-2024-html","opaque_url":"https://mpep.io/n/cs_efquln4w","effective_range":{"start_revision":"R-01.2024","end_revision":null},"rendered_text_html":"","rendered_text_plain":"In re Hirao, 535 F.2d 67, 190 USPQ 15 (CCPA 1976)","provenance":{"source_file":"s2141.html","source_anchor":"","source_sha256":"c18335410b948734844afa0950712df37f56fb7b8d25ca661deb44a79ef5e658"},"short_name":"In re Hirao","all_citations":["535 F.2d 67","190 USPQ 15"],"canonical_citation":"In re Hirao, 535 F.2d 67, 190 USPQ 15 (CCPA 1976)","decision_year":1976,"court":"CCPA"},{"id":"pb_rdoe6ayf","node_type":"prose_block","corpus_id":"mpep-e9r01-2024-html","opaque_url":"https://mpep.io/n/pb_rdoe6ayf","effective_range":{"start_revision":"R-01.2024","end_revision":null},"rendered_text_html":"II. DISTILLING THE INVENTION DOWN TO A “GIST” OR “THRUST” OF AN INVENTION\n DISREGARDS “AS A WHOLE” REQUIREMENT","rendered_text_plain":"II. DISTILLING THE INVENTION DOWN TO A “GIST” OR “THRUST” OF AN INVENTION DISREGARDS “AS A WHOLE” REQUIREMENT","provenance":{"source_file":"s2141.html","source_anchor":"d0e209106/b.2","source_sha256":"c18335410b948734844afa0950712df37f56fb7b8d25ca661deb44a79ef5e658"},"kind":"informal_heading","host_section_id":"se_7euchp5v","heading_level":2,"heading_text":"II. DISTILLING THE INVENTION DOWN TO A “GIST” OR “THRUST” OF AN INVENTION DISREGARDS “AS A WHOLE” REQUIREMENT"},{"id":"pb_iysszppy","node_type":"prose_block","corpus_id":"mpep-e9r01-2024-html","opaque_url":"https://mpep.io/n/pb_iysszppy","effective_range":{"start_revision":"R-01.2024","end_revision":null},"rendered_text_html":"

    Distilling an invention down to the “gist” or “thrust” of an\n invention disregards the requirement of analyzing the subject matter “as a whole.”\n W.L. Gore & Assoc., Inc. v. Garlock, Inc., 721 F.2d 1540,\n 220 USPQ 303 (Fed. Cir. 1983), cert. denied, 469 U.S. 851 (1984)\n (restricting consideration of the claims to a 10% per second rate of stretching of\n unsintered PTFE and disregarding other limitations resulted in treating claims as\n though they read differently than allowed); Bausch & Lomb v.Barnes-Hind/Hydrocurve, Inc., 796 F.2d 443, 447-49, 230 USPQ 416,\n 419-20 (Fed. Cir. 1986), cert. denied, 484 U.S. 823 (1987)\n (District court focused on the “concept of forming ridgeless depressions having\n smooth rounded edges using a laser beam to vaporize the material,” but “disregarded\n express limitations that the product be an ophthalmic lens formed of a transparent\n cross-linked polymer and that the laser marks be surrounded by a smooth surface of\n unsublimated polymer.”). See also Jones v. Hardy, 727 F.2d 1524,\n 1530, 220 USPQ 1021, 1026 (Fed. Cir. 1984) (“treating the advantage as the invention\n disregards the statutory requirement that the invention be viewed ‘as a whole’”);\n Panduit Corp. v. Dennison Mfg. Co., 810 F.2d 1561, 1 USPQ2d\n 1593 (Fed. Cir. 1987), cert. denied, 481 U.S. 1052 (1987)\n (district court improperly distilled claims down to a one word solution to a\n problem).\n

    ","rendered_text_plain":"Distilling an invention down to the “gist” or “thrust” of an invention disregards the requirement of analyzing the subject matter “as a whole.” W.L. Gore & Assoc., Inc. v. Garlock, Inc., 721 F.2d 1540, 220 USPQ 303 (Fed. Cir. 1983), cert. denied, 469 U.S. 851 (1984) (restricting consideration of the claims to a 10% per second rate of stretching of unsintered PTFE and disregarding other limitations resulted in treating claims as though they read differently than allowed); Bausch & Lomb v.Barnes-Hind/Hydrocurve, Inc., 796 F.2d 443, 447-49, 230 USPQ 416, 419-20 (Fed. Cir. 1986), cert. denied, 484 U.S. 823 (1987) (District court focused on the “concept of forming ridgeless depressions having smooth rounded edges using a laser beam to vaporize the material,” but “disregarded express limitations that the product be an ophthalmic lens formed of a transparent cross-linked polymer and that the laser marks be surrounded by a smooth surface of unsublimated polymer.”). See also Jones v. Hardy, 727 F.2d 1524, 1530, 220 USPQ 1021, 1026 (Fed. Cir. 1984) (“treating the advantage as the invention disregards the statutory requirement that the invention be viewed ‘as a whole’”); Panduit Corp. v. Dennison Mfg. Co., 810 F.2d 1561, 1 USPQ2d 1593 (Fed. Cir. 1987), cert. denied, 481 U.S. 1052 (1987) (district court improperly distilled claims down to a one word solution to a problem).","provenance":{"source_file":"s2141.html","source_anchor":"d0e209161","source_sha256":"c18335410b948734844afa0950712df37f56fb7b8d25ca661deb44a79ef5e658"},"kind":"narrative","host_section_id":"se_7euchp5v"},{"id":"cs_vohwqi4v","node_type":"case","corpus_id":"mpep-e9r01-2024-html","opaque_url":"https://mpep.io/n/cs_vohwqi4v","effective_range":{"start_revision":"R-01.2024","end_revision":null},"rendered_text_html":"","rendered_text_plain":"W.L. Gore & Assoc., Inc. v. Garlock, Inc., 721 F.2d 1540, 220 USPQ 303 (Fed. Cir. 1983)","provenance":{"source_file":"s2141.html","source_anchor":"","source_sha256":"c18335410b948734844afa0950712df37f56fb7b8d25ca661deb44a79ef5e658"},"short_name":"W.L. Gore & Assoc., Inc. v. Garlock, Inc.","all_citations":["721 F.2d 1540","220 USPQ 303"],"canonical_citation":"W.L. Gore & Assoc., Inc. v. Garlock, Inc., 721 F.2d 1540, 220 USPQ 303 (Fed. Cir. 1983)","decision_year":1983,"court":"Fed. Cir."},{"id":"cs_sng5peqt","node_type":"case","corpus_id":"mpep-e9r01-2024-html","opaque_url":"https://mpep.io/n/cs_sng5peqt","effective_range":{"start_revision":"R-01.2024","end_revision":null},"rendered_text_html":"","rendered_text_plain":"Bausch & Lomb v. Barnes-Hind/Hydrocurve, Inc., 796 F.2d 443, 230 USPQ 416 (Fed. Cir. 1986)","provenance":{"source_file":"s2141.html","source_anchor":"","source_sha256":"c18335410b948734844afa0950712df37f56fb7b8d25ca661deb44a79ef5e658"},"short_name":"Bausch & Lomb v. Barnes-Hind/Hydrocurve, Inc.","all_citations":["796 F.2d 443","230 USPQ 416"],"canonical_citation":"Bausch & Lomb v. Barnes-Hind/Hydrocurve, Inc., 796 F.2d 443, 230 USPQ 416 (Fed. Cir. 1986)","decision_year":1986,"court":"Fed. Cir."},{"id":"cs_zxnkabix","node_type":"case","corpus_id":"mpep-e9r01-2024-html","opaque_url":"https://mpep.io/n/cs_zxnkabix","effective_range":{"start_revision":"R-01.2024","end_revision":null},"rendered_text_html":"","rendered_text_plain":"Jones v. Hardy, 727 F.2d 1524, 220 USPQ 1021 (Fed. Cir. 1984)","provenance":{"source_file":"s2141.html","source_anchor":"","source_sha256":"c18335410b948734844afa0950712df37f56fb7b8d25ca661deb44a79ef5e658"},"short_name":"Jones v. Hardy","all_citations":["727 F.2d 1524","220 USPQ 1021"],"canonical_citation":"Jones v. Hardy, 727 F.2d 1524, 220 USPQ 1021 (Fed. Cir. 1984)","decision_year":1984,"court":"Fed. Cir."},{"id":"cs_zo7abvjr","node_type":"case","corpus_id":"mpep-e9r01-2024-html","opaque_url":"https://mpep.io/n/cs_zo7abvjr","effective_range":{"start_revision":"R-01.2024","end_revision":null},"rendered_text_html":"","rendered_text_plain":"Panduit Corp. v. Dennison Mfg. Co., 810 F.2d 1561, 1 USPQ2d 1593 (Fed. Cir. 1987)","provenance":{"source_file":"s2141.html","source_anchor":"","source_sha256":"c18335410b948734844afa0950712df37f56fb7b8d25ca661deb44a79ef5e658"},"short_name":"Panduit Corp. v. Dennison Mfg. Co.","all_citations":["810 F.2d 1561","1 USPQ2d 1593"],"canonical_citation":"Panduit Corp. v. Dennison Mfg. Co., 810 F.2d 1561, 1 USPQ2d 1593 (Fed. Cir. 1987)","decision_year":1987,"court":"Fed. Cir."},{"id":"pb_s5jisqcf","node_type":"prose_block","corpus_id":"mpep-e9r01-2024-html","opaque_url":"https://mpep.io/n/pb_s5jisqcf","effective_range":{"start_revision":"R-01.2024","end_revision":null},"rendered_text_html":"III. DISCOVERING SOURCE/CAUSE OF A PROBLEM IS PART OF “AS A WHOLE” INQUIRY","rendered_text_plain":"III. DISCOVERING SOURCE/CAUSE OF A PROBLEM IS PART OF “AS A WHOLE” INQUIRY","provenance":{"source_file":"s2141.html","source_anchor":"d0e209106/b.4","source_sha256":"c18335410b948734844afa0950712df37f56fb7b8d25ca661deb44a79ef5e658"},"kind":"informal_heading","host_section_id":"se_7euchp5v","heading_level":2,"heading_text":"III. DISCOVERING SOURCE/CAUSE OF A PROBLEM IS PART OF “AS A WHOLE” INQUIRY"},{"id":"pb_oezi4yev","node_type":"prose_block","corpus_id":"mpep-e9r01-2024-html","opaque_url":"https://mpep.io/n/pb_oezi4yev","effective_range":{"start_revision":"R-01.2024","end_revision":null},"rendered_text_html":"

    “[A] patentable invention may lie in the discovery of the source of\n a problem even though the remedy may be obvious once the source of the problem is\n identified. This is part of the ‘subject matter as a whole’\n which should always be considered in determining the obviousness of an invention\n under 35 U.S.C. §\n 103.” In re Sponnoble, 405 F.2d 578, 585,\n 160 USPQ 237, 243 (CCPA 1969). However, “discovery of the cause of a problem . . does\n not always result in a patentable invention. . . . [A] different situation exists\n where the solution is obvious from prior art which contains the same\n solution for a similar problem.” In re Wiseman, 596\n F.2d 1019, 1022, 201 USPQ 658, 661 (CCPA 1979) (emphasis in original). \n

    ","rendered_text_plain":"“[A] patentable invention may lie in the discovery of the source of a problem even though the remedy may be obvious once the source of the problem is identified. This is part of the ‘subject matter as a whole’ which should always be considered in determining the obviousness of an invention under 35 U.S.C. § 103.” In re Sponnoble, 405 F.2d 578, 585, 160 USPQ 237, 243 (CCPA 1969). However, “discovery of the cause of a problem . . does not always result in a patentable invention. . . . [A] different situation exists where the solution is obvious from prior art which contains the same solution for a similar problem.” In re Wiseman, 596 F.2d 1019, 1022, 201 USPQ 658, 661 (CCPA 1979) (emphasis in original).","provenance":{"source_file":"s2141.html","source_anchor":"d0e209192","source_sha256":"c18335410b948734844afa0950712df37f56fb7b8d25ca661deb44a79ef5e658"},"kind":"narrative","host_section_id":"se_7euchp5v"},{"id":"cs_bmpvoupi","node_type":"case","corpus_id":"mpep-e9r01-2024-html","opaque_url":"https://mpep.io/n/cs_bmpvoupi","effective_range":{"start_revision":"R-01.2024","end_revision":null},"rendered_text_html":"","rendered_text_plain":"In re Sponnoble, 405 F.2d 578, 160 USPQ 237 (CCPA 1969)","provenance":{"source_file":"s2141.html","source_anchor":"","source_sha256":"c18335410b948734844afa0950712df37f56fb7b8d25ca661deb44a79ef5e658"},"short_name":"In re Sponnoble","all_citations":["405 F.2d 578","160 USPQ 237"],"canonical_citation":"In re Sponnoble, 405 F.2d 578, 160 USPQ 237 (CCPA 1969)","decision_year":1969,"court":"CCPA"},{"id":"cs_km3ef6bq","node_type":"case","corpus_id":"mpep-e9r01-2024-html","opaque_url":"https://mpep.io/n/cs_km3ef6bq","effective_range":{"start_revision":"R-01.2024","end_revision":null},"rendered_text_html":"","rendered_text_plain":"In re Wiseman, 596 F.2d 1019, 201 USPQ 658 (CCPA 1979)","provenance":{"source_file":"s2141.html","source_anchor":"","source_sha256":"c18335410b948734844afa0950712df37f56fb7b8d25ca661deb44a79ef5e658"},"short_name":"In re Wiseman","all_citations":["596 F.2d 1019","201 USPQ 658"],"canonical_citation":"In re Wiseman, 596 F.2d 1019, 201 USPQ 658 (CCPA 1979)","decision_year":1979,"court":"CCPA"},{"id":"pb_ssrnj3hz","node_type":"prose_block","corpus_id":"mpep-e9r01-2024-html","opaque_url":"https://mpep.io/n/pb_ssrnj3hz","effective_range":{"start_revision":"R-01.2024","end_revision":null},"rendered_text_html":"

    In In re Sponnoble, the claim was directed to a\n plural compartment mixing vial wherein a center seal plug was placed between two\n compartments for temporarily isolating a liquid-containing compartment from a\n solids-containing compartment. The claim differed from the prior art in the selection\n of butyl rubber with a silicone coating as the plug material instead of natural\n rubber. The prior art recognized that leakage from the liquid to the solids\n compartment was a problem, and considered the problem to be a result of moisture\n passing around the center plug because of microscopic fissures\n inherently present in molded or blown glass. The court found the inventor discovered\n the cause of moisture transmission was through the center\n plug, and there was no teaching in the prior art which would suggest the necessity of\n selecting applicant's plug material which was more impervious to liquids than the\n natural rubber plug of the prior art.\n

    ","rendered_text_plain":"In In re Sponnoble, the claim was directed to a plural compartment mixing vial wherein a center seal plug was placed between two compartments for temporarily isolating a liquid-containing compartment from a solids-containing compartment. The claim differed from the prior art in the selection of butyl rubber with a silicone coating as the plug material instead of natural rubber. The prior art recognized that leakage from the liquid to the solids compartment was a problem, and considered the problem to be a result of moisture passing around the center plug because of microscopic fissures inherently present in molded or blown glass. The court found the inventor discovered the cause of moisture transmission was through the center plug, and there was no teaching in the prior art which would suggest the necessity of selecting applicant's plug material which was more impervious to liquids than the natural rubber plug of the prior art.","provenance":{"source_file":"s2141.html","source_anchor":"d0e209207","source_sha256":"c18335410b948734844afa0950712df37f56fb7b8d25ca661deb44a79ef5e658"},"kind":"narrative","host_section_id":"se_7euchp5v"},{"id":"pb_w3rshyor","node_type":"prose_block","corpus_id":"mpep-e9r01-2024-html","opaque_url":"https://mpep.io/n/pb_w3rshyor","effective_range":{"start_revision":"R-01.2024","end_revision":null},"rendered_text_html":"

    In In re Wiseman, 596 F.2d at 1022, 201 USPQ at\n 661, claims directed to grooved carbon disc brakes wherein the grooves were provided\n to vent steam or vapor during a braking action to minimize fading of the brakes were\n rejected as obvious over a reference showing carbon disc brakes without grooves in\n combination with a reference showing grooves in noncarbon disc brakes for the purpose\n of cooling the faces of the braking members and eliminating dust, thereby reducing\n fading of the brakes. The court affirmed the rejection, holding that even if the\n inventor discovered the cause of a problem, the solution would have been obvious from\n the prior art which contained the same solution (inserting grooves in disc brakes)\n for a similar problem.\n

    ","rendered_text_plain":"In In re Wiseman, 596 F.2d at 1022, 201 USPQ at 661, claims directed to grooved carbon disc brakes wherein the grooves were provided to vent steam or vapor during a braking action to minimize fading of the brakes were rejected as obvious over a reference showing carbon disc brakes without grooves in combination with a reference showing grooves in noncarbon disc brakes for the purpose of cooling the faces of the braking members and eliminating dust, thereby reducing fading of the brakes. The court affirmed the rejection, holding that even if the inventor discovered the cause of a problem, the solution would have been obvious from the prior art which contained the same solution (inserting grooves in disc brakes) for a similar problem.","provenance":{"source_file":"s2141.html","source_anchor":"d0e209219","source_sha256":"c18335410b948734844afa0950712df37f56fb7b8d25ca661deb44a79ef5e658"},"kind":"narrative","host_section_id":"se_7euchp5v"},{"id":"pb_xqlhpjph","node_type":"prose_block","corpus_id":"mpep-e9r01-2024-html","opaque_url":"https://mpep.io/n/pb_xqlhpjph","effective_range":{"start_revision":"R-01.2024","end_revision":null},"rendered_text_html":"IV. APPLICANTS ALLEGING DISCOVERY OF A SOURCE OF A PROBLEM MUST PROVIDE\n SUBSTANTIATING EVIDENCE","rendered_text_plain":"IV. APPLICANTS ALLEGING DISCOVERY OF A SOURCE OF A PROBLEM MUST PROVIDE SUBSTANTIATING EVIDENCE","provenance":{"source_file":"s2141.html","source_anchor":"d0e209106/b.6","source_sha256":"c18335410b948734844afa0950712df37f56fb7b8d25ca661deb44a79ef5e658"},"kind":"informal_heading","host_section_id":"se_7euchp5v","heading_level":2,"heading_text":"IV. APPLICANTS ALLEGING DISCOVERY OF A SOURCE OF A PROBLEM MUST PROVIDE SUBSTANTIATING EVIDENCE"},{"id":"pb_3nf3e4pj","node_type":"prose_block","corpus_id":"mpep-e9r01-2024-html","opaque_url":"https://mpep.io/n/pb_3nf3e4pj","effective_range":{"start_revision":"R-01.2024","end_revision":null},"rendered_text_html":"

    Applicants who allege the inventor discovered the source of a\n problem must provide evidence substantiating the allegation, either by way of\n affidavits or declarations, or by way of a clear and persuasive assertion in the\n specification. In re Wiseman, 596 F.2d 1019, 201 USPQ 658 (CCPA\n 1979) (unsubstantiated statement of counsel was insufficient to show appellants\n discovered source of the problem); In re Kaslow, 707 F.2d 1366,\n 217 USPQ 1089 (Fed. Cir. 1983) (Claims were directed to a method for redeeming\n merchandising coupons which contain a UPC “5-by-5” bar code wherein, among other\n steps, the memory at each supermarket would identify coupons by manufacturer and\n transmit the data to a central computer to provide an audit, thereby eliminating the\n need for clearinghouses and preventing retailer fraud. In challenging the propriety\n of an obviousness rejection, appellant argued he discovered the source of a problem\n (retailer fraud and manual clearinghouse operations) and its solution. The court\n found appellant’s specification did not support the argument that he discovered the\n source of the problem with respect to retailer fraud, and that the claimed invention\n failed to solve the problem of manual clearinghouse operations.).\n

    ","rendered_text_plain":"Applicants who allege the inventor discovered the source of a problem must provide evidence substantiating the allegation, either by way of affidavits or declarations, or by way of a clear and persuasive assertion in the specification. In re Wiseman, 596 F.2d 1019, 201 USPQ 658 (CCPA 1979) (unsubstantiated statement of counsel was insufficient to show appellants discovered source of the problem); In re Kaslow, 707 F.2d 1366, 217 USPQ 1089 (Fed. Cir. 1983) (Claims were directed to a method for redeeming merchandising coupons which contain a UPC “5-by-5” bar code wherein, among other steps, the memory at each supermarket would identify coupons by manufacturer and transmit the data to a central computer to provide an audit, thereby eliminating the need for clearinghouses and preventing retailer fraud. In challenging the propriety of an obviousness rejection, appellant argued he discovered the source of a problem (retailer fraud and manual clearinghouse operations) and its solution. The court found appellant’s specification did not support the argument that he discovered the source of the problem with respect to retailer fraud, and that the claimed invention failed to solve the problem of manual clearinghouse operations.).","provenance":{"source_file":"s2141.html","source_anchor":"d0e209229","source_sha256":"c18335410b948734844afa0950712df37f56fb7b8d25ca661deb44a79ef5e658"},"kind":"narrative","host_section_id":"se_7euchp5v"},{"id":"cs_hsrsutwg","node_type":"case","corpus_id":"mpep-e9r01-2024-html","opaque_url":"https://mpep.io/n/cs_hsrsutwg","effective_range":{"start_revision":"R-01.2024","end_revision":null},"rendered_text_html":"","rendered_text_plain":"In re Kaslow, 707 F.2d 1366, 217 USPQ 1089 (Fed. Cir. 1983)","provenance":{"source_file":"s2141.html","source_anchor":"","source_sha256":"c18335410b948734844afa0950712df37f56fb7b8d25ca661deb44a79ef5e658"},"short_name":"In re Kaslow","all_citations":["707 F.2d 1366","217 USPQ 1089"],"canonical_citation":"In re Kaslow, 707 F.2d 1366, 217 USPQ 1089 (Fed. Cir. 1983)","decision_year":1983,"court":"Fed. Cir."},{"id":"pb_apdkzmku","node_type":"prose_block","corpus_id":"mpep-e9r01-2024-html","opaque_url":"https://mpep.io/n/pb_apdkzmku","effective_range":{"start_revision":"R-01.2024","end_revision":null},"rendered_text_html":"V. DISCLOSED INHERENT PROPERTIES ARE PART OF “AS A WHOLE” INQUIRY","rendered_text_plain":"V. DISCLOSED INHERENT PROPERTIES ARE PART OF “AS A WHOLE” INQUIRY","provenance":{"source_file":"s2141.html","source_anchor":"d0e209106/b.8","source_sha256":"c18335410b948734844afa0950712df37f56fb7b8d25ca661deb44a79ef5e658"},"kind":"informal_heading","host_section_id":"se_7euchp5v","heading_level":2,"heading_text":"V. DISCLOSED INHERENT PROPERTIES ARE PART OF “AS A WHOLE” INQUIRY"},{"id":"pb_t5qchtfg","node_type":"prose_block","corpus_id":"mpep-e9r01-2024-html","opaque_url":"https://mpep.io/n/pb_t5qchtfg","effective_range":{"start_revision":"R-01.2024","end_revision":null},"rendered_text_html":"

    “In determining whether the invention as a whole would have been\n obvious under 35\n U.S.C. 103, we must first delineate the invention as a whole.\n In delineating the invention as a whole, we look not only to the subject matter which\n is literally recited in the claim in question... but also to those properties of the\n subject matter which are inherent in the subject matter and are\n disclosed in the specification. . . Just as we look to a chemical and its properties\n when we examine the obviousness of a composition of matter claim, it is this\n invention as a whole, and not some part of it, which must be\n obvious under 35\n U.S.C. 103.” In re Antonie, 559 F.2d 618,\n 620, 195 USPQ 6, 8 (CCPA 1977) (emphasis in original) (citations omitted) (The\n claimed wastewater treatment device had a tank volume to contactor area of 0.12\n gal./sq. ft. The court found the invention as a whole was the ratio of 0.12 and its\n inherent property that the claimed devices maximized treatment capacity regardless of\n other variables in the devices. The prior art did not recognize that treatment\n capacity was a function of the tank volume to contactor ratio, and therefore the\n parameter optimized was not recognized in the art to be a result-effective\n variable.). Note, however, that after KSR, the presence of a known\n result-effective variable would be one, but not necessarily the only, motivation for\n a person of ordinary skill in the art to experiment to reach another workable product\n or process. See MPEP §\n 2144.05, subsection II.B. See also In re\n Papesch, 315 F.2d 381, 391, 137 USPQ 43, 51 (CCPA 1963) (“From the\n standpoint of patent law, a compound and all its properties are inseparable.”).\n

    ","rendered_text_plain":"“In determining whether the invention as a whole would have been obvious under 35 U.S.C. 103, we must first delineate the invention as a whole. In delineating the invention as a whole, we look not only to the subject matter which is literally recited in the claim in question... but also to those properties of the subject matter which are inherent in the subject matter and are disclosed in the specification. . . Just as we look to a chemical and its properties when we examine the obviousness of a composition of matter claim, it is this invention as a whole, and not some part of it, which must be obvious under 35 U.S.C. 103.” In re Antonie, 559 F.2d 618, 620, 195 USPQ 6, 8 (CCPA 1977) (emphasis in original) (citations omitted) (The claimed wastewater treatment device had a tank volume to contactor area of 0.12 gal./sq. ft. The court found the invention as a whole was the ratio of 0.12 and its inherent property that the claimed devices maximized treatment capacity regardless of other variables in the devices. The prior art did not recognize that treatment capacity was a function of the tank volume to contactor ratio, and therefore the parameter optimized was not recognized in the art to be a result-effective variable.). Note, however, that after KSR, the presence of a known result-effective variable would be one, but not necessarily the only, motivation for a person of ordinary skill in the art to experiment to reach another workable product or process. See MPEP § 2144.05, subsection II.B. See also In re Papesch, 315 F.2d 381, 391, 137 USPQ 43, 51 (CCPA 1963) (“From the standpoint of patent law, a compound and all its properties are inseparable.”).","provenance":{"source_file":"s2141.html","source_anchor":"d0e209242","source_sha256":"c18335410b948734844afa0950712df37f56fb7b8d25ca661deb44a79ef5e658"},"kind":"narrative","host_section_id":"se_7euchp5v"},{"id":"cs_cyzgatxy","node_type":"case","corpus_id":"mpep-e9r01-2024-html","opaque_url":"https://mpep.io/n/cs_cyzgatxy","effective_range":{"start_revision":"R-01.2024","end_revision":null},"rendered_text_html":"","rendered_text_plain":"In re Antonie, 559 F.2d 618, 195 USPQ 6 (CCPA 1977)","provenance":{"source_file":"s2141.html","source_anchor":"","source_sha256":"c18335410b948734844afa0950712df37f56fb7b8d25ca661deb44a79ef5e658"},"short_name":"In re Antonie","all_citations":["559 F.2d 618","195 USPQ 6"],"canonical_citation":"In re Antonie, 559 F.2d 618, 195 USPQ 6 (CCPA 1977)","decision_year":1977,"court":"CCPA"},{"id":"cs_wbk7j3o3","node_type":"case","corpus_id":"mpep-e9r01-2024-html","opaque_url":"https://mpep.io/n/cs_wbk7j3o3","effective_range":{"start_revision":"R-01.2024","end_revision":null},"rendered_text_html":"","rendered_text_plain":"In re Papesch, 315 F.2d 381, 137 USPQ 43 (CCPA 1963)","provenance":{"source_file":"s2141.html","source_anchor":"","source_sha256":"c18335410b948734844afa0950712df37f56fb7b8d25ca661deb44a79ef5e658"},"short_name":"In re Papesch","all_citations":["315 F.2d 381","137 USPQ 43"],"canonical_citation":"In re Papesch, 315 F.2d 381, 137 USPQ 43 (CCPA 1963)","decision_year":1963,"court":"CCPA"},{"id":"pb_pcibc6im","node_type":"prose_block","corpus_id":"mpep-e9r01-2024-html","opaque_url":"https://mpep.io/n/pb_pcibc6im","effective_range":{"start_revision":"R-01.2024","end_revision":null},"rendered_text_html":"

    Obviousness cannot be predicated on what is not known at the\n relevant time, even if the inherency of a certain feature is later established. See\n In re Rijckaert, 9 F.3d 1531, 28 USPQ2d 1955 (Fed. Cir. 1993).\n See MPEP §\n 2112 for the requirements of rejections based on\n inherency.\n

    ","rendered_text_plain":"Obviousness cannot be predicated on what is not known at the relevant time, even if the inherency of a certain feature is later established. See In re Rijckaert, 9 F.3d 1531, 28 USPQ2d 1955 (Fed. Cir. 1993). See MPEP § 2112 for the requirements of rejections based on inherency.","provenance":{"source_file":"s2141.html","source_anchor":"d0e209263","source_sha256":"c18335410b948734844afa0950712df37f56fb7b8d25ca661deb44a79ef5e658"},"kind":"narrative","host_section_id":"se_7euchp5v"},{"id":"cs_eibzwp5a","node_type":"case","corpus_id":"mpep-e9r01-2024-html","opaque_url":"https://mpep.io/n/cs_eibzwp5a","effective_range":{"start_revision":"R-01.2024","end_revision":null},"rendered_text_html":"","rendered_text_plain":"In re Rijckaert, 9 F.3d 1531, 28 USPQ2d 1955 (Fed. Cir. 1993)","provenance":{"source_file":"s2141.html","source_anchor":"","source_sha256":"c18335410b948734844afa0950712df37f56fb7b8d25ca661deb44a79ef5e658"},"short_name":"In re Rijckaert","all_citations":["9 F.3d 1531","28 USPQ2d 1955"],"canonical_citation":"In re Rijckaert, 9 F.3d 1531, 28 USPQ2d 1955 (Fed. Cir. 1993)","decision_year":1993,"court":"Fed. Cir."},{"id":"pb_ajtiw33g","node_type":"prose_block","corpus_id":"mpep-e9r01-2024-html","opaque_url":"https://mpep.io/n/pb_ajtiw33g","effective_range":{"start_revision":"R-01.2024","end_revision":null},"rendered_text_html":"VI. PRIOR ART MUST BE CONSIDERED IN ITS ENTIRETY, INCLUDING DISCLOSURES THAT TEACH\n AWAY FROM THE CLAIMS","rendered_text_plain":"VI. PRIOR ART MUST BE CONSIDERED IN ITS ENTIRETY, INCLUDING DISCLOSURES THAT TEACH AWAY FROM THE CLAIMS","provenance":{"source_file":"s2141.html","source_anchor":"d0e209106/b.10","source_sha256":"c18335410b948734844afa0950712df37f56fb7b8d25ca661deb44a79ef5e658"},"kind":"informal_heading","host_section_id":"se_7euchp5v","heading_level":2,"heading_text":"VI. PRIOR ART MUST BE CONSIDERED IN ITS ENTIRETY, INCLUDING DISCLOSURES THAT TEACH AWAY FROM THE CLAIMS"},{"id":"pb_4o6c4x25","node_type":"prose_block","corpus_id":"mpep-e9r01-2024-html","opaque_url":"https://mpep.io/n/pb_4o6c4x25","effective_range":{"start_revision":"R-01.2024","end_revision":null},"rendered_text_html":"

    A prior art reference must be considered in its entirety, i.e., as a\n whole, including portions that would lead away from the\n claimed invention. W.L. Gore & Assoc., Inc. v. Garlock, Inc.,\n 721 F.2d 1540, 220 USPQ 303 (Fed. Cir. 1983), cert. denied, 469\n U.S. 851 (1984) (Claims were directed to a process of producing a porous article by\n expanding shaped, unsintered, highly crystalline poly(tetrafluoroethylene) (PTFE) by\n stretching said PTFE at a 10% per second rate to more than five times the original\n length. The prior art teachings with regard to unsintered PTFE indicated the material\n does not respond to conventional plastics processing, and the material should be\n stretched slowly. A reference teaching rapid stretching of conventional plastic\n polypropylene with reduced crystallinity combined with a reference teaching\n stretching unsintered PTFE would not suggest rapid stretching of highly crystalline\n PTFE, in light of the disclosures in the art that teach away from the invention,\n i.e., that the conventional polypropylene should have reduced crystallinity before\n stretching, and that PTFE should be stretched slowly). Allied Erecting v.\n Genesis Attachments, 825 F.3d 1373, 1381, 119 USPQ2d 1132, 1138 (Fed.\n Cir. 2016) (“Although modification of the movable blades may impede the quick change\n functionality disclosed by Caterpillar, ‘[a] given course of action often has\n simultaneous advantages and disadvantages, and this does not necessarily obviate\n motivation to combine.’” (quoting Medichem, S.A. v. Rolabo, S.L.,\n 437 F.3d 1157, 1165, 77 USPQ2d 1865, 1870 (Fed Cir. 2006) (citation omitted))).\n

    ","rendered_text_plain":"A prior art reference must be considered in its entirety, i.e., as a whole, including portions that would lead away from the claimed invention. W.L. Gore & Assoc., Inc. v. Garlock, Inc., 721 F.2d 1540, 220 USPQ 303 (Fed. Cir. 1983), cert. denied, 469 U.S. 851 (1984) (Claims were directed to a process of producing a porous article by expanding shaped, unsintered, highly crystalline poly(tetrafluoroethylene) (PTFE) by stretching said PTFE at a 10% per second rate to more than five times the original length. The prior art teachings with regard to unsintered PTFE indicated the material does not respond to conventional plastics processing, and the material should be stretched slowly. A reference teaching rapid stretching of conventional plastic polypropylene with reduced crystallinity combined with a reference teaching stretching unsintered PTFE would not suggest rapid stretching of highly crystalline PTFE, in light of the disclosures in the art that teach away from the invention, i.e., that the conventional polypropylene should have reduced crystallinity before stretching, and that PTFE should be stretched slowly). Allied Erecting v. Genesis Attachments, 825 F.3d 1373, 1381, 119 USPQ2d 1132, 1138 (Fed. Cir. 2016) (“Although modification of the movable blades may impede the quick change functionality disclosed by Caterpillar, ‘[a] given course of action often has simultaneous advantages and disadvantages, and this does not necessarily obviate motivation to combine.’” (quoting Medichem, S.A. v. Rolabo, S.L., 437 F.3d 1157, 1165, 77 USPQ2d 1865, 1870 (Fed Cir. 2006) (citation omitted))).","provenance":{"source_file":"s2141.html","source_anchor":"d0e209276","source_sha256":"c18335410b948734844afa0950712df37f56fb7b8d25ca661deb44a79ef5e658"},"kind":"narrative","host_section_id":"se_7euchp5v"},{"id":"cs_g5q7gpq7","node_type":"case","corpus_id":"mpep-e9r01-2024-html","opaque_url":"https://mpep.io/n/cs_g5q7gpq7","effective_range":{"start_revision":"R-01.2024","end_revision":null},"rendered_text_html":"","rendered_text_plain":"Allied Erecting v. Genesis Attachments, 825 F.3d 1373, 119 USPQ2d 1132 (Fed. Cir. 2016)","provenance":{"source_file":"s2141.html","source_anchor":"","source_sha256":"c18335410b948734844afa0950712df37f56fb7b8d25ca661deb44a79ef5e658"},"short_name":"Allied Erecting v. Genesis Attachments","all_citations":["825 F.3d 1373","119 USPQ2d 1132"],"canonical_citation":"Allied Erecting v. Genesis Attachments, 825 F.3d 1373, 119 USPQ2d 1132 (Fed. Cir. 2016)","decision_year":2016,"court":"Fed. Cir."},{"id":"cs_bmdve2wf","node_type":"case","corpus_id":"mpep-e9r01-2024-html","opaque_url":"https://mpep.io/n/cs_bmdve2wf","effective_range":{"start_revision":"R-01.2024","end_revision":null},"rendered_text_html":"","rendered_text_plain":"Medichem, S.A. v. Rolabo, S.L., 437 F.3d 1157, 77 USPQ2d 1865 (Fed Cir. 2006)","provenance":{"source_file":"s2141.html","source_anchor":"","source_sha256":"c18335410b948734844afa0950712df37f56fb7b8d25ca661deb44a79ef5e658"},"short_name":"Medichem, S.A. v. Rolabo, S.L.","all_citations":["437 F.3d 1157","77 USPQ2d 1865"],"canonical_citation":"Medichem, S.A. v. Rolabo, S.L., 437 F.3d 1157, 77 USPQ2d 1865 (Fed Cir. 2006)","decision_year":2006,"court":"Fed. Cir."},{"id":"pb_iwkzhfqn","node_type":"prose_block","corpus_id":"mpep-e9r01-2024-html","opaque_url":"https://mpep.io/n/pb_iwkzhfqn","effective_range":{"start_revision":"R-01.2024","end_revision":null},"rendered_text_html":"

    However, “the prior art’s mere disclosure of more than one\n alternative does not constitute a teaching away from any of these alternatives\n because such disclosure does not criticize, discredit, or otherwise discourage the\n solution claimed….” In re Fulton, 391 F.3d 1195, 1201, 73 USPQ2d\n 1141, 1146 (Fed. Cir. 2004). See also MPEP § 2123.\n

    ","rendered_text_plain":"However, “the prior art’s mere disclosure of more than one alternative does not constitute a teaching away from any of these alternatives because such disclosure does not criticize, discredit, or otherwise discourage the solution claimed….” In re Fulton, 391 F.3d 1195, 1201, 73 USPQ2d 1141, 1146 (Fed. Cir. 2004). See also MPEP § 2123.","provenance":{"source_file":"s2141.html","source_anchor":"d0e209288","source_sha256":"c18335410b948734844afa0950712df37f56fb7b8d25ca661deb44a79ef5e658"},"kind":"narrative","host_section_id":"se_7euchp5v"},{"id":"cs_p2kyknia","node_type":"case","corpus_id":"mpep-e9r01-2024-html","opaque_url":"https://mpep.io/n/cs_p2kyknia","effective_range":{"start_revision":"R-01.2024","end_revision":null},"rendered_text_html":"","rendered_text_plain":"In re Fulton, 391 F.3d 1195, 73 USPQ2d 1141 (Fed. Cir. 2004)","provenance":{"source_file":"s2141.html","source_anchor":"","source_sha256":"c18335410b948734844afa0950712df37f56fb7b8d25ca661deb44a79ef5e658"},"short_name":"In re Fulton","all_citations":["391 F.3d 1195","73 USPQ2d 1141"],"canonical_citation":"In re Fulton, 391 F.3d 1195, 73 USPQ2d 1141 (Fed. Cir. 2004)","decision_year":2004,"court":"Fed. Cir."},{"id":"se_7euchp5v","node_type":"section","corpus_id":"mpep-e9r01-2024-html","opaque_url":"https://mpep.io/n/se_7euchp5v","effective_range":{"start_revision":"R-01.2024","end_revision":null},"rendered_text_html":"","rendered_text_plain":"","provenance":{"source_file":"s2141.html","source_anchor":"d0e209106","source_sha256":"c18335410b948734844afa0950712df37f56fb7b8d25ca661deb44a79ef5e658"},"akn_urn":"/akn/us/statement/manual/uspto/2024/mpep/eng@2024-02-29!sec_2141_02","canonical_url":"https://mpep.io/akn/us/statement/manual/uspto/2024/mpep/eng@2024-02-29!sec_2141_02","section_number":"2141.02","chapter":"2100","depth":1,"title":"Differences Between Prior Art and Claimed Invention","children_ids":["pb_yupsbdkq","pb_zk4gz3hn","pb_rmqcdzet","pb_cu5dqjiu","pb_fdmmrj75","pb_rdoe6ayf","pb_iysszppy","pb_s5jisqcf","pb_oezi4yev","pb_ssrnj3hz","pb_w3rshyor","pb_xqlhpjph","pb_3nf3e4pj","pb_apdkzmku","pb_t5qchtfg","pb_pcibc6im","pb_ajtiw33g","pb_4o6c4x25","pb_iwkzhfqn"],"revision_tag":"R-01.2024","parent_section_id":"se_thj3rw3j"},{"id":"pb_r6jmeba3","node_type":"prose_block","corpus_id":"mpep-e9r01-2024-html","opaque_url":"https://mpep.io/n/pb_r6jmeba3","effective_range":{"start_revision":"R-01.2024","end_revision":null},"rendered_text_html":"

    [Editor Note: This MPEP section is applicable regardless of whether an\n application is examined under the AIA or under pre-AIA law. For applications subject\n to the first inventor to file (FITF) provisions of the AIA, the relevant time is\n \"before the effective filing date of the claimed invention\". For applications subject\n to pre-AIA 35\n U.S.C. 102, the relevant time is \"at the time of the\n invention\". See MPEP § 2150 et seq. Many of the\n court decisions discussed in this section involved applications or patents subject to\n pre-AIA 35\n U.S.C. 102. These court decisions may be applicable to\n applications and patents subject to AIA 35 U.S.C. 102 but the\n relevant time is before the effective filing date of the claimed invention and not at\n the time of the invention.]

    ","rendered_text_plain":"[Editor Note: This MPEP section is applicable regardless of whether an application is examined under the AIA or under pre-AIA law. For applications subject to the first inventor to file (FITF) provisions of the AIA, the relevant time is \"before the effective filing date of the claimed invention\". For applications subject to pre-AIA 35 U.S.C. 102, the relevant time is \"at the time of the invention\". See MPEP § 2150 et seq. Many of the court decisions discussed in this section involved applications or patents subject to pre-AIA 35 U.S.C. 102. These court decisions may be applicable to applications and patents subject to AIA 35 U.S.C. 102 but the relevant time is before the effective filing date of the claimed invention and not at the time of the invention.]","provenance":{"source_file":"s2141.html","source_anchor":"ch2100_d223b3_23105_36d","source_sha256":"c18335410b948734844afa0950712df37f56fb7b8d25ca661deb44a79ef5e658"},"kind":"narrative","host_section_id":"se_xg5hcfgc"},{"id":"pb_fzxhtzvk","node_type":"prose_block","corpus_id":"mpep-e9r01-2024-html","opaque_url":"https://mpep.io/n/pb_fzxhtzvk","effective_range":{"start_revision":"R-01.2024","end_revision":null},"rendered_text_html":"I. FACTORS TO CONSIDER IN DETERMINING LEVEL OF ORDINARY SKILL","rendered_text_plain":"I. FACTORS TO CONSIDER IN DETERMINING LEVEL OF ORDINARY SKILL","provenance":{"source_file":"s2141.html","source_anchor":"d0e209300/b.0","source_sha256":"c18335410b948734844afa0950712df37f56fb7b8d25ca661deb44a79ef5e658"},"kind":"informal_heading","host_section_id":"se_xg5hcfgc","heading_level":2,"heading_text":"I. FACTORS TO CONSIDER IN DETERMINING LEVEL OF ORDINARY SKILL"},{"id":"pb_mh2jlimb","node_type":"prose_block","corpus_id":"mpep-e9r01-2024-html","opaque_url":"https://mpep.io/n/pb_mh2jlimb","effective_range":{"start_revision":"R-01.2024","end_revision":null},"rendered_text_html":"

    The person of ordinary skill in the art is a hypothetical person who\n is presumed to have known the relevant art at the relevant time. Factors that may be\n considered in determining the level of ordinary skill in the art may include: (A)\n “type of problems encountered in the art;” (B) “prior art solutions to those\n problems;” (C) “rapidity with which innovations are made;” (D) “sophistication of the\n technology; and” (E) “educational level of active workers in the field. In a given\n case, every factor may not be present, and one or more factors may predominate.”\n In re GPAC, 57 F.3d 1573, 1579, 35 USPQ2d 1116, 1121 (Fed. Cir.\n 1995); Custom Accessories, Inc. v. Jeffrey-Allan Indus., Inc., 807\n F.2d 955, 962, 1 USPQ2d 1196, 1201 (Fed. Cir. 1986); Environmental Designs,\n Ltd. V. Union Oil Co., 713 F.2d 693, 696, 218 USPQ 865, 868 (Fed. Cir.\n 1983). \n

    ","rendered_text_plain":"The person of ordinary skill in the art is a hypothetical person who is presumed to have known the relevant art at the relevant time. Factors that may be considered in determining the level of ordinary skill in the art may include: (A) “type of problems encountered in the art;” (B) “prior art solutions to those problems;” (C) “rapidity with which innovations are made;” (D) “sophistication of the technology; and” (E) “educational level of active workers in the field. In a given case, every factor may not be present, and one or more factors may predominate.” In re GPAC, 57 F.3d 1573, 1579, 35 USPQ2d 1116, 1121 (Fed. Cir. 1995); Custom Accessories, Inc. v. Jeffrey-Allan Indus., Inc., 807 F.2d 955, 962, 1 USPQ2d 1196, 1201 (Fed. Cir. 1986); Environmental Designs, Ltd. V. Union Oil Co., 713 F.2d 693, 696, 218 USPQ 865, 868 (Fed. Cir. 1983).","provenance":{"source_file":"s2141.html","source_anchor":"d0e209311","source_sha256":"c18335410b948734844afa0950712df37f56fb7b8d25ca661deb44a79ef5e658"},"kind":"narrative","host_section_id":"se_xg5hcfgc"},{"id":"cs_zbadqqzd","node_type":"case","corpus_id":"mpep-e9r01-2024-html","opaque_url":"https://mpep.io/n/cs_zbadqqzd","effective_range":{"start_revision":"R-01.2024","end_revision":null},"rendered_text_html":"","rendered_text_plain":"Custom Accessories, Inc. v. Jeffrey-Allan Indus., Inc., 807 F.2d 955, 1 USPQ2d 1196 (Fed. Cir. 1986)","provenance":{"source_file":"s2141.html","source_anchor":"","source_sha256":"c18335410b948734844afa0950712df37f56fb7b8d25ca661deb44a79ef5e658"},"short_name":"Custom Accessories, Inc. v. Jeffrey-Allan Indus., Inc.","all_citations":["807 F.2d 955","1 USPQ2d 1196"],"canonical_citation":"Custom Accessories, Inc. v. Jeffrey-Allan Indus., Inc., 807 F.2d 955, 1 USPQ2d 1196 (Fed. Cir. 1986)","decision_year":1986,"court":"Fed. Cir."},{"id":"cs_7dsxh3zg","node_type":"case","corpus_id":"mpep-e9r01-2024-html","opaque_url":"https://mpep.io/n/cs_7dsxh3zg","effective_range":{"start_revision":"R-01.2024","end_revision":null},"rendered_text_html":"","rendered_text_plain":"Custom Accessories, Inc. v. Jeffrey-Allan Indus., Inc., 713 F.2d 693, 218 USPQ 865 (Fed. Cir. 1983)","provenance":{"source_file":"s2141.html","source_anchor":"","source_sha256":"c18335410b948734844afa0950712df37f56fb7b8d25ca661deb44a79ef5e658"},"short_name":"Custom Accessories, Inc. v. Jeffrey-Allan Indus., Inc.","all_citations":["713 F.2d 693","218 USPQ 865"],"canonical_citation":"Custom Accessories, Inc. v. Jeffrey-Allan Indus., Inc., 713 F.2d 693, 218 USPQ 865 (Fed. Cir. 1983)","decision_year":1983,"court":"Fed. Cir."},{"id":"pb_22dq5glx","node_type":"prose_block","corpus_id":"mpep-e9r01-2024-html","opaque_url":"https://mpep.io/n/pb_22dq5glx","effective_range":{"start_revision":"R-01.2024","end_revision":null},"rendered_text_html":"

    “A person of ordinary skill in the art is also a person of ordinary\n creativity, not an automaton.” KSR Int'l Co. v. Teleflex Inc., 550\n U.S. 398, 421, 82 USPQ2d 1385, 1397 (2007). “[I]n many cases a person of ordinary\n skill will be able to fit the teachings of multiple patents together like pieces of a\n puzzle.” Id. at 420, 82 USPQ2d 1397. Office personnel may also\n take into account “the inferences and creative steps that a person of ordinary skill\n in the art would employ.” Id. at 418, 82 USPQ2d at 1396. \n

    ","rendered_text_plain":"“A person of ordinary skill in the art is also a person of ordinary creativity, not an automaton.” KSR Int'l Co. v. Teleflex Inc., 550 U.S. 398, 421, 82 USPQ2d 1385, 1397 (2007). “[I]n many cases a person of ordinary skill will be able to fit the teachings of multiple patents together like pieces of a puzzle.” Id. at 420, 82 USPQ2d 1397. Office personnel may also take into account “the inferences and creative steps that a person of ordinary skill in the art would employ.” Id. at 418, 82 USPQ2d at 1396.","provenance":{"source_file":"s2141.html","source_anchor":"d0e209326","source_sha256":"c18335410b948734844afa0950712df37f56fb7b8d25ca661deb44a79ef5e658"},"kind":"narrative","host_section_id":"se_xg5hcfgc"},{"id":"pb_gpvtmxrk","node_type":"prose_block","corpus_id":"mpep-e9r01-2024-html","opaque_url":"https://mpep.io/n/pb_gpvtmxrk","effective_range":{"start_revision":"R-01.2024","end_revision":null},"rendered_text_html":"

    The level of disclosure in the specification of the\n application under examination or in relevant references may also be informative of\n the knowledge and skills of a person of ordinary skill in the art. For example, if\n the specification is entirely silent on how a certain step or function is achieved,\n that silence may suggest that figuring out how to achieve that step or function is\n within the ordinary skill in the art, provided that the specification complies with\n 35 U.S.C.\n 112. Uber Techs., Inc. v. X One, Inc., 957\n F.3d 1334, 1339, 2020 USPQ2d 10476 (Fed. Cir. 2020) (“The specification of the '593\n patent is entirely silent on how to transmit user locations and maps from a server to\n a user's mobile device, suggesting that a person of ordinary skill in the art was\n more than capable of selecting between the known methods of accomplishing this. The\n '593 patent confirms that its invention, including any necessary plotting, ‘utilizes\n existing platforms and infrastructure’ and does not ‘require development of new cell\n phone or PDA technology, nor do[es it] require development of new cellular\n communication infrastructure.’\")\n

    ","rendered_text_plain":"The level of disclosure in the specification of the application under examination or in relevant references may also be informative of the knowledge and skills of a person of ordinary skill in the art. For example, if the specification is entirely silent on how a certain step or function is achieved, that silence may suggest that figuring out how to achieve that step or function is within the ordinary skill in the art, provided that the specification complies with 35 U.S.C. 112. Uber Techs., Inc. v. X One, Inc., 957 F.3d 1334, 1339, 2020 USPQ2d 10476 (Fed. Cir. 2020) (“The specification of the '593 patent is entirely silent on how to transmit user locations and maps from a server to a user's mobile device, suggesting that a person of ordinary skill in the art was more than capable of selecting between the known methods of accomplishing this. The '593 patent confirms that its invention, including any necessary plotting, ‘utilizes existing platforms and infrastructure’ and does not ‘require development of new cell phone or PDA technology, nor do[es it] require development of new cellular communication infrastructure.’\")","provenance":{"source_file":"s2141.html","source_anchor":"ch2100_p_35bcf_14cf3_29b","source_sha256":"c18335410b948734844afa0950712df37f56fb7b8d25ca661deb44a79ef5e658"},"kind":"narrative","host_section_id":"se_xg5hcfgc"},{"id":"cs_uqu7afcb","node_type":"case","corpus_id":"mpep-e9r01-2024-html","opaque_url":"https://mpep.io/n/cs_uqu7afcb","effective_range":{"start_revision":"R-01.2024","end_revision":null},"rendered_text_html":"","rendered_text_plain":"Uber Techs., Inc. v. X One, Inc., 957 F.3d 1334, 2020 USPQ2d 10476 (Fed. Cir. 2020)","provenance":{"source_file":"s2141.html","source_anchor":"","source_sha256":"c18335410b948734844afa0950712df37f56fb7b8d25ca661deb44a79ef5e658"},"short_name":"Uber Techs., Inc. v. X One, Inc.","all_citations":["957 F.3d 1334","2020 USPQ2d 10476"],"canonical_citation":"Uber Techs., Inc. v. X One, Inc., 957 F.3d 1334, 2020 USPQ2d 10476 (Fed. Cir. 2020)","decision_year":2020,"court":"Fed. Cir."},{"id":"st_eyyz7gn3","node_type":"statute","corpus_id":"mpep-e9r01-2024-html","opaque_url":"https://mpep.io/n/st_eyyz7gn3","effective_range":{"start_revision":"R-01.2024","end_revision":null},"rendered_text_html":"","rendered_text_plain":"","provenance":{"source_file":"s2141.html","source_anchor":"","source_sha256":"c18335410b948734844afa0950712df37f56fb7b8d25ca661deb44a79ef5e658"},"authority":"us_usc","authority_title_num":"35","authority_section_num":"112","subsection_path":[],"canonical_citation":"35 U.S.C. 112"},{"id":"pb_4dnidzvw","node_type":"prose_block","corpus_id":"mpep-e9r01-2024-html","opaque_url":"https://mpep.io/n/pb_4dnidzvw","effective_range":{"start_revision":"R-01.2024","end_revision":null},"rendered_text_html":"

    The “hypothetical ‘person having ordinary skill in the art’ to which\n the claimed subject matter pertains would, of necessity have the capability of\n understanding the scientific and engineering principles applicable to the pertinent\n art.” Ex parte Hiyamizu, 10 USPQ2d 1393, 1394 (Bd. Pat. App. &\n Inter. 1988) (The Board disagreed with the examiner’s definition of one of ordinary\n skill in the art (a doctorate level engineer or scientist working at least 40 hours\n per week in semiconductor research or development), finding that the hypothetical\n person is not definable by way of credentials, and that the evidence in the\n application did not support the conclusion that such a person would require a\n doctorate or equivalent knowledge in science or engineering.). \n

    ","rendered_text_plain":"The “hypothetical ‘person having ordinary skill in the art’ to which the claimed subject matter pertains would, of necessity have the capability of understanding the scientific and engineering principles applicable to the pertinent art.” Ex parte Hiyamizu, 10 USPQ2d 1393, 1394 (Bd. Pat. App. & Inter. 1988) (The Board disagreed with the examiner’s definition of one of ordinary skill in the art (a doctorate level engineer or scientist working at least 40 hours per week in semiconductor research or development), finding that the hypothetical person is not definable by way of credentials, and that the evidence in the application did not support the conclusion that such a person would require a doctorate or equivalent knowledge in science or engineering.).","provenance":{"source_file":"s2141.html","source_anchor":"d0e209340","source_sha256":"c18335410b948734844afa0950712df37f56fb7b8d25ca661deb44a79ef5e658"},"kind":"narrative","host_section_id":"se_xg5hcfgc"},{"id":"cs_nemhs7lm","node_type":"case","corpus_id":"mpep-e9r01-2024-html","opaque_url":"https://mpep.io/n/cs_nemhs7lm","effective_range":{"start_revision":"R-01.2024","end_revision":null},"rendered_text_html":"","rendered_text_plain":"Ex parte Hiyamizu, 10 USPQ2d 1393 (Bd. Pat. App. & Inter. 1988)","provenance":{"source_file":"s2141.html","source_anchor":"","source_sha256":"c18335410b948734844afa0950712df37f56fb7b8d25ca661deb44a79ef5e658"},"short_name":"Ex parte Hiyamizu","all_citations":["10 USPQ2d 1393"],"canonical_citation":"Ex parte Hiyamizu, 10 USPQ2d 1393 (Bd. Pat. App. & Inter. 1988)","decision_year":1988,"court":"B.P.A.I."},{"id":"pb_aw5c3xfs","node_type":"prose_block","corpus_id":"mpep-e9r01-2024-html","opaque_url":"https://mpep.io/n/pb_aw5c3xfs","effective_range":{"start_revision":"R-01.2024","end_revision":null},"rendered_text_html":"

    References which are not prior art may be relied upon to demonstrate\n the level of ordinary skill in the art at or around the relevant time. See\n In re Merck & Co., Inc., 800 F.2d 1091, 1098, 231 USPQ 375,\n 380 (Fed. Cir. 1986) (“Evidence of contemporaneous invention is probative of ‘the\n level of knowledge in the art at the time the invention was made.’” (citing\n In re Farrenkopf, 713 F.2d 714, 720, 219 USPQ 1, 6 (Fed. Cir.\n 1983))); Ecolochem, Inc. v. S. California Edison Co., 227 F.3d\n 1361, 1379, 56 USPQ2d 1065, 1079 (Fed. Cir. 2000) (“The fact of near-simultaneous\n invention, though not determinative of statutory obviousness, is strong evidence of\n what constitutes the level of ordinary skill in the art.” (quoting The Int’l\n Glass Co. v. United States, 408 F.2d 395, 405, 159 USPQ 434, 442 (Ct.\n Cl. 1969))). See also Thomas & Betts Corp. v. Litton Sys.,\n Inc., 720 F.2d 1572, 1580-81, 220 USPQ 1, 7 (Fed. Cir. 1983) (“Thus, the\n [unpublished internal materials], though not technically prior art, were, in effect,\n properly used as indicators of the level of ordinary skill in the art to which the\n invention pertained.”). \n

    ","rendered_text_plain":"References which are not prior art may be relied upon to demonstrate the level of ordinary skill in the art at or around the relevant time. See In re Merck & Co., Inc., 800 F.2d 1091, 1098, 231 USPQ 375, 380 (Fed. Cir. 1986) (“Evidence of contemporaneous invention is probative of ‘the level of knowledge in the art at the time the invention was made.’” (citing In re Farrenkopf, 713 F.2d 714, 720, 219 USPQ 1, 6 (Fed. Cir. 1983))); Ecolochem, Inc. v. S. California Edison Co., 227 F.3d 1361, 1379, 56 USPQ2d 1065, 1079 (Fed. Cir. 2000) (“The fact of near-simultaneous invention, though not determinative of statutory obviousness, is strong evidence of what constitutes the level of ordinary skill in the art.” (quoting The Int’l Glass Co. v. United States, 408 F.2d 395, 405, 159 USPQ 434, 442 (Ct. Cl. 1969))). See also Thomas & Betts Corp. v. Litton Sys., Inc., 720 F.2d 1572, 1580-81, 220 USPQ 1, 7 (Fed. Cir. 1983) (“Thus, the [unpublished internal materials], though not technically prior art, were, in effect, properly used as indicators of the level of ordinary skill in the art to which the invention pertained.”).","provenance":{"source_file":"s2141.html","source_anchor":"d0e209346","source_sha256":"c18335410b948734844afa0950712df37f56fb7b8d25ca661deb44a79ef5e658"},"kind":"narrative","host_section_id":"se_xg5hcfgc"},{"id":"cs_iuobk766","node_type":"case","corpus_id":"mpep-e9r01-2024-html","opaque_url":"https://mpep.io/n/cs_iuobk766","effective_range":{"start_revision":"R-01.2024","end_revision":null},"rendered_text_html":"","rendered_text_plain":"In re Merck & Co., Inc., 800 F.2d 1091, 231 USPQ 375 (Fed. Cir. 1986)","provenance":{"source_file":"s2141.html","source_anchor":"","source_sha256":"c18335410b948734844afa0950712df37f56fb7b8d25ca661deb44a79ef5e658"},"short_name":"In re Merck & Co., Inc.","all_citations":["800 F.2d 1091","231 USPQ 375"],"canonical_citation":"In re Merck & Co., Inc., 800 F.2d 1091, 231 USPQ 375 (Fed. Cir. 1986)","decision_year":1986,"court":"Fed. Cir."},{"id":"cs_zpitdmqh","node_type":"case","corpus_id":"mpep-e9r01-2024-html","opaque_url":"https://mpep.io/n/cs_zpitdmqh","effective_range":{"start_revision":"R-01.2024","end_revision":null},"rendered_text_html":"","rendered_text_plain":"In re Farrenkopf, 713 F.2d 714, 219 USPQ 1 (Fed. Cir. 1983)","provenance":{"source_file":"s2141.html","source_anchor":"","source_sha256":"c18335410b948734844afa0950712df37f56fb7b8d25ca661deb44a79ef5e658"},"short_name":"In re Farrenkopf","all_citations":["713 F.2d 714","219 USPQ 1"],"canonical_citation":"In re Farrenkopf, 713 F.2d 714, 219 USPQ 1 (Fed. Cir. 1983)","decision_year":1983,"court":"Fed. Cir."},{"id":"cs_vgb5xxbu","node_type":"case","corpus_id":"mpep-e9r01-2024-html","opaque_url":"https://mpep.io/n/cs_vgb5xxbu","effective_range":{"start_revision":"R-01.2024","end_revision":null},"rendered_text_html":"","rendered_text_plain":"Ecolochem, Inc. v. S. California Edison Co., 227 F.3d 1361, 56 USPQ2d 1065 (Fed. Cir. 2000)","provenance":{"source_file":"s2141.html","source_anchor":"","source_sha256":"c18335410b948734844afa0950712df37f56fb7b8d25ca661deb44a79ef5e658"},"short_name":"Ecolochem, Inc. v. S. California Edison Co.","all_citations":["227 F.3d 1361","56 USPQ2d 1065"],"canonical_citation":"Ecolochem, Inc. v. S. California Edison Co., 227 F.3d 1361, 56 USPQ2d 1065 (Fed. Cir. 2000)","decision_year":2000,"court":"Fed. Cir."},{"id":"cs_rjjsvkiy","node_type":"case","corpus_id":"mpep-e9r01-2024-html","opaque_url":"https://mpep.io/n/cs_rjjsvkiy","effective_range":{"start_revision":"R-01.2024","end_revision":null},"rendered_text_html":"","rendered_text_plain":"The Int’l Glass Co. v. United States, 408 F.2d 395, 159 USPQ 434 (Ct. Cl. 1969)","provenance":{"source_file":"s2141.html","source_anchor":"","source_sha256":"c18335410b948734844afa0950712df37f56fb7b8d25ca661deb44a79ef5e658"},"short_name":"The Int’l Glass Co. v. United States","all_citations":["408 F.2d 395","159 USPQ 434"],"canonical_citation":"The Int’l Glass Co. v. United States, 408 F.2d 395, 159 USPQ 434 (Ct. Cl. 1969)","decision_year":1969,"court":"Ct. Cl."},{"id":"cs_tf26fsl2","node_type":"case","corpus_id":"mpep-e9r01-2024-html","opaque_url":"https://mpep.io/n/cs_tf26fsl2","effective_range":{"start_revision":"R-01.2024","end_revision":null},"rendered_text_html":"","rendered_text_plain":"Thomas & Betts Corp. v. Litton Sys., Inc., 720 F.2d 1572, 220 USPQ 1 (Fed. Cir. 1983)","provenance":{"source_file":"s2141.html","source_anchor":"","source_sha256":"c18335410b948734844afa0950712df37f56fb7b8d25ca661deb44a79ef5e658"},"short_name":"Thomas & Betts Corp. v. Litton Sys., Inc.","all_citations":["720 F.2d 1572","220 USPQ 1"],"canonical_citation":"Thomas & Betts Corp. v. Litton Sys., Inc., 720 F.2d 1572, 220 USPQ 1 (Fed. Cir. 1983)","decision_year":1983,"court":"Fed. Cir."},{"id":"pb_6q5wcnya","node_type":"prose_block","corpus_id":"mpep-e9r01-2024-html","opaque_url":"https://mpep.io/n/pb_6q5wcnya","effective_range":{"start_revision":"R-01.2024","end_revision":null},"rendered_text_html":"

    Moreover, references not available as prior art may\n be relevant to establishing “a motivation to combine which is implicit in the\n knowledge of one of ordinary skill in the art.” Nat'l Steel Car, Ltd. v.\n Can. Pac. Ry., Ltd., 357 F.3d 1319, 1337-38, 69 USPQ2d 1641, 1656 (Fed.\n Cir. 2004) (holding that a drawing made by an engineer that was not prior art can,\n nonetheless, “... be used to demonstrate a motivation to combine implicit in the\n knowledge of one of ordinary skill in the art.”).\n

    ","rendered_text_plain":"Moreover, references not available as prior art may be relevant to establishing “a motivation to combine which is implicit in the knowledge of one of ordinary skill in the art.” Nat'l Steel Car, Ltd. v. Can. Pac. Ry., Ltd., 357 F.3d 1319, 1337-38, 69 USPQ2d 1641, 1656 (Fed. Cir. 2004) (holding that a drawing made by an engineer that was not prior art can, nonetheless, “... be used to demonstrate a motivation to combine implicit in the knowledge of one of ordinary skill in the art.”).","provenance":{"source_file":"s2141.html","source_anchor":"ch2100_p_3ab82_1619d_1e6","source_sha256":"c18335410b948734844afa0950712df37f56fb7b8d25ca661deb44a79ef5e658"},"kind":"narrative","host_section_id":"se_xg5hcfgc"},{"id":"cs_mvxmupcc","node_type":"case","corpus_id":"mpep-e9r01-2024-html","opaque_url":"https://mpep.io/n/cs_mvxmupcc","effective_range":{"start_revision":"R-01.2024","end_revision":null},"rendered_text_html":"","rendered_text_plain":"Nat'l Steel Car, Ltd. v. Can. Pac. Ry., Ltd., 357 F.3d 1319, 69 USPQ2d 1641 (Fed. Cir. 2004)","provenance":{"source_file":"s2141.html","source_anchor":"","source_sha256":"c18335410b948734844afa0950712df37f56fb7b8d25ca661deb44a79ef5e658"},"short_name":"Nat'l Steel Car, Ltd. v. Can. Pac. Ry., Ltd.","all_citations":["357 F.3d 1319","69 USPQ2d 1641"],"canonical_citation":"Nat'l Steel Car, Ltd. v. Can. Pac. Ry., Ltd., 357 F.3d 1319, 69 USPQ2d 1641 (Fed. Cir. 2004)","decision_year":2004,"court":"Fed. Cir."},{"id":"pb_scbie2j5","node_type":"prose_block","corpus_id":"mpep-e9r01-2024-html","opaque_url":"https://mpep.io/n/pb_scbie2j5","effective_range":{"start_revision":"R-01.2024","end_revision":null},"rendered_text_html":"II. SPECIFYING A PARTICULAR LEVEL OF SKILL IS NOT NECESSARY WHERE THE PRIOR ART\n ITSELF REFLECTS AN APPROPRIATE LEVEL","rendered_text_plain":"II. SPECIFYING A PARTICULAR LEVEL OF SKILL IS NOT NECESSARY WHERE THE PRIOR ART ITSELF REFLECTS AN APPROPRIATE LEVEL","provenance":{"source_file":"s2141.html","source_anchor":"d0e209300/b.2","source_sha256":"c18335410b948734844afa0950712df37f56fb7b8d25ca661deb44a79ef5e658"},"kind":"informal_heading","host_section_id":"se_xg5hcfgc","heading_level":2,"heading_text":"II. SPECIFYING A PARTICULAR LEVEL OF SKILL IS NOT NECESSARY WHERE THE PRIOR ART ITSELF REFLECTS AN APPROPRIATE LEVEL"},{"id":"pb_vbwupgd7","node_type":"prose_block","corpus_id":"mpep-e9r01-2024-html","opaque_url":"https://mpep.io/n/pb_vbwupgd7","effective_range":{"start_revision":"R-01.2024","end_revision":null},"rendered_text_html":"

    If the only facts of record pertaining to the level of skill in the\n art are found within the prior art of record, the court has held that an invention\n may be held to have been obvious without a specific finding of a particular level of\n skill where the prior art itself reflects an appropriate level. Chore-Time\n Equipment, Inc. v. Cumberland Corp., 713 F.2d 774, 218 USPQ 673 (Fed.\n Cir. 1983). See also Okajima v. Bourdeau, 261 F.3d 1350, 1355, 59\n USPQ2d 1795, 1797 (Fed. Cir. 2001).\n

    ","rendered_text_plain":"If the only facts of record pertaining to the level of skill in the art are found within the prior art of record, the court has held that an invention may be held to have been obvious without a specific finding of a particular level of skill where the prior art itself reflects an appropriate level. Chore-Time Equipment, Inc. v. Cumberland Corp., 713 F.2d 774, 218 USPQ 673 (Fed. Cir. 1983). See also Okajima v. Bourdeau, 261 F.3d 1350, 1355, 59 USPQ2d 1795, 1797 (Fed. Cir. 2001).","provenance":{"source_file":"s2141.html","source_anchor":"d0e209365","source_sha256":"c18335410b948734844afa0950712df37f56fb7b8d25ca661deb44a79ef5e658"},"kind":"narrative","host_section_id":"se_xg5hcfgc"},{"id":"cs_x4lrtncj","node_type":"case","corpus_id":"mpep-e9r01-2024-html","opaque_url":"https://mpep.io/n/cs_x4lrtncj","effective_range":{"start_revision":"R-01.2024","end_revision":null},"rendered_text_html":"","rendered_text_plain":"Chore-Time Equipment, Inc. v. Cumberland Corp., 713 F.2d 774, 218 USPQ 673 (Fed. Cir. 1983)","provenance":{"source_file":"s2141.html","source_anchor":"","source_sha256":"c18335410b948734844afa0950712df37f56fb7b8d25ca661deb44a79ef5e658"},"short_name":"Chore-Time Equipment, Inc. v. Cumberland Corp.","all_citations":["713 F.2d 774","218 USPQ 673"],"canonical_citation":"Chore-Time Equipment, Inc. v. Cumberland Corp., 713 F.2d 774, 218 USPQ 673 (Fed. Cir. 1983)","decision_year":1983,"court":"Fed. Cir."},{"id":"cs_f5u5jox4","node_type":"case","corpus_id":"mpep-e9r01-2024-html","opaque_url":"https://mpep.io/n/cs_f5u5jox4","effective_range":{"start_revision":"R-01.2024","end_revision":null},"rendered_text_html":"","rendered_text_plain":"Okajima v. Bourdeau, 261 F.3d 1350, 59 USPQ2d 1795 (Fed. Cir. 2001)","provenance":{"source_file":"s2141.html","source_anchor":"","source_sha256":"c18335410b948734844afa0950712df37f56fb7b8d25ca661deb44a79ef5e658"},"short_name":"Okajima v. Bourdeau","all_citations":["261 F.3d 1350","59 USPQ2d 1795"],"canonical_citation":"Okajima v. Bourdeau, 261 F.3d 1350, 59 USPQ2d 1795 (Fed. Cir. 2001)","decision_year":2001,"court":"Fed. Cir."},{"id":"pb_us2bqusa","node_type":"prose_block","corpus_id":"mpep-e9r01-2024-html","opaque_url":"https://mpep.io/n/pb_us2bqusa","effective_range":{"start_revision":"R-01.2024","end_revision":null},"rendered_text_html":"III. ASCERTAINING LEVEL OF ORDINARY SKILL IS NECESSARY TO MAINTAIN\n OBJECTIVITY","rendered_text_plain":"III. ASCERTAINING LEVEL OF ORDINARY SKILL IS NECESSARY TO MAINTAIN OBJECTIVITY","provenance":{"source_file":"s2141.html","source_anchor":"d0e209300/b.4","source_sha256":"c18335410b948734844afa0950712df37f56fb7b8d25ca661deb44a79ef5e658"},"kind":"informal_heading","host_section_id":"se_xg5hcfgc","heading_level":2,"heading_text":"III. ASCERTAINING LEVEL OF ORDINARY SKILL IS NECESSARY TO MAINTAIN OBJECTIVITY"},{"id":"pb_iduw5xo7","node_type":"prose_block","corpus_id":"mpep-e9r01-2024-html","opaque_url":"https://mpep.io/n/pb_iduw5xo7","effective_range":{"start_revision":"R-01.2024","end_revision":null},"rendered_text_html":"

    “The importance of resolving the level of ordinary skill in the art\n lies in the necessity of maintaining objectivity in the obviousness inquiry.”\n Ryko Mfg. Co. v. Nu-Star, Inc., 950 F.2d 714, 718, 21 USPQ2d\n 1053, 1057 (Fed. Cir. 1991). The examiner must ascertain what would have been obvious\n as of the relevant time to one of ordinary skill in the art, and not to the inventor,\n a judge, a layman, those skilled in remote arts, or to geniuses in the art at hand.\n Environmental Designs, Ltd. v. Union Oil Co., 713 F.2d 693, 218\n USPQ 865 (Fed. Cir. 1983), cert. denied, 464 U.S. 1043 (1984).\n \n

    ","rendered_text_plain":"“The importance of resolving the level of ordinary skill in the art lies in the necessity of maintaining objectivity in the obviousness inquiry.” Ryko Mfg. Co. v. Nu-Star, Inc., 950 F.2d 714, 718, 21 USPQ2d 1053, 1057 (Fed. Cir. 1991). The examiner must ascertain what would have been obvious as of the relevant time to one of ordinary skill in the art, and not to the inventor, a judge, a layman, those skilled in remote arts, or to geniuses in the art at hand. Environmental Designs, Ltd. v. Union Oil Co., 713 F.2d 693, 218 USPQ 865 (Fed. Cir. 1983), cert. denied, 464 U.S. 1043 (1984).","provenance":{"source_file":"s2141.html","source_anchor":"d0e209381","source_sha256":"c18335410b948734844afa0950712df37f56fb7b8d25ca661deb44a79ef5e658"},"kind":"narrative","host_section_id":"se_xg5hcfgc"},{"id":"cs_lwiui4uv","node_type":"case","corpus_id":"mpep-e9r01-2024-html","opaque_url":"https://mpep.io/n/cs_lwiui4uv","effective_range":{"start_revision":"R-01.2024","end_revision":null},"rendered_text_html":"","rendered_text_plain":"Ryko Mfg. Co. v. Nu-Star, Inc., 950 F.2d 714, 21 USPQ2d 1053 (Fed. Cir. 1991)","provenance":{"source_file":"s2141.html","source_anchor":"","source_sha256":"c18335410b948734844afa0950712df37f56fb7b8d25ca661deb44a79ef5e658"},"short_name":"Ryko Mfg. Co. v. Nu-Star, Inc.","all_citations":["950 F.2d 714","21 USPQ2d 1053"],"canonical_citation":"Ryko Mfg. Co. v. Nu-Star, Inc., 950 F.2d 714, 21 USPQ2d 1053 (Fed. Cir. 1991)","decision_year":1991,"court":"Fed. 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