{"section":{"filename":"s2145.html","chapter":"2100","section_number":"2145","title":"Consideration of Applicant’s Rebuttal Arguments and Evidence","revision_tag":"R-01.2024","bytes":133892,"sha256":"b96dc12eb202283cd1a20f770746d04f6b9da85cb49f8aa6eb2fd17857081044","subsection_count":0,"max_depth":0,"subsections":[]},"quality":"structured","cited_authorities":{"file_section":"2145","cases":[{"key":"case:54f.3d746","slug":"in-re-soni","short_name":"In re Soni","canonical_citation":"In re Soni, 54 F.3d 746, 34 USPQ2d 1684 (1995)","decision_year":1995,"court":"Fed. Cir.","holding_summary":"Rebuttal evidence of nonobviousness may be presented in the specification itself, and it is error not to consider such evidence when evaluating obviousness.","holding_confidence":"high","mentions":5,"propositions":["rebuttal evidence may be presented in the specification","error not to consider evidence presented in the specification"]},{"key":"case:745f.2d1468","slug":"in-re-piasecki","short_name":"In re Piasecki","canonical_citation":"In re Piasecki, 745 F.2d 1468, 223 USPQ 785 (Fed. Cir. 1984)","decision_year":1984,"court":"Fed. Cir.","holding_summary":"Once the examiner establishes a prima facie case and the applicant presents rebuttal evidence, the obviousness determination must be reconsidered on the entire record; rebuttal evidence may relate to any of the Graham factors, including secondary considerations, and declarations on the need for the invention may not be improperly discounted.","holding_confidence":"high","mentions":5,"propositions":["rebuttal evidence may relate to any of the Graham factors including secondary considerations","commercial success","declarations on the need for the invention were improperly discounted by the Board"]},{"key":"case:550u.s.398","slug":"ksr-intl-co-v-teleflex-inc","short_name":"KSR Int'l Co. v. Teleflex Inc.","canonical_citation":"KSR Int'l Co. v. Teleflex Inc., 550 U.S. 398, 82 USPQ2d 1385 (2007)","decision_year":2007,"court":"SCOTUS","holding_summary":"Obviousness requires an explicit, flexible analysis that may draw on common sense rather than rigid rules; predictable uses of prior art elements according to their established functions, and choosing among a finite number of identified, predictable solutions with reasonable expectation of success, support obviousness.","holding_confidence":"high","mentions":5,"propositions":["rigid rules denying factfinders recourse to common sense are neither necessary nor consistent with case law","obvious to try supports obviousness when choosing among a finite number of predictable solutions"]},{"key":"case:919f.2d688","slug":"in-re-dillon","short_name":"In re Dillon","canonical_citation":"In re Dillon, 919 F.2d 688, 16 USPQ2d 1897 (Fed. Cir. 1990)","decision_year":1990,"court":"Fed. Cir.","holding_summary":"A prima facie case of obviousness for a structurally similar compound or composition does not require both structural similarity and a prior art suggestion that it will have the same newly discovered utility as the applicant's; the prima facie case may then be rebutted by evidence and argument.","holding_confidence":"high","mentions":4,"propositions":["rebuttal evidence and arguments rebut a prima facie obviousness case"]},{"key":"case:399f.2d269","slug":"in-re-hoeksema","short_name":"In re Hoeksema","canonical_citation":"In re Hoeksema, 399 F.2d 269, 158 USPQ 596 (CCPA 1968)","decision_year":1968,"court":"CCPA","holding_summary":"The mere naming of a compound in a reference, without an available process for making it, cannot constitute a description of the compound; prior art must enable a skilled artisan to make or synthesize the compound to anticipate or render it obvious.","holding_confidence":"high","mentions":3,"propositions":["prior art must enable making the compound to render it obvious"]},{"key":"case:713f.2d731","slug":"in-re-grasselli","short_name":"In re Grasselli","canonical_citation":"In re Grasselli, 713 F.2d 731, 218 USPQ 769 (Fed. Cir. 1983)","decision_year":1983,"court":"Fed. Cir.","holding_summary":"Inherent disclosures of a prior art reference may support an obviousness rejection, and rebuttal evidence of nonobviousness must be reasonably commensurate in scope with the claims; evidence of superior properties for sodium alone cannot establish nonobviousness of broad alkali-metal claims.","holding_confidence":"high","mentions":3,"propositions":["evidence of superior properties for sodium insufficient to establish nonobviousness of broad alkali-metal claims","references cannot be combined where they teach away from their combination"]},{"key":"case:346f.2d600","slug":"in-re-schulze","short_name":"In re Schulze","canonical_citation":"In re Schulze, 346 F.2d 600, 145 USPQ 716 (CCPA 1965)","decision_year":1965,"court":"CCPA","holding_summary":"Arguments of counsel cannot take the place of factually supported objective evidence in the record, whether rebutting an obviousness rejection or responding to a reasonable challenge to the sufficiency of the disclosure.","holding_confidence":"high","mentions":2,"propositions":[]},{"key":"case:736f.2d699","slug":"in-re-de-blauwe","short_name":"In re De Blauwe","canonical_citation":"In re De Blauwe, 736 F.2d 699, 222 USPQ 191 (1984)","decision_year":1984,"court":"Fed. Cir.","holding_summary":"Attorney argument cannot take the place of factually supported objective evidence; unexpected results must be established by factual evidence such as comparative test data against the closest prior art, and unsupported assertions constitute mere argument.","holding_confidence":"high","mentions":2,"propositions":[]},{"key":"case:76f.3d1168","slug":"in-re-alton","short_name":"In re Alton","canonical_citation":"In re Alton, 76 F.3d 1168, 37 USPQ2d 1578 (Fed. Cir. 1996)","decision_year":1996,"court":"Fed. Cir.","holding_summary":"It is error not to consider factual evidence, such as affidavits, submitted to counter a rejection under 35 U.S.C. 112; when the rejection is maintained, such evidence must be thoroughly analyzed and discussed.","holding_confidence":"high","mentions":2,"propositions":["error not to consider factual evidence submitted to counter a 35 U.S.C. 112 rejection"]},{"key":"case:974f.2d1309","slug":"in-re-beattie","short_name":"In re Beattie","canonical_citation":"In re Beattie, 974 F.2d 1309, 24 USPQ2d 1040 (1992)","decision_year":1992,"court":"Fed. Cir.","holding_summary":"Office personnel should consider declarations from those skilled in the art praising the claimed invention and opining that the art teaches away; however, opinion declarations lacking factual support or failing to address the specific prior art carry little evidentiary weight.","holding_confidence":"high","mentions":2,"propositions":["should consider declarations praising the invention and opining that the art teaches away","declarations not probative because they did not contain facts or address the specific prior art"]},{"key":"case:57f.3d1573","slug":"in-re-gpac","short_name":"In re GPAC","canonical_citation":"In re GPAC, 57 F.3d 1573, 35 USPQ2d 1116 (Fed. Cir. 1995)","decision_year":1995,"court":"Fed. Cir.","holding_summary":"The level of ordinary skill in the art is determined by factors including the types of problems encountered, prior art solutions, rapidity of innovation, sophistication of the technology, and educational level of active workers; not every factor need be present, and evidence of copying by others may rebut obviousness.","holding_confidence":"high","mentions":2,"propositions":[]},{"key":"case:100f.3d135","slug":"in-re-huang","short_name":"In re Huang","canonical_citation":"In re Huang, 100 F.3d 135, 40 USPQ2d 1685 (1996)","decision_year":1996,"court":"Fed. Cir.","holding_summary":"The applicant bears the burden of providing hard evidence of commercial success and of establishing a nexus between objective evidence of nonobviousness and the claimed invention, since the Office cannot gather such evidence itself.","holding_confidence":"high","mentions":2,"propositions":["applicant bears the burden of providing hard evidence of commercial success"]},{"key":"case:816f.2d643","slug":"in-re-chupp","short_name":"In re Chupp","canonical_citation":"In re Chupp, 816 F.2d 643, 2 USPQ2d 1437 (1987)","decision_year":1987,"court":"Fed. Cir.","holding_summary":"Evidence of superior and unexpected properties in one of a spectrum of common properties can suffice to rebut a prima facie case of obviousness; an applicant need not show unexpected results over every property, but objective evidence does not by itself mandate a conclusion of patentability.","holding_confidence":"high","mentions":2,"propositions":[]},{"key":"case:622f.2d1029","slug":"in-re-clemens","short_name":"In re Clemens","canonical_citation":"In re Clemens, 622 F.2d 1029, 206 USPQ 289 (1980)","decision_year":1980,"court":"CCPA","holding_summary":"Nonobviousness of a broad claimed range can be proven by unexpected results in a narrower range when a skilled artisan could ascertain a trend in the data allowing reasonable extension of its probative value; otherwise the objective evidence must be commensurate in scope with the entire claimed range.","holding_confidence":"high","mentions":2,"propositions":["nonobviousness of a broad range can be proven by a narrower range when a skilled artisan could ascertain a trend"]},{"key":"case:686f.3d1322","slug":"in-re-mouttet","short_name":"In re Mouttet","canonical_citation":"In re Mouttet, 686 F.3d 1322, 103 USPQ2d 1219 (2012)","decision_year":2012,"court":"Fed. Cir.","holding_summary":"A determination of obviousness based on teachings from multiple references does not require an actual, physical substitution of elements; the criterion is whether the prior art teachings as a whole render the claimed invention obvious.","holding_confidence":"high","mentions":2,"propositions":["obviousness does not require an actual physical substitution of elements"]},{"key":"case:642f.2d413","slug":"in-re-keller","short_name":"In re Keller","canonical_citation":"In re Keller, 642 F.2d 413, 208 USPQ 871 (1981)","decision_year":1981,"court":"CCPA","holding_summary":"The test for obviousness is not whether the features of a secondary reference may be bodily incorporated into the structure of the primary reference, but what the combined teachings of the references would have suggested to those of ordinary skill in the art.","holding_confidence":"high","mentions":2,"propositions":["test is what the combined teachings suggest, not bodily incorporation"]},{"key":"case:561f.3d1351","slug":"in-re-kubin","short_name":"In re Kubin","canonical_citation":"In re Kubin, 561 F.3d 1351, 90 USPQ2d 1417 (Fed. Cir. 2009)","decision_year":2009,"court":"Fed. Cir.","holding_summary":"KSR's obviousness framework, including obvious-to-try reasoning, applies across technologies and is not limited to predictable arts; a rejection should not be withdrawn solely because the invention lies in a field ordinarily considered unpredictable, such as biotechnology.","holding_confidence":"high","mentions":2,"propositions":["KSR applies across technologies, including unpredictable arts"]},{"key":"case:639f.3d1057","slug":"in-re-kao","short_name":"In re Kao","canonical_citation":"In re Kao, 639 F.3d 1057, 98 USPQ2d 1799 (Fed. Cir. 2011)","decision_year":2011,"court":"Fed. Cir.","holding_summary":"When secondary considerations are present, though not always dispositive, it is error not to consider them; but where the offered evidence results from something other than what is both claimed and novel, there is no nexus. Instructional limitations added to known methods require a new and nonobvious functional relationship.","holding_confidence":"high","mentions":1,"propositions":["when secondary considerations are present, though not always dispositive, it is error not to consider them"]},{"key":"case:726f.3d1346","slug":"leo-pharm-prod-ltd-v-rea","short_name":"Leo Pharm. Prod., Ltd. v. Rea","canonical_citation":"Leo Pharm. Prod., Ltd. v. Rea, 726 F.3d 1346, 107 USPQ2d 1943 (2013)","decision_year":2013,"court":"Fed. Cir.","holding_summary":"Consideration of objective indicia of nonobviousness is part of the whole obviousness analysis, not merely an afterthought; the fact finder must weigh all evidence of obviousness and nonobviousness before reaching a determination.","holding_confidence":"high","mentions":1,"propositions":["objective indicia are part of the whole obviousness analysis, not an afterthought"]},{"key":"case:676f.3d1063","slug":"in-re-cyclobenzaprine-hydrochloride-extended-release-capsule-patent-litig","short_name":"In re Cyclobenzaprine Hydrochloride Extended- Release Capsule Patent Litig.","canonical_citation":"In re Cyclobenzaprine Hydrochloride Extended- Release Capsule Patent Litig., 676 F.3d 1063, 102 USPQ2d 1760 (2012)","decision_year":2012,"court":"Fed. Cir.","holding_summary":"Despite prima facie and rebuttal terminology, a fact finder must consider all evidence of obviousness and nonobviousness, including objective indicia, before reaching an obviousness determination.","holding_confidence":"high","mentions":1,"propositions":["fact finder must consider all evidence of obviousness and nonobviousness"]},{"key":"case:383u.s.1","slug":"graham-v-john-deere-co","short_name":"Graham v. John Deere Co.","canonical_citation":"Graham v. John Deere, 383 U.S. 1, 148 USPQ 459 (1966)","decision_year":1966,"court":"SCOTUS","holding_summary":"Obviousness is resolved through factual inquiries: the scope and content of the prior art, the differences between the prior art and the claims, the level of ordinary skill in the art, and secondary considerations such as commercial success, long-felt need, and failure of others.","holding_confidence":"high","mentions":1,"propositions":["secondary considerations include commercial success, long-felt need, failure of others"]},{"key":"case:104f.3d1339","slug":"in-re-mayne","short_name":"In re Mayne","canonical_citation":"In re Mayne, 104 F.3d 1339, 41 USPQ2d 1451 (Fed. Cir. 1997)","decision_year":1997,"court":"Fed. Cir.","holding_summary":"A claimed invention may be obvious based on structural similarity to the prior art, and a showing of unexpected results must rest on evidence; conclusory statements unsupported by comparative data are insufficient to overcome a prima facie case of obviousness.","holding_confidence":"high","mentions":1,"propositions":["conclusory statements unsupported by comparative data insufficient to overcome prima facie obviousness"]},{"key":"case:802f.2d1367","slug":"hybritech-inc-v-monoclonal-antibodies-inc","short_name":"Hybritech, Inc. v. Monoclonal Antibodies, Inc.","canonical_citation":"Hybritech, Inc. v. Monoclonal Antibodies, Inc., 802 F.2d 1367, 231 USPQ 81 (Fed. Cir. 1986)","decision_year":1986,"court":"Fed. Cir.","holding_summary":"Conception is the formation in the mind of the inventor of a definite and permanent idea of the complete and operative invention as it is to be applied in practice; separately, a specification need not describe in detail—and preferably omits—what is well known in the art.","holding_confidence":"high","mentions":1,"propositions":[]},{"key":"case:579f.2d86","slug":"in-re-oelrich","short_name":"In re Oelrich","canonical_citation":"In re Oelrich, 579 F.2d 86, 198 USPQ 210 (1978)","decision_year":1978,"court":"CCPA","holding_summary":"Factually based expert opinions on the level of ordinary skill in the art are probative of nonobviousness and can suffice to rebut a prima facie case of obviousness.","holding_confidence":"high","mentions":1,"propositions":["expert opinions on the level of skill in the art were probative of nonobviousness"]},{"key":"case:301f.2d929","slug":"in-re-legrice","short_name":"In re LeGrice","canonical_citation":"In re LeGrice, 301 F.2d 929, 133 USPQ 365 (CCPA 1962)","decision_year":1962,"court":"CCPA","holding_summary":"A publication is enabling prior art only if it places the public in possession of the invention; a catalogue picture of a rose that could not be reproduced from seed, with no evidence of commercial availability in enabling form, was not an enabled disclosure.","holding_confidence":"medium","mentions":1,"propositions":[]},{"key":"case:776f.2d281","slug":"ashland-oil-inc-v-delta-resins-refractories-inc","short_name":"Ashland Oil, Inc. v. Delta Resins & Refractories, Inc.","canonical_citation":"Ashland Oil, Inc. v. Delta Resins & Refractories, Inc., 776 F.2d 281, 227 USPQ 657 (1985)","decision_year":1985,"court":"Fed. Cir.","holding_summary":"Evidence of secondary considerations must have a nexus to the claimed invention to be given substantial weight in the obviousness determination, and once the Office establishes a prima facie case of obviousness the burden shifts to the applicant to produce contrary evidence.","holding_confidence":"high","mentions":1,"propositions":[]},{"key":"case:592f.2d1161","slug":"in-re-grose","short_name":"In re Grose","canonical_citation":"In re Grose, 592 F.2d 1161, 201 USPQ 57 (CCPA 1979)","decision_year":1979,"court":"CCPA","holding_summary":"When an examiner relies on a scientific theory to support an obviousness rejection, evidentiary support for the existence and meaning of that theory must be provided; structural-similarity obviousness also assumes the prior art discloses or renders obvious a method of making the claimed composition.","holding_confidence":"high","mentions":1,"propositions":["failure to disclose or render obvious a method for making a composition precludes obviousness"]},{"key":"case:30f.3d1475","slug":"in-re-paulsen","short_name":"In re Paulsen","canonical_citation":"In re Paulsen, 30 F.3d 1475, 31 USPQ2d 1671 (Fed. Cir. 1994)","decision_year":1994,"court":"Fed. Cir.","holding_summary":"An applicant may act as their own lexicographer but must define terms with reasonable clarity, deliberateness, and precision in the disclosure to displace ordinary meaning; broad terms like \"computer\" are not narrowed absent such definition, and commercial success of articles outside the claims is not probative of nonobviousness.","holding_confidence":"high","mentions":1,"propositions":["commercial success of articles not covered by the claims was not probative"]},{"key":"case:897f.2d1147","slug":"in-re-kulling","short_name":"In re Kulling","canonical_citation":"In re Kulling, 897 F.2d 1147, 14 USPQ2d 1056 (Fed. Cir. 1990)","decision_year":1990,"court":"Fed. Cir.","holding_summary":"An obviousness determination must rest on express fact-findings based on the evidence as a whole, and objective evidence of nonobviousness must be reasonably commensurate in scope with the claimed invention.","holding_confidence":"high","mentions":1,"propositions":[]},{"key":"case:944f.3d1366","slug":"fox-factory-inc-v-sram-llc-2019","short_name":"Fox Factory, Inc. v. SRAM, LLC","canonical_citation":"Fox Factory, Inc. v. SRAM, LLC, 944 F.3d 1366, 2019 USPQ2d 483355 (2019)","decision_year":2019,"court":"Fed. Cir.","holding_summary":"For objective evidence of nonobviousness to receive substantial weight there must be a nexus—a legally and factually sufficient connection between the evidence and the claimed invention; nexus is presumed only when the product tied to the evidence embodies the claimed invention and is coextensive with it.","holding_confidence":"high","mentions":1,"propositions":["nexus is a legally and factually sufficient connection between evidence and the claimed invention"]},{"key":"case:81f.4th1202","slug":"volvo-penta-of-the-americas-llc-v-brunswick-corp","short_name":"Volvo Penta of the Americas, LLC v. Brunswick Corp.","canonical_citation":"Volvo Penta of the Americas, LLC v. Brunswick Corp., 81 F.4th 1202, 2023 USPQ2d 1000 (2023)","decision_year":2023,"court":"Fed. Cir.","holding_summary":"A presumption of nexus for secondary considerations requires that the product both embody the claimed invention and be coextensive with it; even absent the presumption, nexus may be proven independently through evidence of commercial success and copying due to the unique features of the claimed invention.","holding_confidence":"high","mentions":1,"propositions":["presumption of nexus requires the product embody the invention and be coextensive with it"]},{"key":"case:571f.2d1185","slug":"in-re-greenfield-1978","short_name":"In re Greenfield","canonical_citation":"In re Greenfield, 571 F.2d 1185, 197 USPQ 227 (1978)","decision_year":1978,"court":"CCPA","holding_summary":"Evidence of superior properties in a single species is insufficient to establish the nonobviousness of a claimed subgenus containing hundreds of compounds.","holding_confidence":"high","mentions":1,"propositions":["superior properties in one species insufficient for a subgenus of hundreds of compounds"]},{"key":"case:457f.2d506","slug":"in-re-lindner","short_name":"In re Lindner","canonical_citation":"In re Lindner, 457 F.2d 506, 173 USPQ 356 (1972)","decision_year":1972,"court":"CCPA","holding_summary":"A single test is insufficient to establish unexpected results where there is no adequate basis for concluding that the other claimed compounds would behave the same way; unexpected results must be shown by factual evidence, not mere argument.","holding_confidence":"high","mentions":1,"propositions":["one test not sufficient where no basis to conclude other claimed compounds behave the same"]},{"key":"case:514f.2d1389","slug":"in-re-albrecht","short_name":"In re Albrecht","canonical_citation":"In re Albrecht, 514 F.2d 1389, 185 USPQ 585 (CCPA 1975)","decision_year":1975,"court":"CCPA","holding_summary":"Lack of any known useful property in a prior art compound weighs against motivation to make structurally similar compounds; where the prior art compound irritated skin so it was unusable for its disclosed anesthetic purpose, related compounds were not prima facie obvious, and unexpected results generally overcome obviousness.","holding_confidence":"high","mentions":1,"propositions":[]},{"key":"case:480f.3d1348","slug":"pfizer-inc-v-apotex-inc","short_name":"Pfizer, Inc. v. Apotex, Inc.","canonical_citation":"Pfizer, Inc. v. Apotex, Inc., 480 F.3d 1348, 82 USPQ2d 1321 (Fed. Cir. 2007)","decision_year":2007,"court":"Fed. Cir.","holding_summary":"Secondary-consideration evidence must be considered when properly presented but does not necessarily control; a sufficiently strong prima facie case of obviousness may outweigh allegedly unexpectedly superior results, as with a claimed besylate salt form of a known drug.","holding_confidence":"high","mentions":1,"propositions":["record established such a strong case of obviousness that superior results were insufficient"]},{"key":"case:485f.3d1157","slug":"leapfrog-enters-inc-v-fisher-price-inc","short_name":"Leapfrog Enters., Inc. v. Fisher-Price, Inc.","canonical_citation":"Leapfrog Enters., Inc. v. Fisher-Price, Inc., 485 F.3d 1157, 82 USPQ2d 1687 (Fed. Cir. 2007)","decision_year":2007,"court":"Fed. Cir.","holding_summary":"Broadly claiming an automated means, such as modern electronics, to replace a manual or mechanical function to accomplish the same result does not distinguish over the prior art; and given a strong prima facie showing of obviousness, secondary-considerations evidence may be inadequate to overcome it.","holding_confidence":"high","mentions":1,"propositions":["given the strong prima facie showing, secondary-considerations evidence was inadequate"]},{"key":"case:864f.2d757","slug":"newell-cos-inc-v-kenney-mfg-co","short_name":"Newell Cos., Inc. v. Kenney Mfg. Co.","canonical_citation":"Newell Cos., Inc. v. Kenney Mfg. Co., 864 F.2d 757, 9 USPQ2d 1417 (1988)","decision_year":1988,"court":"Fed. Cir.","holding_summary":"A sufficiently strong prima facie case of obviousness may outweigh evidence of secondary considerations, although all relevant rebuttal evidence must still be weighed rather than summarily dismissed.","holding_confidence":"medium","mentions":1,"propositions":[]},{"key":"case:491f.3d1342","slug":"pharmastem-therapeutics-inc-v-viacell-inc","short_name":"PharmaStem Therapeutics, Inc. v. ViaCell, Inc.","canonical_citation":"PharmaStem Therapeutics, Inc. v. ViaCell, Inc., 491 F.3d 1342 (Fed. Cir. 2007)","decision_year":2007,"court":"Fed. Cir.","holding_summary":"Obviousness requires only a reasonable expectation of success, not conclusive proof of efficacy or absolute predictability; good science and useful contributions do not necessarily result in patentability, and rebuttal evidence must be reweighed with all the evidence rather than assessed only for knockdown value.","holding_confidence":"high","mentions":1,"propositions":["good science and useful contributions do not necessarily result in patentability"]},{"key":"case:498f.3d1345","slug":"in-re-sullivan","short_name":"In re Sullivan","canonical_citation":"In re Sullivan, 498 F.3d 1345, 84 USPQ2d 1034 (2007)","decision_year":2007,"court":"Fed. Cir.","holding_summary":"Rebuttal evidence of an unexpected property must be considered when submitted against a prima facie case of obviousness, even where the claim is drawn to a composition with a stated intended use; failing to consider such evidence is error.","holding_confidence":"high","mentions":1,"propositions":["rebuttal evidence of unexpected property must be considered even for a composition with a stated intended use"]},{"key":"case:600f.3d1357","slug":"hearing-components-inc-v-shure-inc","short_name":"Hearing Components, Inc. v. Shure Inc.","canonical_citation":"Hearing Components, Inc. v. Shure Inc., 600 F.3d 1357, 94 USPQ2d 1385 (2010)","decision_year":2010,"court":"Fed. Cir.","holding_summary":"Instructive on weighing conflicting evidence and nexus in an obviousness determination; also, when a claim uses a term of degree, the specification should provide some standard for measuring that degree.","holding_confidence":"high","mentions":1,"propositions":["instructive on weighing conflicting evidence and nexus in an obviousness determination"]},{"key":"case:69f.4th1356","slug":"yita-llc-v-macneil-ip-llc","short_name":"Yita LLC v. MacNeil IP LLC","canonical_citation":"Yita LLC v. MacNeil IP LLC, 69 F.4th 1356, 2023 USPQ2d 667 (2023)","decision_year":2023,"court":"Fed. Cir.","holding_summary":"Objective evidence of nonobviousness requires a nexus to the claimed invention; nexus is lacking where the secondary-considerations evidence relates only to a feature that was known in the prior art.","holding_confidence":"high","mentions":1,"propositions":["nexus reversed where secondary-consideration evidence related only to a feature known in the prior art"]},{"key":"case:829f.3d1317","slug":"wbip-llc-v-kohler-co","short_name":"WBIP, LLC v. Kohler Co.","canonical_citation":"WBIP, LLC v. Kohler Co., 829 F.3d 1317, 119 USPQ2d 1301 (2016)","decision_year":2016,"court":"Fed. Cir.","holding_summary":"Objective evidence of nonobviousness need not be tied exclusively to claim elements absent from the prior art; a patentee may show that the claimed combination as a whole serves as the nexus for the evidence.","holding_confidence":"high","mentions":1,"propositions":["distinguished: in WBIP the combination, not a single feature, drove the secondary-consideration evidence"]},{"key":"case:731f.3d1248","slug":"rambus-v-rea","short_name":"Rambus v. Rea","canonical_citation":"Rambus v. Rea, 731 F.3d 1248, 108 USPQ2d 1400 (Fed. Cir. 2013)","decision_year":2013,"court":"Fed. Cir.","holding_summary":"Including a new motivation to combine prior art references constitutes a new ground of rejection rather than mere elaboration of the examiner's findings; and objective evidence of nonobviousness lacks a nexus if it relates exclusively to a feature already known in the prior art.","holding_confidence":"high","mentions":1,"propositions":["objective evidence lacks a nexus if it exclusively relates to a feature known in the prior art"]},{"key":"case:463f.3d1299","slug":"ormco-corp-v-align-technology-inc","short_name":"Ormco Corp. v. Align Technology, Inc.","canonical_citation":"Ormco Corp. v. Align Technology, Inc., 463 F.3d 1299, 79 USPQ2d 1931 (2006)","decision_year":2006,"court":"Fed. Cir.","holding_summary":"Objective evidence of nonobviousness lacks the required nexus if it relates exclusively to a feature that was known in the prior art rather than to the merits of the claimed invention.","holding_confidence":"high","mentions":1,"propositions":[]},{"key":"case:116f.3d1465","slug":"in-re-geisler","short_name":"In re Geisler","canonical_citation":"In re Geisler, 116 F.3d 1465, 43 USPQ2d 1362 (Fed. Cir. 1997)","decision_year":1997,"court":"Fed. Cir.","holding_summary":"A claimed range overlapping or falling within a range taught by the prior art is prima facie obvious—a teaching of \"about 100 Angstroms\" reached a claimed 50-to-100 Angstrom range—and an assertion drawn from common experience is mere attorney argument, not factual evidence.","holding_confidence":"high","mentions":1,"propositions":["an assertion from common experience is just attorney argument, not factual evidence"]},{"key":"case:596f.2d1019","slug":"in-re-wiseman","short_name":"In re Wiseman","canonical_citation":"In re Wiseman, 596 F.2d 1019, 201 USPQ 658 (CCPA 1979)","decision_year":1979,"court":"CCPA","holding_summary":"Mere recognition of latent properties in the prior art does not render an otherwise known invention nonobvious, and a solution is obvious when the prior art contains the same solution for a similar problem; allegations that the inventor discovered the source of a problem require substantiating evidence.","holding_confidence":"high","mentions":1,"propositions":["mere recognition of latent properties does not render a known invention nonobvious"]},{"key":"case:952f.2d388","slug":"in-re-baxter-travenollabs","short_name":"In re Baxter TravenolLabs.","canonical_citation":"In re Baxter Travenol Labs., 952 F.2d 388, 21 USPQ2d 1281 (Fed. Cir. 1991)","decision_year":1991,"court":"Fed. Cir.","holding_summary":"Extrinsic evidence may be used to explain, but not expand, the meaning of terms and phrases in a reference relied upon as anticipatory; separately, unexpected-results arguments fail where the closest prior art inherently achieves the same result.","holding_confidence":"high","mentions":1,"propositions":["inherent achievement of the same result by the closest prior art defeats unexpected-results rebuttal"]},{"key":"case:227uspq58","slug":"ex-parte-obiaya","short_name":"Ex parte Obiaya","canonical_citation":"Ex parte Obiaya, 227 USPQ 58 (1985)","decision_year":1985,"court":"BPAI","holding_summary":"Recognition of an additional advantage that would flow naturally from following the suggestion of the prior art cannot be the basis for patentability where the claimed differences would otherwise be obvious.","holding_confidence":"high","mentions":1,"propositions":["an advantage flowing naturally from the prior art cannot be the basis for patentability"]},{"key":"case:878f.2d1446","slug":"lantech-inc-v-kaufman-co-of-ohio-inc","short_name":"Lantech Inc. v. Kaufman Co. of Ohio Inc.","canonical_citation":"Lantech Inc. v. Kaufman Co. of Ohio Inc., 878 F.2d 1446, 12 USPQ2d 1076 (1989)","decision_year":1989,"court":"Fed. Cir.","holding_summary":"Arguments for nonobviousness cannot rest on limitations that do not appear in the claims.","holding_confidence":"low","mentions":1,"propositions":[]},{"key":"case:458f.2d1013","slug":"in-re-lintner","short_name":"In re Lintner","canonical_citation":"In re Lintner, 458 F.2d 1013, 173 USPQ 560 (CCPA 1972)","decision_year":1972,"court":"CCPA","holding_summary":"That an applicant uses a known ingredient for a different purpose does not alter the conclusion that its use in a prior art composition would be prima facie obvious from the purpose disclosed in the references; prima facie obviousness allocates the burden of going forward during examination.","holding_confidence":"high","mentions":1,"propositions":[]},{"key":"case:756f.2d852","slug":"in-re-etter","short_name":"In re Etter","canonical_citation":"In re Etter, 756 F.2d 852, 225 USPQ 1 (1985)","decision_year":1985,"court":"Fed. Cir.","holding_summary":"Obviousness based on multiple references does not require that the references be physically combinable; the criterion is whether the claimed invention is rendered obvious by the teachings of the prior art as a whole.","holding_confidence":"high","mentions":1,"propositions":["criterion is whether the claims are rendered obvious, not whether references could be physically combined"]},{"key":"case:710f.2d1544","slug":"in-re-sneed","short_name":"In re Sneed","canonical_citation":"In re Sneed, 710 F.2d 1544, 218 USPQ 385 (Fed. Cir. 1983)","decision_year":1983,"court":"Fed. Cir.","holding_summary":"It is not necessary that the inventions of prior art references be physically combinable to render the claimed invention obvious; additionally, claims in a reissue application enjoy no presumption of validity.","holding_confidence":"high","mentions":1,"propositions":["not necessary that the inventions of the references be physically combinable"]},{"key":"case:482f.2d965","slug":"in-re-nievelt","short_name":"In re Nievelt","canonical_citation":"In re Nievelt, 482 F.2d 965, 179 USPQ 224 (1973)","decision_year":1973,"court":"CCPA","holding_summary":"Combining the teachings of references for obviousness does not require an ability to combine their specific structures; the references need not be physically combinable.","holding_confidence":"high","mentions":1,"propositions":["combining teachings does not involve an ability to combine specific structures"]},{"key":"case:800f.2d1091","slug":"in-re-merck-co-inc","short_name":"In re Merck & Co., Inc.","canonical_citation":"In re Merck & Co., Inc., 800 F.2d 1091, 231 USPQ 375 (Fed. Cir. 1986)","decision_year":1986,"court":"Fed. Cir.","holding_summary":"A claimed compound or method may be prima facie obvious where structurally similar prior art compounds would have been expected to have similar activity, such as a known bioisosteric replacement; evidence of contemporaneous invention is probative of the level of knowledge in the art.","holding_confidence":"high","mentions":1,"propositions":[]},{"key":"case:933f.2d982","slug":"in-re-gorman","short_name":"In re Gorman","canonical_citation":"In re Gorman, 933 F.2d 982, 18 USPQ2d 1885 (1991)","decision_year":1991,"court":"Fed. Cir.","holding_summary":"Reliance on a large number of references in a rejection does not, without more, weigh against the obviousness of the claimed invention; a rejection of a detailed candy-sucker claim based on thirteen prior art references was affirmed.","holding_confidence":"high","mentions":1,"propositions":["rejection of a candy-sucker claim affirmed over thirteen prior art references"]},{"key":"case:988f.2d1181","slug":"in-re-van-geuns","short_name":"In re Van Geuns","canonical_citation":"In re Van Geuns, 988 F.2d 1181, 26 USPQ2d 1057 (1993)","decision_year":1993,"court":"Fed. Cir.","holding_summary":"Although claims are interpreted in light of the specification, limitations from the specification are not read into the claims; a claim to a magnet generating a uniform magnetic field was not limited to the degree of uniformity of the disclosed NMR application.","holding_confidence":"high","mentions":1,"propositions":["limitations from the specification are not read into the claims"]},{"key":"case:848f.2d1560","slug":"constant-v-advanced-micro-devices-inc","short_name":"Constant v. Advanced Micro-Devices Inc.","canonical_citation":"Constant v. Advanced Micro-Devices Inc., 848 F.2d 1560, 7 USPQ2d 1057 (Fed. Cir. 1988)","decision_year":1988,"court":"Fed. Cir.","holding_summary":"A statement by an applicant identifying the work of another as prior art is an admission that may be relied upon for both anticipation and obviousness determinations, regardless of whether the admitted material otherwise qualifies as prior art under the statutory categories.","holding_confidence":"high","mentions":1,"propositions":["limitations relied upon were not stated in the claims"]},{"key":"case:7uspq2d1889","slug":"ex-parte-mccullough","short_name":"Ex parte McCullough","canonical_citation":"Ex parte McCullough, 7 USPQ2d 1889 (1987)","decision_year":1987,"court":"BPAI","holding_summary":"Evidence of unexpected results must be germane to the claimed invention; results demonstrated for a battery containing the claimed electrode are not germane to the patentability of the electrode itself as claimed.","holding_confidence":"high","mentions":1,"propositions":["results germane to a battery containing the electrode are not germane to the claimed invention"]},{"key":"case:713f.2d714","slug":"in-re-farrenkopf","short_name":"In re Farrenkopf","canonical_citation":"In re Farrenkopf, 713 F.2d 714, 219 USPQ 1 (Fed. Cir. 1983)","decision_year":1983,"court":"Fed. Cir.","holding_summary":"That a combination would not be made by businessmen for economic reasons does not show a person of ordinary skill would not make it; added expense, such as the cost of adding inhibitors, does not discourage a skilled artisan from an otherwise expected combination. Contemporaneous invention is probative of the level of knowledge in the art.","holding_confidence":"high","mentions":1,"propositions":["economic infeasibility does not preclude a person of skill from making the combination"]},{"key":"case:569f.2d1124","slug":"in-re-wright","short_name":"In re Wright","canonical_citation":"In re Wright, 569 F.2d 1124, 193 USPQ 332 (CCPA 1977)","decision_year":1977,"court":"CCPA","holding_summary":"The description of an article pictured in a reference may be relied on, together with the drawings, for what they reasonably teach one of ordinary skill, though undimensioned drawings do not establish scale; and the mere age of references is not persuasive of nonobviousness absent evidence the art tried and failed to solve the problem.","holding_confidence":"high","mentions":1,"propositions":["mere age of references is not persuasive of nonobviousness"]},{"key":"case:6uspq2d1966","slug":"ex-parte-meyer","short_name":"Ex parte Meyer","canonical_citation":"Ex parte Meyer, 6 USPQ2d 1966 (1988)","decision_year":1988,"court":"BPAI","holding_summary":"The length of time between the issuance of prior art patents relied upon in a rejection is not persuasive of nonobviousness.","holding_confidence":"high","mentions":1,"propositions":["length of time between prior-art patents was not persuasive of nonobviousness"]},{"key":"case:443f.2d1392","slug":"in-re-mclaughlin","short_name":"In re McLaughlin","canonical_citation":"In re McLaughlin, 443 F.2d 1392, 170 USPQ 209 (1971)","decision_year":1971,"court":"CCPA","holding_summary":"Any obviousness judgment is in a sense a hindsight reconstruction, but the reconstruction is proper so long as it relies only on knowledge within the level of ordinary skill at the time of the invention and not on knowledge gleaned solely from the applicant's disclosure.","holding_confidence":"high","mentions":1,"propositions":["hindsight reconstruction is proper if confined to knowledge within the level of ordinary skill"]},{"key":"case:357f.3d1270","slug":"ruiz-v-a-b-chance-co","short_name":"Ruiz v. A.B. Chance Co.","canonical_citation":"Ruiz v. A.B. Chance Co., 357 F.3d 1270, 69 USPQ2d 1686 (Fed. Cir. 2004)","decision_year":2004,"court":"Fed. Cir.","holding_summary":"There is no requirement that an express written motivation to combine appear in the prior art; substituting one known load-transferring element for another to achieve a predictable result is obvious.","holding_confidence":"high","mentions":1,"propositions":["no requirement that an express written motivation to combine appear in the prior art"]},{"key":"case:957f.3d1334","slug":"uber-techs-inc-v-x-one-inc","short_name":"Uber Techs., Inc. v. X One, Inc.","canonical_citation":"Uber Techs., Inc. v. X One, Inc., 957 F.3d 1334, 2020 USPQ2d 10476 (Fed. Cir. 2020)","decision_year":2020,"court":"Fed. Cir.","holding_summary":"A specification's silence on how a step is achieved may suggest that accomplishing it was within the ordinary skill in the art; combining two predictable, known solutions in the art is not impermissible hindsight for obviousness purposes.","holding_confidence":"high","mentions":1,"propositions":["combining two predictable solutions known in the art is not impermissible hindsight"]},{"key":"case:853f.2d894","slug":"in-re-ofarrell","short_name":"In re O’Farrell","canonical_citation":"In re O’Farrell, 853 F.2d 894 (Fed. Cir. 1988)","decision_year":1988,"court":"Fed. Cir.","holding_summary":"A reasonable expectation of success is required for a proper obviousness determination; an obvious-to-try rationale is improper where the prior art gives only general guidance as to the particular form of the invention or how to achieve it, or no direction at all.","holding_confidence":"high","mentions":1,"propositions":["obvious to try is improper where the prior art gives only general guidance or no direction"]},{"key":"case:27f.3d551","slug":"in-re-gurley","short_name":"In re Gurley","canonical_citation":"In re Gurley, 27 F.3d 551, 31 USPQ2d 1130 (Fed. Cir. 1994)","decision_year":1994,"court":"Fed. Cir.","holding_summary":"A known or obvious composition does not become patentable simply because the prior art describes it as somewhat inferior to another product for the same use; the nature of a teaching away must be weighed in substance.","holding_confidence":"high","mentions":1,"propositions":["a known composition does not become patentable because described as somewhat inferior"]},{"key":"case:391f.3d1195","slug":"in-re-fulton","short_name":"In re Fulton","canonical_citation":"In re Fulton, 391 F.3d 1195, 73 USPQ2d 1141 (Fed. Cir. 2004)","decision_year":2004,"court":"Fed. Cir.","holding_summary":"The prior art's mere disclosure of more than one alternative does not constitute a teaching away from any of those alternatives unless the disclosure criticizes, discredits, or otherwise discourages the claimed solution; disclosure of desirable alternatives does not negate a suggestion to modify.","holding_confidence":"high","mentions":1,"propositions":["disclosure of more than one alternative does not by itself teach away"]},{"key":"case:65f.4th679","slug":"ucb-inc-v-actavis-labs-ut-inc","short_name":"UCB, Inc. v. Actavis Labs, UT, Inc.","canonical_citation":"UCB, Inc. v. Actavis Labs. UT, Inc., 65 F.4th 679, 2023 USPQ2d 448 (Fed. Cir. 2023)","decision_year":2023,"court":"Fed. Cir.","holding_summary":"If the prior art discloses a point within a claimed range, the prior art anticipates the claim. For obviousness of ranges, a difference of degree is less persuasive than a difference in kind, and a reference expressing only a general preference for an alternative does not teach away.","holding_confidence":"high","mentions":1,"propositions":["a reference does not teach away if it merely expresses a general preference for an alternative"]},{"key":"case:567f.3d1314","slug":"depuy-spine-inc-v-medtronic-sofamor-danek-inc","short_name":"DePuy Spine, Inc. v. Medtronic Sofamor Danek, Inc.","canonical_citation":"DePuy Spine, Inc. v. Medtronic Sofamor Danek, Inc., 567 F.3d 1314, 90 USPQ2d 1865 (Fed. Cir. 2009)","decision_year":2009,"court":"Fed. Cir.","holding_summary":"An inference of nonobviousness is especially strong where the prior art's teachings undermine the very reason offered for combining known elements; however, a reference does not teach away if it merely expresses a general preference without criticizing, discrediting, or discouraging the claimed invention.","holding_confidence":"high","mentions":1,"propositions":[]},{"key":"case:82f.4th1371","slug":"schwendimann-v-neenah-inc","short_name":"Schwendimann v. Neenah, Inc.","canonical_citation":"Schwendimann v. Neenah, Inc., 82 F.4th 1371, 2023 USPQ2d 1173 (2023)","decision_year":2023,"court":"Fed. Cir.","holding_summary":"A prior art reference that does not discourage a skilled artisan from the claimed approach or lead in a divergent direction does not teach away, and such a disclosure is substantial evidence supporting a finding of no teaching away.","holding_confidence":"high","mentions":1,"propositions":["a reference that does not discourage the claimed approach is substantial evidence it does not teach away"]},{"key":"case:783f.2d1038","slug":"in-re-hedges","short_name":"In re Hedges","canonical_citation":"In re Hedges, 783 F.2d 1038, 228 USPQ 685 (Fed. Cir. 1986)","decision_year":1986,"court":"Fed. Cir.","holding_summary":"The totality of the prior art must be considered, and proceeding contrary to accepted wisdom in the art—such as running a reaction at temperatures the art taught to avoid—is evidence of nonobviousness. An examiner's reliance on other portions of an applicant-submitted reference does not create a new ground of rejection.","holding_confidence":"high","mentions":1,"propositions":["proceeding contrary to accepted wisdom in the art is evidence of nonobviousness"]},{"key":"case:383u.s.39","slug":"united-states-v-adams","short_name":"United States v. Adams","canonical_citation":"United States v. Adams, 383 U.S. 39, 148 USPQ 479 (1966)","decision_year":1966,"court":"SCOTUS","holding_summary":"Combining known prior art elements does not render an invention obvious when the results would not have been predictable to one of ordinary skill; prior art that teaches away, including known disadvantages in old devices that would discourage the search, supports nonobviousness.","holding_confidence":"high","mentions":1,"propositions":["known disadvantages in old devices that discourage search may show nonobviousness"]}],"statutes":[{"key":"us_usc:35:103","slug":"35-usc-103","canonical_citation":"35 U.S.C. 103","mentions":5},{"key":"us_cfr:37:1.132","slug":"37-cfr-1-132","canonical_citation":"37 CFR 1.132","mentions":4},{"key":"us_cfr:37:1.130","slug":"37-cfr-1-130","canonical_citation":"37 CFR 1.130","mentions":2},{"key":"us_usc:35:102","slug":"35-usc-102","canonical_citation":"35 U.S.C. 102","mentions":2},{"key":"us_cfr:37:1.131","slug":"37-cfr-1-131","canonical_citation":"37 CFR 1.131","mentions":2},{"key":"us_usc:35:112","slug":"35-usc-112","canonical_citation":"35 U.S.C. 112","mentions":1}],"cross_references":[{"key":"mpep:706","section_number":"706","title":"Rejection of Claims","exists":true,"mentions":1},{"key":"mpep:707","section_number":"707","title":"Examiner’s Letter or Action","exists":true,"mentions":1},{"key":"mpep:714","section_number":"714","title":"Amendments, Applicant’s Action","exists":true,"mentions":1},{"key":"mpep:715","section_number":"715","title":"Swearing Behind a Reference — Affidavit or Declaration Under 37 CFR 1.131(a)","exists":true,"mentions":1},{"key":"mpep:716","section_number":"716","title":"Affidavits or Declarations Under 37 CFR 1.132 and Other Evidence Traversing Rejections","exists":true,"mentions":7},{"key":"mpep:2111","section_number":"2111","title":"Claim Interpretation; Broadest Reasonable Interpretation","exists":true,"mentions":1},{"key":"mpep:2116","section_number":"2116","title":"Novel, Nonobvious Starting Material or End Product","exists":true,"mentions":1},{"key":"mpep:2129","section_number":"2129","title":"Admissions as Prior Art","exists":true,"mentions":1},{"key":"mpep:2136","section_number":"2136","title":"Pre-AIA 35 U.S.C. 102(e)","exists":true,"mentions":1},{"key":"mpep:2141","section_number":"2141","title":"Examination Guidelines for Determining Obviousness Under 35 U.S.C. 103","exists":true,"mentions":4},{"key":"mpep:2143","section_number":"2143","title":"Examples of Basic Requirements of a Prima Facie Case of Obviousness","exists":true,"mentions":5},{"key":"mpep:2144","section_number":"2144","title":"Supporting a Rejection Under 35 U.S.C. 103","exists":true,"mentions":2},{"key":"mpep:2155","section_number":"2155","title":"Use of Affidavits or Declarations Under 37 CFR 1.130\n                        To Overcome Prior Art Rejections","exists":true,"mentions":1}],"form_paragraphs":[]},"structured_data":{"nodes":[{"id":"se_sg3joi2a","node_type":"section","corpus_id":"mpep-e9r01-2024-html","opaque_url":"https://mpep.io/n/se_sg3joi2a","effective_range":{"start_revision":"R-01.2024","end_revision":null},"rendered_text_html":"","rendered_text_plain":"","provenance":{"source_file":"s2145.html","source_anchor":"d0e212553","source_sha256":"b96dc12eb202283cd1a20f770746d04f6b9da85cb49f8aa6eb2fd17857081044"},"akn_urn":"/akn/us/statement/manual/uspto/2024/mpep/eng@2024-02-29!sec_2145","canonical_url":"https://mpep.io/akn/us/statement/manual/uspto/2024/mpep/eng@2024-02-29!sec_2145","section_number":"2145","chapter":"2100","depth":0,"title":"Consideration of Applicant’s Rebuttal Arguments and Evidence","revision_tag":"R-01.2024","children_ids":["pb_rlpmw3vk","pb_vb6nwevi","pb_3qb2pa5t","pb_27xb56xd","pb_frcihx54","nq_vbmyxaan","pb_mjvabjas","pb_4attohme","nq_gzi6cl4w","pb_bgeid7ru","pb_tej5lw6w","pb_bo6dic46","pb_unbml2ic","pb_33qtw4yh","pb_ljvt2i5l","we_v3uxf6pp","we_xihnwtzm","we_j36ahkpp","we_tahja557","pb_ki7pqrid","pb_b65ahbg6","pb_3jfuttg3","pb_vd6ldh2c","ls_ruq6uqb4","pb_yterec24","pb_isjugmyt","pb_xepoyo56","pb_hsf5qpj6","pb_lqhdbaq5","pb_hf6ahgsl","pb_a2xrd7er","pb_xjc4v6ng","pb_kegiyhn2","pb_cigb7eys","pb_7b7pixo4","pb_sldqczoz","pb_wxv3agbr","pb_26q755xm","pb_oc6ulhef","pb_q2wkce5q","pb_mjk2mg6h","pb_oecaaokt","pb_dxl3ywjr","pb_qnsmqbnl","pb_obt4otum","pb_4nentnh4","ls_z3j2lwog","pb_mwid32oy","pb_z7ocua2u","pb_g5opb6kq","pb_bchxxfv7","pb_wealuhy7","pb_6qjd43wh","pb_c55njbzm","pb_43zesqxa","pb_62dinulf","pb_ibxmi4cp","pb_o5jmgifu","pb_xfpdq4uo","pb_qhnnuv5z","pb_c7v5nfxt","pb_wlx7fbqf","pb_xf5aqwvg","pb_y5svgubl","pb_sprsouzf","pb_5tgmags4","pb_u4wgnd42","pb_z45g2uhy","nq_aasjdzwd","pb_vg2vv7tt","pb_sqojp4fn","pb_h64cfi4g"]},{"id":"pb_rlpmw3vk","node_type":"prose_block","corpus_id":"mpep-e9r01-2024-html","opaque_url":"https://mpep.io/n/pb_rlpmw3vk","effective_range":{"start_revision":"R-01.2024","end_revision":null},"rendered_text_html":"<p id=\"ch2100_d223b3_2394c_2cc\"><i>[Editor Note: This MPEP section is applicable regardless of whether an application\n                           is examined under the AIA or under pre-AIA law. For applications subject to the first\n                           inventor to file (FITF) provisions of the AIA, the relevant time is \"before the\n                           effective filing date of the claimed invention\". For applications subject to\n                           <b><a href=\"mpep-9015-appx-l.html#d0e302383\">pre-AIA 35 U.S.C.\n                                 102</a></b>, the relevant time is \"at the time of the invention\". See\n                           <b><a href=\"s2150.html#ch2100_d2002f_22805_16e\">MPEP §\n                                 2150</a></b> et seq. Many of the court decisions discussed in this\n                           section involved applications or patents subject to <b><a href=\"mpep-9015-appx-l.html#d0e302383\">pre-AIA 35 U.S.C. 102</a></b>. These court\n                           decisions may be applicable to applications and patents subject to <b><a href=\"mpep-9015-appx-l.html#al_d1fbe1_234ed_52\">AIA 35 U.S.C.\n                                 102</a></b> but the relevant time is before the effective filing date of\n                           the claimed invention and not at the time of the invention.]</i></p>","rendered_text_plain":"[Editor Note: This MPEP section is applicable regardless of whether an application is examined under the AIA or under pre-AIA law. For applications subject to the first inventor to file (FITF) provisions of the AIA, the relevant time is \"before the effective filing date of the claimed invention\". For applications subject to pre-AIA 35 U.S.C. 102, the relevant time is \"at the time of the invention\". See MPEP § 2150 et seq. Many of the court decisions discussed in this section involved applications or patents subject to pre-AIA 35 U.S.C. 102. These court decisions may be applicable to applications and patents subject to AIA 35 U.S.C. 102 but the relevant time is before the effective filing date of the claimed invention and not at the time of the invention.]","provenance":{"source_file":"s2145.html","source_anchor":"ch2100_d223b3_2394c_2cc","source_sha256":"b96dc12eb202283cd1a20f770746d04f6b9da85cb49f8aa6eb2fd17857081044"},"kind":"narrative","host_section_id":"se_sg3joi2a"},{"id":"pb_vb6nwevi","node_type":"prose_block","corpus_id":"mpep-e9r01-2024-html","opaque_url":"https://mpep.io/n/pb_vb6nwevi","effective_range":{"start_revision":"R-01.2024","end_revision":null},"rendered_text_html":"<p id=\"d0e212561\">If a <i>prima facie</i> case of obviousness is established,\n                        the burden shifts to the applicant to come forward with arguments and/or evidence to rebut\n                        the <i>prima facie </i>case. See, e.g., <i>In re Dillon,</i> 919\n                        F.2d 688, 692, 16&nbsp;USPQ2d 1897, 1901 (Fed. Cir. 1990) <i>(en banc).</i>\n                        Applicant may also present rebuttal evidence and arguments prior to an Office action in\n                        anticipation of possible prior art rejections. Examiners should consider all evidence of\n                        obviousness and nonobviousness of record before making a determination under\n                        <b><a href=\"mpep-9015-appx-l.html#al_d1fbe1_19797_b0\">35 U.S.C.\n                              103</a></b>. \n                     </p>","rendered_text_plain":"If a prima facie case of obviousness is established, the burden shifts to the applicant to come forward with arguments and/or evidence to rebut the prima facie case. See, e.g., In re Dillon, 919 F.2d 688, 692, 16 USPQ2d 1897, 1901 (Fed. Cir. 1990) (en banc). Applicant may also present rebuttal evidence and arguments prior to an Office action in anticipation of possible prior art rejections. Examiners should consider all evidence of obviousness and nonobviousness of record before making a determination under 35 U.S.C. 103.","provenance":{"source_file":"s2145.html","source_anchor":"d0e212561","source_sha256":"b96dc12eb202283cd1a20f770746d04f6b9da85cb49f8aa6eb2fd17857081044"},"kind":"narrative","host_section_id":"se_sg3joi2a"},{"id":"cs_djnct276","node_type":"case","corpus_id":"mpep-e9r01-2024-html","opaque_url":"https://mpep.io/n/cs_djnct276","effective_range":{"start_revision":"R-01.2024","end_revision":null},"rendered_text_html":"","rendered_text_plain":"In re Dillon, 919 F.2d 688 (1990)","provenance":{"source_file":"s2145.html","source_anchor":"","source_sha256":"b96dc12eb202283cd1a20f770746d04f6b9da85cb49f8aa6eb2fd17857081044"},"short_name":"In re Dillon","all_citations":["919 F.2d 688","16 USPQ2d 1897"],"canonical_citation":"In re Dillon, 919 F.2d 688, 16 USPQ2d 1897 (1990)","decision_year":1990,"court":"Fed. Cir."},{"id":"st_ompe7akv","node_type":"statute","corpus_id":"mpep-e9r01-2024-html","opaque_url":"https://mpep.io/n/st_ompe7akv","effective_range":{"start_revision":"R-01.2024","end_revision":null},"rendered_text_html":"","rendered_text_plain":"","provenance":{"source_file":"s2145.html","source_anchor":"","source_sha256":"b96dc12eb202283cd1a20f770746d04f6b9da85cb49f8aa6eb2fd17857081044"},"authority":"us_usc","authority_title_num":"35","authority_section_num":"103","subsection_path":[],"canonical_citation":"35 U.S.C. 103"},{"id":"pb_3qb2pa5t","node_type":"prose_block","corpus_id":"mpep-e9r01-2024-html","opaque_url":"https://mpep.io/n/pb_3qb2pa5t","effective_range":{"start_revision":"R-01.2024","end_revision":null},"rendered_text_html":"<p id=\"ch2100_p_3ab82_1da50_35c\">Rebuttal evidence and arguments can be presented in the\n                        specification, <i>In re Soni,</i> 54 F.3d 746, 750, 34 USPQ2d 1684, 1687 (Fed.\n                        Cir. 1995), by way of an affidavit or declaration under <b><a href=\"mpep-9020-appx-r.html#d0e323552\">37 CFR 1.132</a></b>, e.g.,\n                        <i>Soni,</i> 54 F.3d at 750, 34 USPQ2d at 1687; <i>In re\n                           Piasecki,</i> 745 F.2d 1468, 1474, 223 USPQ 785, 789-90 (Fed. Cir. 1984), or\n                        otherwise presented during prosecution. See, e.g., <b><a href=\"s714.html#d0e85040\">MPEP §§ 714</a></b> to <b><a href=\"s716.html#d0e92085\">716</a></b><i>et seq.</i> However, arguments presented by applicant cannot take the place\n                        of factually supported objective evidence. See, e.g., <i>In re Schulze,</i> 346\n                        F.2d 600, 602, 145 USPQ 716, 718 (CCPA 1965); <i>In re De Blauwe,</i> 736 F.2d\n                        699, 705, 222 USPQ 191, 196 (Fed. Cir. 1984).\n                     </p>","rendered_text_plain":"Rebuttal evidence and arguments can be presented in the specification, In re Soni, 54 F.3d 746, 750, 34 USPQ2d 1684, 1687 (Fed. Cir. 1995), by way of an affidavit or declaration under 37 CFR 1.132, e.g., Soni, 54 F.3d at 750, 34 USPQ2d at 1687; In re Piasecki, 745 F.2d 1468, 1474, 223 USPQ 785, 789-90 (Fed. Cir. 1984), or otherwise presented during prosecution. See, e.g., MPEP §§ 714 to 716et seq. However, arguments presented by applicant cannot take the place of factually supported objective evidence. See, e.g., In re Schulze, 346 F.2d 600, 602, 145 USPQ 716, 718 (CCPA 1965); In re De Blauwe, 736 F.2d 699, 705, 222 USPQ 191, 196 (Fed. Cir. 1984).","provenance":{"source_file":"s2145.html","source_anchor":"ch2100_p_3ab82_1da50_35c","source_sha256":"b96dc12eb202283cd1a20f770746d04f6b9da85cb49f8aa6eb2fd17857081044"},"kind":"narrative","host_section_id":"se_sg3joi2a"},{"id":"cs_s3zh6rfg","node_type":"case","corpus_id":"mpep-e9r01-2024-html","opaque_url":"https://mpep.io/n/cs_s3zh6rfg","effective_range":{"start_revision":"R-01.2024","end_revision":null},"rendered_text_html":"","rendered_text_plain":"In re Soni, 54 F.3d 746 (1995)","provenance":{"source_file":"s2145.html","source_anchor":"","source_sha256":"b96dc12eb202283cd1a20f770746d04f6b9da85cb49f8aa6eb2fd17857081044"},"short_name":"In re Soni","all_citations":["54 F.3d 746","34 USPQ2d 1684"],"canonical_citation":"In re Soni, 54 F.3d 746, 34 USPQ2d 1684 (1995)","decision_year":1995,"court":"Fed. Cir."},{"id":"st_jzb2mm2c","node_type":"statute","corpus_id":"mpep-e9r01-2024-html","opaque_url":"https://mpep.io/n/st_jzb2mm2c","effective_range":{"start_revision":"R-01.2024","end_revision":null},"rendered_text_html":"","rendered_text_plain":"","provenance":{"source_file":"s2145.html","source_anchor":"","source_sha256":"b96dc12eb202283cd1a20f770746d04f6b9da85cb49f8aa6eb2fd17857081044"},"authority":"us_cfr","authority_title_num":"37","authority_section_num":"1.132","subsection_path":[],"canonical_citation":"37 CFR 1.132"},{"id":"cs_4opqd42k","node_type":"case","corpus_id":"mpep-e9r01-2024-html","opaque_url":"https://mpep.io/n/cs_4opqd42k","effective_range":{"start_revision":"R-01.2024","end_revision":null},"rendered_text_html":"","rendered_text_plain":"In re Piasecki, 745 F.2d 1468 (1984)","provenance":{"source_file":"s2145.html","source_anchor":"","source_sha256":"b96dc12eb202283cd1a20f770746d04f6b9da85cb49f8aa6eb2fd17857081044"},"short_name":"In re Piasecki","all_citations":["745 F.2d 1468","223 USPQ 785"],"canonical_citation":"In re Piasecki, 745 F.2d 1468, 223 USPQ 785 (1984)","decision_year":1984,"court":"Fed. Cir."},{"id":"se_vipqkod3","node_type":"section","corpus_id":"mpep-e9r01-2024-html","opaque_url":"https://mpep.io/n/se_vipqkod3","effective_range":{"start_revision":"R-01.2024","end_revision":null},"rendered_text_html":"","rendered_text_plain":"","provenance":{"source_file":"s2145.html","source_anchor":"stub-714","source_sha256":"b96dc12eb202283cd1a20f770746d04f6b9da85cb49f8aa6eb2fd17857081044"},"akn_urn":"/akn/us/statement/manual/uspto/2024/mpep/eng@2024-02-29!sec_714","canonical_url":"https://mpep.io/akn/us/statement/manual/uspto/2024/mpep/eng@2024-02-29!sec_714","section_number":"714","chapter":"700","depth":0,"title":"Section 714","children_ids":[]},{"id":"se_gdeekbal","node_type":"section","corpus_id":"mpep-e9r01-2024-html","opaque_url":"https://mpep.io/n/se_gdeekbal","effective_range":{"start_revision":"R-01.2024","end_revision":null},"rendered_text_html":"","rendered_text_plain":"","provenance":{"source_file":"s2145.html","source_anchor":"stub-716","source_sha256":"b96dc12eb202283cd1a20f770746d04f6b9da85cb49f8aa6eb2fd17857081044"},"akn_urn":"/akn/us/statement/manual/uspto/2024/mpep/eng@2024-02-29!sec_716","canonical_url":"https://mpep.io/akn/us/statement/manual/uspto/2024/mpep/eng@2024-02-29!sec_716","section_number":"716","chapter":"700","depth":0,"title":"Section 716","children_ids":[]},{"id":"cs_xqzhovub","node_type":"case","corpus_id":"mpep-e9r01-2024-html","opaque_url":"https://mpep.io/n/cs_xqzhovub","effective_range":{"start_revision":"R-01.2024","end_revision":null},"rendered_text_html":"","rendered_text_plain":"In re Schulze, 346 F.2d 600 (1965)","provenance":{"source_file":"s2145.html","source_anchor":"","source_sha256":"b96dc12eb202283cd1a20f770746d04f6b9da85cb49f8aa6eb2fd17857081044"},"short_name":"In re Schulze","all_citations":["346 F.2d 600","145 USPQ 716"],"canonical_citation":"In re Schulze, 346 F.2d 600, 145 USPQ 716 (1965)","decision_year":1965,"court":"CCPA"},{"id":"cs_cnxbx676","node_type":"case","corpus_id":"mpep-e9r01-2024-html","opaque_url":"https://mpep.io/n/cs_cnxbx676","effective_range":{"start_revision":"R-01.2024","end_revision":null},"rendered_text_html":"","rendered_text_plain":"In re De Blauwe, 736 F.2d 699 (1984)","provenance":{"source_file":"s2145.html","source_anchor":"","source_sha256":"b96dc12eb202283cd1a20f770746d04f6b9da85cb49f8aa6eb2fd17857081044"},"short_name":"In re De Blauwe","all_citations":["736 F.2d 699","222 USPQ 191"],"canonical_citation":"In re De Blauwe, 736 F.2d 699, 222 USPQ 191 (1984)","decision_year":1984,"court":"Fed. Cir."},{"id":"pb_27xb56xd","node_type":"prose_block","corpus_id":"mpep-e9r01-2024-html","opaque_url":"https://mpep.io/n/pb_27xb56xd","effective_range":{"start_revision":"R-01.2024","end_revision":null},"rendered_text_html":"<p id=\"d0e212595\">Office personnel should consider all rebuttal arguments and evidence\n                        presented by applicants. See, e.g., <i> Soni,</i> 54 F.3d at 750, 34 USPQ2d at\n                        1687 (error not to consider evidence presented in the specification). C.f., <i>In re\n                           Kao,</i> 639 F.3d 1057, 1067, 98 USPQ2d 1799, 1807 (Fed. Cir. 2011) (“[W]hen\n                        secondary considerations are present, though they are not always dispositive, it is error\n                        not to consider them.”);<i> In re Alton,</i> 76 F.3d 1168, 37 USPQ2d 1578 (Fed.\n                        Cir. 1996) (error not to consider factual evidence submitted to counter a <b><a href=\"mpep-9015-appx-l.html#d0e302824\">35 U.S.C. 112</a></b>\n                        rejection); <i>In re Beattie,</i> 974 F.2d 1309, 1313, 24 USPQ2d 1040, 1042-43\n                        (Fed. Cir. 1992) (Office personnel should consider declarations from those skilled in the\n                        art praising the claimed invention and opining that the art teaches away from the\n                        invention.); <i>Piasecki, </i>745 F.2d at 1472, 223 USPQ at 788 (“[Rebuttal\n                        evidence] may relate to any of the <i>Graham</i> factors including the\n                        so-called secondary considerations.”). The Federal Circuit has “emphasized that\n                        consideration of the objective indicia is part of the whole obviousness analysis, not just\n                        an afterthought.” <i>Leo Pharm. Prod., Ltd. v. Rea,</i> 726 F.3d 1346, 1357,\n                        107 USPQ2d 1943, 1952 (Fed. Cir. 2013) (emphasis in original). Even though court decisions\n                        “have used the ‘prima facie’ and ‘rebuttal’ language [the decisions have] generally have\n                        made clear that a fact finder must consider <i>all</i> evidence of obviousness\n                        and nonobviousness before reaching a determination.” <i>In re Cyclobenzaprine\n                           Hydrochloride Extended- Release Capsule Patent Litig.,</i> 676 F.3d 1063, 1077,\n                        102 USPQ2d 1760, 1772 (Fed. Cir. 2012) (emphasis in the original).\n                     </p>","rendered_text_plain":"Office personnel should consider all rebuttal arguments and evidence presented by applicants. See, e.g., Soni, 54 F.3d at 750, 34 USPQ2d at 1687 (error not to consider evidence presented in the specification). C.f., In re Kao, 639 F.3d 1057, 1067, 98 USPQ2d 1799, 1807 (Fed. Cir. 2011) (“[W]hen secondary considerations are present, though they are not always dispositive, it is error not to consider them.”); In re Alton, 76 F.3d 1168, 37 USPQ2d 1578 (Fed. Cir. 1996) (error not to consider factual evidence submitted to counter a 35 U.S.C. 112 rejection); In re Beattie, 974 F.2d 1309, 1313, 24 USPQ2d 1040, 1042-43 (Fed. Cir. 1992) (Office personnel should consider declarations from those skilled in the art praising the claimed invention and opining that the art teaches away from the invention.); Piasecki, 745 F.2d at 1472, 223 USPQ at 788 (“[Rebuttal evidence] may relate to any of the Graham factors including the so-called secondary considerations.”). The Federal Circuit has “emphasized that consideration of the objective indicia is part of the whole obviousness analysis, not just an afterthought.” Leo Pharm. Prod., Ltd. v. Rea, 726 F.3d 1346, 1357, 107 USPQ2d 1943, 1952 (Fed. Cir. 2013) (emphasis in original). Even though court decisions “have used the ‘prima facie’ and ‘rebuttal’ language [the decisions have] generally have made clear that a fact finder must consider all evidence of obviousness and nonobviousness before reaching a determination.” In re Cyclobenzaprine Hydrochloride Extended- Release Capsule Patent Litig., 676 F.3d 1063, 1077, 102 USPQ2d 1760, 1772 (Fed. Cir. 2012) (emphasis in the original).","provenance":{"source_file":"s2145.html","source_anchor":"d0e212595","source_sha256":"b96dc12eb202283cd1a20f770746d04f6b9da85cb49f8aa6eb2fd17857081044"},"kind":"narrative","host_section_id":"se_sg3joi2a"},{"id":"cs_w5a4mgyw","node_type":"case","corpus_id":"mpep-e9r01-2024-html","opaque_url":"https://mpep.io/n/cs_w5a4mgyw","effective_range":{"start_revision":"R-01.2024","end_revision":null},"rendered_text_html":"","rendered_text_plain":"In re Kao, 639 F.3d 1057 (2011)","provenance":{"source_file":"s2145.html","source_anchor":"","source_sha256":"b96dc12eb202283cd1a20f770746d04f6b9da85cb49f8aa6eb2fd17857081044"},"short_name":"In re Kao","all_citations":["639 F.3d 1057","98 USPQ2d 1799"],"canonical_citation":"In re Kao, 639 F.3d 1057, 98 USPQ2d 1799 (2011)","decision_year":2011,"court":"Fed. Cir."},{"id":"cs_6naqkuy4","node_type":"case","corpus_id":"mpep-e9r01-2024-html","opaque_url":"https://mpep.io/n/cs_6naqkuy4","effective_range":{"start_revision":"R-01.2024","end_revision":null},"rendered_text_html":"","rendered_text_plain":"In re Alton, 76 F.3d 1168 (1996)","provenance":{"source_file":"s2145.html","source_anchor":"","source_sha256":"b96dc12eb202283cd1a20f770746d04f6b9da85cb49f8aa6eb2fd17857081044"},"short_name":"In re Alton","all_citations":["76 F.3d 1168","37 USPQ2d 1578"],"canonical_citation":"In re Alton, 76 F.3d 1168, 37 USPQ2d 1578 (1996)","decision_year":1996,"court":"Fed. Cir."},{"id":"st_35hzro2v","node_type":"statute","corpus_id":"mpep-e9r01-2024-html","opaque_url":"https://mpep.io/n/st_35hzro2v","effective_range":{"start_revision":"R-01.2024","end_revision":null},"rendered_text_html":"","rendered_text_plain":"","provenance":{"source_file":"s2145.html","source_anchor":"","source_sha256":"b96dc12eb202283cd1a20f770746d04f6b9da85cb49f8aa6eb2fd17857081044"},"authority":"us_usc","authority_title_num":"35","authority_section_num":"112","subsection_path":[],"canonical_citation":"35 U.S.C. 112"},{"id":"cs_wp77iofo","node_type":"case","corpus_id":"mpep-e9r01-2024-html","opaque_url":"https://mpep.io/n/cs_wp77iofo","effective_range":{"start_revision":"R-01.2024","end_revision":null},"rendered_text_html":"","rendered_text_plain":"In re Beattie, 974 F.2d 1309 (1992)","provenance":{"source_file":"s2145.html","source_anchor":"","source_sha256":"b96dc12eb202283cd1a20f770746d04f6b9da85cb49f8aa6eb2fd17857081044"},"short_name":"In re Beattie","all_citations":["974 F.2d 1309","24 USPQ2d 1040"],"canonical_citation":"In re Beattie, 974 F.2d 1309, 24 USPQ2d 1040 (1992)","decision_year":1992,"court":"Fed. Cir."},{"id":"cs_kohnbem2","node_type":"case","corpus_id":"mpep-e9r01-2024-html","opaque_url":"https://mpep.io/n/cs_kohnbem2","effective_range":{"start_revision":"R-01.2024","end_revision":null},"rendered_text_html":"","rendered_text_plain":"Leo Pharm. Prod., Ltd. v. Rea, 726 F.3d 1346 (2013)","provenance":{"source_file":"s2145.html","source_anchor":"","source_sha256":"b96dc12eb202283cd1a20f770746d04f6b9da85cb49f8aa6eb2fd17857081044"},"short_name":"Leo Pharm. Prod., Ltd. v. Rea","all_citations":["726 F.3d 1346","107 USPQ2d 1943"],"canonical_citation":"Leo Pharm. Prod., Ltd. v. Rea, 726 F.3d 1346, 107 USPQ2d 1943 (2013)","decision_year":2013,"court":"Fed. Cir."},{"id":"cs_hf77wsrm","node_type":"case","corpus_id":"mpep-e9r01-2024-html","opaque_url":"https://mpep.io/n/cs_hf77wsrm","effective_range":{"start_revision":"R-01.2024","end_revision":null},"rendered_text_html":"","rendered_text_plain":"In re Cyclobenzaprine Hydrochloride Extended- Release Capsule Patent Litig., 676 F.3d 1063 (2012)","provenance":{"source_file":"s2145.html","source_anchor":"","source_sha256":"b96dc12eb202283cd1a20f770746d04f6b9da85cb49f8aa6eb2fd17857081044"},"short_name":"In re Cyclobenzaprine Hydrochloride Extended- Release Capsule Patent Litig.","all_citations":["676 F.3d 1063","102 USPQ2d 1760"],"canonical_citation":"In re Cyclobenzaprine Hydrochloride Extended- Release Capsule Patent Litig., 676 F.3d 1063, 102 USPQ2d 1760 (2012)","decision_year":2012,"court":"Fed. Cir."},{"id":"pb_frcihx54","node_type":"prose_block","corpus_id":"mpep-e9r01-2024-html","opaque_url":"https://mpep.io/n/pb_frcihx54","effective_range":{"start_revision":"R-01.2024","end_revision":null},"rendered_text_html":"<p id=\"d0e212616\">Rebuttal evidence may include evidence of “secondary considerations,” such\n                        as “commercial success, long felt but unsolved needs, [and] failure of others.”\n                        <i>Graham v. John Deere Co.,</i> 383 U.S. 1, 148 USPQ 4459, 467. See also,\n                        e.g., <i>In re Piasecki,</i> 745&nbsp;F.2d 1468, 1473, 223 USPQ 785, 788 (Fed. Cir.\n                        1984) (commercial success). Rebuttal evidence may also include evidence that the claimed\n                        invention yields unexpectedly improved properties or properties not present in the prior\n                        art. Rebuttal evidence may consist of a showing that the claimed compound possesses\n                        unexpected properties. <i>Dillon,</i> 919 F.2d at 692-93, 16 USPQ2d at 1901. A\n                        showing of unexpected results must be based on evidence, not argument or speculation.\n                        <i>In re Mayne,</i> 104 F.3d 1339, 1343-44, 41&nbsp;USPQ2d 1451, 1455-56 (Fed.\n                        Cir. 1997) (conclusory statements regarding unusually low immune response or unexpected\n                        biological activity that were unsupported by comparative data held insufficient to overcome\n                        <i>prima facie</i> case of obviousness). Rebuttal evidence may include\n                        evidence that the claimed invention was copied by others. See, e.g., <i>In re\n                           GPAC,</i> 57 F.3d 1573, 1580, 35&nbsp;USPQ2d 1116, 1121 (Fed. Cir. 1995);\n                        <i>Hybritech Inc.</i><i>v. Monoclonal Antibodies,</i> 802 F.2d 1367, 1380, 231 USPQ 81, 90 (Fed.\n                        Cir. 1986). It may also include evidence of the state of the art, the level of skill in the\n                        art, and the beliefs of those skilled in the art. See, e.g., <i>In re Oelrich,\n                           </i>579 F.2d 86, 91-92, 198 USPQ 210, 214 (CCPA 1978) (Expert opinions regarding the\n                        level of skill in the art were probative of the nonobviousness of the claimed invention.);\n                        <i>Piasecki,</i> 745 F.2d at 1471, 1473-74, 223 USPQ at 790 (Evidence of\n                        nontechnological nature is pertinent to the conclusion of obviousness. The declarations of\n                        those skilled in the art regarding the need for the invention and its reception by the art\n                        were improperly discounted by the Board.); <i>Beattie,</i> 974 F.2d at 1313, 24\n                        USPQ2d at 1042-43 (Seven declarations provided by music teachers opining that the art\n                        teaches away from the claimed invention must be considered, but were not probative because\n                        they did not contain facts and did not deal with the specific prior art that was the\n                        subject of the rejection.). For example, rebuttal evidence may include a showing that the\n                        prior art fails to disclose or render obvious a method for making the compound, which would\n                        preclude a conclusion of obviousness of the compound. A conclusion of obviousness requires\n                        that the reference(s) relied upon, together with the knowledge of a person skilled in the\n                        art, be enabling in that it put the public in possession of the claimed invention.\n                        <i>In re Hoeksema,</i> 399 F.2d 269, 273, 158 USPQ 596, 600 (CCPA 1968)\n                        (citing <i>In re Le Grice,</i> 301 F.2d 929, 936, 133 USPQ 365, 372 (CCPA\n                        1962)). The <i>Hoeksema,</i> court stated: \n                     </p>","rendered_text_plain":"Rebuttal evidence may include evidence of “secondary considerations,” such as “commercial success, long felt but unsolved needs, [and] failure of others.” Graham v. John Deere Co., 383 U.S. 1, 148 USPQ 4459, 467. See also, e.g., In re Piasecki, 745 F.2d 1468, 1473, 223 USPQ 785, 788 (Fed. Cir. 1984) (commercial success). Rebuttal evidence may also include evidence that the claimed invention yields unexpectedly improved properties or properties not present in the prior art. Rebuttal evidence may consist of a showing that the claimed compound possesses unexpected properties. Dillon, 919 F.2d at 692-93, 16 USPQ2d at 1901. A showing of unexpected results must be based on evidence, not argument or speculation. In re Mayne, 104 F.3d 1339, 1343-44, 41 USPQ2d 1451, 1455-56 (Fed. Cir. 1997) (conclusory statements regarding unusually low immune response or unexpected biological activity that were unsupported by comparative data held insufficient to overcome prima facie case of obviousness). Rebuttal evidence may include evidence that the claimed invention was copied by others. See, e.g., In re GPAC, 57 F.3d 1573, 1580, 35 USPQ2d 1116, 1121 (Fed. Cir. 1995); Hybritech Inc.v. Monoclonal Antibodies, 802 F.2d 1367, 1380, 231 USPQ 81, 90 (Fed. Cir. 1986). It may also include evidence of the state of the art, the level of skill in the art, and the beliefs of those skilled in the art. See, e.g., In re Oelrich, 579 F.2d 86, 91-92, 198 USPQ 210, 214 (CCPA 1978) (Expert opinions regarding the level of skill in the art were probative of the nonobviousness of the claimed invention.); Piasecki, 745 F.2d at 1471, 1473-74, 223 USPQ at 790 (Evidence of nontechnological nature is pertinent to the conclusion of obviousness. The declarations of those skilled in the art regarding the need for the invention and its reception by the art were improperly discounted by the Board.); Beattie, 974 F.2d at 1313, 24 USPQ2d at 1042-43 (Seven declarations provided by music teachers opining that the art teaches away from the claimed invention must be considered, but were not probative because they did not contain facts and did not deal with the specific prior art that was the subject of the rejection.). For example, rebuttal evidence may include a showing that the prior art fails to disclose or render obvious a method for making the compound, which would preclude a conclusion of obviousness of the compound. A conclusion of obviousness requires that the reference(s) relied upon, together with the knowledge of a person skilled in the art, be enabling in that it put the public in possession of the claimed invention. In re Hoeksema, 399 F.2d 269, 273, 158 USPQ 596, 600 (CCPA 1968) (citing In re Le Grice, 301 F.2d 929, 936, 133 USPQ 365, 372 (CCPA 1962)). The Hoeksema, court stated:","provenance":{"source_file":"s2145.html","source_anchor":"d0e212616","source_sha256":"b96dc12eb202283cd1a20f770746d04f6b9da85cb49f8aa6eb2fd17857081044"},"kind":"narrative","host_section_id":"se_sg3joi2a"},{"id":"cs_mebii6tt","node_type":"case","corpus_id":"mpep-e9r01-2024-html","opaque_url":"https://mpep.io/n/cs_mebii6tt","effective_range":{"start_revision":"R-01.2024","end_revision":null},"rendered_text_html":"","rendered_text_plain":"Graham v. John Deere Co., 383 U.S. 1 (1966)","provenance":{"source_file":"s2145.html","source_anchor":"","source_sha256":"b96dc12eb202283cd1a20f770746d04f6b9da85cb49f8aa6eb2fd17857081044"},"short_name":"Graham v. John Deere Co.","all_citations":["383 U.S. 1","148 USPQ 459"],"canonical_citation":"Graham v. John Deere Co., 383 U.S. 1, 148 USPQ 459 (1966)","decision_year":1966,"court":"SCOTUS"},{"id":"cs_3oweabbk","node_type":"case","corpus_id":"mpep-e9r01-2024-html","opaque_url":"https://mpep.io/n/cs_3oweabbk","effective_range":{"start_revision":"R-01.2024","end_revision":null},"rendered_text_html":"","rendered_text_plain":"In re Mayne, 104 F.3d 1339 (1997)","provenance":{"source_file":"s2145.html","source_anchor":"","source_sha256":"b96dc12eb202283cd1a20f770746d04f6b9da85cb49f8aa6eb2fd17857081044"},"short_name":"In re Mayne","all_citations":["104 F.3d 1339","41 USPQ2d 1451"],"canonical_citation":"In re Mayne, 104 F.3d 1339, 41 USPQ2d 1451 (1997)","decision_year":1997,"court":"Fed. Cir."},{"id":"cs_5xb574lk","node_type":"case","corpus_id":"mpep-e9r01-2024-html","opaque_url":"https://mpep.io/n/cs_5xb574lk","effective_range":{"start_revision":"R-01.2024","end_revision":null},"rendered_text_html":"","rendered_text_plain":"In re GPAC, 57 F.3d 1573 (1995)","provenance":{"source_file":"s2145.html","source_anchor":"","source_sha256":"b96dc12eb202283cd1a20f770746d04f6b9da85cb49f8aa6eb2fd17857081044"},"short_name":"In re GPAC","all_citations":["57 F.3d 1573","35 USPQ2d 1116"],"canonical_citation":"In re GPAC, 57 F.3d 1573, 35 USPQ2d 1116 (1995)","decision_year":1995,"court":"Fed. Cir."},{"id":"cs_qzdr5cvi","node_type":"case","corpus_id":"mpep-e9r01-2024-html","opaque_url":"https://mpep.io/n/cs_qzdr5cvi","effective_range":{"start_revision":"R-01.2024","end_revision":null},"rendered_text_html":"","rendered_text_plain":"Hybritech Inc. v. Monoclonal Antibodies, 802 F.2d 1367 (1986)","provenance":{"source_file":"s2145.html","source_anchor":"","source_sha256":"b96dc12eb202283cd1a20f770746d04f6b9da85cb49f8aa6eb2fd17857081044"},"short_name":"Hybritech Inc. v. Monoclonal Antibodies","all_citations":["802 F.2d 1367","231 USPQ 81"],"canonical_citation":"Hybritech Inc. v. Monoclonal Antibodies, 802 F.2d 1367, 231 USPQ 81 (1986)","decision_year":1986,"court":"Fed. Cir."},{"id":"cs_n6rmsq6e","node_type":"case","corpus_id":"mpep-e9r01-2024-html","opaque_url":"https://mpep.io/n/cs_n6rmsq6e","effective_range":{"start_revision":"R-01.2024","end_revision":null},"rendered_text_html":"","rendered_text_plain":"In re Oelrich, 579 F.2d 86 (1978)","provenance":{"source_file":"s2145.html","source_anchor":"","source_sha256":"b96dc12eb202283cd1a20f770746d04f6b9da85cb49f8aa6eb2fd17857081044"},"short_name":"In re Oelrich","all_citations":["579 F.2d 86","198 USPQ 210"],"canonical_citation":"In re Oelrich, 579 F.2d 86, 198 USPQ 210 (1978)","decision_year":1978,"court":"CCPA"},{"id":"cs_in6hewcs","node_type":"case","corpus_id":"mpep-e9r01-2024-html","opaque_url":"https://mpep.io/n/cs_in6hewcs","effective_range":{"start_revision":"R-01.2024","end_revision":null},"rendered_text_html":"","rendered_text_plain":"In re Hoeksema, 399 F.2d 269 (1968)","provenance":{"source_file":"s2145.html","source_anchor":"","source_sha256":"b96dc12eb202283cd1a20f770746d04f6b9da85cb49f8aa6eb2fd17857081044"},"short_name":"In re Hoeksema","all_citations":["399 F.2d 269","158 USPQ 596"],"canonical_citation":"In re Hoeksema, 399 F.2d 269, 158 USPQ 596 (1968)","decision_year":1968,"court":"CCPA"},{"id":"cs_lf3666yd","node_type":"case","corpus_id":"mpep-e9r01-2024-html","opaque_url":"https://mpep.io/n/cs_lf3666yd","effective_range":{"start_revision":"R-01.2024","end_revision":null},"rendered_text_html":"","rendered_text_plain":"In re Le Grice, 301 F.2d 929 (1962)","provenance":{"source_file":"s2145.html","source_anchor":"","source_sha256":"b96dc12eb202283cd1a20f770746d04f6b9da85cb49f8aa6eb2fd17857081044"},"short_name":"In re Le Grice","all_citations":["301 F.2d 929","133 USPQ 365"],"canonical_citation":"In re Le Grice, 301 F.2d 929, 133 USPQ 365 (1962)","decision_year":1962,"court":"CCPA"},{"id":"nq_vbmyxaan","node_type":"narrative_quote","corpus_id":"mpep-e9r01-2024-html","opaque_url":"https://mpep.io/n/nq_vbmyxaan","effective_range":{"start_revision":"R-01.2024","end_revision":null},"rendered_text_html":"<blockquote id=\"d0e212659\">\n                        <p id=\"d0e212660\"> Thus, upon careful reconsideration it is our view that if the prior\n                           art of record fails to disclose or render obvious a method for making a claimed\n                           compound, at the time the invention was made, it may not be legally concluded that the\n                           compound itself is in the possession of the public. [footnote omitted.] In this context,\n                           we say that the absence of a known or obvious process for making the claimed compounds\n                           overcomes a presumption that the compounds are obvious, based on close relationships\n                           between their structures and those of prior art compounds.\n                        </p>\n                     </blockquote>","rendered_text_plain":"Thus, upon careful reconsideration it is our view that if the prior art of record fails to disclose or render obvious a method for making a claimed compound, at the time the invention was made, it may not be legally concluded that the compound itself is in the possession of the public. [footnote omitted.] In this context, we say that the absence of a known or obvious process for making the claimed compounds overcomes a presumption that the compounds are obvious, based on close relationships between their structures and those of prior art compounds.","provenance":{"source_file":"s2145.html","source_anchor":"d0e212659","source_sha256":"b96dc12eb202283cd1a20f770746d04f6b9da85cb49f8aa6eb2fd17857081044"},"source_anchor":"d0e212659","host_section_id":"se_sg3joi2a","source_case_id":"cs_in6hewcs"},{"id":"pb_mjvabjas","node_type":"prose_block","corpus_id":"mpep-e9r01-2024-html","opaque_url":"https://mpep.io/n/pb_mjvabjas","effective_range":{"start_revision":"R-01.2024","end_revision":null},"rendered_text_html":"<p id=\"d0e212663\">See <i>Hoeksema</i>, 399 F.2d at 274, 158 USPQ at 601. The\n                        <i>Hoeksema</i> court further noted that once a <i>prima\n                           facie</i> case of obviousness is made by the USPTO through citation of references,\n                        the burden is on the applicant to produce contrary evidence. In\n                        <i>Hoeksema</i>, the contrary evidence was that the applied reference did not\n                        disclose or render obvious a process for producing the claimed compounds.\n                        <i>Id.</i> at 274-75, 158 USPQ at 601. See also <i>Ashland Oil, Inc.\n                           v. Delta Resins &amp; Refractories, Inc.,</i> 776 F.2d 281, 295, 297, 227 USPQ\n                        657, 666, 667 (Fed. Cir. 1985) (citing <i>Hoeksema</i> for the proposition\n                        above); <i>In re Grose,</i> 592 F.2d 1161, 1168, 201 USPQ 57, 63-64 (CCPA 1979)\n                        (\"One of the assumptions underlying a prima facie obviousness rejection based upon a\n                        structural relationship between compounds, such as adjacent homologs, is that a method\n                        disclosed for producing one would provide those skilled in the art with a method for\n                        producing the other... Failure of the prior art to disclose or render obvious a method for\n                        making any composition of matter, whether a compound or a mixture of compounds like a\n                        zeolite, precludes a conclusion that the composition would have been obvious.\").\n                     </p>","rendered_text_plain":"See Hoeksema, 399 F.2d at 274, 158 USPQ at 601. The Hoeksema court further noted that once a prima facie case of obviousness is made by the USPTO through citation of references, the burden is on the applicant to produce contrary evidence. In Hoeksema, the contrary evidence was that the applied reference did not disclose or render obvious a process for producing the claimed compounds. Id. at 274-75, 158 USPQ at 601. See also Ashland Oil, Inc. v. Delta Resins & Refractories, Inc., 776 F.2d 281, 295, 297, 227 USPQ 657, 666, 667 (Fed. Cir. 1985) (citing Hoeksema for the proposition above); In re Grose, 592 F.2d 1161, 1168, 201 USPQ 57, 63-64 (CCPA 1979) (\"One of the assumptions underlying a prima facie obviousness rejection based upon a structural relationship between compounds, such as adjacent homologs, is that a method disclosed for producing one would provide those skilled in the art with a method for producing the other... Failure of the prior art to disclose or render obvious a method for making any composition of matter, whether a compound or a mixture of compounds like a zeolite, precludes a conclusion that the composition would have been obvious.\").","provenance":{"source_file":"s2145.html","source_anchor":"d0e212663","source_sha256":"b96dc12eb202283cd1a20f770746d04f6b9da85cb49f8aa6eb2fd17857081044"},"kind":"narrative","host_section_id":"se_sg3joi2a"},{"id":"cs_2pzju7gn","node_type":"case","corpus_id":"mpep-e9r01-2024-html","opaque_url":"https://mpep.io/n/cs_2pzju7gn","effective_range":{"start_revision":"R-01.2024","end_revision":null},"rendered_text_html":"","rendered_text_plain":"Ashland Oil, Inc. v. Delta Resins & Refractories, Inc., 776 F.2d 281 (1985)","provenance":{"source_file":"s2145.html","source_anchor":"","source_sha256":"b96dc12eb202283cd1a20f770746d04f6b9da85cb49f8aa6eb2fd17857081044"},"short_name":"Ashland Oil, Inc. v. Delta Resins & Refractories, Inc.","all_citations":["776 F.2d 281","227 USPQ 657"],"canonical_citation":"Ashland Oil, Inc. v. Delta Resins & Refractories, Inc., 776 F.2d 281, 227 USPQ 657 (1985)","decision_year":1985,"court":"Fed. Cir."},{"id":"cs_4zbcgmnv","node_type":"case","corpus_id":"mpep-e9r01-2024-html","opaque_url":"https://mpep.io/n/cs_4zbcgmnv","effective_range":{"start_revision":"R-01.2024","end_revision":null},"rendered_text_html":"","rendered_text_plain":"In re Grose, 592 F.2d 1161 (1979)","provenance":{"source_file":"s2145.html","source_anchor":"","source_sha256":"b96dc12eb202283cd1a20f770746d04f6b9da85cb49f8aa6eb2fd17857081044"},"short_name":"In re Grose","all_citations":["592 F.2d 1161","201 USPQ 57"],"canonical_citation":"In re Grose, 592 F.2d 1161, 201 USPQ 57 (1979)","decision_year":1979,"court":"CCPA"},{"id":"pb_4attohme","node_type":"prose_block","corpus_id":"mpep-e9r01-2024-html","opaque_url":"https://mpep.io/n/pb_4attohme","effective_range":{"start_revision":"R-01.2024","end_revision":null},"rendered_text_html":"<p id=\"d0e212684\">Consideration of rebuttal evidence and arguments requires Office personnel\n                        to weigh the proffered evidence and arguments. <i>Id.;</i> see also <i>In\n                           re Alton,</i> 76 F.3d 1168, 1174-75, 37 USPQ2d 1578, 1582-83 (Fed. Cir. 1996).\n                        Office personnel should avoid giving no weight to evidence submitted by applicant, except\n                        in rare circumstances. However, to be entitled to substantial weight, the applicant should\n                        establish a nexus between the rebuttal evidence and the claimed invention, i.e., objective\n                        evidence of nonobviousness must be attributable to the claimed invention. The Federal\n                        Circuit has acknowledged that applicant bears the burden of establishing nexus,\n                        stating:\n                     </p>","rendered_text_plain":"Consideration of rebuttal evidence and arguments requires Office personnel to weigh the proffered evidence and arguments. Id.; see also In re Alton, 76 F.3d 1168, 1174-75, 37 USPQ2d 1578, 1582-83 (Fed. Cir. 1996). Office personnel should avoid giving no weight to evidence submitted by applicant, except in rare circumstances. However, to be entitled to substantial weight, the applicant should establish a nexus between the rebuttal evidence and the claimed invention, i.e., objective evidence of nonobviousness must be attributable to the claimed invention. The Federal Circuit has acknowledged that applicant bears the burden of establishing nexus, stating:","provenance":{"source_file":"s2145.html","source_anchor":"d0e212684","source_sha256":"b96dc12eb202283cd1a20f770746d04f6b9da85cb49f8aa6eb2fd17857081044"},"kind":"narrative","host_section_id":"se_sg3joi2a"},{"id":"cs_nwsngfnc","node_type":"case","corpus_id":"mpep-e9r01-2024-html","opaque_url":"https://mpep.io/n/cs_nwsngfnc","effective_range":{"start_revision":"R-01.2024","end_revision":null},"rendered_text_html":"","rendered_text_plain":"In re Huang, 100 F.3d 135 (1996)","provenance":{"source_file":"s2145.html","source_anchor":"","source_sha256":"b96dc12eb202283cd1a20f770746d04f6b9da85cb49f8aa6eb2fd17857081044"},"short_name":"In re Huang","all_citations":["100 F.3d 135","40 USPQ2d 1685"],"canonical_citation":"In re Huang, 100 F.3d 135, 40 USPQ2d 1685 (1996)","decision_year":1996,"court":"Fed. Cir."},{"id":"nq_gzi6cl4w","node_type":"narrative_quote","corpus_id":"mpep-e9r01-2024-html","opaque_url":"https://mpep.io/n/nq_gzi6cl4w","effective_range":{"start_revision":"R-01.2024","end_revision":null},"rendered_text_html":"<blockquote id=\"d0e212693\">\n                        <p id=\"d0e212694\">In the <i>ex parte</i> process of examining a patent\n                           application, however, the PTO lacks the means or resources to gather evidence which\n                           supports or refutes the applicant’s assertion that the sales constitute commercial\n                           success. <i>C.f. Ex parte Remark,</i> 15 USPQ2d 1498, 1503 ([BPAI] 1990)\n                           (evidentiary routine of shifting burdens in civil proceedings inappropriate in\n                           <i>ex parte</i> prosecution proceedings because examiner has no available\n                           means for adducing evidence). Consequently, the PTO must rely upon the applicant to\n                           provide hard evidence of commercial success.\n                        </p>\n                     </blockquote>","rendered_text_plain":"In the ex parte process of examining a patent application, however, the PTO lacks the means or resources to gather evidence which supports or refutes the applicant’s assertion that the sales constitute commercial success. C.f. Ex parte Remark, 15 USPQ2d 1498, 1503 ([BPAI] 1990) (evidentiary routine of shifting burdens in civil proceedings inappropriate in ex parte prosecution proceedings because examiner has no available means for adducing evidence). Consequently, the PTO must rely upon the applicant to provide hard evidence of commercial success.","provenance":{"source_file":"s2145.html","source_anchor":"d0e212693","source_sha256":"b96dc12eb202283cd1a20f770746d04f6b9da85cb49f8aa6eb2fd17857081044"},"source_anchor":"d0e212693","host_section_id":"se_sg3joi2a","source_case_id":"cs_nwsngfnc"},{"id":"pb_bgeid7ru","node_type":"prose_block","corpus_id":"mpep-e9r01-2024-html","opaque_url":"https://mpep.io/n/pb_bgeid7ru","effective_range":{"start_revision":"R-01.2024","end_revision":null},"rendered_text_html":"<p id=\"d0e212712\"><i>In re Huang,</i> 100 F.3d 135, 139-40, 40 USPQ2d 1685, 1689 (Fed. Cir.\n                        1996). See also <i>GPAC,</i> 57 F.3d at 1580, 35 USPQ2d at 1121; <i>In re\n                           Paulsen,</i> 30 F.3d 1475, 1482, 31 USPQ2d 1671, 1676 (Fed. Cir. 1994) (Evidence\n                        of commercial success of articles not covered by the claims subject to the\n                        <b><a href=\"mpep-9015-appx-l.html#d0e302450\">35 U.S.C.\n                              103</a></b> rejection was not probative of nonobviousness.). Additionally,\n                        the evidence must be reasonably commensurate in scope with the claimed invention. See,\n                        e.g., <i>In re Kulling,</i> 897 F.2d 1147, 1149, 14 USPQ2d 1056, 1058 (Fed.\n                        Cir. 1990); <i>In re Grasselli,</i> 713 F.2d 731, 743, 218 USPQ 769, 777 (Fed.\n                        Cir. 1983). <i>In re Soni,</i> 54 F.3d 746, 34 USPQ2d 1684 (Fed. Cir. 1995)\n                        does not change this analysis. In <i>Soni,</i> the court declined to consider\n                        the Office’s argument that the evidence of nonobviousness was not commensurate in scope\n                        with the claim because it had not been raised by the examiner. <i>Id.</i> 54\n                        F.3d at 751, 34 USPQ2d at 1688. \n                     </p>","rendered_text_plain":"In re Huang, 100 F.3d 135, 139-40, 40 USPQ2d 1685, 1689 (Fed. Cir. 1996). See also GPAC, 57 F.3d at 1580, 35 USPQ2d at 1121; In re Paulsen, 30 F.3d 1475, 1482, 31 USPQ2d 1671, 1676 (Fed. Cir. 1994) (Evidence of commercial success of articles not covered by the claims subject to the 35 U.S.C. 103 rejection was not probative of nonobviousness.). Additionally, the evidence must be reasonably commensurate in scope with the claimed invention. See, e.g., In re Kulling, 897 F.2d 1147, 1149, 14 USPQ2d 1056, 1058 (Fed. Cir. 1990); In re Grasselli, 713 F.2d 731, 743, 218 USPQ 769, 777 (Fed. Cir. 1983). In re Soni, 54 F.3d 746, 34 USPQ2d 1684 (Fed. Cir. 1995) does not change this analysis. In Soni, the court declined to consider the Office’s argument that the evidence of nonobviousness was not commensurate in scope with the claim because it had not been raised by the examiner. Id. 54 F.3d at 751, 34 USPQ2d at 1688.","provenance":{"source_file":"s2145.html","source_anchor":"d0e212712","source_sha256":"b96dc12eb202283cd1a20f770746d04f6b9da85cb49f8aa6eb2fd17857081044"},"kind":"narrative","host_section_id":"se_sg3joi2a"},{"id":"cs_53kh6kxy","node_type":"case","corpus_id":"mpep-e9r01-2024-html","opaque_url":"https://mpep.io/n/cs_53kh6kxy","effective_range":{"start_revision":"R-01.2024","end_revision":null},"rendered_text_html":"","rendered_text_plain":"In re Paulsen, 30 F.3d 1475 (1994)","provenance":{"source_file":"s2145.html","source_anchor":"","source_sha256":"b96dc12eb202283cd1a20f770746d04f6b9da85cb49f8aa6eb2fd17857081044"},"short_name":"In re Paulsen","all_citations":["30 F.3d 1475","31 USPQ2d 1671"],"canonical_citation":"In re Paulsen, 30 F.3d 1475, 31 USPQ2d 1671 (1994)","decision_year":1994,"court":"Fed. Cir."},{"id":"cs_mdkulu5w","node_type":"case","corpus_id":"mpep-e9r01-2024-html","opaque_url":"https://mpep.io/n/cs_mdkulu5w","effective_range":{"start_revision":"R-01.2024","end_revision":null},"rendered_text_html":"","rendered_text_plain":"In re Kulling, 897 F.2d 1147 (1990)","provenance":{"source_file":"s2145.html","source_anchor":"","source_sha256":"b96dc12eb202283cd1a20f770746d04f6b9da85cb49f8aa6eb2fd17857081044"},"short_name":"In re Kulling","all_citations":["897 F.2d 1147","14 USPQ2d 1056"],"canonical_citation":"In re Kulling, 897 F.2d 1147, 14 USPQ2d 1056 (1990)","decision_year":1990,"court":"Fed. Cir."},{"id":"cs_c7byyf7l","node_type":"case","corpus_id":"mpep-e9r01-2024-html","opaque_url":"https://mpep.io/n/cs_c7byyf7l","effective_range":{"start_revision":"R-01.2024","end_revision":null},"rendered_text_html":"","rendered_text_plain":"In re Grasselli, 713 F.2d 731 (1983)","provenance":{"source_file":"s2145.html","source_anchor":"","source_sha256":"b96dc12eb202283cd1a20f770746d04f6b9da85cb49f8aa6eb2fd17857081044"},"short_name":"In re Grasselli","all_citations":["713 F.2d 731","218 USPQ 769"],"canonical_citation":"In re Grasselli, 713 F.2d 731, 218 USPQ 769 (1983)","decision_year":1983,"court":"Fed. Cir."},{"id":"pb_tej5lw6w","node_type":"prose_block","corpus_id":"mpep-e9r01-2024-html","opaque_url":"https://mpep.io/n/pb_tej5lw6w","effective_range":{"start_revision":"R-01.2024","end_revision":null},"rendered_text_html":"<p id=\"ch2100_p_35bcf_16e09_3b7\">In other words, in order for evidence of secondary\n                        considerations to be accorded substantial weight, there must be a nexus, i.e., a legally\n                        and factually sufficient connection or correspondence between the submitted evidence and\n                        the claimed invention. <i>Fox Factory, Inc. v. SRAM, LLC,</i> 944 F.3d 1366,\n                        1373, 2019 USPQ2d 483355 (Fed. Cir. 2019), cert. denied, 141 S.Ct. 373 (2020). “A\n                        presumption of nexus requires both that the product embodies the invention and is\n                        coextensive with it.” <i>Volvo Penta of the Americas, LLC v. Brunswick\n                           Corp.,</i> 81 F.4th 1202,1211-12, 2023 USPQ2d 1000 (Fed. Cir. 2023) (While Volvo\n                        Penta provided insufficient evidence to show a presumption of nexus, they did provide\n                        sufficient evidence to show nexus, independent of the presumption, through evidence of\n                        commercial success and copying due to the unique features of the claimed invention.). See\n                        <b><a href=\"s716.html#d0e92626\">MPEP §\n                              716.01(b)</a></b>.\n                     </p>","rendered_text_plain":"In other words, in order for evidence of secondary considerations to be accorded substantial weight, there must be a nexus, i.e., a legally and factually sufficient connection or correspondence between the submitted evidence and the claimed invention. Fox Factory, Inc. v. SRAM, LLC, 944 F.3d 1366, 1373, 2019 USPQ2d 483355 (Fed. Cir. 2019), cert. denied, 141 S.Ct. 373 (2020). “A presumption of nexus requires both that the product embodies the invention and is coextensive with it.” Volvo Penta of the Americas, LLC v. Brunswick Corp., 81 F.4th 1202,1211-12, 2023 USPQ2d 1000 (Fed. Cir. 2023) (While Volvo Penta provided insufficient evidence to show a presumption of nexus, they did provide sufficient evidence to show nexus, independent of the presumption, through evidence of commercial success and copying due to the unique features of the claimed invention.). See MPEP § 716.01(b).","provenance":{"source_file":"s2145.html","source_anchor":"ch2100_p_35bcf_16e09_3b7","source_sha256":"b96dc12eb202283cd1a20f770746d04f6b9da85cb49f8aa6eb2fd17857081044"},"kind":"narrative","host_section_id":"se_sg3joi2a"},{"id":"cs_jhecabc5","node_type":"case","corpus_id":"mpep-e9r01-2024-html","opaque_url":"https://mpep.io/n/cs_jhecabc5","effective_range":{"start_revision":"R-01.2024","end_revision":null},"rendered_text_html":"","rendered_text_plain":"Fox Factory, Inc. v. SRAM, LLC, 944 F.3d 1366 (2019)","provenance":{"source_file":"s2145.html","source_anchor":"","source_sha256":"b96dc12eb202283cd1a20f770746d04f6b9da85cb49f8aa6eb2fd17857081044"},"short_name":"Fox Factory, Inc. v. SRAM, LLC","all_citations":["944 F.3d 1366","2019 USPQ2d 483355"],"canonical_citation":"Fox Factory, Inc. v. SRAM, LLC, 944 F.3d 1366, 2019 USPQ2d 483355 (2019)","decision_year":2019,"court":"Fed. Cir."},{"id":"cs_t6sarnoj","node_type":"case","corpus_id":"mpep-e9r01-2024-html","opaque_url":"https://mpep.io/n/cs_t6sarnoj","effective_range":{"start_revision":"R-01.2024","end_revision":null},"rendered_text_html":"","rendered_text_plain":"Volvo Penta of the Americas, LLC v. Brunswick Corp., 81 F.4th 1202 (2023)","provenance":{"source_file":"s2145.html","source_anchor":"","source_sha256":"b96dc12eb202283cd1a20f770746d04f6b9da85cb49f8aa6eb2fd17857081044"},"short_name":"Volvo Penta of the Americas, LLC v. Brunswick Corp.","all_citations":["81 F.4th 1202","2023 USPQ2d 1000"],"canonical_citation":"Volvo Penta of the Americas, LLC v. Brunswick Corp., 81 F.4th 1202, 2023 USPQ2d 1000 (2023)","decision_year":2023,"court":"Fed. Cir."},{"id":"pb_bo6dic46","node_type":"prose_block","corpus_id":"mpep-e9r01-2024-html","opaque_url":"https://mpep.io/n/pb_bo6dic46","effective_range":{"start_revision":"R-01.2024","end_revision":null},"rendered_text_html":"<p id=\"d0e212738\">When considering whether proffered evidence is commensurate in scope with\n                        the claimed invention, Office personnel should not require the applicant to show\n                        unexpected&nbsp;results over the entire range of properties possessed&nbsp;by&nbsp;a&nbsp;chemical compound or\n                        composition. See, e.g., <i>In re Chupp,</i> 816 F.2d 643, 646, 2&nbsp;USPQ2d 1437,\n                        1439 (Fed. Cir. 1987). Evidence that the compound or composition possesses superior and\n                        unexpected properties in one of a spectrum of common properties can be sufficient to rebut\n                        a <i>prima facie</i> case of obviousness. <i>Id.</i></p>","rendered_text_plain":"When considering whether proffered evidence is commensurate in scope with the claimed invention, Office personnel should not require the applicant to show unexpected results over the entire range of properties possessed by a chemical compound or composition. See, e.g., In re Chupp, 816 F.2d 643, 646, 2 USPQ2d 1437, 1439 (Fed. Cir. 1987). Evidence that the compound or composition possesses superior and unexpected properties in one of a spectrum of common properties can be sufficient to rebut a prima facie case of obviousness. Id.","provenance":{"source_file":"s2145.html","source_anchor":"d0e212738","source_sha256":"b96dc12eb202283cd1a20f770746d04f6b9da85cb49f8aa6eb2fd17857081044"},"kind":"narrative","host_section_id":"se_sg3joi2a"},{"id":"cs_e7tbx4k4","node_type":"case","corpus_id":"mpep-e9r01-2024-html","opaque_url":"https://mpep.io/n/cs_e7tbx4k4","effective_range":{"start_revision":"R-01.2024","end_revision":null},"rendered_text_html":"","rendered_text_plain":"In re Chupp, 816 F.2d 643 (1987)","provenance":{"source_file":"s2145.html","source_anchor":"","source_sha256":"b96dc12eb202283cd1a20f770746d04f6b9da85cb49f8aa6eb2fd17857081044"},"short_name":"In re Chupp","all_citations":["816 F.2d 643","2 USPQ2d 1437"],"canonical_citation":"In re Chupp, 816 F.2d 643, 2 USPQ2d 1437 (1987)","decision_year":1987,"court":"Fed. Cir."},{"id":"pb_unbml2ic","node_type":"prose_block","corpus_id":"mpep-e9r01-2024-html","opaque_url":"https://mpep.io/n/pb_unbml2ic","effective_range":{"start_revision":"R-01.2024","end_revision":null},"rendered_text_html":"<p id=\"d0e212750\">For example, a showing of unexpected results for a single member of a\n                        claimed subgenus, or a narrow portion of a claimed range would be sufficient to rebut a\n                        <i>prima facie</i> case of obviousness if a skilled artisan “could ascertain\n                        a trend in the exemplified data that would allow him to reasonably extend the probative\n                        value thereof.” <i>In re Clemens,</i> 622 F.2d 1029, 1036, 206 USPQ 289, 296\n                        (CCPA 1980) (Evidence of the nonobviousness of a broad range can be proven by a narrower\n                        range when one skilled in the art could ascertain a trend that would allow him to\n                        reasonably extend the probative value thereof.). But see, <i>Grasselli,</i> 713\n                        F.2d at 743, 218 USPQ at 778 (evidence of superior properties for sodium containing\n                        composition insufficient to establish the non-obviousness of broad claims for a catalyst\n                        with “an alkali metal” where it was well known in the catalyst art that different alkali\n                        metals were not interchangeable and applicant had shown unexpected results only for sodium\n                        containing materials); <i>In re Greenfield,</i> 571 F.2d 1185, 1189, 197 USPQ\n                        227, 230 (CCPA 1978) (evidence of superior properties in one species insufficient to\n                        establish the nonobviousness of a subgenus containing hundreds of compounds); <i>In\n                           re Lindner,</i> 457 F.2d 506, 508, 173 USPQ 356, 358 (CCPA 1972) (one test not\n                        sufficient where there was no adequate basis for concluding the other claimed compounds\n                        would behave the same way). However, an exemplary showing may be sufficient to establish a\n                        reasonable correlation between the showing and the entire scope of the claim, when viewed\n                        by a skilled artisan. See, e.g., <i>Chupp,</i> 816 F.2d at 646, 2 USPQ2d at\n                        1439; <i>Clemens,</i> 622 F.2d at 1036, 206 USPQ at 296. On the other hand,\n                        evidence of an unexpected property may not be sufficient regardless of the scope of the\n                        showing. Usually, a showing of unexpected results is sufficient to overcome a\n                        <i>prima facie </i>case of obviousness. See, e.g., <i>In re\n                           Albrecht,</i> 514 F.2d 1389, 1396, 185 USPQ 585, 590 (CCPA 1975). However, where\n                        the claims are not limited to a particular use, and where the prior art provides other\n                        motivation to select a particular species or subgenus, a showing of a new use alone may not\n                        be sufficient to confer patentability. See <i>Dillon,</i> 919 F.2d at 692, 16\n                        USPQ2d at 1900-01. Accordingly, each case should be evaluated individually based on the\n                        totality of the circumstances. \n                     </p>","rendered_text_plain":"For example, a showing of unexpected results for a single member of a claimed subgenus, or a narrow portion of a claimed range would be sufficient to rebut a prima facie case of obviousness if a skilled artisan “could ascertain a trend in the exemplified data that would allow him to reasonably extend the probative value thereof.” In re Clemens, 622 F.2d 1029, 1036, 206 USPQ 289, 296 (CCPA 1980) (Evidence of the nonobviousness of a broad range can be proven by a narrower range when one skilled in the art could ascertain a trend that would allow him to reasonably extend the probative value thereof.). But see, Grasselli, 713 F.2d at 743, 218 USPQ at 778 (evidence of superior properties for sodium containing composition insufficient to establish the non-obviousness of broad claims for a catalyst with “an alkali metal” where it was well known in the catalyst art that different alkali metals were not interchangeable and applicant had shown unexpected results only for sodium containing materials); In re Greenfield, 571 F.2d 1185, 1189, 197 USPQ 227, 230 (CCPA 1978) (evidence of superior properties in one species insufficient to establish the nonobviousness of a subgenus containing hundreds of compounds); In re Lindner, 457 F.2d 506, 508, 173 USPQ 356, 358 (CCPA 1972) (one test not sufficient where there was no adequate basis for concluding the other claimed compounds would behave the same way). However, an exemplary showing may be sufficient to establish a reasonable correlation between the showing and the entire scope of the claim, when viewed by a skilled artisan. See, e.g., Chupp, 816 F.2d at 646, 2 USPQ2d at 1439; Clemens, 622 F.2d at 1036, 206 USPQ at 296. On the other hand, evidence of an unexpected property may not be sufficient regardless of the scope of the showing. Usually, a showing of unexpected results is sufficient to overcome a prima facie case of obviousness. See, e.g., In re Albrecht, 514 F.2d 1389, 1396, 185 USPQ 585, 590 (CCPA 1975). However, where the claims are not limited to a particular use, and where the prior art provides other motivation to select a particular species or subgenus, a showing of a new use alone may not be sufficient to confer patentability. See Dillon, 919 F.2d at 692, 16 USPQ2d at 1900-01. Accordingly, each case should be evaluated individually based on the totality of the circumstances.","provenance":{"source_file":"s2145.html","source_anchor":"d0e212750","source_sha256":"b96dc12eb202283cd1a20f770746d04f6b9da85cb49f8aa6eb2fd17857081044"},"kind":"narrative","host_section_id":"se_sg3joi2a"},{"id":"cs_qkmulq5e","node_type":"case","corpus_id":"mpep-e9r01-2024-html","opaque_url":"https://mpep.io/n/cs_qkmulq5e","effective_range":{"start_revision":"R-01.2024","end_revision":null},"rendered_text_html":"","rendered_text_plain":"In re Clemens, 622 F.2d 1029 (1980)","provenance":{"source_file":"s2145.html","source_anchor":"","source_sha256":"b96dc12eb202283cd1a20f770746d04f6b9da85cb49f8aa6eb2fd17857081044"},"short_name":"In re Clemens","all_citations":["622 F.2d 1029","206 USPQ 289"],"canonical_citation":"In re Clemens, 622 F.2d 1029, 206 USPQ 289 (1980)","decision_year":1980,"court":"CCPA"},{"id":"cs_uuu4xjag","node_type":"case","corpus_id":"mpep-e9r01-2024-html","opaque_url":"https://mpep.io/n/cs_uuu4xjag","effective_range":{"start_revision":"R-01.2024","end_revision":null},"rendered_text_html":"","rendered_text_plain":"In re Greenfield, 571 F.2d 1185 (1978)","provenance":{"source_file":"s2145.html","source_anchor":"","source_sha256":"b96dc12eb202283cd1a20f770746d04f6b9da85cb49f8aa6eb2fd17857081044"},"short_name":"In re Greenfield","all_citations":["571 F.2d 1185","197 USPQ 227"],"canonical_citation":"In re Greenfield, 571 F.2d 1185, 197 USPQ 227 (1978)","decision_year":1978,"court":"CCPA"},{"id":"cs_l2b7tnna","node_type":"case","corpus_id":"mpep-e9r01-2024-html","opaque_url":"https://mpep.io/n/cs_l2b7tnna","effective_range":{"start_revision":"R-01.2024","end_revision":null},"rendered_text_html":"","rendered_text_plain":"In re Lindner, 457 F.2d 506 (1972)","provenance":{"source_file":"s2145.html","source_anchor":"","source_sha256":"b96dc12eb202283cd1a20f770746d04f6b9da85cb49f8aa6eb2fd17857081044"},"short_name":"In re Lindner","all_citations":["457 F.2d 506","173 USPQ 356"],"canonical_citation":"In re Lindner, 457 F.2d 506, 173 USPQ 356 (1972)","decision_year":1972,"court":"CCPA"},{"id":"cs_jqkoaybe","node_type":"case","corpus_id":"mpep-e9r01-2024-html","opaque_url":"https://mpep.io/n/cs_jqkoaybe","effective_range":{"start_revision":"R-01.2024","end_revision":null},"rendered_text_html":"","rendered_text_plain":"In re Albrecht, 514 F.2d 1389 (1975)","provenance":{"source_file":"s2145.html","source_anchor":"","source_sha256":"b96dc12eb202283cd1a20f770746d04f6b9da85cb49f8aa6eb2fd17857081044"},"short_name":"In re Albrecht","all_citations":["514 F.2d 1389","185 USPQ 585"],"canonical_citation":"In re Albrecht, 514 F.2d 1389, 185 USPQ 585 (1975)","decision_year":1975,"court":"CCPA"},{"id":"pb_33qtw4yh","node_type":"prose_block","corpus_id":"mpep-e9r01-2024-html","opaque_url":"https://mpep.io/n/pb_33qtw4yh","effective_range":{"start_revision":"R-01.2024","end_revision":null},"rendered_text_html":"<p id=\"d0e212783\"> Evidence pertaining to secondary considerations must be taken into\n                        account whenever it has been properly presented; however, it does not necessarily control\n                        the obviousness conclusion. See, e.g., <i>Pfizer, Inc. v. Apotex, Inc.,</i> 480\n                        F.3d 1348, 1372, 82 USPQ2d 1321, 1339 (Fed. Cir. 2007) (“the record establish[ed] such a\n                        strong case of obviousness” that allegedly unexpectedly superior results were ultimately\n                        insufficient to overcome obviousness conclusion); <i>Leapfrog Enterprises Inc. v.\n                           Fisher-Price Inc.,</i> 485 F.3d 1157, 1162, 82 USPQ2d 1687, 1692 (Fed. Cir. 2007)\n                        (“given the strength of the <i>prima facie</i> obviousness showing, the\n                        evidence on secondary considerations was inadequate to overcome a final conclusion” of\n                        obviousness); and <i>Newell Cos., Inc. v. Kenney Mfg. Co.,</i> 864 F.2d 757,\n                        768, 9 USPQ2d 1417, 1426 (Fed. Cir. 1988). Office personnel should not evaluate rebuttal\n                        evidence for its “knockdown” value against the <i>prima facie</i> case,\n                        <i>Piasecki,</i> 745 F.2d at 1473, 223 USPQ at 788, or summarily dismiss it\n                        as not compelling or insufficient. Office personnel should weigh all relevant evidence of\n                        record in order to determine whether the claims would have been obvious based on a\n                        preponderance (more likely than not) standard, and then explain their conclusions. See\n                        <b><a href=\"s716.html#d0e92085\">MPEP §\n                              716</a></b> - <b><a href=\"s716.html#d0e93797\">§ 716.10</a></b> for additional information\n                        pertaining to the evaluation of rebuttal evidence submitted under <b><a href=\"mpep-9020-appx-r.html#d0e323552\">37 CFR 1.132</a></b>.\n                     </p>","rendered_text_plain":"Evidence pertaining to secondary considerations must be taken into account whenever it has been properly presented; however, it does not necessarily control the obviousness conclusion. See, e.g., Pfizer, Inc. v. Apotex, Inc., 480 F.3d 1348, 1372, 82 USPQ2d 1321, 1339 (Fed. Cir. 2007) (“the record establish[ed] such a strong case of obviousness” that allegedly unexpectedly superior results were ultimately insufficient to overcome obviousness conclusion); Leapfrog Enterprises Inc. v. Fisher-Price Inc., 485 F.3d 1157, 1162, 82 USPQ2d 1687, 1692 (Fed. Cir. 2007) (“given the strength of the prima facie obviousness showing, the evidence on secondary considerations was inadequate to overcome a final conclusion” of obviousness); and Newell Cos., Inc. v. Kenney Mfg. Co., 864 F.2d 757, 768, 9 USPQ2d 1417, 1426 (Fed. Cir. 1988). Office personnel should not evaluate rebuttal evidence for its “knockdown” value against the prima facie case, Piasecki, 745 F.2d at 1473, 223 USPQ at 788, or summarily dismiss it as not compelling or insufficient. Office personnel should weigh all relevant evidence of record in order to determine whether the claims would have been obvious based on a preponderance (more likely than not) standard, and then explain their conclusions. See MPEP § 716 - § 716.10 for additional information pertaining to the evaluation of rebuttal evidence submitted under 37 CFR 1.132.","provenance":{"source_file":"s2145.html","source_anchor":"d0e212783","source_sha256":"b96dc12eb202283cd1a20f770746d04f6b9da85cb49f8aa6eb2fd17857081044"},"kind":"narrative","host_section_id":"se_sg3joi2a"},{"id":"cs_5kw4tb7d","node_type":"case","corpus_id":"mpep-e9r01-2024-html","opaque_url":"https://mpep.io/n/cs_5kw4tb7d","effective_range":{"start_revision":"R-01.2024","end_revision":null},"rendered_text_html":"","rendered_text_plain":"Pfizer, Inc. v. Apotex, Inc., 480 F.3d 1348 (2007)","provenance":{"source_file":"s2145.html","source_anchor":"","source_sha256":"b96dc12eb202283cd1a20f770746d04f6b9da85cb49f8aa6eb2fd17857081044"},"short_name":"Pfizer, Inc. v. Apotex, Inc.","all_citations":["480 F.3d 1348","82 USPQ2d 1321"],"canonical_citation":"Pfizer, Inc. v. Apotex, Inc., 480 F.3d 1348, 82 USPQ2d 1321 (2007)","decision_year":2007,"court":"Fed. Cir."},{"id":"cs_uamcs5bq","node_type":"case","corpus_id":"mpep-e9r01-2024-html","opaque_url":"https://mpep.io/n/cs_uamcs5bq","effective_range":{"start_revision":"R-01.2024","end_revision":null},"rendered_text_html":"","rendered_text_plain":"Leapfrog Enterprises Inc. v. Fisher-Price Inc., 485 F.3d 1157 (2007)","provenance":{"source_file":"s2145.html","source_anchor":"","source_sha256":"b96dc12eb202283cd1a20f770746d04f6b9da85cb49f8aa6eb2fd17857081044"},"short_name":"Leapfrog Enterprises Inc. v. Fisher-Price Inc.","all_citations":["485 F.3d 1157","82 USPQ2d 1687"],"canonical_citation":"Leapfrog Enterprises Inc. v. Fisher-Price Inc., 485 F.3d 1157, 82 USPQ2d 1687 (2007)","decision_year":2007,"court":"Fed. Cir."},{"id":"cs_6qquo6cy","node_type":"case","corpus_id":"mpep-e9r01-2024-html","opaque_url":"https://mpep.io/n/cs_6qquo6cy","effective_range":{"start_revision":"R-01.2024","end_revision":null},"rendered_text_html":"","rendered_text_plain":"Newell Cos., Inc. v. Kenney Mfg. Co., 864 F.2d 757 (1988)","provenance":{"source_file":"s2145.html","source_anchor":"","source_sha256":"b96dc12eb202283cd1a20f770746d04f6b9da85cb49f8aa6eb2fd17857081044"},"short_name":"Newell Cos., Inc. v. Kenney Mfg. Co.","all_citations":["864 F.2d 757","9 USPQ2d 1417"],"canonical_citation":"Newell Cos., Inc. v. Kenney Mfg. Co., 864 F.2d 757, 9 USPQ2d 1417 (1988)","decision_year":1988,"court":"Fed. Cir."},{"id":"pb_ljvt2i5l","node_type":"prose_block","corpus_id":"mpep-e9r01-2024-html","opaque_url":"https://mpep.io/n/pb_ljvt2i5l","effective_range":{"start_revision":"R-01.2024","end_revision":null},"rendered_text_html":"<p id=\"ch2100_d1b1a1_25500_dc\">The following cases exemplify the continued application of\n                        the principle that when evidence has been presented to rebut an obviousness rejection, it\n                        should not be evaluated simply for its “knockdown” value. Rather, all evidence must be\n                        reweighed to determine whether the claims are nonobvious.\n                     </p>","rendered_text_plain":"The following cases exemplify the continued application of the principle that when evidence has been presented to rebut an obviousness rejection, it should not be evaluated simply for its “knockdown” value. Rather, all evidence must be reweighed to determine whether the claims are nonobvious.","provenance":{"source_file":"s2145.html","source_anchor":"ch2100_d1b1a1_25500_dc","source_sha256":"b96dc12eb202283cd1a20f770746d04f6b9da85cb49f8aa6eb2fd17857081044"},"kind":"narrative","host_section_id":"se_sg3joi2a"},{"id":"we_v3uxf6pp","node_type":"worked_example","corpus_id":"mpep-e9r01-2024-html","opaque_url":"https://mpep.io/n/we_v3uxf6pp","effective_range":{"start_revision":"R-01.2024","end_revision":null},"rendered_text_html":"<div id=\"ch2100_d24bfd_17602_fb\" class=\"Example\"><b>Example 1:</b><p id=\"ch2100_d1b1a1_2554b_106\">The claims at issue in <i>PharmaStem Therapeutics,\n                              Inc. v. Viacell, Inc.,</i> 491 F.3d 1342, 83 USPQ2d 1289 (Fed. Cir. 2007), were\n                           directed to compositions comprising hematopoietic stem cells from umbilical cord or\n                           placental blood, and to methods of using such compositions for treatment of blood and\n                           immune system disorders. The composition claims required that the stem cells be present\n                           in an amount sufficient to effect hematopoietic reconstitution when administered to a\n                           human adult. The trial court had found that PharmaStem’s patents were infringed and not\n                           invalid on obviousness or other grounds. On appeal, the Federal Circuit reversed the\n                           district court, determining that the claims were invalid for obviousness. \n                        </p>\n                        <p id=\"ch2100_d1b1a1_25563_10d\">The Federal Circuit discussed the evidence presented at\n                           trial. It pointed out that the patentee, PharmaStem, had not invented an entirely new\n                           procedure or new composition. Rather, PharmaStem’s own specification acknowledged that\n                           it was already known in the prior art that umbilical cord and placental blood-based\n                           compositions contained hematopoietic stem cells, and that hematopoietic stem cells were\n                           useful for the purpose of hematopoietic reconstitution. PharmaStem’s contribution was to\n                           provide experimental proof that umbilical cord and placental blood could be used to\n                           effect hematopoietic reconstitution in mice. By extrapolation, one of ordinary skill in\n                           the art would have expected this reconstitution method to work in humans as well. \n                        </p>\n                        <p id=\"ch2100_d1b1a1_2556b_3aa\">The court rejected PharmaStem’s expert testimony that\n                           hematopoietic stem cells had not been proved to exist in cord blood prior to the\n                           experiments described in PharmaStem’s patents. The court explained that the expert\n                           testimony was contrary to the inventors’ admissions in the specification, as well as\n                           prior art teachings that disclosed stem cells in cord blood. In this case, PharmaStem’s\n                           evidence of nonobviousness was outweighed by contradictory evidence. \n                        </p>\n                        <p id=\"ch2100_d1b1a1_25572_2e5\">Despite PharmaStem’s useful experimental validation of\n                           hematopoietic reconstitution using hematopoietic stem cells from umbilical cord and\n                           placental blood, the Federal Circuit found that the claims at issue would have been\n                           obvious. There had been ample suggestion in the prior art that the claimed method would\n                           have worked. Absolute predictability is not a necessary prerequisite to a case of\n                           obviousness. Rather, a degree of predictability that one of ordinary skill would have\n                           found to be reasonable is sufficient. The Federal Circuit concluded that “[g]ood science\n                           and useful contributions do not necessarily result in patentability.”\n                           <i>Id.</i> at 1364, 83 USPQ2d at 1304.\n                        </p>\n                     </div>","rendered_text_plain":"Example 1:The claims at issue in PharmaStem Therapeutics, Inc. v. Viacell, Inc., 491 F.3d 1342, 83 USPQ2d 1289 (Fed. Cir. 2007), were directed to compositions comprising hematopoietic stem cells from umbilical cord or placental blood, and to methods of using such compositions for treatment of blood and immune system disorders. The composition claims required that the stem cells be present in an amount sufficient to effect hematopoietic reconstitution when administered to a human adult. The trial court had found that PharmaStem’s patents were infringed and not invalid on obviousness or other grounds. On appeal, the Federal Circuit reversed the district court, determining that the claims were invalid for obviousness. The Federal Circuit discussed the evidence presented at trial. It pointed out that the patentee, PharmaStem, had not invented an entirely new procedure or new composition. Rather, PharmaStem’s own specification acknowledged that it was already known in the prior art that umbilical cord and placental blood-based compositions contained hematopoietic stem cells, and that hematopoietic stem cells were useful for the purpose of hematopoietic reconstitution. PharmaStem’s contribution was to provide experimental proof that umbilical cord and placental blood could be used to effect hematopoietic reconstitution in mice. By extrapolation, one of ordinary skill in the art would have expected this reconstitution method to work in humans as well. The court rejected PharmaStem’s expert testimony that hematopoietic stem cells had not been proved to exist in cord blood prior to the experiments described in PharmaStem’s patents. The court explained that the expert testimony was contrary to the inventors’ admissions in the specification, as well as prior art teachings that disclosed stem cells in cord blood. In this case, PharmaStem’s evidence of nonobviousness was outweighed by contradictory evidence. Despite PharmaStem’s useful experimental validation of hematopoietic reconstitution using hematopoietic stem cells from umbilical cord and placental blood, the Federal Circuit found that the claims at issue would have been obvious. There had been ample suggestion in the prior art that the claimed method would have worked. Absolute predictability is not a necessary prerequisite to a case of obviousness. Rather, a degree of predictability that one of ordinary skill would have found to be reasonable is sufficient. The Federal Circuit concluded that “[g]ood science and useful contributions do not necessarily result in patentability.” Id. at 1364, 83 USPQ2d at 1304.","provenance":{"source_file":"s2145.html","source_anchor":"ch2100_d24bfd_17602_fb","source_sha256":"b96dc12eb202283cd1a20f770746d04f6b9da85cb49f8aa6eb2fd17857081044"},"example_number":1,"example_type":"obviousness","host_section_id":"se_sg3joi2a"},{"id":"cs_tv5ncbuo","node_type":"case","corpus_id":"mpep-e9r01-2024-html","opaque_url":"https://mpep.io/n/cs_tv5ncbuo","effective_range":{"start_revision":"R-01.2024","end_revision":null},"rendered_text_html":"","rendered_text_plain":"PharmaStem Therapeutics, Inc. v. Viacell, Inc., 491 F.3d 1342 (2007)","provenance":{"source_file":"s2145.html","source_anchor":"","source_sha256":"b96dc12eb202283cd1a20f770746d04f6b9da85cb49f8aa6eb2fd17857081044"},"short_name":"PharmaStem Therapeutics, Inc. v. Viacell, Inc.","all_citations":["491 F.3d 1342","83 USPQ2d 1289"],"canonical_citation":"PharmaStem Therapeutics, Inc. v. Viacell, Inc., 491 F.3d 1342, 83 USPQ2d 1289 (2007)","decision_year":2007,"court":"Fed. Cir."},{"id":"we_xihnwtzm","node_type":"worked_example","corpus_id":"mpep-e9r01-2024-html","opaque_url":"https://mpep.io/n/we_xihnwtzm","effective_range":{"start_revision":"R-01.2024","end_revision":null},"rendered_text_html":"<div id=\"ch2100_d24bfd_1760d_1b\" class=\"Example\"><b>Example 2:</b><p id=\"ch2100_d1b1a1_25578_55\">It was found to be an error in <i>In re\n                              Sullivan,</i> 498 F.3d 1345, 84 USPQ2d 1034 (Fed. Cir. 2007), for the Board to\n                           fail to consider evidence submitted to rebut a <i>prima facie</i> case of\n                           obviousness. \n                        </p>\n                        <p id=\"ch2100_d1b1a1_255b0_c5\">The claimed invention was directed to an antivenom\n                           composition comprising F(ab) fragments used to treat venomous rattlesnake bites. The\n                           composition was created from antibody molecules that include three fragments, F(ab)2,\n                           F(ab) and F(c), which have separate properties and utilities. There had been\n                           commercially available antivenom products that consisted of whole antibodies and F(ab)2\n                           fragments, but researchers had not experimented with antivenoms containing only F(ab)\n                           fragments because it was believed that their unique properties would prevent them from\n                           decreasing the toxicity of snake venom. The inventor, Sullivan, discovered that F(ab)\n                           fragments are effective at neutralizing the lethality of rattlesnake venom, while\n                           reducing the occurrence of adverse immune reactions in humans. On appeal of the\n                           examiner’s rejection, the Board held that the claim was obvious because all the elements\n                           of the claimed composition were accounted for in the prior art, and that the composition\n                           taught by that prior art would have been expected by a person of ordinary skill in the\n                           art at the time the invention was made (the case was examined under <b><a href=\"mpep-9015-appx-l.html#d0e302450\">pre-AIA 35 U.S.C.\n                                 103</a></b>) to neutralize the lethality of the venom of a rattlesnake. \n                        </p>\n                        <p id=\"ch2100_d1b1a1_255ba_151\">Rebuttal evidence had not been considered by the Board\n                           because it considered the evidence to relate to the intended use of the claimed\n                           composition as an antivenom, rather than the composition itself. Appellant successfully\n                           argued that even if the Board had shown a <i>prima facie</i> case of\n                           obviousness, the extensive rebuttal evidence must be considered. The evidence included\n                           three expert declarations submitted to show that the prior art taught away from the\n                           claimed invention, an unexpected property or result from the use of F(ab) fragment\n                           antivenom, and why those having ordinary skill in the art expected antivenoms comprising\n                           F(ab) fragments to fail. The declarations related to more than the use of the claimed\n                           composition. While a statement of intended use may not render a known composition\n                           patentable, the claimed composition was not known, and whether it would have been\n                           obvious depends upon consideration of the rebuttal evidence. Appellant did not concede\n                           that the only distinguishing factor of its composition is the statement of intended use\n                           and extensively argued that its claimed composition exhibits the unexpected property of\n                           neutralizing the lethality of rattlesnake venom while reducing the occurrence of adverse\n                           immune reactions in humans. The Federal Circuit found that such a use and unexpected\n                           property cannot be ignored – the unexpected property is relevant and thus the\n                           declarations describing it should have been considered. \n                        </p>\n                        <p id=\"ch2100_d1b1a1_255c0_257\">Nonobviousness can be shown when a person of ordinary\n                           skill in the art would not have reasonably predicted the claimed invention based on the\n                           prior art, and the resulting invention would not have been expected. All evidence must\n                           be considered when properly presented. \n                        </p>\n                     </div>","rendered_text_plain":"Example 2:It was found to be an error in In re Sullivan, 498 F.3d 1345, 84 USPQ2d 1034 (Fed. Cir. 2007), for the Board to fail to consider evidence submitted to rebut a prima facie case of obviousness. The claimed invention was directed to an antivenom composition comprising F(ab) fragments used to treat venomous rattlesnake bites. The composition was created from antibody molecules that include three fragments, F(ab)2, F(ab) and F(c), which have separate properties and utilities. There had been commercially available antivenom products that consisted of whole antibodies and F(ab)2 fragments, but researchers had not experimented with antivenoms containing only F(ab) fragments because it was believed that their unique properties would prevent them from decreasing the toxicity of snake venom. The inventor, Sullivan, discovered that F(ab) fragments are effective at neutralizing the lethality of rattlesnake venom, while reducing the occurrence of adverse immune reactions in humans. On appeal of the examiner’s rejection, the Board held that the claim was obvious because all the elements of the claimed composition were accounted for in the prior art, and that the composition taught by that prior art would have been expected by a person of ordinary skill in the art at the time the invention was made (the case was examined under pre-AIA 35 U.S.C. 103) to neutralize the lethality of the venom of a rattlesnake. Rebuttal evidence had not been considered by the Board because it considered the evidence to relate to the intended use of the claimed composition as an antivenom, rather than the composition itself. Appellant successfully argued that even if the Board had shown a prima facie case of obviousness, the extensive rebuttal evidence must be considered. The evidence included three expert declarations submitted to show that the prior art taught away from the claimed invention, an unexpected property or result from the use of F(ab) fragment antivenom, and why those having ordinary skill in the art expected antivenoms comprising F(ab) fragments to fail. The declarations related to more than the use of the claimed composition. While a statement of intended use may not render a known composition patentable, the claimed composition was not known, and whether it would have been obvious depends upon consideration of the rebuttal evidence. Appellant did not concede that the only distinguishing factor of its composition is the statement of intended use and extensively argued that its claimed composition exhibits the unexpected property of neutralizing the lethality of rattlesnake venom while reducing the occurrence of adverse immune reactions in humans. The Federal Circuit found that such a use and unexpected property cannot be ignored – the unexpected property is relevant and thus the declarations describing it should have been considered. Nonobviousness can be shown when a person of ordinary skill in the art would not have reasonably predicted the claimed invention based on the prior art, and the resulting invention would not have been expected. All evidence must be considered when properly presented.","provenance":{"source_file":"s2145.html","source_anchor":"ch2100_d24bfd_1760d_1b","source_sha256":"b96dc12eb202283cd1a20f770746d04f6b9da85cb49f8aa6eb2fd17857081044"},"example_number":2,"example_type":"obviousness","host_section_id":"se_sg3joi2a"},{"id":"cs_45nidl6b","node_type":"case","corpus_id":"mpep-e9r01-2024-html","opaque_url":"https://mpep.io/n/cs_45nidl6b","effective_range":{"start_revision":"R-01.2024","end_revision":null},"rendered_text_html":"","rendered_text_plain":"In re Sullivan, 498 F.3d 1345 (2007)","provenance":{"source_file":"s2145.html","source_anchor":"","source_sha256":"b96dc12eb202283cd1a20f770746d04f6b9da85cb49f8aa6eb2fd17857081044"},"short_name":"In re Sullivan","all_citations":["498 F.3d 1345","84 USPQ2d 1034"],"canonical_citation":"In re Sullivan, 498 F.3d 1345, 84 USPQ2d 1034 (2007)","decision_year":2007,"court":"Fed. Cir."},{"id":"we_j36ahkpp","node_type":"worked_example","corpus_id":"mpep-e9r01-2024-html","opaque_url":"https://mpep.io/n/we_j36ahkpp","effective_range":{"start_revision":"R-01.2024","end_revision":null},"rendered_text_html":"<div id=\"ch2100_d24bfd_17641_294\" class=\"Example\"><b>Example 3: </b><p id=\"ch2100_d1b1a1_255c7_b6\">The case of <i>Hearing Components, Inc. v. Shure\n                              Inc.,</i> 600 F.3d 1357, 94 USPQ2d 1385 (Fed. Cir. 2010), involved a disposable\n                           protective covering for the portion of a hearing aid that is inserted into the ear\n                           canal. The covering was such that it could be readily replaced by a user as needed. \n                        </p>\n                        <p id=\"ch2100_d1b1a1_255d8_36c\">At the district court, Shure had argued that Hearing\n                           Components’ patents were obvious over one or more of three different combinations of\n                           prior art references. The jury disagreed, and determined that the claims were\n                           nonobvious. The district court upheld the jury verdict, stating that in view of the\n                           conflicting evidence presented by the parties as to the teachings of the references,\n                           motivation to combine, and secondary considerations, the nonobviousness verdict was\n                           sufficiently grounded in the evidence. \n                        </p>\n                        <p id=\"ch2100_d1b1a1_255de_2f0\">Shure appealed to the Federal Circuit, but the Federal\n                           Circuit agreed with the district court that the jury’s nonobviousness verdict had been\n                           supported by substantial evidence. Although Shure had argued before the jury that the\n                           Carlisle reference taught an ear piece positioned inside the ear canal, Hearing\n                           Components’ credible witness countered that only the molded duct and not the ear piece\n                           itself was taught by Carlisle as being inside the ear canal. On the issue of combining\n                           references, Shure’s witness had given testimony described as “rather sparse, and lacking\n                           in specific details.” <i>Id.</i> at 1364, 94 USPQ2d at 1397. In\n                           contradistinction, Hearing Components’ witness “described particular reasons why one\n                           skilled in the art would not have been motivated to combine the references.”\n                           <i>Id.</i> Finally, as to secondary considerations, the Federal Circuit\n                           determined that Hearing Components had shown a nexus between the commercial success of\n                           its product and the patent by providing evidence that “the licensing fee for a covered\n                           product was more than cut in half immediately upon expiration” of the patent. \n                        </p>\n                        <p id=\"ch2100_d1b1a1_25613_213\">Although the <i>Hearing Components</i> case\n                           involves substantial evidence of nonobviousness in a jury verdict, it is nevertheless\n                           instructive for Office personnel on the matter of weighing evidence. Office personnel\n                           routinely must consider evidence in the form of prior art references, statements in the\n                           specification, or declarations under <b><a href=\"mpep-9020-appx-r.html#d0e323465\">37 CFR 1.130</a></b> (for cases examined\n                           under the <b><a href=\"mpep-9015-appx-l.html#al_d1fbe1_234ed_52\">AIA\n                                 35 U.S.C. 102</a></b> and <b><a href=\"mpep-9015-appx-l.html#al_d1fbe1_19797_b0\">103</a></b>), <b><a href=\"mpep-9020-appx-r.html#aia_d0e323504\">37 CFR 1.131</a></b>\n                           (for cases examined under <b><a href=\"mpep-9015-appx-l.html#d0e302383\">pre-AIA 35 U.S.C. 102</a></b> and\n                           <b><a href=\"mpep-9015-appx-l.html#d0e302450\">103</a></b>), or <b><a href=\"mpep-9020-appx-r.html#d0e323552\">1.132</a></b> (for cases examined either\n                           under the AIA or under pre-AIA law). Other forms of evidence may also be presented\n                           during prosecution. Office personnel are reminded that evidence that has been presented\n                           in a timely manner should not be ignored, but rather should be considered on the record.\n                           However, not all evidence need be accorded the same weight. In determining the relative\n                           weight to accord to rebuttal evidence, considerations such as whether a nexus exists\n                           between the claimed invention and the proffered evidence, and whether the evidence is\n                           commensurate in scope with the claimed invention, are appropriate. The mere presence of\n                           some credible rebuttal evidence does not dictate that an obviousness rejection must\n                           always be withdrawn. See <b><a href=\"s2145.html#d0e212553\">MPEP § 2145</a></b>. Office personnel must consider the appropriate\n                           weight to be accorded to each piece of evidence. An obviousness rejection should be made\n                           or maintained only if evidence of obviousness outweighs evidence of nonobviousness. See\n                           <b><a href=\"s706.html#d0e57969\">MPEP §\n                                 706</a></b>, subsection I. (“The standard to be applied in all cases\n                           is the ‘preponderance of the evidence’ test. In other words, an examiner should reject a\n                           claim if, in view of the prior art and evidence of record, it is more likely than not\n                           that the claim is unpatentable.”). <b><a href=\"s716.html#d0e92769\">MPEP § 716.01(d)</a></b> provides further\n                           guidance on weighing evidence in making a determination of patentability. \n                        </p>\n                     </div>","rendered_text_plain":"Example 3: The case of Hearing Components, Inc. v. Shure Inc., 600 F.3d 1357, 94 USPQ2d 1385 (Fed. Cir. 2010), involved a disposable protective covering for the portion of a hearing aid that is inserted into the ear canal. The covering was such that it could be readily replaced by a user as needed. At the district court, Shure had argued that Hearing Components’ patents were obvious over one or more of three different combinations of prior art references. The jury disagreed, and determined that the claims were nonobvious. The district court upheld the jury verdict, stating that in view of the conflicting evidence presented by the parties as to the teachings of the references, motivation to combine, and secondary considerations, the nonobviousness verdict was sufficiently grounded in the evidence. Shure appealed to the Federal Circuit, but the Federal Circuit agreed with the district court that the jury’s nonobviousness verdict had been supported by substantial evidence. Although Shure had argued before the jury that the Carlisle reference taught an ear piece positioned inside the ear canal, Hearing Components’ credible witness countered that only the molded duct and not the ear piece itself was taught by Carlisle as being inside the ear canal. On the issue of combining references, Shure’s witness had given testimony described as “rather sparse, and lacking in specific details.” Id. at 1364, 94 USPQ2d at 1397. In contradistinction, Hearing Components’ witness “described particular reasons why one skilled in the art would not have been motivated to combine the references.” Id. Finally, as to secondary considerations, the Federal Circuit determined that Hearing Components had shown a nexus between the commercial success of its product and the patent by providing evidence that “the licensing fee for a covered product was more than cut in half immediately upon expiration” of the patent. Although the Hearing Components case involves substantial evidence of nonobviousness in a jury verdict, it is nevertheless instructive for Office personnel on the matter of weighing evidence. Office personnel routinely must consider evidence in the form of prior art references, statements in the specification, or declarations under 37 CFR 1.130 (for cases examined under the AIA 35 U.S.C. 102 and 103), 37 CFR 1.131 (for cases examined under pre-AIA 35 U.S.C. 102 and 103), or 1.132 (for cases examined either under the AIA or under pre-AIA law). Other forms of evidence may also be presented during prosecution. Office personnel are reminded that evidence that has been presented in a timely manner should not be ignored, but rather should be considered on the record. However, not all evidence need be accorded the same weight. In determining the relative weight to accord to rebuttal evidence, considerations such as whether a nexus exists between the claimed invention and the proffered evidence, and whether the evidence is commensurate in scope with the claimed invention, are appropriate. The mere presence of some credible rebuttal evidence does not dictate that an obviousness rejection must always be withdrawn. See MPEP § 2145. Office personnel must consider the appropriate weight to be accorded to each piece of evidence. An obviousness rejection should be made or maintained only if evidence of obviousness outweighs evidence of nonobviousness. See MPEP § 706, subsection I. (“The standard to be applied in all cases is the ‘preponderance of the evidence’ test. In other words, an examiner should reject a claim if, in view of the prior art and evidence of record, it is more likely than not that the claim is unpatentable.”). MPEP § 716.01(d) provides further guidance on weighing evidence in making a determination of patentability.","provenance":{"source_file":"s2145.html","source_anchor":"ch2100_d24bfd_17641_294","source_sha256":"b96dc12eb202283cd1a20f770746d04f6b9da85cb49f8aa6eb2fd17857081044"},"example_number":3,"example_type":"obviousness","host_section_id":"se_sg3joi2a"},{"id":"cs_p4uxqvuo","node_type":"case","corpus_id":"mpep-e9r01-2024-html","opaque_url":"https://mpep.io/n/cs_p4uxqvuo","effective_range":{"start_revision":"R-01.2024","end_revision":null},"rendered_text_html":"","rendered_text_plain":"Hearing Components, Inc. v. Shure Inc., 600 F.3d 1357 (2010)","provenance":{"source_file":"s2145.html","source_anchor":"","source_sha256":"b96dc12eb202283cd1a20f770746d04f6b9da85cb49f8aa6eb2fd17857081044"},"short_name":"Hearing Components, Inc. v. Shure Inc.","all_citations":["600 F.3d 1357","94 USPQ2d 1385"],"canonical_citation":"Hearing Components, Inc. v. Shure Inc., 600 F.3d 1357, 94 USPQ2d 1385 (2010)","decision_year":2010,"court":"Fed. Cir."},{"id":"st_bllk6i34","node_type":"statute","corpus_id":"mpep-e9r01-2024-html","opaque_url":"https://mpep.io/n/st_bllk6i34","effective_range":{"start_revision":"R-01.2024","end_revision":null},"rendered_text_html":"","rendered_text_plain":"","provenance":{"source_file":"s2145.html","source_anchor":"","source_sha256":"b96dc12eb202283cd1a20f770746d04f6b9da85cb49f8aa6eb2fd17857081044"},"authority":"us_cfr","authority_title_num":"37","authority_section_num":"1.130","subsection_path":[],"canonical_citation":"37 CFR 1.130"},{"id":"st_wrfmgtn5","node_type":"statute","corpus_id":"mpep-e9r01-2024-html","opaque_url":"https://mpep.io/n/st_wrfmgtn5","effective_range":{"start_revision":"R-01.2024","end_revision":null},"rendered_text_html":"","rendered_text_plain":"","provenance":{"source_file":"s2145.html","source_anchor":"","source_sha256":"b96dc12eb202283cd1a20f770746d04f6b9da85cb49f8aa6eb2fd17857081044"},"authority":"us_usc","authority_title_num":"35","authority_section_num":"102","subsection_path":[],"canonical_citation":"35 U.S.C. 102"},{"id":"st_5xsternl","node_type":"statute","corpus_id":"mpep-e9r01-2024-html","opaque_url":"https://mpep.io/n/st_5xsternl","effective_range":{"start_revision":"R-01.2024","end_revision":null},"rendered_text_html":"","rendered_text_plain":"","provenance":{"source_file":"s2145.html","source_anchor":"","source_sha256":"b96dc12eb202283cd1a20f770746d04f6b9da85cb49f8aa6eb2fd17857081044"},"authority":"us_cfr","authority_title_num":"37","authority_section_num":"1.131","subsection_path":[],"canonical_citation":"37 CFR 1.131"},{"id":"se_nlcohp3e","node_type":"section","corpus_id":"mpep-e9r01-2024-html","opaque_url":"https://mpep.io/n/se_nlcohp3e","effective_range":{"start_revision":"R-01.2024","end_revision":null},"rendered_text_html":"","rendered_text_plain":"","provenance":{"source_file":"s2145.html","source_anchor":"stub-706","source_sha256":"b96dc12eb202283cd1a20f770746d04f6b9da85cb49f8aa6eb2fd17857081044"},"akn_urn":"/akn/us/statement/manual/uspto/2024/mpep/eng@2024-02-29!sec_706","canonical_url":"https://mpep.io/akn/us/statement/manual/uspto/2024/mpep/eng@2024-02-29!sec_706","section_number":"706","chapter":"700","depth":0,"title":"Section 706","children_ids":[]},{"id":"we_tahja557","node_type":"worked_example","corpus_id":"mpep-e9r01-2024-html","opaque_url":"https://mpep.io/n/we_tahja557","effective_range":{"start_revision":"R-01.2024","end_revision":null},"rendered_text_html":"<div id=\"ch2100_d3ab82_23364_33c\" class=\"Example\"><b>Example 4:</b><p id=\"ch2100_p_3ab82_23375_33c\"><i>Yita LLC, v MacNeil IP LLC,</i> 69 F.4th\n                           1356, 2023 USPQ2d 667 (Fed. Cir. 2023) involved consideration of Yita’s challenge to\n                           MacNeil’s patent in two <i>inter partes</i> reviews (IPRs). In\n                           IPR2020-01139, the Board found the patent claims nonobvious due to MacNeil’s “evidence\n                           of secondary considerations [which was] compelling and indicative of non-obviousness.”\n                           On appeal, the Federal Circuit reversed the Board’s final written decision.\n                        </p>\n                        <p id=\"ch2100_p_3ab82_235b6_13b\">MacNeil’s patent claims were directed to a vehicle floor\n                           tray “closely conforming” to certain walls of the vehicle foot well, a feature that the\n                           Board recognized was disclosed in one of the asserted prior art references (Rabbe). The\n                           Board had found that MacNeil was entitled to a presumption of nexus because its marketed\n                           vehicle trays embodied the claimed invention and were coextensive with the claims. \n                        </p>\n                        <p id=\"ch2100_p_3ab82_235c2_120\">On appeal, the Federal Circuit determined that the\n                           finding of nexus rested on two legal errors: (1) the finding that Rabbe’s disclosure\n                           needed to but did not establish that close conformance was well-known; and (2) the\n                           misapplication of <i>WBIP, LLC v. Kohler Co.,</i> 829 F.3d 1317, 119 USPQ2d\n                           1301 (Fed. Cir. 2016), which did not speak to the present situation where the secondary\n                           consideration evidence is linked to an individual element of the claimed invention,\n                           specifically the close-conformity element taught by Rabbe.\n                        </p>\n                        <p id=\"ch2100_p_3ab82_235cc_30e\">As to the first error, the court determined that their\n                           previous case law made clear that “objective evidence of nonobviousness lacks a nexus if\n                           it exclusively relates to a feature that was ‘known in the prior art’—not necessarily\n                           well-known.” <i>Rambus Inc. v. Rea,</i> 731 F.3d 1248, 1257, 108 USPQ2d 1400\n                           (Fed. Cir. 2013) (emphasis in the original) (quoting <i>Ormco Corp. v. Align\n                              Technology, Inc.,</i> 463 F.3d 1299, 1312, 79 USPQ2d 1931 (Fed. Cir. 2006))\n                           (internal quotation marks omitted). Additionally, the court noted that the finding of\n                           coextensiveness is only relevant to the presumption of nexus and it alone does not\n                           decide the overall nexus question. \n                        </p>\n                        <p id=\"ch2100_p_3ab82_235d7_324\">As to the second error, the court determined the\n                           secondary consideration evidence was related solely to the individual element of\n                           close-conformance disclosed in the prior art to Rabbe. This circumstance was different\n                           than the one present in <i>WBIP</i> in which no single feature (but only the\n                           combination) was responsible for the secondary consideration evidence. \n                        </p>\n                        <p id=\"ch2100_p_3ab82_23625_3bb\">The secondary consideration evidence was the only\n                           <i>Graham</i> factor that the Board deemed to weigh in favor of\n                           nonobviousness. Because the Board determined that an artisan of ordinary skill would\n                           have been motivated to combine the teachings of the prior art references to arrive at\n                           the claimed invention with a reasonable expectation of success, the court reversed the\n                           final written decision.\n                        </p>\n                        <p id=\"ch2100_p_3ab82_23634_17a\"><b><a href=\"s716.html#d0e92626\">MPEP § 716.01(b)</a></b> provides further\n                           guidance on the nexus requirement and evidence of nonobviousness.\n                        </p>\n                        <p id=\"ch2100_p_3ab82_23638_ab\">See <b><a href=\"s2155.html#ch2100_d20034_16784_56\">MPEP § 2155</a></b> regarding affidavits or\n                           declarations under <b><a href=\"mpep-9020-appx-r.html#d0e323465\">37\n                                 CFR 1.130</a></b> to overcome prior art rejections. \n                        </p>\n                        <p id=\"ch2100_p_3ab82_2366a_360\">See <b><a href=\"s715.html#d0e89737\">MPEP §§ 715</a></b> et seq. and\n                           <b><a href=\"s2136.html#ch2100_d2c183_21160_34b\">2136.05(a)</a></b> regarding affidavits or declarations under\n                           <b><a href=\"mpep-9020-appx-r.html#aia_d0e323504\">37 CFR\n                                 1.131</a></b> to overcome prior art rejections. \n                        </p>\n                        <p id=\"ch2100_p_3ab82_23676_268\">See <b><a href=\"s716.html#d0e92085\">MPEP §§ 716</a></b> et seq. and\n                           <b><a href=\"s2136.html#ch2100_d2c183_211c7_5e\">2136.05(b)</a></b> regarding affidavits or declarations under\n                           <b><a href=\"mpep-9020-appx-r.html#d0e323552\">37 CFR\n                                 1.132</a></b> to overcome prior art rejections. \n                        </p>\n                     </div>","rendered_text_plain":"Example 4:Yita LLC, v MacNeil IP LLC, 69 F.4th 1356, 2023 USPQ2d 667 (Fed. Cir. 2023) involved consideration of Yita’s challenge to MacNeil’s patent in two inter partes reviews (IPRs). In IPR2020-01139, the Board found the patent claims nonobvious due to MacNeil’s “evidence of secondary considerations [which was] compelling and indicative of non-obviousness.” On appeal, the Federal Circuit reversed the Board’s final written decision. MacNeil’s patent claims were directed to a vehicle floor tray “closely conforming” to certain walls of the vehicle foot well, a feature that the Board recognized was disclosed in one of the asserted prior art references (Rabbe). The Board had found that MacNeil was entitled to a presumption of nexus because its marketed vehicle trays embodied the claimed invention and were coextensive with the claims. On appeal, the Federal Circuit determined that the finding of nexus rested on two legal errors: (1) the finding that Rabbe’s disclosure needed to but did not establish that close conformance was well-known; and (2) the misapplication of WBIP, LLC v. Kohler Co., 829 F.3d 1317, 119 USPQ2d 1301 (Fed. Cir. 2016), which did not speak to the present situation where the secondary consideration evidence is linked to an individual element of the claimed invention, specifically the close-conformity element taught by Rabbe. As to the first error, the court determined that their previous case law made clear that “objective evidence of nonobviousness lacks a nexus if it exclusively relates to a feature that was ‘known in the prior art’—not necessarily well-known.” Rambus Inc. v. Rea, 731 F.3d 1248, 1257, 108 USPQ2d 1400 (Fed. Cir. 2013) (emphasis in the original) (quoting Ormco Corp. v. Align Technology, Inc., 463 F.3d 1299, 1312, 79 USPQ2d 1931 (Fed. Cir. 2006)) (internal quotation marks omitted). Additionally, the court noted that the finding of coextensiveness is only relevant to the presumption of nexus and it alone does not decide the overall nexus question. As to the second error, the court determined the secondary consideration evidence was related solely to the individual element of close-conformance disclosed in the prior art to Rabbe. This circumstance was different than the one present in WBIP in which no single feature (but only the combination) was responsible for the secondary consideration evidence. The secondary consideration evidence was the only Graham factor that the Board deemed to weigh in favor of nonobviousness. Because the Board determined that an artisan of ordinary skill would have been motivated to combine the teachings of the prior art references to arrive at the claimed invention with a reasonable expectation of success, the court reversed the final written decision. MPEP § 716.01(b) provides further guidance on the nexus requirement and evidence of nonobviousness. See MPEP § 2155 regarding affidavits or declarations under 37 CFR 1.130 to overcome prior art rejections. See MPEP §§ 715 et seq. and 2136.05(a) regarding affidavits or declarations under 37 CFR 1.131 to overcome prior art rejections. See MPEP §§ 716 et seq. and 2136.05(b) regarding affidavits or declarations under 37 CFR 1.132 to overcome prior art rejections.","provenance":{"source_file":"s2145.html","source_anchor":"ch2100_d3ab82_23364_33c","source_sha256":"b96dc12eb202283cd1a20f770746d04f6b9da85cb49f8aa6eb2fd17857081044"},"example_number":4,"example_type":"obviousness","host_section_id":"se_sg3joi2a"},{"id":"cs_uway6wrl","node_type":"case","corpus_id":"mpep-e9r01-2024-html","opaque_url":"https://mpep.io/n/cs_uway6wrl","effective_range":{"start_revision":"R-01.2024","end_revision":null},"rendered_text_html":"","rendered_text_plain":"Yita LLC v. MacNeil IP LLC, 69 F.4th 1356 (2023)","provenance":{"source_file":"s2145.html","source_anchor":"","source_sha256":"b96dc12eb202283cd1a20f770746d04f6b9da85cb49f8aa6eb2fd17857081044"},"short_name":"Yita LLC v. MacNeil IP LLC","all_citations":["69 F.4th 1356","2023 USPQ2d 667"],"canonical_citation":"Yita LLC v. MacNeil IP LLC, 69 F.4th 1356, 2023 USPQ2d 667 (2023)","decision_year":2023,"court":"Fed. Cir."},{"id":"cs_tcocrd42","node_type":"case","corpus_id":"mpep-e9r01-2024-html","opaque_url":"https://mpep.io/n/cs_tcocrd42","effective_range":{"start_revision":"R-01.2024","end_revision":null},"rendered_text_html":"","rendered_text_plain":"WBIP, LLC v. Kohler Co., 829 F.3d 1317 (2016)","provenance":{"source_file":"s2145.html","source_anchor":"","source_sha256":"b96dc12eb202283cd1a20f770746d04f6b9da85cb49f8aa6eb2fd17857081044"},"short_name":"WBIP, LLC v. Kohler Co.","all_citations":["829 F.3d 1317","119 USPQ2d 1301"],"canonical_citation":"WBIP, LLC v. Kohler Co., 829 F.3d 1317, 119 USPQ2d 1301 (2016)","decision_year":2016,"court":"Fed. Cir."},{"id":"cs_rcsfqrvs","node_type":"case","corpus_id":"mpep-e9r01-2024-html","opaque_url":"https://mpep.io/n/cs_rcsfqrvs","effective_range":{"start_revision":"R-01.2024","end_revision":null},"rendered_text_html":"","rendered_text_plain":"Rambus Inc. v. Rea, 731 F.3d 1248 (2013)","provenance":{"source_file":"s2145.html","source_anchor":"","source_sha256":"b96dc12eb202283cd1a20f770746d04f6b9da85cb49f8aa6eb2fd17857081044"},"short_name":"Rambus Inc. v. Rea","all_citations":["731 F.3d 1248","108 USPQ2d 1400"],"canonical_citation":"Rambus Inc. v. Rea, 731 F.3d 1248, 108 USPQ2d 1400 (2013)","decision_year":2013,"court":"Fed. Cir."},{"id":"cs_h4rgomxa","node_type":"case","corpus_id":"mpep-e9r01-2024-html","opaque_url":"https://mpep.io/n/cs_h4rgomxa","effective_range":{"start_revision":"R-01.2024","end_revision":null},"rendered_text_html":"","rendered_text_plain":"Ormco Corp. v. Align Technology, Inc., 463 F.3d 1299 (2006)","provenance":{"source_file":"s2145.html","source_anchor":"","source_sha256":"b96dc12eb202283cd1a20f770746d04f6b9da85cb49f8aa6eb2fd17857081044"},"short_name":"Ormco Corp. v. Align Technology, Inc.","all_citations":["463 F.3d 1299","79 USPQ2d 1931"],"canonical_citation":"Ormco Corp. v. Align Technology, Inc., 463 F.3d 1299, 79 USPQ2d 1931 (2006)","decision_year":2006,"court":"Fed. Cir."},{"id":"se_kgpvdazh","node_type":"section","corpus_id":"mpep-e9r01-2024-html","opaque_url":"https://mpep.io/n/se_kgpvdazh","effective_range":{"start_revision":"R-01.2024","end_revision":null},"rendered_text_html":"","rendered_text_plain":"","provenance":{"source_file":"s2145.html","source_anchor":"stub-2155","source_sha256":"b96dc12eb202283cd1a20f770746d04f6b9da85cb49f8aa6eb2fd17857081044"},"akn_urn":"/akn/us/statement/manual/uspto/2024/mpep/eng@2024-02-29!sec_2155","canonical_url":"https://mpep.io/akn/us/statement/manual/uspto/2024/mpep/eng@2024-02-29!sec_2155","section_number":"2155","chapter":"2100","depth":0,"title":"Section 2155","children_ids":[]},{"id":"se_65ns7wh3","node_type":"section","corpus_id":"mpep-e9r01-2024-html","opaque_url":"https://mpep.io/n/se_65ns7wh3","effective_range":{"start_revision":"R-01.2024","end_revision":null},"rendered_text_html":"","rendered_text_plain":"","provenance":{"source_file":"s2145.html","source_anchor":"stub-715","source_sha256":"b96dc12eb202283cd1a20f770746d04f6b9da85cb49f8aa6eb2fd17857081044"},"akn_urn":"/akn/us/statement/manual/uspto/2024/mpep/eng@2024-02-29!sec_715","canonical_url":"https://mpep.io/akn/us/statement/manual/uspto/2024/mpep/eng@2024-02-29!sec_715","section_number":"715","chapter":"700","depth":0,"title":"Section 715","children_ids":[]},{"id":"se_qyw22cak","node_type":"section","corpus_id":"mpep-e9r01-2024-html","opaque_url":"https://mpep.io/n/se_qyw22cak","effective_range":{"start_revision":"R-01.2024","end_revision":null},"rendered_text_html":"","rendered_text_plain":"","provenance":{"source_file":"s2145.html","source_anchor":"stub-2136","source_sha256":"b96dc12eb202283cd1a20f770746d04f6b9da85cb49f8aa6eb2fd17857081044"},"akn_urn":"/akn/us/statement/manual/uspto/2024/mpep/eng@2024-02-29!sec_2136","canonical_url":"https://mpep.io/akn/us/statement/manual/uspto/2024/mpep/eng@2024-02-29!sec_2136","section_number":"2136","chapter":"2100","depth":0,"title":"Section 2136","children_ids":[]},{"id":"pb_ki7pqrid","node_type":"prose_block","corpus_id":"mpep-e9r01-2024-html","opaque_url":"https://mpep.io/n/pb_ki7pqrid","effective_range":{"start_revision":"R-01.2024","end_revision":null},"rendered_text_html":"<b id=\"\">I.</b><b id=\"\"> ARGUMENT DOES NOT REPLACE EVIDENCE WHERE EVIDENCE IS NECESSARY</b>","rendered_text_plain":"I. ARGUMENT DOES NOT REPLACE EVIDENCE WHERE EVIDENCE IS NECESSARY","provenance":{"source_file":"s2145.html","source_anchor":"d0e212553/b.0","source_sha256":"b96dc12eb202283cd1a20f770746d04f6b9da85cb49f8aa6eb2fd17857081044"},"kind":"informal_heading","heading_level":2,"heading_text":"I. ARGUMENT DOES NOT REPLACE EVIDENCE WHERE EVIDENCE IS NECESSARY","host_section_id":"se_sg3joi2a"},{"id":"pb_b65ahbg6","node_type":"prose_block","corpus_id":"mpep-e9r01-2024-html","opaque_url":"https://mpep.io/n/pb_b65ahbg6","effective_range":{"start_revision":"R-01.2024","end_revision":null},"rendered_text_html":"<p id=\"d0e212821\">An argument by the applicant is not evidence unless it is an admission,\n                        in which case, an examiner may use the admission in making a rejection. See\n                        <b><a href=\"s2129.html#d0e202844\">MPEP §\n                              2129</a></b> and <b><a href=\"s2144.html#d0e210752\">§ 2144.03</a></b> for a discussion of\n                        admissions as prior art. \n                     </p>","rendered_text_plain":"An argument by the applicant is not evidence unless it is an admission, in which case, an examiner may use the admission in making a rejection. See MPEP § 2129 and § 2144.03 for a discussion of admissions as prior art.","provenance":{"source_file":"s2145.html","source_anchor":"d0e212821","source_sha256":"b96dc12eb202283cd1a20f770746d04f6b9da85cb49f8aa6eb2fd17857081044"},"kind":"narrative","host_section_id":"se_sg3joi2a"},{"id":"se_mdcpazgt","node_type":"section","corpus_id":"mpep-e9r01-2024-html","opaque_url":"https://mpep.io/n/se_mdcpazgt","effective_range":{"start_revision":"R-01.2024","end_revision":null},"rendered_text_html":"","rendered_text_plain":"","provenance":{"source_file":"s2145.html","source_anchor":"stub-2129","source_sha256":"b96dc12eb202283cd1a20f770746d04f6b9da85cb49f8aa6eb2fd17857081044"},"akn_urn":"/akn/us/statement/manual/uspto/2024/mpep/eng@2024-02-29!sec_2129","canonical_url":"https://mpep.io/akn/us/statement/manual/uspto/2024/mpep/eng@2024-02-29!sec_2129","section_number":"2129","chapter":"2100","depth":0,"title":"Section 2129","children_ids":[]},{"id":"se_orc3vnf5","node_type":"section","corpus_id":"mpep-e9r01-2024-html","opaque_url":"https://mpep.io/n/se_orc3vnf5","effective_range":{"start_revision":"R-01.2024","end_revision":null},"rendered_text_html":"","rendered_text_plain":"","provenance":{"source_file":"s2145.html","source_anchor":"stub-2144","source_sha256":"b96dc12eb202283cd1a20f770746d04f6b9da85cb49f8aa6eb2fd17857081044"},"akn_urn":"/akn/us/statement/manual/uspto/2024/mpep/eng@2024-02-29!sec_2144","canonical_url":"https://mpep.io/akn/us/statement/manual/uspto/2024/mpep/eng@2024-02-29!sec_2144","section_number":"2144","chapter":"2100","depth":0,"title":"Section 2144","children_ids":[]},{"id":"pb_3jfuttg3","node_type":"prose_block","corpus_id":"mpep-e9r01-2024-html","opaque_url":"https://mpep.io/n/pb_3jfuttg3","effective_range":{"start_revision":"R-01.2024","end_revision":null},"rendered_text_html":"<p id=\"d0e212830\">Arguments presented by applicant cannot take the place of evidence in\n                        the record. See <i>In re De Blauwe,</i> 736 F.2d 699, 705, 222 USPQ 191, 196\n                        (Fed. Cir. 1984); <i>In re </i><i>Schulze,</i> 346 F.2d 600, 602, 145 USPQ 716, 718 (CCPA 1965);\n                        <i>In re Geisler,</i> 116 F.3d 1465, 43 USPQ2d 1362 (Fed. Cir. 1997) (“An\n                        assertion of what seems to follow from common experience is just attorney argument and\n                        not the kind of factual evidence that is required to rebut a <i>prima\n                           facie</i> case of obviousness.”). See <b><a href=\"s716.html#d0e92659\">MPEP § 716.01(c)</a></b> for examples of\n                        applicant statements which are not evidence and which must be supported by an\n                        appropriate affidavit or declaration.\n                     </p>","rendered_text_plain":"Arguments presented by applicant cannot take the place of evidence in the record. See In re De Blauwe, 736 F.2d 699, 705, 222 USPQ 191, 196 (Fed. Cir. 1984); In re Schulze, 346 F.2d 600, 602, 145 USPQ 716, 718 (CCPA 1965); In re Geisler, 116 F.3d 1465, 43 USPQ2d 1362 (Fed. Cir. 1997) (“An assertion of what seems to follow from common experience is just attorney argument and not the kind of factual evidence that is required to rebut a prima facie case of obviousness.”). See MPEP § 716.01(c) for examples of applicant statements which are not evidence and which must be supported by an appropriate affidavit or declaration.","provenance":{"source_file":"s2145.html","source_anchor":"d0e212830","source_sha256":"b96dc12eb202283cd1a20f770746d04f6b9da85cb49f8aa6eb2fd17857081044"},"kind":"narrative","host_section_id":"se_sg3joi2a"},{"id":"cs_mak65enw","node_type":"case","corpus_id":"mpep-e9r01-2024-html","opaque_url":"https://mpep.io/n/cs_mak65enw","effective_range":{"start_revision":"R-01.2024","end_revision":null},"rendered_text_html":"","rendered_text_plain":"In re Geisler, 116 F.3d 1465 (1997)","provenance":{"source_file":"s2145.html","source_anchor":"","source_sha256":"b96dc12eb202283cd1a20f770746d04f6b9da85cb49f8aa6eb2fd17857081044"},"short_name":"In re Geisler","all_citations":["116 F.3d 1465","43 USPQ2d 1362"],"canonical_citation":"In re Geisler, 116 F.3d 1465, 43 USPQ2d 1362 (1997)","decision_year":1997,"court":"Fed. Cir."},{"id":"pb_vd6ldh2c","node_type":"prose_block","corpus_id":"mpep-e9r01-2024-html","opaque_url":"https://mpep.io/n/pb_vd6ldh2c","effective_range":{"start_revision":"R-01.2024","end_revision":null},"rendered_text_html":"<b id=\"\">II.</b><b id=\"\"> ARGUING ADDITIONAL ADVANTAGES OR LATENT PROPERTIES</b>","rendered_text_plain":"II. ARGUING ADDITIONAL ADVANTAGES OR LATENT PROPERTIES","provenance":{"source_file":"s2145.html","source_anchor":"d0e212553/b.2","source_sha256":"b96dc12eb202283cd1a20f770746d04f6b9da85cb49f8aa6eb2fd17857081044"},"kind":"informal_heading","heading_level":2,"heading_text":"II. ARGUING ADDITIONAL ADVANTAGES OR LATENT PROPERTIES","host_section_id":"se_sg3joi2a"},{"id":"ls_ruq6uqb4","node_type":"list","corpus_id":"mpep-e9r01-2024-html","opaque_url":"https://mpep.io/n/ls_ruq6uqb4","effective_range":{"start_revision":"R-01.2024","end_revision":null},"rendered_text_html":"","rendered_text_plain":"","provenance":{"source_file":"s2145.html","source_anchor":"d0e212553/ul.0","source_sha256":"b96dc12eb202283cd1a20f770746d04f6b9da85cb49f8aa6eb2fd17857081044"},"enumerator_style":"no_enumerator","host_section_id":"se_sg3joi2a","parent_list_item_id":null,"item_ids":["li_qw4fyegf"],"nesting_depth":1},{"id":"li_qw4fyegf","node_type":"list_item","corpus_id":"mpep-e9r01-2024-html","opaque_url":"https://mpep.io/n/li_qw4fyegf","effective_range":{"start_revision":"R-01.2024","end_revision":null},"rendered_text_html":"","rendered_text_plain":"","provenance":{"source_file":"s2145.html","source_anchor":"d0e212553/ul.0/li.0","source_sha256":"b96dc12eb202283cd1a20f770746d04f6b9da85cb49f8aa6eb2fd17857081044"},"parent_list_id":"ls_ruq6uqb4","enumerator_label":"","enumerator_ordinal":0},{"id":"pb_yterec24","node_type":"prose_block","corpus_id":"mpep-e9r01-2024-html","opaque_url":"https://mpep.io/n/pb_yterec24","effective_range":{"start_revision":"R-01.2024","end_revision":null},"rendered_text_html":"<i><b id=\"\">Prima Facie Obviousness Is Not Rebutted by Merely Recognizing Additional\n                           Advantages or Latent Properties Present But Not Recognized in the Prior\n                           Art</b></i>","rendered_text_plain":"Prima Facie Obviousness Is Not Rebutted by Merely Recognizing Additional Advantages or Latent Properties Present But Not Recognized in the Prior Art","provenance":{"source_file":"s2145.html","source_anchor":"d0e212553/i.0","source_sha256":"b96dc12eb202283cd1a20f770746d04f6b9da85cb49f8aa6eb2fd17857081044"},"kind":"informal_heading","heading_level":2,"heading_text":"Prima Facie Obviousness Is Not Rebutted by Merely Recognizing Additional Advantages or Latent Properties Present But Not Recognized in the Prior Art","host_section_id":"se_sg3joi2a"},{"id":"pb_isjugmyt","node_type":"prose_block","corpus_id":"mpep-e9r01-2024-html","opaque_url":"https://mpep.io/n/pb_isjugmyt","effective_range":{"start_revision":"R-01.2024","end_revision":null},"rendered_text_html":"<p id=\"d0e212855\">Mere recognition of latent properties in the prior art does not\n                        render nonobvious an otherwise known invention. <i>In re Wiseman,</i> 596\n                        F.2d 1019, 201 USPQ 658 (CCPA 1979) (Claims were directed to grooved carbon disc\n                        brakes wherein the grooves were provided to vent steam or vapor during a braking\n                        action. A prior art reference taught noncarbon disc brakes which were grooved for the\n                        purpose of cooling the faces of the braking members and eliminating dust. The court\n                        held the prior art references when combined would overcome the problems of dust and\n                        overheating solved by the prior art and would inherently overcome the steam or vapor\n                        cause of the problem relied upon for patentability by applicants. Granting a patent\n                        on the discovery of an unknown but inherent function (here venting steam or vapor)\n                        “would remove from the public that which is in the public domain by virtue of its\n                        inclusion in, or obviousness from, the prior art.” 596 F.2d at 1022, 201 USPQ at\n                        661.); <i>In re Baxter Travenol Labs.,</i> 952 F.2d 388, 21 USPQ2d 1281\n                        (Fed. Cir. 1991) (Appellant argued that the presence of DEHP as the plasticizer in a\n                        blood collection bag unexpectedly suppressed hemolysis and therefore rebutted any\n                        <i>prima facie</i> showing of obviousness. However, the closest prior\n                        art utilizing a DEHP plasticized blood collection bag inherently achieved same\n                        result, although this fact was unknown in the prior art.).\n                     </p>","rendered_text_plain":"Mere recognition of latent properties in the prior art does not render nonobvious an otherwise known invention. In re Wiseman, 596 F.2d 1019, 201 USPQ 658 (CCPA 1979) (Claims were directed to grooved carbon disc brakes wherein the grooves were provided to vent steam or vapor during a braking action. A prior art reference taught noncarbon disc brakes which were grooved for the purpose of cooling the faces of the braking members and eliminating dust. The court held the prior art references when combined would overcome the problems of dust and overheating solved by the prior art and would inherently overcome the steam or vapor cause of the problem relied upon for patentability by applicants. Granting a patent on the discovery of an unknown but inherent function (here venting steam or vapor) “would remove from the public that which is in the public domain by virtue of its inclusion in, or obviousness from, the prior art.” 596 F.2d at 1022, 201 USPQ at 661.); In re Baxter Travenol Labs., 952 F.2d 388, 21 USPQ2d 1281 (Fed. Cir. 1991) (Appellant argued that the presence of DEHP as the plasticizer in a blood collection bag unexpectedly suppressed hemolysis and therefore rebutted any prima facie showing of obviousness. However, the closest prior art utilizing a DEHP plasticized blood collection bag inherently achieved same result, although this fact was unknown in the prior art.).","provenance":{"source_file":"s2145.html","source_anchor":"d0e212855","source_sha256":"b96dc12eb202283cd1a20f770746d04f6b9da85cb49f8aa6eb2fd17857081044"},"kind":"narrative","host_section_id":"se_sg3joi2a"},{"id":"cs_5oubjc75","node_type":"case","corpus_id":"mpep-e9r01-2024-html","opaque_url":"https://mpep.io/n/cs_5oubjc75","effective_range":{"start_revision":"R-01.2024","end_revision":null},"rendered_text_html":"","rendered_text_plain":"In re Wiseman, 596 F.2d 1019 (1979)","provenance":{"source_file":"s2145.html","source_anchor":"","source_sha256":"b96dc12eb202283cd1a20f770746d04f6b9da85cb49f8aa6eb2fd17857081044"},"short_name":"In re Wiseman","all_citations":["596 F.2d 1019","201 USPQ 658"],"canonical_citation":"In re Wiseman, 596 F.2d 1019, 201 USPQ 658 (1979)","decision_year":1979,"court":"CCPA"},{"id":"cs_4bjkcya2","node_type":"case","corpus_id":"mpep-e9r01-2024-html","opaque_url":"https://mpep.io/n/cs_4bjkcya2","effective_range":{"start_revision":"R-01.2024","end_revision":null},"rendered_text_html":"","rendered_text_plain":"In re Baxter Travenol Labs., 952 F.2d 388 (1991)","provenance":{"source_file":"s2145.html","source_anchor":"","source_sha256":"b96dc12eb202283cd1a20f770746d04f6b9da85cb49f8aa6eb2fd17857081044"},"short_name":"In re Baxter Travenol Labs.","all_citations":["952 F.2d 388","21 USPQ2d 1281"],"canonical_citation":"In re Baxter Travenol Labs., 952 F.2d 388, 21 USPQ2d 1281 (1991)","decision_year":1991,"court":"Fed. Cir."},{"id":"pb_xepoyo56","node_type":"prose_block","corpus_id":"mpep-e9r01-2024-html","opaque_url":"https://mpep.io/n/pb_xepoyo56","effective_range":{"start_revision":"R-01.2024","end_revision":null},"rendered_text_html":"<p id=\"d0e212871\">“The fact that appellant has recognized another advantage which\n                        would flow naturally from following the suggestion of the prior art cannot be the\n                        basis for patentability when the differences would otherwise be obvious.” <i>Ex\n                           parte Obiaya,</i> 227 USPQ 58, 60 (Bd. Pat. App. &amp; Inter. 1985) (The\n                        prior art taught combustion fluid analyzers which used labyrinth heaters to maintain\n                        the samples at a uniform temperature. Although appellant showed that an unexpectedly\n                        shorter response time was obtained when a labyrinth heater was employed, the Board\n                        held this advantage would flow naturally from following the suggestion of the prior\n                        art.). See also <i> Lantech Inc.</i><i>v. Kaufman Co. of Ohio Inc.,</i> 878 F.2d 1446, 12 USPQ2d 1076, 1077\n                        (Fed. Cir. 1989), <i>cert. denied,</i> 493 U.S. 1058 (1990) (unpublished\n                        — not citable as precedent) (“The recitation of an additional advantage associated\n                        with doing what the prior art suggests does not lend patentability to an otherwise\n                        unpatentable invention.”).\n                     </p>","rendered_text_plain":"“The fact that appellant has recognized another advantage which would flow naturally from following the suggestion of the prior art cannot be the basis for patentability when the differences would otherwise be obvious.” Ex parte Obiaya, 227 USPQ 58, 60 (Bd. Pat. App. & Inter. 1985) (The prior art taught combustion fluid analyzers which used labyrinth heaters to maintain the samples at a uniform temperature. Although appellant showed that an unexpectedly shorter response time was obtained when a labyrinth heater was employed, the Board held this advantage would flow naturally from following the suggestion of the prior art.). See also Lantech Inc.v. Kaufman Co. of Ohio Inc., 878 F.2d 1446, 12 USPQ2d 1076, 1077 (Fed. Cir. 1989), cert. denied, 493 U.S. 1058 (1990) (unpublished — not citable as precedent) (“The recitation of an additional advantage associated with doing what the prior art suggests does not lend patentability to an otherwise unpatentable invention.”).","provenance":{"source_file":"s2145.html","source_anchor":"d0e212871","source_sha256":"b96dc12eb202283cd1a20f770746d04f6b9da85cb49f8aa6eb2fd17857081044"},"kind":"narrative","host_section_id":"se_sg3joi2a"},{"id":"cs_lk2zizgi","node_type":"case","corpus_id":"mpep-e9r01-2024-html","opaque_url":"https://mpep.io/n/cs_lk2zizgi","effective_range":{"start_revision":"R-01.2024","end_revision":null},"rendered_text_html":"","rendered_text_plain":"Ex parte Obiaya, 227 USPQ 58 (1985)","provenance":{"source_file":"s2145.html","source_anchor":"","source_sha256":"b96dc12eb202283cd1a20f770746d04f6b9da85cb49f8aa6eb2fd17857081044"},"short_name":"Ex parte Obiaya","all_citations":["227 USPQ 58"],"canonical_citation":"Ex parte Obiaya, 227 USPQ 58 (1985)","decision_year":1985,"court":"BPAI"},{"id":"cs_nhgdeipp","node_type":"case","corpus_id":"mpep-e9r01-2024-html","opaque_url":"https://mpep.io/n/cs_nhgdeipp","effective_range":{"start_revision":"R-01.2024","end_revision":null},"rendered_text_html":"","rendered_text_plain":"Lantech Inc. v. Kaufman Co. of Ohio Inc., 878 F.2d 1446 (1989)","provenance":{"source_file":"s2145.html","source_anchor":"","source_sha256":"b96dc12eb202283cd1a20f770746d04f6b9da85cb49f8aa6eb2fd17857081044"},"short_name":"Lantech Inc. v. Kaufman Co. of Ohio Inc.","all_citations":["878 F.2d 1446","12 USPQ2d 1076"],"canonical_citation":"Lantech Inc. v. Kaufman Co. of Ohio Inc., 878 F.2d 1446, 12 USPQ2d 1076 (1989)","decision_year":1989,"court":"Fed. Cir."},{"id":"pb_hsf5qpj6","node_type":"prose_block","corpus_id":"mpep-e9r01-2024-html","opaque_url":"https://mpep.io/n/pb_hsf5qpj6","effective_range":{"start_revision":"R-01.2024","end_revision":null},"rendered_text_html":"<p id=\"d0e212886\"><i>In re Lintner,</i> 458 F.2d 1013, 173 USPQ 560 (CCPA 1972) and\n                        <i>In re Dillon,</i> 919 F.2d 688, 16&nbsp;USPQ2d 1897 (Fed. Cir. 1990)\n                        discussed in <b><a href=\"s2144.html#d0e210576\">MPEP\n                              §&nbsp;2144</a></b> are also pertinent to this issue.\n                     </p>","rendered_text_plain":"In re Lintner, 458 F.2d 1013, 173 USPQ 560 (CCPA 1972) and In re Dillon, 919 F.2d 688, 16 USPQ2d 1897 (Fed. Cir. 1990) discussed in MPEP § 2144 are also pertinent to this issue.","provenance":{"source_file":"s2145.html","source_anchor":"d0e212886","source_sha256":"b96dc12eb202283cd1a20f770746d04f6b9da85cb49f8aa6eb2fd17857081044"},"kind":"narrative","host_section_id":"se_sg3joi2a"},{"id":"cs_oezj5p3w","node_type":"case","corpus_id":"mpep-e9r01-2024-html","opaque_url":"https://mpep.io/n/cs_oezj5p3w","effective_range":{"start_revision":"R-01.2024","end_revision":null},"rendered_text_html":"","rendered_text_plain":"In re Lintner, 458 F.2d 1013 (1972)","provenance":{"source_file":"s2145.html","source_anchor":"","source_sha256":"b96dc12eb202283cd1a20f770746d04f6b9da85cb49f8aa6eb2fd17857081044"},"short_name":"In re Lintner","all_citations":["458 F.2d 1013","173 USPQ 560"],"canonical_citation":"In re Lintner, 458 F.2d 1013, 173 USPQ 560 (1972)","decision_year":1972,"court":"CCPA"},{"id":"pb_lqhdbaq5","node_type":"prose_block","corpus_id":"mpep-e9r01-2024-html","opaque_url":"https://mpep.io/n/pb_lqhdbaq5","effective_range":{"start_revision":"R-01.2024","end_revision":null},"rendered_text_html":"<p id=\"d0e212897\">See <b><a href=\"s716.html#d0e92844\">MPEP § 716.02</a></b> - <b><a href=\"s716.html#d0e93296\">§ 716.02(g)</a></b> for a discussion of\n                        declaratory evidence alleging unexpected results.\n                     </p>","rendered_text_plain":"See MPEP § 716.02 - § 716.02(g) for a discussion of declaratory evidence alleging unexpected results.","provenance":{"source_file":"s2145.html","source_anchor":"d0e212897","source_sha256":"b96dc12eb202283cd1a20f770746d04f6b9da85cb49f8aa6eb2fd17857081044"},"kind":"narrative","host_section_id":"se_sg3joi2a"},{"id":"pb_hf6ahgsl","node_type":"prose_block","corpus_id":"mpep-e9r01-2024-html","opaque_url":"https://mpep.io/n/pb_hf6ahgsl","effective_range":{"start_revision":"R-01.2024","end_revision":null},"rendered_text_html":"<b id=\"\">III.</b><b id=\"\"> ARGUING THAT PRIOR ART DEVICES ARE NOT PHYSICALLY COMBINABLE</b>","rendered_text_plain":"III. ARGUING THAT PRIOR ART DEVICES ARE NOT PHYSICALLY COMBINABLE","provenance":{"source_file":"s2145.html","source_anchor":"d0e212553/b.4","source_sha256":"b96dc12eb202283cd1a20f770746d04f6b9da85cb49f8aa6eb2fd17857081044"},"kind":"informal_heading","heading_level":2,"heading_text":"III. ARGUING THAT PRIOR ART DEVICES ARE NOT PHYSICALLY COMBINABLE","host_section_id":"se_sg3joi2a"},{"id":"pb_a2xrd7er","node_type":"prose_block","corpus_id":"mpep-e9r01-2024-html","opaque_url":"https://mpep.io/n/pb_a2xrd7er","effective_range":{"start_revision":"R-01.2024","end_revision":null},"rendered_text_html":"<p id=\"d0e212910\">“It is well-established that a determination of obviousness based on\n                        teachings from multiple references does not require an actual, physical substitution of\n                        elements.” <i>In re Mouttet,</i> 686 F.3d 1322, 1332, 103 USPQ2d 1219, 1226\n                        (Fed. Cir. 2012) (citing <i>In re Etter,</i> 756 F.2d 852, 859, 225 USPQ 1,\n                        6 (Fed. Cir. 1985) (<i>en banc</i>)) (“Etter's assertions that Azure cannot\n                        be incorporated in Ambrosio are basically irrelevant, the criterion being not whether\n                        the references could be physically combined but whether the claimed inventions are\n                        rendered obvious by the teachings of the prior art as a whole.”). See also <i>In\n                           re Keller,</i> 642 F.2d 413, 425, 208 USPQ 871, 881 (CCPA 1981) (“The test for\n                        obviousness is not whether the features of a secondary reference may be bodily\n                        incorporated into the structure of the primary reference.... Rather, the test is what\n                        the combined teachings of those references would have suggested to those of ordinary\n                        skill in the art.”); <i>In re Sneed,</i> 710 F.2d 1544, 1550, 218 USPQ 385,\n                        389 (Fed. Cir. 1983) (“[I]t is not necessary that the inventions of the references be\n                        physically combinable to render obvious the invention under review.”); and <i>In\n                           re Nievelt,</i> 482 F.2d 965, 179 USPQ 224, 226 (CCPA 1973) (“Combining the\n                        <span class=\"Underline\">teachings</span> of references does not involve an ability to combine\n                        their specific structures.”).\n                     </p>","rendered_text_plain":"“It is well-established that a determination of obviousness based on teachings from multiple references does not require an actual, physical substitution of elements.” In re Mouttet, 686 F.3d 1322, 1332, 103 USPQ2d 1219, 1226 (Fed. Cir. 2012) (citing In re Etter, 756 F.2d 852, 859, 225 USPQ 1, 6 (Fed. Cir. 1985) (en banc)) (“Etter's assertions that Azure cannot be incorporated in Ambrosio are basically irrelevant, the criterion being not whether the references could be physically combined but whether the claimed inventions are rendered obvious by the teachings of the prior art as a whole.”). See also In re Keller, 642 F.2d 413, 425, 208 USPQ 871, 881 (CCPA 1981) (“The test for obviousness is not whether the features of a secondary reference may be bodily incorporated into the structure of the primary reference.... Rather, the test is what the combined teachings of those references would have suggested to those of ordinary skill in the art.”); In re Sneed, 710 F.2d 1544, 1550, 218 USPQ 385, 389 (Fed. Cir. 1983) (“[I]t is not necessary that the inventions of the references be physically combinable to render obvious the invention under review.”); and In re Nievelt, 482 F.2d 965, 179 USPQ 224, 226 (CCPA 1973) (“Combining the teachings of references does not involve an ability to combine their specific structures.”).","provenance":{"source_file":"s2145.html","source_anchor":"d0e212910","source_sha256":"b96dc12eb202283cd1a20f770746d04f6b9da85cb49f8aa6eb2fd17857081044"},"kind":"narrative","host_section_id":"se_sg3joi2a"},{"id":"cs_zqauuhtr","node_type":"case","corpus_id":"mpep-e9r01-2024-html","opaque_url":"https://mpep.io/n/cs_zqauuhtr","effective_range":{"start_revision":"R-01.2024","end_revision":null},"rendered_text_html":"","rendered_text_plain":"In re Mouttet, 686 F.3d 1322 (2012)","provenance":{"source_file":"s2145.html","source_anchor":"","source_sha256":"b96dc12eb202283cd1a20f770746d04f6b9da85cb49f8aa6eb2fd17857081044"},"short_name":"In re Mouttet","all_citations":["686 F.3d 1322","103 USPQ2d 1219"],"canonical_citation":"In re Mouttet, 686 F.3d 1322, 103 USPQ2d 1219 (2012)","decision_year":2012,"court":"Fed. Cir."},{"id":"cs_6mk7laph","node_type":"case","corpus_id":"mpep-e9r01-2024-html","opaque_url":"https://mpep.io/n/cs_6mk7laph","effective_range":{"start_revision":"R-01.2024","end_revision":null},"rendered_text_html":"","rendered_text_plain":"In re Etter, 756 F.2d 852 (1985)","provenance":{"source_file":"s2145.html","source_anchor":"","source_sha256":"b96dc12eb202283cd1a20f770746d04f6b9da85cb49f8aa6eb2fd17857081044"},"short_name":"In re Etter","all_citations":["756 F.2d 852","225 USPQ 1"],"canonical_citation":"In re Etter, 756 F.2d 852, 225 USPQ 1 (1985)","decision_year":1985,"court":"Fed. Cir."},{"id":"cs_6izc5hjz","node_type":"case","corpus_id":"mpep-e9r01-2024-html","opaque_url":"https://mpep.io/n/cs_6izc5hjz","effective_range":{"start_revision":"R-01.2024","end_revision":null},"rendered_text_html":"","rendered_text_plain":"In re Keller, 642 F.2d 413 (1981)","provenance":{"source_file":"s2145.html","source_anchor":"","source_sha256":"b96dc12eb202283cd1a20f770746d04f6b9da85cb49f8aa6eb2fd17857081044"},"short_name":"In re Keller","all_citations":["642 F.2d 413","208 USPQ 871"],"canonical_citation":"In re Keller, 642 F.2d 413, 208 USPQ 871 (1981)","decision_year":1981,"court":"CCPA"},{"id":"cs_cchjqxen","node_type":"case","corpus_id":"mpep-e9r01-2024-html","opaque_url":"https://mpep.io/n/cs_cchjqxen","effective_range":{"start_revision":"R-01.2024","end_revision":null},"rendered_text_html":"","rendered_text_plain":"In re Sneed, 710 F.2d 1544 (1983)","provenance":{"source_file":"s2145.html","source_anchor":"","source_sha256":"b96dc12eb202283cd1a20f770746d04f6b9da85cb49f8aa6eb2fd17857081044"},"short_name":"In re Sneed","all_citations":["710 F.2d 1544","218 USPQ 385"],"canonical_citation":"In re Sneed, 710 F.2d 1544, 218 USPQ 385 (1983)","decision_year":1983,"court":"Fed. Cir."},{"id":"cs_zutrk4iz","node_type":"case","corpus_id":"mpep-e9r01-2024-html","opaque_url":"https://mpep.io/n/cs_zutrk4iz","effective_range":{"start_revision":"R-01.2024","end_revision":null},"rendered_text_html":"","rendered_text_plain":"In re Nievelt, 482 F.2d 965 (1973)","provenance":{"source_file":"s2145.html","source_anchor":"","source_sha256":"b96dc12eb202283cd1a20f770746d04f6b9da85cb49f8aa6eb2fd17857081044"},"short_name":"In re Nievelt","all_citations":["482 F.2d 965","179 USPQ 224"],"canonical_citation":"In re Nievelt, 482 F.2d 965, 179 USPQ 224 (1973)","decision_year":1973,"court":"CCPA"},{"id":"pb_xjc4v6ng","node_type":"prose_block","corpus_id":"mpep-e9r01-2024-html","opaque_url":"https://mpep.io/n/pb_xjc4v6ng","effective_range":{"start_revision":"R-01.2024","end_revision":null},"rendered_text_html":"<p id=\"d0e212934\">However, the claimed combination cannot change the principle of\n                        operation of the primary reference or render the reference inoperable for its intended\n                        purpose. See <b><a href=\"s2143.html#d0e210245\">MPEP\n                              §&nbsp;2143.01</a></b>, subsection VI. \n                     </p>","rendered_text_plain":"However, the claimed combination cannot change the principle of operation of the primary reference or render the reference inoperable for its intended purpose. See MPEP § 2143.01, subsection VI.","provenance":{"source_file":"s2145.html","source_anchor":"d0e212934","source_sha256":"b96dc12eb202283cd1a20f770746d04f6b9da85cb49f8aa6eb2fd17857081044"},"kind":"narrative","host_section_id":"se_sg3joi2a"},{"id":"se_hdybb4dq","node_type":"section","corpus_id":"mpep-e9r01-2024-html","opaque_url":"https://mpep.io/n/se_hdybb4dq","effective_range":{"start_revision":"R-01.2024","end_revision":null},"rendered_text_html":"","rendered_text_plain":"","provenance":{"source_file":"s2145.html","source_anchor":"stub-2143","source_sha256":"b96dc12eb202283cd1a20f770746d04f6b9da85cb49f8aa6eb2fd17857081044"},"akn_urn":"/akn/us/statement/manual/uspto/2024/mpep/eng@2024-02-29!sec_2143","canonical_url":"https://mpep.io/akn/us/statement/manual/uspto/2024/mpep/eng@2024-02-29!sec_2143","section_number":"2143","chapter":"2100","depth":0,"title":"Section 2143","children_ids":[]},{"id":"pb_kegiyhn2","node_type":"prose_block","corpus_id":"mpep-e9r01-2024-html","opaque_url":"https://mpep.io/n/pb_kegiyhn2","effective_range":{"start_revision":"R-01.2024","end_revision":null},"rendered_text_html":"<b id=\"\">IV.</b><b id=\"\"> ARGUING AGAINST REFERENCES INDIVIDUALLY </b>","rendered_text_plain":"IV. ARGUING AGAINST REFERENCES INDIVIDUALLY","provenance":{"source_file":"s2145.html","source_anchor":"d0e212553/b.6","source_sha256":"b96dc12eb202283cd1a20f770746d04f6b9da85cb49f8aa6eb2fd17857081044"},"kind":"informal_heading","heading_level":2,"heading_text":"IV. ARGUING AGAINST REFERENCES INDIVIDUALLY","host_section_id":"se_sg3joi2a"},{"id":"pb_cigb7eys","node_type":"prose_block","corpus_id":"mpep-e9r01-2024-html","opaque_url":"https://mpep.io/n/pb_cigb7eys","effective_range":{"start_revision":"R-01.2024","end_revision":null},"rendered_text_html":"<p id=\"d0e212944\"><b id=\"\">One cannot show nonobviousness by attacking references individually where the\n                           rejections are based on combinations of references</b>. <i>In re\n                           Keller,</i> 642 F.2d 413, 208 USPQ 871 (CCPA 1981); <i>In re Merck &amp;\n                           Co., Inc.,</i> 800 F.2d 1091, 231 USPQ 375 (Fed. Cir. 1986). Where a rejection\n                        of a claim is based on two or more references, a reply that is limited to what a subset\n                        of the applied references teaches or fails to teach, or that fails to address the\n                        combined teaching of the applied references may be considered to be an argument that\n                        attacks the reference(s) individually. Where an applicant’s reply establishes that each\n                        of the applied references fails to teach a limitation and addresses the combined\n                        teachings and/or suggestions of the applied prior art, the reply as a whole does not\n                        attack the references individually as the phrase is used in <i>Keller</i>\n                        and reliance on <i>Keller</i> would not be appropriate. This is because\n                        “[T]he test for obviousness is what the combined teachings of the references would have\n                        suggested to [a PHOSITA].” <i>In re Mouttet,</i> 686 F.3d 1322, 1333, 103\n                        USPQ2d 1219, 1226 (Fed. Cir. 2012).\n                     </p>","rendered_text_plain":"One cannot show nonobviousness by attacking references individually where the rejections are based on combinations of references. In re Keller, 642 F.2d 413, 208 USPQ 871 (CCPA 1981); In re Merck & Co., Inc., 800 F.2d 1091, 231 USPQ 375 (Fed. Cir. 1986). Where a rejection of a claim is based on two or more references, a reply that is limited to what a subset of the applied references teaches or fails to teach, or that fails to address the combined teaching of the applied references may be considered to be an argument that attacks the reference(s) individually. Where an applicant’s reply establishes that each of the applied references fails to teach a limitation and addresses the combined teachings and/or suggestions of the applied prior art, the reply as a whole does not attack the references individually as the phrase is used in Keller and reliance on Keller would not be appropriate. This is because “[T]he test for obviousness is what the combined teachings of the references would have suggested to [a PHOSITA].” In re Mouttet, 686 F.3d 1322, 1333, 103 USPQ2d 1219, 1226 (Fed. Cir. 2012).","provenance":{"source_file":"s2145.html","source_anchor":"d0e212944","source_sha256":"b96dc12eb202283cd1a20f770746d04f6b9da85cb49f8aa6eb2fd17857081044"},"kind":"narrative","host_section_id":"se_sg3joi2a"},{"id":"cs_pxziomkx","node_type":"case","corpus_id":"mpep-e9r01-2024-html","opaque_url":"https://mpep.io/n/cs_pxziomkx","effective_range":{"start_revision":"R-01.2024","end_revision":null},"rendered_text_html":"","rendered_text_plain":"In re Merck & Co., Inc., 800 F.2d 1091 (1986)","provenance":{"source_file":"s2145.html","source_anchor":"","source_sha256":"b96dc12eb202283cd1a20f770746d04f6b9da85cb49f8aa6eb2fd17857081044"},"short_name":"In re Merck & Co., Inc.","all_citations":["800 F.2d 1091","231 USPQ 375"],"canonical_citation":"In re Merck & Co., Inc., 800 F.2d 1091, 231 USPQ 375 (1986)","decision_year":1986,"court":"Fed. Cir."},{"id":"pb_7b7pixo4","node_type":"prose_block","corpus_id":"mpep-e9r01-2024-html","opaque_url":"https://mpep.io/n/pb_7b7pixo4","effective_range":{"start_revision":"R-01.2024","end_revision":null},"rendered_text_html":"<b id=\"\">V.</b><b id=\"\"> ARGUING ABOUT THE NUMBER OF REFERENCES COMBINED</b>","rendered_text_plain":"V. ARGUING ABOUT THE NUMBER OF REFERENCES COMBINED","provenance":{"source_file":"s2145.html","source_anchor":"d0e212553/b.8","source_sha256":"b96dc12eb202283cd1a20f770746d04f6b9da85cb49f8aa6eb2fd17857081044"},"kind":"informal_heading","heading_level":2,"heading_text":"V. ARGUING ABOUT THE NUMBER OF REFERENCES COMBINED","host_section_id":"se_sg3joi2a"},{"id":"pb_sldqczoz","node_type":"prose_block","corpus_id":"mpep-e9r01-2024-html","opaque_url":"https://mpep.io/n/pb_sldqczoz","effective_range":{"start_revision":"R-01.2024","end_revision":null},"rendered_text_html":"<p id=\"d0e212963\">Reliance on a large number of references in a rejection does not,\n                        without more, weigh against the obviousness of the claimed invention. <i>In re\n                           Gorman,</i> 933 F.2d 982, 18 USPQ2d 1885 (Fed. Cir. 1991) (Court affirmed a\n                        rejection of a detailed claim to a candy sucker shaped like a thumb on a stick based on\n                        thirteen prior art references.).\n                     </p>","rendered_text_plain":"Reliance on a large number of references in a rejection does not, without more, weigh against the obviousness of the claimed invention. In re Gorman, 933 F.2d 982, 18 USPQ2d 1885 (Fed. Cir. 1991) (Court affirmed a rejection of a detailed claim to a candy sucker shaped like a thumb on a stick based on thirteen prior art references.).","provenance":{"source_file":"s2145.html","source_anchor":"d0e212963","source_sha256":"b96dc12eb202283cd1a20f770746d04f6b9da85cb49f8aa6eb2fd17857081044"},"kind":"narrative","host_section_id":"se_sg3joi2a"},{"id":"cs_375xku42","node_type":"case","corpus_id":"mpep-e9r01-2024-html","opaque_url":"https://mpep.io/n/cs_375xku42","effective_range":{"start_revision":"R-01.2024","end_revision":null},"rendered_text_html":"","rendered_text_plain":"In re Gorman, 933 F.2d 982 (1991)","provenance":{"source_file":"s2145.html","source_anchor":"","source_sha256":"b96dc12eb202283cd1a20f770746d04f6b9da85cb49f8aa6eb2fd17857081044"},"short_name":"In re Gorman","all_citations":["933 F.2d 982","18 USPQ2d 1885"],"canonical_citation":"In re Gorman, 933 F.2d 982, 18 USPQ2d 1885 (1991)","decision_year":1991,"court":"Fed. Cir."},{"id":"pb_wxv3agbr","node_type":"prose_block","corpus_id":"mpep-e9r01-2024-html","opaque_url":"https://mpep.io/n/pb_wxv3agbr","effective_range":{"start_revision":"R-01.2024","end_revision":null},"rendered_text_html":"<b id=\"\">VI.</b><b id=\"\"> ARGUING LIMITATIONS WHICH ARE NOT CLAIMED </b>","rendered_text_plain":"VI. ARGUING LIMITATIONS WHICH ARE NOT CLAIMED","provenance":{"source_file":"s2145.html","source_anchor":"d0e212553/b.10","source_sha256":"b96dc12eb202283cd1a20f770746d04f6b9da85cb49f8aa6eb2fd17857081044"},"kind":"informal_heading","heading_level":2,"heading_text":"VI. ARGUING LIMITATIONS WHICH ARE NOT CLAIMED","host_section_id":"se_sg3joi2a"},{"id":"pb_26q755xm","node_type":"prose_block","corpus_id":"mpep-e9r01-2024-html","opaque_url":"https://mpep.io/n/pb_26q755xm","effective_range":{"start_revision":"R-01.2024","end_revision":null},"rendered_text_html":"<p id=\"d0e212976\">Although the claims are interpreted in light of the specification,\n                        limitations from the specification are not read into the claims. <i>In re Van\n                           Geuns,</i> 988 F.2d 1181, 26 USPQ2d 1057 (Fed. Cir. 1993) (Claims to a\n                        superconducting magnet which generates a “uniform magnetic field” were not limited to\n                        the degree of magnetic field uniformity required for Nuclear Magnetic Resonance (NMR)\n                        imaging. Although the specification disclosed that the claimed magnet may be used in an\n                        NMR apparatus, the claims were not so limited.); <i>Constant v. Advanced\n                           Micro-Devices, Inc.,</i> 848 F.2d 1560, 1571-72, 7 USPQ2d 1057, 1064-1065 (Fed.\n                        Cir.), <i>cert. denied,</i> 488 U.S. 892 (1988) (Various limitations on\n                        which appellant relied were not stated in the claims; the specification did not provide\n                        evidence indicating these limitations must be read into the claims to give meaning to\n                        the disputed terms.); <i>Ex parte McCullough,</i> 7 USPQ2d 1889, 1891 (Bd.\n                        Pat. App. &amp; Inter. 1987) (Claimed electrode was rejected as obvious despite\n                        assertions that electrode functions differently than would be expected when used in\n                        nonaqueous battery since “although the demonstrated results may be germane to the\n                        patentability of a battery containing appellant’s electrode, they are not germane to the\n                        patentability of the invention claimed on appeal.”).\n                     </p>","rendered_text_plain":"Although the claims are interpreted in light of the specification, limitations from the specification are not read into the claims. In re Van Geuns, 988 F.2d 1181, 26 USPQ2d 1057 (Fed. Cir. 1993) (Claims to a superconducting magnet which generates a “uniform magnetic field” were not limited to the degree of magnetic field uniformity required for Nuclear Magnetic Resonance (NMR) imaging. Although the specification disclosed that the claimed magnet may be used in an NMR apparatus, the claims were not so limited.); Constant v. Advanced Micro-Devices, Inc., 848 F.2d 1560, 1571-72, 7 USPQ2d 1057, 1064-1065 (Fed. Cir.), cert. denied, 488 U.S. 892 (1988) (Various limitations on which appellant relied were not stated in the claims; the specification did not provide evidence indicating these limitations must be read into the claims to give meaning to the disputed terms.); Ex parte McCullough, 7 USPQ2d 1889, 1891 (Bd. Pat. App. & Inter. 1987) (Claimed electrode was rejected as obvious despite assertions that electrode functions differently than would be expected when used in nonaqueous battery since “although the demonstrated results may be germane to the patentability of a battery containing appellant’s electrode, they are not germane to the patentability of the invention claimed on appeal.”).","provenance":{"source_file":"s2145.html","source_anchor":"d0e212976","source_sha256":"b96dc12eb202283cd1a20f770746d04f6b9da85cb49f8aa6eb2fd17857081044"},"kind":"narrative","host_section_id":"se_sg3joi2a"},{"id":"cs_iepjp7sm","node_type":"case","corpus_id":"mpep-e9r01-2024-html","opaque_url":"https://mpep.io/n/cs_iepjp7sm","effective_range":{"start_revision":"R-01.2024","end_revision":null},"rendered_text_html":"","rendered_text_plain":"In re Van Geuns, 988 F.2d 1181 (1993)","provenance":{"source_file":"s2145.html","source_anchor":"","source_sha256":"b96dc12eb202283cd1a20f770746d04f6b9da85cb49f8aa6eb2fd17857081044"},"short_name":"In re Van Geuns","all_citations":["988 F.2d 1181","26 USPQ2d 1057"],"canonical_citation":"In re Van Geuns, 988 F.2d 1181, 26 USPQ2d 1057 (1993)","decision_year":1993,"court":"Fed. Cir."},{"id":"cs_y6y22bzu","node_type":"case","corpus_id":"mpep-e9r01-2024-html","opaque_url":"https://mpep.io/n/cs_y6y22bzu","effective_range":{"start_revision":"R-01.2024","end_revision":null},"rendered_text_html":"","rendered_text_plain":"Constant v. Advanced Micro-Devices, Inc., 848 F.2d 1560 (1988)","provenance":{"source_file":"s2145.html","source_anchor":"","source_sha256":"b96dc12eb202283cd1a20f770746d04f6b9da85cb49f8aa6eb2fd17857081044"},"short_name":"Constant v. Advanced Micro-Devices, Inc.","all_citations":["848 F.2d 1560","7 USPQ2d 1057"],"canonical_citation":"Constant v. Advanced Micro-Devices, Inc., 848 F.2d 1560, 7 USPQ2d 1057 (1988)","decision_year":1988,"court":"Fed. Cir."},{"id":"cs_d2zwi2h5","node_type":"case","corpus_id":"mpep-e9r01-2024-html","opaque_url":"https://mpep.io/n/cs_d2zwi2h5","effective_range":{"start_revision":"R-01.2024","end_revision":null},"rendered_text_html":"","rendered_text_plain":"Ex parte McCullough, 7 USPQ2d 1889 (1987)","provenance":{"source_file":"s2145.html","source_anchor":"","source_sha256":"b96dc12eb202283cd1a20f770746d04f6b9da85cb49f8aa6eb2fd17857081044"},"short_name":"Ex parte McCullough","all_citations":["7 USPQ2d 1889"],"canonical_citation":"Ex parte McCullough, 7 USPQ2d 1889 (1987)","decision_year":1987,"court":"BPAI"},{"id":"pb_oc6ulhef","node_type":"prose_block","corpus_id":"mpep-e9r01-2024-html","opaque_url":"https://mpep.io/n/pb_oc6ulhef","effective_range":{"start_revision":"R-01.2024","end_revision":null},"rendered_text_html":"<p id=\"d0e213000\">See <b><a href=\"s2111.html#d0e200352\">MPEP\n                              § 2111</a></b> - <b><a href=\"s2116.html#d0e201660\">§ 2116.01</a></b>, for additional case law\n                        relevant to claim interpretation.\n                     </p>","rendered_text_plain":"See MPEP § 2111 - § 2116.01, for additional case law relevant to claim interpretation.","provenance":{"source_file":"s2145.html","source_anchor":"d0e213000","source_sha256":"b96dc12eb202283cd1a20f770746d04f6b9da85cb49f8aa6eb2fd17857081044"},"kind":"narrative","host_section_id":"se_sg3joi2a"},{"id":"se_nbb4kbct","node_type":"section","corpus_id":"mpep-e9r01-2024-html","opaque_url":"https://mpep.io/n/se_nbb4kbct","effective_range":{"start_revision":"R-01.2024","end_revision":null},"rendered_text_html":"","rendered_text_plain":"","provenance":{"source_file":"s2145.html","source_anchor":"stub-2111","source_sha256":"b96dc12eb202283cd1a20f770746d04f6b9da85cb49f8aa6eb2fd17857081044"},"akn_urn":"/akn/us/statement/manual/uspto/2024/mpep/eng@2024-02-29!sec_2111","canonical_url":"https://mpep.io/akn/us/statement/manual/uspto/2024/mpep/eng@2024-02-29!sec_2111","section_number":"2111","chapter":"2100","depth":0,"title":"Section 2111","children_ids":[]},{"id":"se_ed35z3w5","node_type":"section","corpus_id":"mpep-e9r01-2024-html","opaque_url":"https://mpep.io/n/se_ed35z3w5","effective_range":{"start_revision":"R-01.2024","end_revision":null},"rendered_text_html":"","rendered_text_plain":"","provenance":{"source_file":"s2145.html","source_anchor":"stub-2116","source_sha256":"b96dc12eb202283cd1a20f770746d04f6b9da85cb49f8aa6eb2fd17857081044"},"akn_urn":"/akn/us/statement/manual/uspto/2024/mpep/eng@2024-02-29!sec_2116","canonical_url":"https://mpep.io/akn/us/statement/manual/uspto/2024/mpep/eng@2024-02-29!sec_2116","section_number":"2116","chapter":"2100","depth":0,"title":"Section 2116","children_ids":[]},{"id":"pb_q2wkce5q","node_type":"prose_block","corpus_id":"mpep-e9r01-2024-html","opaque_url":"https://mpep.io/n/pb_q2wkce5q","effective_range":{"start_revision":"R-01.2024","end_revision":null},"rendered_text_html":"<b id=\"\">VII.</b><b id=\"\"> ARGUING ECONOMIC INFEASIBILITY </b>","rendered_text_plain":"VII. ARGUING ECONOMIC INFEASIBILITY","provenance":{"source_file":"s2145.html","source_anchor":"d0e212553/b.12","source_sha256":"b96dc12eb202283cd1a20f770746d04f6b9da85cb49f8aa6eb2fd17857081044"},"kind":"informal_heading","heading_level":2,"heading_text":"VII. ARGUING ECONOMIC INFEASIBILITY","host_section_id":"se_sg3joi2a"},{"id":"pb_mjk2mg6h","node_type":"prose_block","corpus_id":"mpep-e9r01-2024-html","opaque_url":"https://mpep.io/n/pb_mjk2mg6h","effective_range":{"start_revision":"R-01.2024","end_revision":null},"rendered_text_html":"<p id=\"d0e213013\">The fact that a \"combination would not be made by businessmen for\n                        economic reasons\" does not mean that a person of ordinary skill in the art would not\n                        make the combination because of some technological incompatibility. <i>In re\n                           Farrenkopf,</i> 713 F.2d 714, 718, 219&nbsp;USPQ 1, 4 (Fed. Cir. 1983) (Prior art\n                        reference taught that addition of inhibitors to radioimmunoassay is the most convenient,\n                        but costliest solution to stability problem. The court held that the additional expense\n                        associated with the addition of inhibitors would not discourage one of ordinary skill in\n                        the art from seeking the convenience expected therefrom.).\n                     </p>","rendered_text_plain":"The fact that a \"combination would not be made by businessmen for economic reasons\" does not mean that a person of ordinary skill in the art would not make the combination because of some technological incompatibility. In re Farrenkopf, 713 F.2d 714, 718, 219 USPQ 1, 4 (Fed. Cir. 1983) (Prior art reference taught that addition of inhibitors to radioimmunoassay is the most convenient, but costliest solution to stability problem. The court held that the additional expense associated with the addition of inhibitors would not discourage one of ordinary skill in the art from seeking the convenience expected therefrom.).","provenance":{"source_file":"s2145.html","source_anchor":"d0e213013","source_sha256":"b96dc12eb202283cd1a20f770746d04f6b9da85cb49f8aa6eb2fd17857081044"},"kind":"narrative","host_section_id":"se_sg3joi2a"},{"id":"cs_yh5ifmgs","node_type":"case","corpus_id":"mpep-e9r01-2024-html","opaque_url":"https://mpep.io/n/cs_yh5ifmgs","effective_range":{"start_revision":"R-01.2024","end_revision":null},"rendered_text_html":"","rendered_text_plain":"In re Farrenkopf, 713 F.2d 714 (1983)","provenance":{"source_file":"s2145.html","source_anchor":"","source_sha256":"b96dc12eb202283cd1a20f770746d04f6b9da85cb49f8aa6eb2fd17857081044"},"short_name":"In re Farrenkopf","all_citations":["713 F.2d 714","219 USPQ 1"],"canonical_citation":"In re Farrenkopf, 713 F.2d 714, 219 USPQ 1 (1983)","decision_year":1983,"court":"Fed. Cir."},{"id":"pb_oecaaokt","node_type":"prose_block","corpus_id":"mpep-e9r01-2024-html","opaque_url":"https://mpep.io/n/pb_oecaaokt","effective_range":{"start_revision":"R-01.2024","end_revision":null},"rendered_text_html":"<b id=\"\">VIII.</b><b id=\"\"> ARGUING ABOUT THE AGE OF REFERENCES </b>","rendered_text_plain":"VIII. ARGUING ABOUT THE AGE OF REFERENCES","provenance":{"source_file":"s2145.html","source_anchor":"d0e212553/b.14","source_sha256":"b96dc12eb202283cd1a20f770746d04f6b9da85cb49f8aa6eb2fd17857081044"},"kind":"informal_heading","heading_level":2,"heading_text":"VIII. ARGUING ABOUT THE AGE OF REFERENCES","host_section_id":"se_sg3joi2a"},{"id":"pb_dxl3ywjr","node_type":"prose_block","corpus_id":"mpep-e9r01-2024-html","opaque_url":"https://mpep.io/n/pb_dxl3ywjr","effective_range":{"start_revision":"R-01.2024","end_revision":null},"rendered_text_html":"<p id=\"d0e213026\">“The mere age of the references is not persuasive of the unobviousness\n                        of the combination of their teachings, absent evidence that, notwithstanding knowledge\n                        of the references, the art tried and failed to solve the problem.” <i>In re\n                           Wright,</i> 569 F.2d 1124, 1127, 193 USPQ 332, 335 (CCPA 1977) (100 year old\n                        patent was properly relied upon in a rejection based on a combination of references.).\n                        See also <i>Ex parte Meyer,</i> 6 USPQ2d 1966 (Bd. Pat. App. &amp; Inter.\n                        1988) (length of time between the issuance of prior art patents relied upon (1920 and\n                        1976) was not persuasive of nonobviousness).\n                     </p>","rendered_text_plain":"“The mere age of the references is not persuasive of the unobviousness of the combination of their teachings, absent evidence that, notwithstanding knowledge of the references, the art tried and failed to solve the problem.” In re Wright, 569 F.2d 1124, 1127, 193 USPQ 332, 335 (CCPA 1977) (100 year old patent was properly relied upon in a rejection based on a combination of references.). See also Ex parte Meyer, 6 USPQ2d 1966 (Bd. Pat. App. & Inter. 1988) (length of time between the issuance of prior art patents relied upon (1920 and 1976) was not persuasive of nonobviousness).","provenance":{"source_file":"s2145.html","source_anchor":"d0e213026","source_sha256":"b96dc12eb202283cd1a20f770746d04f6b9da85cb49f8aa6eb2fd17857081044"},"kind":"narrative","host_section_id":"se_sg3joi2a"},{"id":"cs_bp2hjch3","node_type":"case","corpus_id":"mpep-e9r01-2024-html","opaque_url":"https://mpep.io/n/cs_bp2hjch3","effective_range":{"start_revision":"R-01.2024","end_revision":null},"rendered_text_html":"","rendered_text_plain":"In re Wright, 569 F.2d 1124 (1977)","provenance":{"source_file":"s2145.html","source_anchor":"","source_sha256":"b96dc12eb202283cd1a20f770746d04f6b9da85cb49f8aa6eb2fd17857081044"},"short_name":"In re Wright","all_citations":["569 F.2d 1124","193 USPQ 332"],"canonical_citation":"In re Wright, 569 F.2d 1124, 193 USPQ 332 (1977)","decision_year":1977,"court":"CCPA"},{"id":"cs_esfwyjrh","node_type":"case","corpus_id":"mpep-e9r01-2024-html","opaque_url":"https://mpep.io/n/cs_esfwyjrh","effective_range":{"start_revision":"R-01.2024","end_revision":null},"rendered_text_html":"","rendered_text_plain":"Ex parte Meyer, 6 USPQ2d 1966 (1988)","provenance":{"source_file":"s2145.html","source_anchor":"","source_sha256":"b96dc12eb202283cd1a20f770746d04f6b9da85cb49f8aa6eb2fd17857081044"},"short_name":"Ex parte Meyer","all_citations":["6 USPQ2d 1966"],"canonical_citation":"Ex parte Meyer, 6 USPQ2d 1966 (1988)","decision_year":1988,"court":"BPAI"},{"id":"pb_qnsmqbnl","node_type":"prose_block","corpus_id":"mpep-e9r01-2024-html","opaque_url":"https://mpep.io/n/pb_qnsmqbnl","effective_range":{"start_revision":"R-01.2024","end_revision":null},"rendered_text_html":"<b id=\"\">IX.</b><b id=\"\"> ARGUING THAT PRIOR ART IS NONANALOGOUS</b>","rendered_text_plain":"IX. ARGUING THAT PRIOR ART IS NONANALOGOUS","provenance":{"source_file":"s2145.html","source_anchor":"d0e212553/b.16","source_sha256":"b96dc12eb202283cd1a20f770746d04f6b9da85cb49f8aa6eb2fd17857081044"},"kind":"informal_heading","heading_level":2,"heading_text":"IX. ARGUING THAT PRIOR ART IS NONANALOGOUS","host_section_id":"se_sg3joi2a"},{"id":"pb_obt4otum","node_type":"prose_block","corpus_id":"mpep-e9r01-2024-html","opaque_url":"https://mpep.io/n/pb_obt4otum","effective_range":{"start_revision":"R-01.2024","end_revision":null},"rendered_text_html":"<p id=\"d0e213048\">See <b><a href=\"s2141.html#d0e208985\">MPEP\n                              § 2141.01(a)</a></b> for case law pertaining to analogous art.\n                     </p>","rendered_text_plain":"See MPEP § 2141.01(a) for case law pertaining to analogous art.","provenance":{"source_file":"s2145.html","source_anchor":"d0e213048","source_sha256":"b96dc12eb202283cd1a20f770746d04f6b9da85cb49f8aa6eb2fd17857081044"},"kind":"narrative","host_section_id":"se_sg3joi2a"},{"id":"se_66hro5fg","node_type":"section","corpus_id":"mpep-e9r01-2024-html","opaque_url":"https://mpep.io/n/se_66hro5fg","effective_range":{"start_revision":"R-01.2024","end_revision":null},"rendered_text_html":"","rendered_text_plain":"","provenance":{"source_file":"s2145.html","source_anchor":"stub-2141","source_sha256":"b96dc12eb202283cd1a20f770746d04f6b9da85cb49f8aa6eb2fd17857081044"},"akn_urn":"/akn/us/statement/manual/uspto/2024/mpep/eng@2024-02-29!sec_2141","canonical_url":"https://mpep.io/akn/us/statement/manual/uspto/2024/mpep/eng@2024-02-29!sec_2141","section_number":"2141","chapter":"2100","depth":0,"title":"Section 2141","children_ids":[]},{"id":"pb_4nentnh4","node_type":"prose_block","corpus_id":"mpep-e9r01-2024-html","opaque_url":"https://mpep.io/n/pb_4nentnh4","effective_range":{"start_revision":"R-01.2024","end_revision":null},"rendered_text_html":"<b id=\"\">X.</b><b id=\"\"> ARGUING IMPROPER RATIONALES FOR COMBINING REFERENCES</b>","rendered_text_plain":"X. ARGUING IMPROPER RATIONALES FOR COMBINING REFERENCES","provenance":{"source_file":"s2145.html","source_anchor":"d0e212553/b.18","source_sha256":"b96dc12eb202283cd1a20f770746d04f6b9da85cb49f8aa6eb2fd17857081044"},"kind":"informal_heading","heading_level":2,"heading_text":"X. ARGUING IMPROPER RATIONALES FOR COMBINING REFERENCES","host_section_id":"se_sg3joi2a"},{"id":"ls_z3j2lwog","node_type":"list","corpus_id":"mpep-e9r01-2024-html","opaque_url":"https://mpep.io/n/ls_z3j2lwog","effective_range":{"start_revision":"R-01.2024","end_revision":null},"rendered_text_html":"","rendered_text_plain":"","provenance":{"source_file":"s2145.html","source_anchor":"d0e212553/ul.1","source_sha256":"b96dc12eb202283cd1a20f770746d04f6b9da85cb49f8aa6eb2fd17857081044"},"enumerator_style":"no_enumerator","host_section_id":"se_sg3joi2a","parent_list_item_id":null,"item_ids":["li_y5fec4t5"],"nesting_depth":1},{"id":"li_y5fec4t5","node_type":"list_item","corpus_id":"mpep-e9r01-2024-html","opaque_url":"https://mpep.io/n/li_y5fec4t5","effective_range":{"start_revision":"R-01.2024","end_revision":null},"rendered_text_html":"","rendered_text_plain":"","provenance":{"source_file":"s2145.html","source_anchor":"d0e212553/ul.1/li.0","source_sha256":"b96dc12eb202283cd1a20f770746d04f6b9da85cb49f8aa6eb2fd17857081044"},"parent_list_id":"ls_z3j2lwog","enumerator_label":"","enumerator_ordinal":0},{"id":"pb_mwid32oy","node_type":"prose_block","corpus_id":"mpep-e9r01-2024-html","opaque_url":"https://mpep.io/n/pb_mwid32oy","effective_range":{"start_revision":"R-01.2024","end_revision":null},"rendered_text_html":"<b id=\"\"><i>A. </i></b><b id=\"\"><i> Impermissible Hindsight</i></b>","rendered_text_plain":"A. Impermissible Hindsight","provenance":{"source_file":"s2145.html","source_anchor":"d0e212553/b.20","source_sha256":"b96dc12eb202283cd1a20f770746d04f6b9da85cb49f8aa6eb2fd17857081044"},"kind":"informal_heading","heading_level":2,"heading_text":"A. Impermissible Hindsight","host_section_id":"se_sg3joi2a"},{"id":"pb_z7ocua2u","node_type":"prose_block","corpus_id":"mpep-e9r01-2024-html","opaque_url":"https://mpep.io/n/pb_z7ocua2u","effective_range":{"start_revision":"R-01.2024","end_revision":null},"rendered_text_html":"<p id=\"d0e213062\">Applicants may argue that the examiner’s conclusion of obviousness\n                        is based on improper hindsight reasoning. However, “[a]ny judgment on obviousness is\n                        in a sense necessarily a reconstruction based on hindsight reasoning, but so long as\n                        it takes into account only knowledge which was within the level of ordinary skill in\n                        the art at the time the claimed invention was made and does not include knowledge\n                        gleaned only from applicant’s disclosure, such a reconstruction is proper.”\n                        <i>In re McLaughlin,</i> 443 F.2d 1392, 1395, 170 USPQ 209, 212 (CCPA\n                        1971). “A factfinder should be aware, of course, of the distortion caused by\n                        hindsight bias and must be cautious of arguments reliant upon ex post reasoning. . .\n                        . Rigid preventative rules that deny factfinders recourse to common sense, however,\n                        are neither necessary under our case law nor consistent with it.” <i>KSR Int'l\n                           Co. v. Teleflex Inc.,</i> 550 U.S. 398, 421, 82 USPQ2d 1385, 1397 (2007)\n                        (internal quotations omitted). Applicants may also argue that the combination of two\n                        or more references is “hindsight” because “express” motivation to combine the\n                        references is lacking. However, there is no requirement that an “express, written\n                        motivation to combine must appear in prior art references before a finding of\n                        obviousness.” <i>Ruiz v. A.B. Chance Co.,</i> 357 F.3d 1270, 1276, 69\n                        USPQ2d 1686, 1690 (Fed. Cir. 2004). See <i>KSR,</i> 550 U.S. at 402, 82\n                        USPQ2d at 1389 (“The diversity of inventive pursuits and of modern technology\n                        counsels against confining the obviousness analysis by a formalistic conception of\n                        the words teaching, suggestion, and motivation, or by overemphasizing the importance\n                        of published articles and the explicit content of issued patents.”) See also\n                        <i>Uber Techs., Inc. v. X One, Inc.,</i> 957 F.3d 1334, 1339-40, 2020\n                        USPQ2d 10476 (Fed. Cir. 2020) (“[W]e hold that the Board erred when it determined\n                        that a person of ordinary skill in the art would not have been motivated to combine\n                        the teachings of Okubo with Konishi's server-side plotting to render obvious the\n                        limitation ‘software ... to transmit the map with plotted locations to the first\n                        individual.’ This combination does not represent ‘impermissible hindsight’…. Rather,\n                        because Okubo's terminal-side plotting and Konishi's server-side plotting were both\n                        well known in the art, and were the only two identified, predictable solutions for\n                        transmitting a map and plotting locations, it would have been obvious to substitute\n                        server-side plotting for terminal-side plotting in a combination of Okubo and\n                        Konishi.”). \n                     </p>","rendered_text_plain":"Applicants may argue that the examiner’s conclusion of obviousness is based on improper hindsight reasoning. However, “[a]ny judgment on obviousness is in a sense necessarily a reconstruction based on hindsight reasoning, but so long as it takes into account only knowledge which was within the level of ordinary skill in the art at the time the claimed invention was made and does not include knowledge gleaned only from applicant’s disclosure, such a reconstruction is proper.” In re McLaughlin, 443 F.2d 1392, 1395, 170 USPQ 209, 212 (CCPA 1971). “A factfinder should be aware, of course, of the distortion caused by hindsight bias and must be cautious of arguments reliant upon ex post reasoning. . . . Rigid preventative rules that deny factfinders recourse to common sense, however, are neither necessary under our case law nor consistent with it.” KSR Int'l Co. v. Teleflex Inc., 550 U.S. 398, 421, 82 USPQ2d 1385, 1397 (2007) (internal quotations omitted). Applicants may also argue that the combination of two or more references is “hindsight” because “express” motivation to combine the references is lacking. However, there is no requirement that an “express, written motivation to combine must appear in prior art references before a finding of obviousness.” Ruiz v. A.B. Chance Co., 357 F.3d 1270, 1276, 69 USPQ2d 1686, 1690 (Fed. Cir. 2004). See KSR, 550 U.S. at 402, 82 USPQ2d at 1389 (“The diversity of inventive pursuits and of modern technology counsels against confining the obviousness analysis by a formalistic conception of the words teaching, suggestion, and motivation, or by overemphasizing the importance of published articles and the explicit content of issued patents.”) See also Uber Techs., Inc. v. X One, Inc., 957 F.3d 1334, 1339-40, 2020 USPQ2d 10476 (Fed. Cir. 2020) (“[W]e hold that the Board erred when it determined that a person of ordinary skill in the art would not have been motivated to combine the teachings of Okubo with Konishi's server-side plotting to render obvious the limitation ‘software ... to transmit the map with plotted locations to the first individual.’ This combination does not represent ‘impermissible hindsight’…. Rather, because Okubo's terminal-side plotting and Konishi's server-side plotting were both well known in the art, and were the only two identified, predictable solutions for transmitting a map and plotting locations, it would have been obvious to substitute server-side plotting for terminal-side plotting in a combination of Okubo and Konishi.”).","provenance":{"source_file":"s2145.html","source_anchor":"d0e213062","source_sha256":"b96dc12eb202283cd1a20f770746d04f6b9da85cb49f8aa6eb2fd17857081044"},"kind":"narrative","host_section_id":"se_sg3joi2a"},{"id":"cs_uw45ndg6","node_type":"case","corpus_id":"mpep-e9r01-2024-html","opaque_url":"https://mpep.io/n/cs_uw45ndg6","effective_range":{"start_revision":"R-01.2024","end_revision":null},"rendered_text_html":"","rendered_text_plain":"In re McLaughlin, 443 F.2d 1392 (1971)","provenance":{"source_file":"s2145.html","source_anchor":"","source_sha256":"b96dc12eb202283cd1a20f770746d04f6b9da85cb49f8aa6eb2fd17857081044"},"short_name":"In re McLaughlin","all_citations":["443 F.2d 1392","170 USPQ 209"],"canonical_citation":"In re McLaughlin, 443 F.2d 1392, 170 USPQ 209 (1971)","decision_year":1971,"court":"CCPA"},{"id":"cs_gyaikujm","node_type":"case","corpus_id":"mpep-e9r01-2024-html","opaque_url":"https://mpep.io/n/cs_gyaikujm","effective_range":{"start_revision":"R-01.2024","end_revision":null},"rendered_text_html":"","rendered_text_plain":"KSR Int'l Co. v. Teleflex Inc., 550 U.S. 398 (2007)","provenance":{"source_file":"s2145.html","source_anchor":"","source_sha256":"b96dc12eb202283cd1a20f770746d04f6b9da85cb49f8aa6eb2fd17857081044"},"short_name":"KSR Int'l Co. v. Teleflex Inc.","all_citations":["550 U.S. 398","82 USPQ2d 1385"],"canonical_citation":"KSR Int'l Co. v. Teleflex Inc., 550 U.S. 398, 82 USPQ2d 1385 (2007)","decision_year":2007,"court":"SCOTUS"},{"id":"cs_an5iqdnz","node_type":"case","corpus_id":"mpep-e9r01-2024-html","opaque_url":"https://mpep.io/n/cs_an5iqdnz","effective_range":{"start_revision":"R-01.2024","end_revision":null},"rendered_text_html":"","rendered_text_plain":"Ruiz v. A.B. Chance Co., 357 F.3d 1270 (2004)","provenance":{"source_file":"s2145.html","source_anchor":"","source_sha256":"b96dc12eb202283cd1a20f770746d04f6b9da85cb49f8aa6eb2fd17857081044"},"short_name":"Ruiz v. A.B. Chance Co.","all_citations":["357 F.3d 1270","69 USPQ2d 1686"],"canonical_citation":"Ruiz v. A.B. Chance Co., 357 F.3d 1270, 69 USPQ2d 1686 (2004)","decision_year":2004,"court":"Fed. Cir."},{"id":"cs_oandc7s7","node_type":"case","corpus_id":"mpep-e9r01-2024-html","opaque_url":"https://mpep.io/n/cs_oandc7s7","effective_range":{"start_revision":"R-01.2024","end_revision":null},"rendered_text_html":"","rendered_text_plain":"Uber Techs., Inc. v. X One, Inc., 957 F.3d 1334 (2020)","provenance":{"source_file":"s2145.html","source_anchor":"","source_sha256":"b96dc12eb202283cd1a20f770746d04f6b9da85cb49f8aa6eb2fd17857081044"},"short_name":"Uber Techs., Inc. v. X One, Inc.","all_citations":["957 F.3d 1334","2020 USPQ2d 10476"],"canonical_citation":"Uber Techs., Inc. v. X One, Inc., 957 F.3d 1334, 2020 USPQ2d 10476 (2020)","decision_year":2020,"court":"Fed. Cir."},{"id":"pb_g5opb6kq","node_type":"prose_block","corpus_id":"mpep-e9r01-2024-html","opaque_url":"https://mpep.io/n/pb_g5opb6kq","effective_range":{"start_revision":"R-01.2024","end_revision":null},"rendered_text_html":"<p id=\"ch2100_p_35bcf_1752f_1b3\">See <b><a href=\"s2141.html#d0e208143\">MPEP § 2141</a></b> and\n                        <b><a href=\"s2143.html#d0e209516\">§\n                              2143</a></b> for guidance regarding establishment of a\n                        <i>prima facie </i> case of obviousness.\n                     </p>","rendered_text_plain":"See MPEP § 2141 and § 2143 for guidance regarding establishment of a prima facie case of obviousness.","provenance":{"source_file":"s2145.html","source_anchor":"ch2100_p_35bcf_1752f_1b3","source_sha256":"b96dc12eb202283cd1a20f770746d04f6b9da85cb49f8aa6eb2fd17857081044"},"kind":"narrative","host_section_id":"se_sg3joi2a"},{"id":"pb_bchxxfv7","node_type":"prose_block","corpus_id":"mpep-e9r01-2024-html","opaque_url":"https://mpep.io/n/pb_bchxxfv7","effective_range":{"start_revision":"R-01.2024","end_revision":null},"rendered_text_html":"<b id=\"\"><i>B. </i></b><b id=\"\"><i> Obvious To Try Rationale</i></b>","rendered_text_plain":"B. Obvious To Try Rationale","provenance":{"source_file":"s2145.html","source_anchor":"d0e212553/b.22","source_sha256":"b96dc12eb202283cd1a20f770746d04f6b9da85cb49f8aa6eb2fd17857081044"},"kind":"informal_heading","heading_level":2,"heading_text":"B. Obvious To Try Rationale","host_section_id":"se_sg3joi2a"},{"id":"pb_wealuhy7","node_type":"prose_block","corpus_id":"mpep-e9r01-2024-html","opaque_url":"https://mpep.io/n/pb_wealuhy7","effective_range":{"start_revision":"R-01.2024","end_revision":null},"rendered_text_html":"<p id=\"d0e213091\">An applicant may argue the examiner is applying an improper “obvious\n                        to try” rationale in support of an obviousness rejection. \n                     </p>","rendered_text_plain":"An applicant may argue the examiner is applying an improper “obvious to try” rationale in support of an obviousness rejection.","provenance":{"source_file":"s2145.html","source_anchor":"d0e213091","source_sha256":"b96dc12eb202283cd1a20f770746d04f6b9da85cb49f8aa6eb2fd17857081044"},"kind":"narrative","host_section_id":"se_sg3joi2a"},{"id":"pb_6qjd43wh","node_type":"prose_block","corpus_id":"mpep-e9r01-2024-html","opaque_url":"https://mpep.io/n/pb_6qjd43wh","effective_range":{"start_revision":"R-01.2024","end_revision":null},"rendered_text_html":"<p id=\"d0e213094\">An “obvious to try” rationale may support a conclusion that a claim\n                        would have been obvious where one skilled in the art is choosing from a finite number\n                        of identified, predictable solutions, with a reasonable expectation of success. “ [A]\n                        person of ordinary skill has good reason to pursue the known options within his or\n                        her technical grasp. If this leads to the anticipated success, it is likely that\n                        product [was] not of innovation but of ordinary skill and common sense. In that\n                        instance the fact that a combination was obvious to try might show that it was\n                        obvious under <b><a href=\"mpep-9015-appx-l.html#d0e302450\">§\n                              103</a></b>.” <i>KSR Int'l Co. v. Teleflex Inc.,</i> 550\n                        U.S. 398, 421, 82 USPQ2d 1385, 1397 (2007).\n                     </p>","rendered_text_plain":"An “obvious to try” rationale may support a conclusion that a claim would have been obvious where one skilled in the art is choosing from a finite number of identified, predictable solutions, with a reasonable expectation of success. “ [A] person of ordinary skill has good reason to pursue the known options within his or her technical grasp. If this leads to the anticipated success, it is likely that product [was] not of innovation but of ordinary skill and common sense. In that instance the fact that a combination was obvious to try might show that it was obvious under § 103.” KSR Int'l Co. v. Teleflex Inc., 550 U.S. 398, 421, 82 USPQ2d 1385, 1397 (2007).","provenance":{"source_file":"s2145.html","source_anchor":"d0e213094","source_sha256":"b96dc12eb202283cd1a20f770746d04f6b9da85cb49f8aa6eb2fd17857081044"},"kind":"narrative","host_section_id":"se_sg3joi2a"},{"id":"pb_c55njbzm","node_type":"prose_block","corpus_id":"mpep-e9r01-2024-html","opaque_url":"https://mpep.io/n/pb_c55njbzm","effective_range":{"start_revision":"R-01.2024","end_revision":null},"rendered_text_html":"<p id=\"d0e213102\">“The admonition that ‘obvious to try’ is not the standard under\n                        <b><a href=\"mpep-9015-appx-l.html#al_d1fbe1_19797_b0\">§\n                              103</a></b> has been directed mainly at two kinds of error. In some\n                        cases, what would have been ‘obvious to try’ would have been to vary all parameters\n                        or try each of numerous possible choices until one possibly arrived at a successful\n                        result, where the prior art gave either no indication of which parameters were\n                        critical or no direction as to which of many possible choices is likely to be\n                        successful.... In others, what was ‘obvious to try’ was to explore a new technology\n                        or general approach that seemed to be a promising field of experimentation, where the\n                        prior art gave only general guidance as to the particular form of the claimed\n                        invention or how to achieve it.” <i>In re O’Farrell,</i> 853 F.2d 894,\n                        903, 7 USPQ2d 1673, 1681 (Fed. Cir. 1988) (citations omitted) (The court held the\n                        claimed method would have been obvious over the prior art relied upon because one\n                        reference contained a detailed enabling methodology, a suggestion to modify the prior\n                        art to produce the claimed invention, and evidence suggesting the modification would\n                        be successful.). \n                     </p>","rendered_text_plain":"“The admonition that ‘obvious to try’ is not the standard under § 103 has been directed mainly at two kinds of error. In some cases, what would have been ‘obvious to try’ would have been to vary all parameters or try each of numerous possible choices until one possibly arrived at a successful result, where the prior art gave either no indication of which parameters were critical or no direction as to which of many possible choices is likely to be successful.... In others, what was ‘obvious to try’ was to explore a new technology or general approach that seemed to be a promising field of experimentation, where the prior art gave only general guidance as to the particular form of the claimed invention or how to achieve it.” In re O’Farrell, 853 F.2d 894, 903, 7 USPQ2d 1673, 1681 (Fed. Cir. 1988) (citations omitted) (The court held the claimed method would have been obvious over the prior art relied upon because one reference contained a detailed enabling methodology, a suggestion to modify the prior art to produce the claimed invention, and evidence suggesting the modification would be successful.).","provenance":{"source_file":"s2145.html","source_anchor":"d0e213102","source_sha256":"b96dc12eb202283cd1a20f770746d04f6b9da85cb49f8aa6eb2fd17857081044"},"kind":"narrative","host_section_id":"se_sg3joi2a"},{"id":"cs_euexw2x2","node_type":"case","corpus_id":"mpep-e9r01-2024-html","opaque_url":"https://mpep.io/n/cs_euexw2x2","effective_range":{"start_revision":"R-01.2024","end_revision":null},"rendered_text_html":"","rendered_text_plain":"In re O’Farrell, 853 F.2d 894 (1988)","provenance":{"source_file":"s2145.html","source_anchor":"","source_sha256":"b96dc12eb202283cd1a20f770746d04f6b9da85cb49f8aa6eb2fd17857081044"},"short_name":"In re O’Farrell","all_citations":["853 F.2d 894","7 USPQ2d 1673"],"canonical_citation":"In re O’Farrell, 853 F.2d 894, 7 USPQ2d 1673 (1988)","decision_year":1988,"court":"Fed. Cir."},{"id":"pb_43zesqxa","node_type":"prose_block","corpus_id":"mpep-e9r01-2024-html","opaque_url":"https://mpep.io/n/pb_43zesqxa","effective_range":{"start_revision":"R-01.2024","end_revision":null},"rendered_text_html":"<b id=\"\"><i>C. </i></b><b id=\"\"><i> Lack of Suggestion To Combine References</i></b>","rendered_text_plain":"C. Lack of Suggestion To Combine References","provenance":{"source_file":"s2145.html","source_anchor":"d0e212553/b.24","source_sha256":"b96dc12eb202283cd1a20f770746d04f6b9da85cb49f8aa6eb2fd17857081044"},"kind":"informal_heading","heading_level":2,"heading_text":"C. Lack of Suggestion To Combine References","host_section_id":"se_sg3joi2a"},{"id":"pb_62dinulf","node_type":"prose_block","corpus_id":"mpep-e9r01-2024-html","opaque_url":"https://mpep.io/n/pb_62dinulf","effective_range":{"start_revision":"R-01.2024","end_revision":null},"rendered_text_html":"<p id=\"d0e213116\">A teaching, suggestion, or motivation to combine references that is\n                        found in the prior art is an appropriate rationale for determining obviousness.\n                        <i>KSR,</i> 550 U.S. at 418, 82 USPQ2d at 1396. However, it is just\n                        one of a number of valid rationales for doing so. The Court in <i>KSR</i>\n                        identified several exemplary rationales to support a conclusion of obviousness which\n                        are consistent with the proper “functional approach” to the determination of\n                        obviousness as laid down in <i>Graham.</i><i>KSR,</i> 550 U.S. at 415-21, 82 USPQ2d at 1395-97. See\n                        <b><a href=\"s2141.html#d0e208143\">MPEP §\n                              2141</a></b> and <b><a href=\"s2143.html#d0e209516\">§ 2143</a></b>.\n                     </p>","rendered_text_plain":"A teaching, suggestion, or motivation to combine references that is found in the prior art is an appropriate rationale for determining obviousness. KSR, 550 U.S. at 418, 82 USPQ2d at 1396. However, it is just one of a number of valid rationales for doing so. The Court in KSR identified several exemplary rationales to support a conclusion of obviousness which are consistent with the proper “functional approach” to the determination of obviousness as laid down in Graham.KSR, 550 U.S. at 415-21, 82 USPQ2d at 1395-97. See MPEP § 2141 and § 2143.","provenance":{"source_file":"s2145.html","source_anchor":"d0e213116","source_sha256":"b96dc12eb202283cd1a20f770746d04f6b9da85cb49f8aa6eb2fd17857081044"},"kind":"narrative","host_section_id":"se_sg3joi2a"},{"id":"pb_ibxmi4cp","node_type":"prose_block","corpus_id":"mpep-e9r01-2024-html","opaque_url":"https://mpep.io/n/pb_ibxmi4cp","effective_range":{"start_revision":"R-01.2024","end_revision":null},"rendered_text_html":"<b id=\"\"><i>D. </i></b><b id=\"\"><i> References Teach Away from the Invention or Render Prior Art\n                           Unsatisfactory for Intended Purpose</i></b>","rendered_text_plain":"D. References Teach Away from the Invention or Render Prior Art Unsatisfactory for Intended Purpose","provenance":{"source_file":"s2145.html","source_anchor":"d0e212553/b.26","source_sha256":"b96dc12eb202283cd1a20f770746d04f6b9da85cb49f8aa6eb2fd17857081044"},"kind":"informal_heading","heading_level":2,"heading_text":"D. References Teach Away from the Invention or Render Prior Art Unsatisfactory for Intended Purpose","host_section_id":"se_sg3joi2a"},{"id":"pb_o5jmgifu","node_type":"prose_block","corpus_id":"mpep-e9r01-2024-html","opaque_url":"https://mpep.io/n/pb_o5jmgifu","effective_range":{"start_revision":"R-01.2024","end_revision":null},"rendered_text_html":"<p id=\"d0e213142\">In addition to the material below, see <b><a href=\"s2141.html#d0e209106\">MPEP §&nbsp;2141.02</a></b>\n                        (prior art must be considered in its entirety, including disclosures that teach away\n                        from the claims) and <b><a href=\"s2143.html#d0e210245\">MPEP §&nbsp;2143.01</a></b>, subsection VI (proposed modification\n                        cannot render the prior art unsatisfactory for its intended purpose or change the\n                        principle of operation of a reference).\n                     </p>","rendered_text_plain":"In addition to the material below, see MPEP § 2141.02 (prior art must be considered in its entirety, including disclosures that teach away from the claims) and MPEP § 2143.01, subsection VI (proposed modification cannot render the prior art unsatisfactory for its intended purpose or change the principle of operation of a reference).","provenance":{"source_file":"s2145.html","source_anchor":"d0e213142","source_sha256":"b96dc12eb202283cd1a20f770746d04f6b9da85cb49f8aa6eb2fd17857081044"},"kind":"narrative","host_section_id":"se_sg3joi2a"},{"id":"pb_xfpdq4uo","node_type":"prose_block","corpus_id":"mpep-e9r01-2024-html","opaque_url":"https://mpep.io/n/pb_xfpdq4uo","effective_range":{"start_revision":"R-01.2024","end_revision":null},"rendered_text_html":"<b id=\"\">1.</b><b id=\"\"> The Nature of the Teaching Is Highly\n                        Relevant</b>","rendered_text_plain":"1. The Nature of the Teaching Is Highly Relevant","provenance":{"source_file":"s2145.html","source_anchor":"d0e212553/b.28","source_sha256":"b96dc12eb202283cd1a20f770746d04f6b9da85cb49f8aa6eb2fd17857081044"},"kind":"informal_heading","heading_level":2,"heading_text":"1. The Nature of the Teaching Is Highly Relevant","host_section_id":"se_sg3joi2a"},{"id":"pb_qhnnuv5z","node_type":"prose_block","corpus_id":"mpep-e9r01-2024-html","opaque_url":"https://mpep.io/n/pb_qhnnuv5z","effective_range":{"start_revision":"R-01.2024","end_revision":null},"rendered_text_html":"<p id=\"d0e213155\">A prior art reference that “teaches away” from the claimed\n                        invention is a significant factor to be considered in determining obviousness.\n                        However, “the nature of the teaching is highly relevant and must be weighed in\n                        substance. A known or obvious composition does not become patentable simply\n                        because it has been described as somewhat inferior to some other product for the\n                        same use.” <i>In re</i><i>Gurley,</i> 27 F.3d 551, 553, 31 USPQ2d 1130, 1132 (Fed. Cir. 1994)\n                        (Claims were directed to an epoxy resin based printed circuit material. A prior\n                        art reference disclosed a polyester-imide resin based printed circuit material,\n                        and taught that although epoxy resin based materials have acceptable stability and\n                        some degree of flexibility, they are inferior to polyester-imide resin based\n                        materials. The court held the claims would have been obvious over the prior art\n                        because the reference taught epoxy resin based material was useful for the\n                        inventor’s purpose, applicant did not distinguish the claimed epoxy from the prior\n                        art epoxy, and applicant asserted no discovery beyond what was known to the\n                        art.).\n                     </p>","rendered_text_plain":"A prior art reference that “teaches away” from the claimed invention is a significant factor to be considered in determining obviousness. However, “the nature of the teaching is highly relevant and must be weighed in substance. A known or obvious composition does not become patentable simply because it has been described as somewhat inferior to some other product for the same use.” In reGurley, 27 F.3d 551, 553, 31 USPQ2d 1130, 1132 (Fed. Cir. 1994) (Claims were directed to an epoxy resin based printed circuit material. A prior art reference disclosed a polyester-imide resin based printed circuit material, and taught that although epoxy resin based materials have acceptable stability and some degree of flexibility, they are inferior to polyester-imide resin based materials. The court held the claims would have been obvious over the prior art because the reference taught epoxy resin based material was useful for the inventor’s purpose, applicant did not distinguish the claimed epoxy from the prior art epoxy, and applicant asserted no discovery beyond what was known to the art.).","provenance":{"source_file":"s2145.html","source_anchor":"d0e213155","source_sha256":"b96dc12eb202283cd1a20f770746d04f6b9da85cb49f8aa6eb2fd17857081044"},"kind":"narrative","host_section_id":"se_sg3joi2a"},{"id":"cs_4hgjen7r","node_type":"case","corpus_id":"mpep-e9r01-2024-html","opaque_url":"https://mpep.io/n/cs_4hgjen7r","effective_range":{"start_revision":"R-01.2024","end_revision":null},"rendered_text_html":"","rendered_text_plain":"In re Gurley, 27 F.3d 551 (1994)","provenance":{"source_file":"s2145.html","source_anchor":"","source_sha256":"b96dc12eb202283cd1a20f770746d04f6b9da85cb49f8aa6eb2fd17857081044"},"short_name":"In re Gurley","all_citations":["27 F.3d 551","31 USPQ2d 1130"],"canonical_citation":"In re Gurley, 27 F.3d 551, 31 USPQ2d 1130 (1994)","decision_year":1994,"court":"Fed. Cir."},{"id":"pb_c7v5nfxt","node_type":"prose_block","corpus_id":"mpep-e9r01-2024-html","opaque_url":"https://mpep.io/n/pb_c7v5nfxt","effective_range":{"start_revision":"R-01.2024","end_revision":null},"rendered_text_html":"<p id=\"d0e213164\">Furthermore, “the prior art’s mere disclosure of more than one\n                        alternative does not constitute a teaching away from any of these alternatives\n                        because such disclosure does not criticize, discredit, or otherwise discourage the\n                        solution claimed….” <i>In re Fulton,</i> 391&nbsp;F.3d 1195, 1201, 73\n                        USPQ2d 1141, 1146 (Fed. Cir. 2004). See also <i>UCB, Inc. v. Actavis Labs,\n                           UT, Inc.,</i> 65 F.4th 679, 692, 2023 USPQ2d 448 (Fed. Cir. 2023) (“a\n                        reference does not teach away if it merely expresses a general preference for an\n                        alternative invention but does not criticize, discredit or otherwise discourage\n                        investigation into the invention claimed.”) (internal quotations omitted) (quoting\n                        <i>DePuy Spine, Inc. v. Medtronic Sofamor Danek, Inc.,</i> 567 F.3d\n                        1314, 1327 (Fed. Cir. 2009)); and <i>Schwendimann v. Neenah, Inc.,</i>\n                        82 F.4th 1371, 1381, 2023 USPQ2d 1173 (Fed. Cir. 2023) (“Although Oez [the prior\n                        art] used a white pigment with a cross-linking polymer, it does not discourage a\n                        skilled artisan from using the white pigment without a cross-linking polymer or\n                        lead the skilled artisan in a direction divergent from the path taken in the\n                        Appealed Patents. Thus, Oez's disclosure is substantial evidence that supports the\n                        Board's finding that Oez does not teach away from the proposed combination.”).\n                     </p>","rendered_text_plain":"Furthermore, “the prior art’s mere disclosure of more than one alternative does not constitute a teaching away from any of these alternatives because such disclosure does not criticize, discredit, or otherwise discourage the solution claimed….” In re Fulton, 391 F.3d 1195, 1201, 73 USPQ2d 1141, 1146 (Fed. Cir. 2004). See also UCB, Inc. v. Actavis Labs, UT, Inc., 65 F.4th 679, 692, 2023 USPQ2d 448 (Fed. Cir. 2023) (“a reference does not teach away if it merely expresses a general preference for an alternative invention but does not criticize, discredit or otherwise discourage investigation into the invention claimed.”) (internal quotations omitted) (quoting DePuy Spine, Inc. v. Medtronic Sofamor Danek, Inc., 567 F.3d 1314, 1327 (Fed. Cir. 2009)); and Schwendimann v. Neenah, Inc., 82 F.4th 1371, 1381, 2023 USPQ2d 1173 (Fed. Cir. 2023) (“Although Oez [the prior art] used a white pigment with a cross-linking polymer, it does not discourage a skilled artisan from using the white pigment without a cross-linking polymer or lead the skilled artisan in a direction divergent from the path taken in the Appealed Patents. Thus, Oez's disclosure is substantial evidence that supports the Board's finding that Oez does not teach away from the proposed combination.”).","provenance":{"source_file":"s2145.html","source_anchor":"d0e213164","source_sha256":"b96dc12eb202283cd1a20f770746d04f6b9da85cb49f8aa6eb2fd17857081044"},"kind":"narrative","host_section_id":"se_sg3joi2a"},{"id":"cs_efjcw2ja","node_type":"case","corpus_id":"mpep-e9r01-2024-html","opaque_url":"https://mpep.io/n/cs_efjcw2ja","effective_range":{"start_revision":"R-01.2024","end_revision":null},"rendered_text_html":"","rendered_text_plain":"In re Fulton, 391 F.3d 1195 (2004)","provenance":{"source_file":"s2145.html","source_anchor":"","source_sha256":"b96dc12eb202283cd1a20f770746d04f6b9da85cb49f8aa6eb2fd17857081044"},"short_name":"In re Fulton","all_citations":["391 F.3d 1195","73 USPQ2d 1141"],"canonical_citation":"In re Fulton, 391 F.3d 1195, 73 USPQ2d 1141 (2004)","decision_year":2004,"court":"Fed. Cir."},{"id":"cs_yzrdqgzv","node_type":"case","corpus_id":"mpep-e9r01-2024-html","opaque_url":"https://mpep.io/n/cs_yzrdqgzv","effective_range":{"start_revision":"R-01.2024","end_revision":null},"rendered_text_html":"","rendered_text_plain":"UCB, Inc. v. Actavis Labs, UT, Inc., 65 F.4th 679 (2023)","provenance":{"source_file":"s2145.html","source_anchor":"","source_sha256":"b96dc12eb202283cd1a20f770746d04f6b9da85cb49f8aa6eb2fd17857081044"},"short_name":"UCB, Inc. v. Actavis Labs, UT, Inc.","all_citations":["65 F.4th 679","2023 USPQ2d 448"],"canonical_citation":"UCB, Inc. v. Actavis Labs, UT, Inc., 65 F.4th 679, 2023 USPQ2d 448 (2023)","decision_year":2023,"court":"Fed. Cir."},{"id":"cs_zurszfoo","node_type":"case","corpus_id":"mpep-e9r01-2024-html","opaque_url":"https://mpep.io/n/cs_zurszfoo","effective_range":{"start_revision":"R-01.2024","end_revision":null},"rendered_text_html":"","rendered_text_plain":"DePuy Spine, Inc. v. Medtronic Sofamor Danek, Inc., 567 F.3d 1314 (2009)","provenance":{"source_file":"s2145.html","source_anchor":"","source_sha256":"b96dc12eb202283cd1a20f770746d04f6b9da85cb49f8aa6eb2fd17857081044"},"short_name":"DePuy Spine, Inc. v. Medtronic Sofamor Danek, Inc.","all_citations":["567 F.3d 1314"],"canonical_citation":"DePuy Spine, Inc. v. Medtronic Sofamor Danek, Inc., 567 F.3d 1314 (2009)","decision_year":2009,"court":"Fed. Cir."},{"id":"cs_jivlxaqo","node_type":"case","corpus_id":"mpep-e9r01-2024-html","opaque_url":"https://mpep.io/n/cs_jivlxaqo","effective_range":{"start_revision":"R-01.2024","end_revision":null},"rendered_text_html":"","rendered_text_plain":"Schwendimann v. Neenah, Inc., 82 F.4th 1371 (2023)","provenance":{"source_file":"s2145.html","source_anchor":"","source_sha256":"b96dc12eb202283cd1a20f770746d04f6b9da85cb49f8aa6eb2fd17857081044"},"short_name":"Schwendimann v. Neenah, Inc.","all_citations":["82 F.4th 1371","2023 USPQ2d 1173"],"canonical_citation":"Schwendimann v. Neenah, Inc., 82 F.4th 1371, 2023 USPQ2d 1173 (2023)","decision_year":2023,"court":"Fed. Cir."},{"id":"pb_wlx7fbqf","node_type":"prose_block","corpus_id":"mpep-e9r01-2024-html","opaque_url":"https://mpep.io/n/pb_wlx7fbqf","effective_range":{"start_revision":"R-01.2024","end_revision":null},"rendered_text_html":"<b id=\"\">2.</b><b id=\"\"> References Cannot Be Combined Where Reference Teaches Away from Their\n                        Combination</b>","rendered_text_plain":"2. References Cannot Be Combined Where Reference Teaches Away from Their Combination","provenance":{"source_file":"s2145.html","source_anchor":"d0e212553/b.30","source_sha256":"b96dc12eb202283cd1a20f770746d04f6b9da85cb49f8aa6eb2fd17857081044"},"kind":"informal_heading","heading_level":2,"heading_text":"2. References Cannot Be Combined Where Reference Teaches Away from Their Combination","host_section_id":"se_sg3joi2a"},{"id":"pb_xf5aqwvg","node_type":"prose_block","corpus_id":"mpep-e9r01-2024-html","opaque_url":"https://mpep.io/n/pb_xf5aqwvg","effective_range":{"start_revision":"R-01.2024","end_revision":null},"rendered_text_html":"<p id=\"d0e213174\">It is improper to combine references where the references teach\n                        away from their combination. <i>In re Grasselli,</i> 713 F.2d 731,\n                        743, 218 USPQ 769, 779 (Fed. Cir. 1983) (The claimed catalyst which contained both\n                        iron and an alkali metal was not suggested by the combination of a reference which\n                        taught the interchangeability of antimony and alkali metal with the same\n                        beneficial result, combined with a reference expressly excluding antimony from,\n                        and adding iron to, a catalyst.). \n                     </p>","rendered_text_plain":"It is improper to combine references where the references teach away from their combination. In re Grasselli, 713 F.2d 731, 743, 218 USPQ 769, 779 (Fed. Cir. 1983) (The claimed catalyst which contained both iron and an alkali metal was not suggested by the combination of a reference which taught the interchangeability of antimony and alkali metal with the same beneficial result, combined with a reference expressly excluding antimony from, and adding iron to, a catalyst.).","provenance":{"source_file":"s2145.html","source_anchor":"d0e213174","source_sha256":"b96dc12eb202283cd1a20f770746d04f6b9da85cb49f8aa6eb2fd17857081044"},"kind":"narrative","host_section_id":"se_sg3joi2a"},{"id":"pb_y5svgubl","node_type":"prose_block","corpus_id":"mpep-e9r01-2024-html","opaque_url":"https://mpep.io/n/pb_y5svgubl","effective_range":{"start_revision":"R-01.2024","end_revision":null},"rendered_text_html":"<b id=\"\">3.</b><b id=\"\"> Proceeding Contrary to Accepted Wisdom Is Evidence of Nonobviousness</b>","rendered_text_plain":"3. Proceeding Contrary to Accepted Wisdom Is Evidence of Nonobviousness","provenance":{"source_file":"s2145.html","source_anchor":"d0e212553/b.32","source_sha256":"b96dc12eb202283cd1a20f770746d04f6b9da85cb49f8aa6eb2fd17857081044"},"kind":"informal_heading","heading_level":2,"heading_text":"3. Proceeding Contrary to Accepted Wisdom Is Evidence of Nonobviousness","host_section_id":"se_sg3joi2a"},{"id":"pb_sprsouzf","node_type":"prose_block","corpus_id":"mpep-e9r01-2024-html","opaque_url":"https://mpep.io/n/pb_sprsouzf","effective_range":{"start_revision":"R-01.2024","end_revision":null},"rendered_text_html":"<p id=\"d0e213184\">The totality of the prior art must be considered, and proceeding\n                        contrary to accepted wisdom in the art is evidence of nonobviousness. <i>In\n                           re Hedges,</i> 783 F.2d 1038, 228 USPQ 685 (Fed. Cir. 1986) (Applicant’s\n                        claimed process for sulfonating diphenyl sulfone at a temperature above 127ºC was\n                        contrary to accepted wisdom because the prior art as a whole suggested using lower\n                        temperatures for optimum results as evidenced by charring, decomposition, or\n                        reduced yields at higher temperatures.).\n                     </p>","rendered_text_plain":"The totality of the prior art must be considered, and proceeding contrary to accepted wisdom in the art is evidence of nonobviousness. In re Hedges, 783 F.2d 1038, 228 USPQ 685 (Fed. Cir. 1986) (Applicant’s claimed process for sulfonating diphenyl sulfone at a temperature above 127ºC was contrary to accepted wisdom because the prior art as a whole suggested using lower temperatures for optimum results as evidenced by charring, decomposition, or reduced yields at higher temperatures.).","provenance":{"source_file":"s2145.html","source_anchor":"d0e213184","source_sha256":"b96dc12eb202283cd1a20f770746d04f6b9da85cb49f8aa6eb2fd17857081044"},"kind":"narrative","host_section_id":"se_sg3joi2a"},{"id":"cs_5le22quw","node_type":"case","corpus_id":"mpep-e9r01-2024-html","opaque_url":"https://mpep.io/n/cs_5le22quw","effective_range":{"start_revision":"R-01.2024","end_revision":null},"rendered_text_html":"","rendered_text_plain":"In re Hedges, 783 F.2d 1038 (1986)","provenance":{"source_file":"s2145.html","source_anchor":"","source_sha256":"b96dc12eb202283cd1a20f770746d04f6b9da85cb49f8aa6eb2fd17857081044"},"short_name":"In re Hedges","all_citations":["783 F.2d 1038","228 USPQ 685"],"canonical_citation":"In re Hedges, 783 F.2d 1038, 228 USPQ 685 (1986)","decision_year":1986,"court":"Fed. Cir."},{"id":"pb_5tgmags4","node_type":"prose_block","corpus_id":"mpep-e9r01-2024-html","opaque_url":"https://mpep.io/n/pb_5tgmags4","effective_range":{"start_revision":"R-01.2024","end_revision":null},"rendered_text_html":"<p id=\"d0e213190\">Furthermore, “[k]nown disadvantages in old devices which would\n                        naturally discourage search for new inventions may be taken into account in\n                        determining obviousness.” <i>United States v. Adams,</i> 383 U.S. 39,\n                        52, 148 USPQ 479, 484 (1966).\n                     </p>","rendered_text_plain":"Furthermore, “[k]nown disadvantages in old devices which would naturally discourage search for new inventions may be taken into account in determining obviousness.” United States v. Adams, 383 U.S. 39, 52, 148 USPQ 479, 484 (1966).","provenance":{"source_file":"s2145.html","source_anchor":"d0e213190","source_sha256":"b96dc12eb202283cd1a20f770746d04f6b9da85cb49f8aa6eb2fd17857081044"},"kind":"narrative","host_section_id":"se_sg3joi2a"},{"id":"cs_65r47k4h","node_type":"case","corpus_id":"mpep-e9r01-2024-html","opaque_url":"https://mpep.io/n/cs_65r47k4h","effective_range":{"start_revision":"R-01.2024","end_revision":null},"rendered_text_html":"","rendered_text_plain":"United States v. Adams, 383 U.S. 39 (1966)","provenance":{"source_file":"s2145.html","source_anchor":"","source_sha256":"b96dc12eb202283cd1a20f770746d04f6b9da85cb49f8aa6eb2fd17857081044"},"short_name":"United States v. Adams","all_citations":["383 U.S. 39","148 USPQ 479"],"canonical_citation":"United States v. Adams, 383 U.S. 39, 148 USPQ 479 (1966)","decision_year":1966,"court":"SCOTUS"},{"id":"pb_u4wgnd42","node_type":"prose_block","corpus_id":"mpep-e9r01-2024-html","opaque_url":"https://mpep.io/n/pb_u4wgnd42","effective_range":{"start_revision":"R-01.2024","end_revision":null},"rendered_text_html":"<b id=\"\"><i>E. </i></b><b id=\"\"><i> Applicability of KSR to All Technologies</i></b>","rendered_text_plain":"E. Applicability of KSR to All Technologies","provenance":{"source_file":"s2145.html","source_anchor":"d0e212553/b.34","source_sha256":"b96dc12eb202283cd1a20f770746d04f6b9da85cb49f8aa6eb2fd17857081044"},"kind":"informal_heading","heading_level":2,"heading_text":"E. Applicability of KSR to All Technologies","host_section_id":"se_sg3joi2a"},{"id":"pb_z45g2uhy","node_type":"prose_block","corpus_id":"mpep-e9r01-2024-html","opaque_url":"https://mpep.io/n/pb_z45g2uhy","effective_range":{"start_revision":"R-01.2024","end_revision":null},"rendered_text_html":"<p id=\"ch2100_d24bfd_186da_1eb\">At the time the <i>KSR</i> decision was\n                        handed down, some observers questioned whether the principles discussed were intended\n                        by the Supreme Court to apply to all fields of inventive endeavor. Arguments were\n                        made that because the technology at issue in <i>KSR</i> involved the\n                        relatively well-developed and predictable field of vehicle pedal assemblies, the\n                        decision was relevant only to such fields. The Federal Circuit has soundly repudiated\n                        such a notion, stating that <i>KSR</i> applies across technologies:\n                     </p>","rendered_text_plain":"At the time the KSR decision was handed down, some observers questioned whether the principles discussed were intended by the Supreme Court to apply to all fields of inventive endeavor. Arguments were made that because the technology at issue in KSR involved the relatively well-developed and predictable field of vehicle pedal assemblies, the decision was relevant only to such fields. The Federal Circuit has soundly repudiated such a notion, stating that KSR applies across technologies:","provenance":{"source_file":"s2145.html","source_anchor":"ch2100_d24bfd_186da_1eb","source_sha256":"b96dc12eb202283cd1a20f770746d04f6b9da85cb49f8aa6eb2fd17857081044"},"kind":"narrative","host_section_id":"se_sg3joi2a"},{"id":"cs_nkvgtquj","node_type":"case","corpus_id":"mpep-e9r01-2024-html","opaque_url":"https://mpep.io/n/cs_nkvgtquj","effective_range":{"start_revision":"R-01.2024","end_revision":null},"rendered_text_html":"","rendered_text_plain":"In re Kubin, 561 F.3d 1351 (2009)","provenance":{"source_file":"s2145.html","source_anchor":"","source_sha256":"b96dc12eb202283cd1a20f770746d04f6b9da85cb49f8aa6eb2fd17857081044"},"short_name":"In re Kubin","all_citations":["561 F.3d 1351","90 USPQ2d 1417"],"canonical_citation":"In re Kubin, 561 F.3d 1351, 90 USPQ2d 1417 (2009)","decision_year":2009,"court":"Fed. Cir."},{"id":"nq_aasjdzwd","node_type":"narrative_quote","corpus_id":"mpep-e9r01-2024-html","opaque_url":"https://mpep.io/n/nq_aasjdzwd","effective_range":{"start_revision":"R-01.2024","end_revision":null},"rendered_text_html":"<blockquote id=\"ch2100_d24bfd_174df_84\">\n                        <p id=\"ch2100_d24bfd_174e2_2f4\">This court also declines to cabin KSR to the\n                           “predictable arts” (as opposed to the “unpredictable art” of biotechnology). In\n                           fact, this record shows that one of skill in this advanced art would find these\n                           claimed “results” profoundly “predictable.” \n                        </p>\n                     </blockquote>","rendered_text_plain":"This court also declines to cabin KSR to the “predictable arts” (as opposed to the “unpredictable art” of biotechnology). In fact, this record shows that one of skill in this advanced art would find these claimed “results” profoundly “predictable.”","provenance":{"source_file":"s2145.html","source_anchor":"ch2100_d24bfd_174df_84","source_sha256":"b96dc12eb202283cd1a20f770746d04f6b9da85cb49f8aa6eb2fd17857081044"},"source_anchor":"ch2100_d24bfd_174df_84","host_section_id":"se_sg3joi2a","source_case_id":"cs_nkvgtquj"},{"id":"pb_vg2vv7tt","node_type":"prose_block","corpus_id":"mpep-e9r01-2024-html","opaque_url":"https://mpep.io/n/pb_vg2vv7tt","effective_range":{"start_revision":"R-01.2024","end_revision":null},"rendered_text_html":"<p id=\"ch2100_d24bfd_18706_1ab\"><i>In re Kubin,</i> 561 F.3d 1351, 1360, 90 USPQ2d 1417, 1424 (Fed. Cir.\n                        2009). Thus, Office personnel should not withdraw any rejection solely on the basis\n                        that the invention lies in a technological area ordinarily considered to be\n                        unpredictable. See also <b><a href=\"s2143.html#d0e210414\">MPEP § 2143.02</a></b>.\n                     </p>","rendered_text_plain":"In re Kubin, 561 F.3d 1351, 1360, 90 USPQ2d 1417, 1424 (Fed. Cir. 2009). Thus, Office personnel should not withdraw any rejection solely on the basis that the invention lies in a technological area ordinarily considered to be unpredictable. See also MPEP § 2143.02.","provenance":{"source_file":"s2145.html","source_anchor":"ch2100_d24bfd_18706_1ab","source_sha256":"b96dc12eb202283cd1a20f770746d04f6b9da85cb49f8aa6eb2fd17857081044"},"kind":"narrative","host_section_id":"se_sg3joi2a"},{"id":"pb_sqojp4fn","node_type":"prose_block","corpus_id":"mpep-e9r01-2024-html","opaque_url":"https://mpep.io/n/pb_sqojp4fn","effective_range":{"start_revision":"R-01.2024","end_revision":null},"rendered_text_html":"<b id=\"\">XI.</b><b id=\"\"> FORM PARAGRAPHS </b>","rendered_text_plain":"XI. FORM PARAGRAPHS","provenance":{"source_file":"s2145.html","source_anchor":"d0e212553/b.36","source_sha256":"b96dc12eb202283cd1a20f770746d04f6b9da85cb49f8aa6eb2fd17857081044"},"kind":"informal_heading","heading_level":2,"heading_text":"XI. FORM PARAGRAPHS","host_section_id":"se_sg3joi2a"},{"id":"pb_h64cfi4g","node_type":"prose_block","corpus_id":"mpep-e9r01-2024-html","opaque_url":"https://mpep.io/n/pb_h64cfi4g","effective_range":{"start_revision":"R-01.2024","end_revision":null},"rendered_text_html":"<p id=\"d0e213200\">See <b><a href=\"s707.html#d0e74561\">MPEP\n                              § 707.07(f)</a></b> for form paragraphs <b><a href=\"#fp7.37\">7.37</a></b> through <b><a href=\"#fp7.38\">7.38</a></b> which may be used where applicant’s\n                        arguments are not persuasive or are moot.\n                     </p>","rendered_text_plain":"See MPEP § 707.07(f) for form paragraphs 7.37 through 7.38 which may be used where applicant’s arguments are not persuasive or are moot.","provenance":{"source_file":"s2145.html","source_anchor":"d0e213200","source_sha256":"b96dc12eb202283cd1a20f770746d04f6b9da85cb49f8aa6eb2fd17857081044"},"kind":"narrative","host_section_id":"se_sg3joi2a"},{"id":"se_e6oec5qo","node_type":"section","corpus_id":"mpep-e9r01-2024-html","opaque_url":"https://mpep.io/n/se_e6oec5qo","effective_range":{"start_revision":"R-01.2024","end_revision":null},"rendered_text_html":"","rendered_text_plain":"","provenance":{"source_file":"s2145.html","source_anchor":"stub-707","source_sha256":"b96dc12eb202283cd1a20f770746d04f6b9da85cb49f8aa6eb2fd17857081044"},"akn_urn":"/akn/us/statement/manual/uspto/2024/mpep/eng@2024-02-29!sec_707","canonical_url":"https://mpep.io/akn/us/statement/manual/uspto/2024/mpep/eng@2024-02-29!sec_707","section_number":"707","chapter":"700","depth":0,"title":"Section 707","children_ids":[]}],"edges":[{"id":"e_65lmej6s","edge_type":"cites-case","source_id":"pb_vb6nwevi","target_id":"cs_djnct276","properties":{"citation_text":"In re Dillon, 919 F.2d 688, 16 USPQ2d 1897 (1990)","source_offset":{"start":177,"end":189},"signal":"see","proposition":"rebuttal evidence and arguments rebut a prima facie obviousness case"},"provenance":{"source_file":"s2145.html","source_anchor":"d0e212561","source_sha256":"b96dc12eb202283cd1a20f770746d04f6b9da85cb49f8aa6eb2fd17857081044"}},{"id":"e_f7yw5zfd","edge_type":"cites-statute","source_id":"pb_vb6nwevi","target_id":"st_ompe7akv","properties":{"citation_text":"35 U.S.C. 103","specificity":"section","source_offset":{"start":513,"end":526}},"provenance":{"source_file":"s2145.html","source_anchor":"d0e212561","source_sha256":"b96dc12eb202283cd1a20f770746d04f6b9da85cb49f8aa6eb2fd17857081044"}},{"id":"e_5vebukgr","edge_type":"cites-case","source_id":"pb_3qb2pa5t","target_id":"cs_s3zh6rfg","properties":{"citation_text":"In 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